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a
Today, health insurance is a key component in the system of social 
security in most European Union countries. In many of these countries, 
modern health-insurance funds and healthcare insurers play an essential 
role in implementing the public health-insurance system. Many of these 
health-insurance funds have a long and fascinating history, of which 
clear traces can be seen today in the organisation and structure of health 
insurance, as well as health-insurance funds and insurers. 
In Two centuries of solidarity, the authors compare the systems of health 
insurance, health-insurance funds and healthcare insurers in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Given the similar political, economic 
and social development that these countries have undergone in the 
past 60 years and the availability of a qualitatively high level of health 
care, one might expect a high degree of similarity between these 
countries’ healthcare insurance systems. However, the dissimilarities are 
surprising. In fact, these differences are currently becoming ever more 
apparent between systems in general, and the structure and operation 
of the health insurance funds and health care insurers in particular. The 
differences include the compulsory nature of insurance, the extent of 
coverage, premiums, entrepreneurship, competition, and the degree of 
private insurance.
Many of these national singularities can be understood and explained 
only by considering the historical background of the health insurance 
systems, the insurers, and their evolution over the past two centuries. 
This study adopts an institutional and political perspective towards a 
further understanding of the development of health insurance, and of 
how this ultimately determined the specifi c nature of the healthcare 
insurers and funds and the way they currently operate in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands.
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PREFACE
This volume, Two centuries of solidarity. German, Belgian and Dutch social health insurance 1770-
2008, is an updated and translated edition of Twee eeuwen solidariteit. De Nederlandse, Belgische en 
Duitse ziekenfondsen tijdens de negentiende en twintigste eeuw, published in 2001 by the Stichting 
Historie Ziekenfondswezen (Stichting HiZ; Foundation for the History of Health Insurance) 
in close cooperation with Aksant Academic Publishers.
In most EU-countries the system of structuring and fi nancing healthcare is in a constant 
state of change. The division of roles between state, health insurers, care providers and consum-
ers is changing. The introduction of regulated competition, the re-regulation of supervision 
and prices and an orientation towards consumer-driven healthcare, cost containment and 
sustainability are key-concepts in the political restructuring-effort of healthcare and social 
security. 
How these adaptations will develop in the upcoming decennia is uncertain. They not only 
depend on national political and social relations, but also on the infl uence of supranational 
legislation by the European Union. How health insurance will function in 2020 is unforesee-
able. At present, ‘Europe’ has no direct jurisdiction on the national systems of healthcare and 
social security of its 25 member states. The principle of subsidiarity, laid down in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957) and reconfi rmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), stipulates that health 
insurance and the structure of healthcare are a matter of the individual member states. The 
core of the European Union, though, is its free internal market. The infl uence of the EU 
on national systems of healthcare and social security is therefore indirect, but unmistakably 
present. Prime examples of this infl uence are the rulings of the European Court of Justice in 
the renowned Decker/Kohl-arrests, enabling the provision of transnational healthcare. The 
European Parliament wishes to strengthen this development.
The frontiers between national systems of healthcare and health insurance will probably 
fade in the future. This brings the risk that knowledge of these national systems and the les-
sons that can be drawn from them will be lost. Bearing this in mind the Stichting HiZ and 
the Kenniscentrum Historie Zorgverzekeraars (Centre for the History of Health Insurance) 
wanted to publish a comparative historical study to document and analyse the character-
istics and strengths and weaknesses of the system of health insurance in the Netherlands 
and other EU-countries. Describing and interpreting the historical development of the 
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health insurance systems of all EU-countries would probably take a lifetime. The authors 
therefore restricted themselves to three countries: Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands; 
three neighbouring countries with their own long history of insuring the risks of sickness, 
disability and accidents.
The Board of the Stichting HiZ asked the authors K.P. Companje, K.F.E. Veraghtert, 
B.E.M. Widdershoven and R.H.M Hendriks to edit and translate the Dutch edition of Twee 
eeuwen solidariteit, which was published in 2001. Much has changed in the German, Belgian 
and Dutch systems of healthcare and health insurance since 2001. Two centuries of solidarity
is not only the English translation of Twee eeuwen solidariteit, it also describes and clarifi es 
developments in the system of health insurance and social security of these countries from 
2000 onwards. How did the government and civil society, as joint partners in healthcare and 
health insurance, collaborate to remould the principles of solidarity, coverage of risks and 
sustainability as future cornerstones of the subsequent systems? And what was the infl uence 
of the European Union on these developments? 
The authors and the Stichting HiZ do not pretend to provide lessons for the future of 
healthcare and health insurance. They do hope to give the reader insight in the long history 
of this special branch of the large tree of social security, which eventually guaranteed every 
citizen of the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany of full coverage against the costs of medical 
care. The slow process of political and social implementation of basic social values, such as 
solidarity and cooperation, and underlying ideological notions about society and healthcare, 
provides us with a fascinating and rich history.
The Board of the Stichting HiZ wants to thank the authors who succeeded in writing 
this scientifi c, yet accessible study, and Aksant Academic Publishers for its publication. The 
Stichting HiZ also wants to express their gratitude to the parties which supported this project: 
the Belgian National Alliance of Christian Mutualities and the National Alliance of Social 
Democratic Mutualities.
A comprehensive European approach of social security and healthcare policy is something 
for the future. We hope that the history of the national systems of healthcare and social security 
will be its  organic foundation. Only in this way the anti-European sentiments of past years 
can be turned from developing for the worse.
December 2009
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ABVV Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond
ABGV Algemeen Belgisch Geneesherenverbond
ACLVB Algemene Centrale van Liberale Vakbonden van België
ACV Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond
ACW Algemeen Christelijk Werknemersverbond
AIM Association Internationale de la Mutualité
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ANOZ Algemeen Nederlands Onderling Ziekenfonds
ANWV Algemeen Nederlandsch Werklieden-Verbond
AOW Algemene Ouderdomswet
AOZ Amsterdams Onderling Ziekenfonds
ARP Antirevolutionaire Partij
ASGB Algemeen Syndicaat van Geneesheren van België
AVB Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen
AVGV Algemeen Vlaams Geneesherenverbond
AWBZ Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten
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CAVINED Centrale Administratie Verzekeringsinstellingen in Nederland
CBOZ Centrale Bond van Onderling Beheerde Ziekenfondsen
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COZ Centraal Overleg van Ziekenfondsorganisaties
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CSO Centrale Samenwerkende Ouderenorganisaties
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union
CVP Christelijke Volkspartij
DMP Disease Management Programme
EGKS Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging
Federatie VMZ Federatie van Vereenigde Maatschappij Fondsen, (na 1952 Federatie van
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GKK Gesetzliche Krankenkasse
GKV Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
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NMa Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit
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NOZ Nederlands Onderling Herverzekeringsinstituut voor Ziektekosten
NSB Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging
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NVVZA Nederlandse Vereniging van Ziekenfondsartsen
NZa Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit
OKK Ortskrankenkasse
PSC Parti Social Chrétien
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid
PKV Private Krankenversicherung
RAM Reichsarbeitsminister
RIZIV Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering
RKWV Rooms-Katholiek Werklieden Verbond
RMZ Rijksdienst voor Maatschappelijke Zekerheid
RSA  Risikostrukturausgleich 
RVO Reichsversicherungsordnung
SAZ Stichting Autonome Ziekenfondsen
SDAP Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij
SDB Sociaal-Democratische Bond
SER Sociaal Economische Raad
SOAZ Stichting Organisatie en Automatisering Ziekenfondsen
SPD Socialistische Partei Deutschlands
VAV Vrije aanvullende verzekering
VDGU Verband “Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung”
VMZ Vereenigde Maatschappij Ziekenfondsen
VNW Vereniging Nederlandse Werkgevers
VNZ Vereniging van Nederlandse Ziekenfondsen
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
VVGB Vereniging der  Vlaamse Geneesheren van België
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ZIV Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering
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Algemeen Afdelingsfonds aaz-fonds - sickness fund of the Dutch Medical Association
Algemeen Belgische Geneesherenverbond ABVG - General Association of Physicians 
(Belgian)
Algemeen Christelijk Werkgeversverbond ACW - General Christian Employers Alliance 
(Belgian)
Algemeen Nederlands Onderling Ziekenfonds ANOZ - General Netherlands Mutual 
Health-insurance fund (Dutch)
Algemeen Nederlandsch Werklieden Verbond ANWV - General Dutch Workers’ Alliance 
Algemeen Syndicaat der Geneesheren van België - General Medical Union of Belgium
Algemeen Vlaamse Geneesherenverbond AVGV - Flemish Physicians’ Union (Belgian)
Algemeen Ziekenfonds te Amsterdam AZA- General Sickness Fund Amsterdam (Dutch)
Algemeene Raad ter bevordering van het Ziekenfondswezen, Algemeene Raad - General 
Council for the Advancement of the Health-insurance fund System (Dutch)
Algemene Ouderdomswet AOW - General Old-Age Pensions Act (Dutch)
Algemene Rekenkamer - Netherlands Court of Audits (Dutch)
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten AWBZ - Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
(Dutch)
Algemene Ziekenfondsen - General Sickness or Health-Insurance Funds (Dutch)
Allgemeine Gewerbeordung - Common Labour Ordinance (German)
Allgemeinen Versicherungsbedingungen AVB - General Conditions of Insurance 
(German)
Allgemeines Landrecht - Common Law (German)
Alterungsrückstellungen - old age provisions (German)
Antirevolutionaire Partij ARP -  Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party 
Angestellten-Ersatzkassen - sickness funds for employees (German)
Arbeiterersatzkassen - health insurance fund originally for blue-collar workers (German)
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Spitzenverbände der Krankenkassen - Association of Sickness 
Fund Organisations (German)
Armenwet - Poor Law (Dutch)
Artsenkamer - Physicians’ Chamber (Dutch)
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Assemblée - National Assembly (Belgian and French)
Aufbaugesetz - Construction Law (German)
Aufsichtsbehörde - district inspector (German)
Beitragsentlassungsgesetz - Contribution Relief Act (German)
Beirat - assistent manager (German)
Belgisch Staatsblad - Belgian statute book
Belgische Werkliedenpartij BWP - Belgian Workers Party 
Berliner Abkommen - German national treaty between sickness funds and physicians
Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders - Social Security Act for 
Employed Workers (Belgian)
Betriebskrankenkasse BKK - Company Health Insurance Fund (German)
bos, bosse, bus, beurs - guild relief funds (Dutch, Belgian)
Bureau de Bienfaisance- public welfare offi ce (Belgian)
Berufsgenossenschaften - institutions for statutory accident insurance and prevention 
(German)
Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders - Social Security Act 
(Belgian)
Besluit op de Ziekenfondsraad - Health-Insurance Council Decree (Dutch)
Bond van R.-K. Ziekenfondsen - Alliance of Roman Catholic Health-Insurance Funds 
(Dutch)
Bovenbouwverzekeraars, bovenbouwen - Private health insurers, related to sickness funds 
(Dutch) 
Bindend Besluit - Binding Resolution (Dutch)
Bundesausschüss - Federal Committee of doctors and health-insurance funds (German)
Bundesminister für soziale Sicherheit - Minister for Labour and Social Planning (German)
Bundesministerium für Gesundheid - Federal Ministry of Health (German)
Bundesrat - Federal Council comprising representatives of the Länder (German)
Bundesverband - national federation of sickness funds (German)
Bundesverfassungsgericht- Federal Constitutional Court (German)
Burgerversicherung - universal health insurance (German) 
Centraal Overleg van Ziekenfondsorganisaties COZ - Central Consultation of Health-
Insurance Fund Organisations (Dutch)
Centraal Planbureau - Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Dutch)
Centrale Bond van Ziekenfondsen CBZ - Central Alliance of Health-insurance funds 
(Dutch)
Centrale Commissie voor het Ziekenfondswezen - Central Commission for the Health-
insurance fund System (Dutch)
Centrale Sociale Raad - Central Social Council (Dutch)
Christelijk Historische Unie CHU - Christian Historical Union (Dutch)
Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond CNV- National Protestant Trade Union (Dutch)
Commissie van Openbare Onderstand - Public Assistance Commission (Belgian)
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Commissie-Dekker - Dekker Committee (Dutch)
Controledienst voor de ziekenfondsen en de landsbonden van ziekenfondsen - 
Supervising Authority for Health-Insurance Funds and National Alliances of Health-
Insurance Funds (Belgian)
Corporatiewet - Corporations Act (Dutch)
Directeur-Generaal van den Arbeid - Director-General for Labour (Dutch)
directiefondsen - commercial sickness funds (Dutch)
Ersatzkassen - health insurance fund originally for white-collar workers (German)
Existenzrisiken - occupational hazards (German)
Facultatieve aanvullende verzekering FAV - optional supplementary insurance (Belgian)
Fallmanagers -  care managers (German)
Federatie van door Verzekerden en Medewerkers bestuurde Ziekenfondsen Federatie 
VMZ - Federation of Member- and Employer-Administered Health-Insurance Funds 
(Dutch)
Federatie Vereenigde Maatschappij Ziekenfondsen Federatie VMZ - Federation of United 
Association Health-Insurance Funds (Dutch)
Festbeträge - reference prices (German)
Finanzausgleichsverfahren - fi nancial equalisation (German)
Freien Gewerkschaften - trade unions (German)
Führer principle - managers principle (German)
Gemeentewet - Municipalities Act (Dutch)
Gemeenschappelijk Overleg van Ziekenfondsorganisaties GOZ - Joint Consultation of 
Health-Insurance Fund Organisations (Dutch)
Gemeindekassen - municipal funds (German)
Geneeskundig Staatstoezicht - State Health Inspectorate (Dutch)
Geschäftsgruppe Soziale Verwaltung GSV - Coordination team for Social Affairs (Dutch-
German)
Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung der Landwirte - Legislation relating to health 
insurance for those employed in the agriculture sector (German)
Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung der Studenten - Health-insurance act for students 
(German)
Gesetz über die Sozialversicherung Behinderte - Social Security act for handicapped 
persons (German)
Gesetz über Kassenarztrecht GKAR - Legislation for physicians contracting to sickness 
funds (German)
Gesetz zur Reform des Risikostrukturausgleichs - Health Insurance Equalisation Fund 
Modernisation (German)
Gesetzliche Kassen GKK - compulsory funds (German)
Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung GKV - statutory health-insurance system (German)
Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung - compulsory or statutory accident insurance (German)
Gesundheits-Reformgesetz - Healthcare Reform Act (German)
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Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz - Healthcare Structure Act (German)
Gesundheitsfonds - health-insurance fund (German)
Gesundheitsreform - health system reform (German)
Gewerbliche Gesetz betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter KVG - Social 
Health Insurance Law for Labourers (German)
gezellenbeurzen - journeymen’s funds (Belgian)
GKV-Modernisierunggesetzes - Health Insurance Modernisation Act (German)
GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz- Statutory Social Health Insurance Restructuring Act (German)
GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz GKV-WSG - Competition Reinforcement Health 
Insurance Act (German)
Globalsteuerung und Budgetierung - Overall Control and Budgeting (German)
Grundlohnsumme - base rate salary sum (German)
Grundpauschal - nominal premium sum (German)
Hartmann Bund, Leipziger Verband -  doctors association (German)
Hilfskassen - health-insurance funds (German)
Hoge Raad van Arbeid - Higher Labour Council (Dutch)
Hoge Raad voor Geneeskundig Toezicht - the High Council for Medical Supervision 
(Dutch)
Hoofdbestuur HB - Executive Board of the Dutch Medical Association
hospitaal, gasthuis - hospital (Dutch and Belgian)
Hulpkas - Auxiliary Insurance Fund (Belgian)
Innungskassen IKK - sectoral sicknessfunds (German)
Instituut voor Geneeskundige Controle - Institute for Medical Control (Belgian)
integrierte Krankenversicherung - universal health insurance (German)
Integrierten Versorgung- integrated care (German)
Karenzdagen - waiting days
Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung KBV- National Association of Statutory Health 
Insurance Physicians (German)
Kassenärztliche Vereinigung - Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians 
(German)
Kassenärztliche Vereinigung Deutschlands - German Association of Statutory Health 
Insurance Physicians
Kinderwetje - Child Labour Act (Dutch)
Knappschafte - miners’ associations (German)
Knappschaftsgesetz - Law on german miner’s guild funds (German)
Knappschaftskassen, Knappschaftsvereine - german miner’s guild funds (German)
Krankenhaus-Notopfer - copayment for hospital care (German)
Krankheitsbezogenen Risikostrukturausgleich - morbidity-related equalisation fund 
(German)
Kontaktkommissie Landelijke Organisaties van Ziektekostenverzekeraars KLOZ - Contact 
Body for Private Health Insurers (Dutch)
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Konvergenzklausel - regional equalisation fund (German)
Kopfpauschale - capitation fee (German)
Kostendämpfungs-Erganzungsgesetz KEG- Health Insurance Cost-Containment 
Amendment Act (German)
Krankenversicherung-änderungsgesetz KVAG- Health Insurance Amendment Act 
(German)
Krankenversicherungs-Kostendämpfungsgesetz KVKG- Health Insurance Cost-
Containment Act (German)
Krankenversicherungsgesetz - Health Insurance Act (German)
Landelijke Federatie ter Behartiging van het Ziekenfondswezen, Landelijke Federatie 
LFBZ - National Federation for the Promotion of the Health-Insurance Fund System 
(Dutch)
Landelijke Huisartsen Vereniging LHV - National Association of General Practitioners 
(Dutch)
Landelijke Specialisten Vereniging LSV - National Association of Medical Specialists 
(Dutch)
Landesverbände - regional federations of sickness funds (German)
Landelijke Contactcommissie van Onderling Beheerde Ziekenfondsen - National Contact 
Commission of Mutually Administered Health-insurance funds (Dutch)
Landkrankenkassen LKK - regional sickness funds (German)
Landsbond van Bedrijfs- en Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen LBBOZ - the National 
Union of Professional and Independent Health-Insurance (Belgian)
Landsbond van de Beroepsmutualiteiten LBM- National Alliance of Occupation-Relation 
Mutualities (Belgian)
Landsbond van Christelijke Mutualiteiten LCM - National Alliance of Christian 
Mutualities) (Belgian)
Landsbond van Liberale Mutualiteiten - Alliance of Liberal Health-Insurance Funds 
(Belgian)
Landsbond van Neutrale ziekenfondsen LNZ - Neutral Association of Health-Insurance 
Funds (Belgian)
Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkassen - agricultural sickness funds (German)
Leipziger Verband, Hartmann Bund - doctors association (German)
Leiter - executive manager (German)
Maatschappij tot Nut van ’t Algemeen - Society for Public Welfare (Dutch)
Maatschappijfondsen -  Association Funds (Dutch)
Maximum-factuur - maximum charge system (Belgian)
Medisch Contact - Medical Contact (Dutch)
Medicijnknaak - copayment NLG 2.50 per medicine (Dutch)
Middelburgsch Ziekenfonds - Middelburg Health-Insurance Fund (Dutch)
Mindestleistung - minimum benefi t (German)
Minister van Arbeid en Nijverheid - Ministry of Labour and Industry (Belgian)
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Ministerie van Arbeid - Ministry of Labour (Dutch)
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken - Department of Social Affairs (Dutch)
Mutualités Libres - Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen MLOZ - Independent Health 
Insurance Funds (Belgian)
Mutualiteitwet, Mutualitistische Wet (1851, 1894) - Mutuality Act (Belgian)
Nationaal Hulp- en Voedingscomité NVHC - National Help and Nutrition Committee 
(Belgian)
Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging NSB - National Socialist Movement (Dutch)
Nationale Arbeidscommissie - National Labour Commission (Belgian)
Nationale Kas voor Kinderbijslagen - the National Fund for Child Benefi t (Belgian)
Nationale Organisatie van Ziekenfondsen - National Organisation of Health-Insurance 
Funds (Dutch)
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Ärztebund NSDÄB - German National Socialist 
Physicians Organisation
Nederlands Arbeidsfront NAF - Netherlands Labour Front
Nederlands Onderling Herverzekeringsinstituut voor Ziektekosten NOZ - Netherlands 
Mutual Medical-Expenses Reinsurance Institute (Dutch)
Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen NVV - Dutch Association of Trade Unions
Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst NMG - Dutch Medical 
Association 
Nederlandse Bond van Ziekenfondsen NBZ - Netherlands Health-Insurance Fund 
Alliance (Dutch)
Nederlandse Unie van Ziekenfondsen - Netherlands Union of Health-Insurance Funds
Nederlandse Vereniging van Ziekenfondsartsen NVVZA - Netherlands Association of 
Health-insurance fund Doctors
nutsfondsen - sickness funds of the Society for Public Welfare (Dutch)
Nutzersouveränität - consumer power (German)
Ongevallenwet  - Accident Act (Dutch)
Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn OCMW - Public Centres for Social 
Welfare (Belgian)
Orde der Geneesheren - Order of Doctors (Belgian)
Organisatie van Algemene Ziekenfondsen OAZ - Organisation of General Health-
Insurance Funds (Dutch)
Ortskassen, Ortskrankenkassen OKK - municipal or regional sickness funds (German)
Overleg van Ondernemingsziekenfondsen - Consultation of Corporate Funds (Dutch)
Palingoproer - Eel Revolt (Dutch)
private Pfl egeversicherung - private long-term healthcare insurance (German)
Private Krankenversicherung PKV- private insurance (German)
Pfl egebedürftigkeit - level of care required (German)
Pfl egestützpunkte - care support offi ces (German)
Pfl egeversicherung - long-term care insurance (German)
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Pfl egekassen - care administration offi ces (German)
Preussische Allgemeine Landrecht - Prussian Common Law
Proeve Postuma-Kupers - Postuma-Kupers Draft (Dutch)
R.K. Staatspartij - Catholic Party (Dutch)
Raad van Bijstand - Council of Assistance (Dutch)
Raden van Arbeid - Dutch Labour Councils
Radenwet  - Councils Act (Dutch)
Referentenentwurf - draft bill (German)
Reichsarbeitsminister - Minister for Labour (German)
Reichsarbeitsministerium - Ministry of Labour (German)
Reichsausschuss - German government commission
Reichscommissar - German government commissioner
Reichsversicherungsamt - German government social insurance offi ce
Reichsversicherungsordnung RVO - Imperial Insurance Regulation (German)
Rekenhof - the Treasury (Belgian)
Risikostrukturausgleich - risk adjustment scheme (German)
Rijksdienst voor Maatschappelijke Zekerheid - National Social Security Offi ce
Rijksfonds voor Verzekering tegen Ziekte en Invaliditeit RVZI - National Fund for 
Sickness and Disability
Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering RIZIV - National Institute for 
Health and Disability Insurance (Belgian)
Rijkskas voor Jaarlijks Verlof - National Fund for Annual Leave (Belgian)
Rijkskas voor ouderdoms- en weduwerente - National Fund for Old-Age and Widowed 
Persons’ Pensions (Belgian)
Rijksverzekeringsbank - National Insurance Bank (Dutch)
Rooms Katholiek Werklieden Verbond RKWV - Roman Catholic Trade Union (Dutch)
Sachverständigenkommission zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Krankenversicherung - 
Advisory Committee on the Development of Social Health Insurance (German)
See-Krankenkasse - seamen’s health-insurance fund
Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij SDAP - Dutch Social Democratic Workers’ Party
Sociale Verzekeringsraad - Social Insurance Council
soziale Pfl ichtversicherung - social long-term healthcare insurance
Specialistengeeltje - co-payment of 25 guilders for referral to a specialist (Dutch)
Spitzenverband Bund - Union of Health Insurance Organisations (German)
staatscommissie Arbeidsenquête - Labour Inquiry Commission (Dutch)
Steunfonds voor werklozen - the Support Fund for the Unemployed (Belgian)
Stichting Autonome Ziekenfondsen - Foundation of Autonomous Health-Insurance 
Funds (Dutch)
Stopcirculaire - Cessation Circular (Dutch)
Structuurnota Gezondheidszorg - paper ‘Structuring Healthcare’ (Dutch)
Sociaal Democratische Bond SDB - Social Democratic Alliance (Dutch)
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Sonderkassen - occupation-related funds (German)
Sozialgesetzbuch - Social Code Book (German)
Soziale Marktwirtschaft - social market economy (German)
Spitzenverband - umbrella organisation (German)
Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen - National Confederation of Sickness Fund 
Organisations (German)
Syndicale Kamers van Geneesheren  - National Chambers of Doctors (Belgian)
trägerübergreifendes persönliches Budget - personal budget for integrated care (German)
Überaltlastausgleich - fund for equalising previous disproportionate operating costs by 
sector (German)
Unfallkassen - casualty administration boards (German)
Unfallversicherung - accident insurance (German)
Unifi catierapport - Unifi cation Report (Dutch)
Unterstützungskassengesetz - Relief  Fund Act (German) 
Verbond van Voorzienigheidskassen - Alliance of Providential Funds (Belgian)
Verandering  Verzekerd - paper ‘Change Assured’ (Dutch)
Veralgemeende aanvullende vrije verzekering VAV- generalised non-compulsory 
supplementary insurance (Belgian)
Verband “Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung VDGU” - German Statutory Accident 
Insurance (German)
Verbond der Belgische Beroepsverenigingen van Geneesheren-Specialisten - Union of 
Belgian Physicians and Specialists 
Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen - Belgian Business Association 
Vereniging ter Bestrijding van Tuberculose - Society to Combat Tuberculosis (Dutch)
Vereniging der Vlaamse Geneesheren van België VVGB - Association of Flemish Doctors 
in Belgium
Versicherungsplichtgrenze - income treshold for compulsory insurance (German)
Verordnungen - ordinances (German)
Vlaams Patiëntenplatform - Flemish Patient Platform
Vlaamse Zorgkas - Flemish Healthcare Fund
Vrije Federatie van de maatschappijen der Volksapotheken - Free Federation of the 
Societies of General Pharmacies (Belgian)
Wahlfreiheitmodell - free insurer choice for sickness funds (German) 
Wagnisgerecht - risk-justifi ed (German)
Werken aan Zorgvernieuwing - paper ‘Working for Change in Healthcare’ (Dutch)
Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning WMO - Social Support Act (Dutch)
Wet Financiële Dienstverlening - The Financial Services Act (Dutch)
Wet Marktordening Gezondheidszorg - The Healthcare Market Regulation Act (Dutch)
Wet op de Toegang tot de Ziektekostenverzekering WTZ - Insurance Law on Access to 
Healthcare (Dutch)
Wet op de Verenigingen - Assembly Act (Dutch)
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Wet op de Ziekteverzekering - Councils Act and the Health Insurance Act (Dutch)
Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg WTG - Healthcare Charges Act (Dutch)
Wet Toelating Zorginstellingen - The Healthcare Institutions Licensing Act (Dutch)
Wet Voorzieningen Gezondheidszorg - Health Services Act (Dutch)
Wet Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen WZV - Hospital Provisions Act (Dutch)
Wet-Leburton - Leburton Act (Belgian)
Ziekenfonds - sickness fund, health-insurance fund (Dutch and Belgian)
Ziekenfondsenbeleid - Health-Insurance Fund policy (Dutch)
Ziekenfondsenbesluit - Sickness fund Decree (Dutch)
Ziekenfondsraad - Health-Insurance Council (Dutch)
Ziekenfondswet - Sickness Fund Act, Health Insurance Act (Dutch)
Ziekenverzorgingswet - Health Insurance Act (Dutch)
Ziekte-Garantiefonds - Healthcare Guarantee Fund (Dutch)
Ziektewet - Sickness Benefi ts Act (Dutch) 
Zorgkantoren - care administration offi ces (Dutch)
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland - Branche Organisation of Dutch Care Insurers
Zorgverzekeringswet - legislation on healthcare insurance (Dutch)
Zusatzversicherungen - supplementary insurance (German)

INTRODUCTION
The health and medical-expenses insurances funded from premiums in countries such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Poland are an important part of modern-day 
social security within the European Community, in addition to the care systems fi nanced 
from tax revenue, as in England, Spain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries.1 The insurance 
institutions in the various countries insure millions of people, receive and pay out billions of 
euros each year, and are major employers. 
Modern health-insurance funds and health-insurance companies are an essential link in this 
gigantic and complex whole. Many outsiders – as well as people who live and work within 
the world of insurance – do not realise that these modern institutions have a fascinating 
history that extends back over many centuries, and that, even today, traces of this history are 
visible in the organisation of health insurance, national health-fund structures and the activi-
ties of health-insurance funds. The social insurance systems implemented by health-insurance 
funds have their roots in Western Europe. In countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany, some of the large-scale health-insurance funds – with hundred of thousands or 
even millions of insured persons – owe their existence to modest local initiatives taken in the 
nineteenth century, when groups of people with a social conscience (e.g. community leaders, 
employers, physicians) worked together to provide more secure fi nancial circumstances and 
medical care for those in need. Elsewhere, it was the artisans or labourers themselves who 
joined forces to build an independent mutual support fund from their modest wage. It is this 
historical continuity and geographical proximity that enable us to compare the development 
of health insurance in Germany and Belgium with that of the Netherlands.
After the Second World War, in the highly developed Western countries and against a back-
ground of unprecedented economic growth, modern welfare states were rapidly established. 
During the 1970s, however, economic expansion slowed, prompting a broad social discus-
sion about social security. Was the organisational structure still appropriate for an industrial 
economy that was evolving into a service economy? Was it not so that cumbersome and 
bureaucratic implementing bodies, such as the health-insurance funds, were swallowing up 
too much money? And, above all, would the greatly extolled social-security system – which 
supported every citizen from the cradle to the grave – remain affordable in the future? In 
addition to pensions – in the grip of demographic ageing – the restructuring of the health 
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care system, and of health insurance in particular, became a live topic that was rapidly put 
high on the political agenda of many countries. 
Decreasing government intervention, privatising public enterprises and services, and 
making insurance institutions more responsible became urgent issues after 1980. Great em-
phasis was placed on the relationship between compulsory and private insurance. The com-
mercial insurance of copayment was re-examined in debates about health insurance and the 
fi nancing of health care. This immediately gave rise to the question of whether extending 
the market mechanism to include health insurance was eroding the justice of the principle 
of social solidarity with disadvantaged citizens. Is that historical solidarity, which inspired the 
pioneers of the health-insurance funds and their successors to take action – often unselfi shly 
– not being eroded by impersonal modern business practice?
The trend towards effi ciency in dealing with the health ‘dossier’ gained a European 
dimension in the 1990s. Makers of national and European policy are paying greater atten-
tion to ‘social Europe’ in addition to ‘economic Europe’. Not only that, but in the future, as 
political and economic unifi cation continues, social legislation and social security will also 
be streamlined and possibly ‘levelled’. The pressure of economic competition will no doubt 
cause the business world to take a critical look at potentially disadvantageous differences in 
social-security premiums and contributions. National governments will be alerted to the 
negative consequences for national production and employment. 
The principle of the free market mechanism – one of the founding principles of the 
European Economic Community and included in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 – will have 
an impact on the health-insurance sector too. The European effect will play out on at least 
two fronts. The elimination of government monopolies in the service sector (telecommunica-
tions, post, transport) will not end with the removal of monopolies in the economic sphere. 
In several European countries, health-insurance funds have a monopoly (e.g. Belgium) or a 
quasi-monopoly (e.g. Germany) in health insurance. Commercial insurers are eagerly waiting 
to penetrate these markets. 
European unifi cation also applies to the medical market. The demand for health care and 
the supply of medical services are continually increasing within Europe’s borders. The search 
for specialist treatment or a bed in an old-age home no longer stops at a country’s borders. 
Healthcare insurers – and the health-insurance funds in particular – are forced to take account 
of medical service provision in other countries. In the past, improvements in communication 
and transport at national level blurred regional boundaries and virtually forced the health-
insurance funds to increase the scale of their activities. Now, too, the disappearance of national 
boundaries will undoubtedly lend a European dimension to the area of operation and the 
services of the health-insurance funds. Judicial decisions on the insurability and reimburse-
ment of medical treatment provided abroad are forcing the health-insurance funds to think 
seriously about cooperating on an international level.2
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, these recent developments within and 
relating to national and European health-insurance systems require an in-depth multidisci-
plinary analysis of the role and functioning of health-insurance funds in the future. Although 
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there is an excessive tendency to look to history for ‘lessons’, a historical contemplation of 
the origin, the role and functioning of the health-insurance funds can contribute to a well 
thought-out (re-)organisation of social health insurance and the health-insurance funds. 
In order for reforms to be successful, it is not only fi nancial motives that need to be borne 
in mind. The modern health-insurance funds are the outcome of decades of development, 
during which people – inspired by ideological, political, social, economic and not least by 
religious motives – attempted through trial and error to achieve a workable balance. Institu-
tional and personal networks, together with positions of power, were established on a local 
and national level. In order to reform this historically rooted insurance structure, great care 
will be required if we are to avoid doing serious damage to the delicate fabric of society. 
European unifi cation in particular, with its drive for uniform regulation, threatens to clash 
with historic national differences and characteristics.  There are many historic sensitivities 
that are not always clearly visible or tangible. 
A thorough comparison and analysis of the national insurance systems, with their deep 
historical roots, is required if we are to prevent the European bull from wreaking havoc in 
the china shop of health care in general and health-insurance funds in particular. In 1995, 
during the 22nd Flemish Scientifi c Economic Congress ‘De Sociale Zekerheid Verzekerd?’
(‘Social Security Assured?’), Professor K.P. Goudswaard pointed to the distinctly national 
character of the discussions on the review of the social-security system.3 As an example he 
cited the Netherlands where, at the time, there was an intense debate about the tendency 
to allow private-sector insurance companies to play a greater role in the implementation of 
social-insurance schemes. Goudswaard emphasised the need for research into the experi-
ences of other countries, and to fi nd out how successful the privatisation of social schemes 
had been to date. 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany are therefore not islands in an ocean of healthcare 
systems. In recent decades, as a result of the growing problems with funding social security 
and of the increasing infl uence of European unifi cation on health insurance, there has been a 
growing interest in comparative economic and sociological research into social security.  This 
interest has also been evident among the medical-expense insurers and the health-insurance 
funds, not least through the publications of the Association Internationale de la Mutualité (AIM). 
Since 2000, the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies has published studies 
on care and insurance systems in the countries of Europe. In these studies, conclusions are 
drawn on the basis of the historical-comparative component. One of the most important 
studies is by R.B. Saltman and R. Busse: Social Health Insurance in Western Europe.
There is a great need for knowledge about causes, structures and processes to solve the 
problems with healthcare funding, but since J. Blanpain, L. Delesie and H. Nys published 
their study National Health Insurance and Health Resources: The European Experience4 in 1978 
to address these questions from an international, comparative and historical perspective, the 
academic market has more than met this need. Blanpain, Delesie and Nys described the his-
tory of health care and its funding in Germany, England, Wales, France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden from a supply-side perspective. Later historic and international comparative studies 
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such as those by J. Rogers Hollingworth, J. Hage and R.A. Hanneman5, E.M. Immergut6,
R. Freeman7 and H. Maarse8, dealt with aspects of the history of fi nancing healthcare systems 
as well as the development of an incomplete market.
In this study, our aim is to assess the development of the German and Belgian health-
insurance funds, and medical-expenses insurance against their development in the Netherlands. 
First, the development dynamics of the health-insurance system will be studied – obviously 
with a strong emphasis on the changes and durability of institutional characteristics of the 
system in the three countries, which show very strong economic and political similarities.  The 
institutional-political perspective will be used to analyse the development of health-insurance 
systems that eventually led to the specifi c forms of health insurance in the three countries 
studied. Other recurring questions relate to the relationships between health-insurance funds 
and other interest groups. In each period, there was a complex and not always problem-
free interaction between the health-insurance funds and other relevant social groups such 
as doctors, employers, trade unions and political parties. How did they infl uence political 
decision-making in the countries studied? In addition, this study will assess whether – and if 
so, how – successive governments have involved themselves in shaping the health-insurance 
funds. In particular, it is interesting to study how and when health-insurance legislation and 
health-insurance funds evolved in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. But we must not 
overlook the other angle: how did health-insurance funds respond to increasing government 
intervention? In addition, for each period, this study will address specifi c questions.
When conducting a comparative historical study, researchers often have to deal with major 
diffi culties in terms of defi ning the research object. Diffi culties are often encountered when 
the meaning of a term changes within the period studied, or when different countries defi ne 
a term in different ways. These problems were encountered in this study too.  The meaning 
of the term ziekenfonds (sickness fund, health-insurance fund) has changed over the centuries. 
In publications of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was sometimes used to describe 
organisations with very diverse and varying activities. 
In the HiZ yearbook for 1999, M. ‘t Hart correctly pointed out the diffi culty of clearly 
defi ning the term ziekenfonds: ‘One the one hand, illness involves the cost of medical treatment, 
medicines and nursing. On the other hand, there is the problem of loss of income, which is 
a direct result of the illness.Although most health-insurance funds of the second type disap-
peared when the Ziektewet (Sickness Benefi t Act) was introduced in 1930, the other type of 
health-insurance fund continued to exist, and they eventually shaped the character of the 
Dutch health-insurance system…In the sources and literature there are many references to 
ziekenfonds, when in fact what is meant is funds that are concerned with the problem of loss 
of income’.9 In Dutch studies, until 1930, the term ziekenfonds was also used for insurance 
funds that paid out sickness benefi t to compensate loss of wages. 
In research after 1930, the defi nition of K.P. Companje can be used for the Netherlands: 
‘A ziekenfonds (sickness fund) is an institution that provides fi xed sums of money and medi-
cal treatment with or without medicines to its members who make a regular payment’.10
Unfortunately, these defi nitions do not solve all the problems. In Belgium as well as Germany, 
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the sickness funds still fulfi l their original role. They not only provide insurance for medical 
expenses, but also pay out sickness benefi ts to their members. Traditionally, therefore, Belgian 
and German sickness funds have a much broader range of activities than the old Dutch sickness 
funds.11 Terms such as mutualiteit, ziekenkas and Krankenkasse are still used, and refer directly 
to the origins of today’s health-insurance funds. In the Netherlands, the name ziekenfonds
offi cially went out of use in 2006, when the Zorgverzekeringswet (Health Care Insurance Act) 
replaced the old health-insurance system with basic insurance for curative care. Since that 
date, ziekenfondsen (sickness funds) and ziektekostenverzekeraars (medical-expense insurers) 
have been formally known as zorgverzekeraars (care insurers). Wherever possible, this study 
assumes Companje’s defi nition: in other words, the emphasis is on the insurance for medical 
expenses through the health-insurance funds. However, in some cases the study inevitably 
refers to sickness benefi ts.
A second diffi culty was the sharp contrast between Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium 
with regard to the amount and quality of statistical information. These differences can largely 
be explained by the fact that compulsory health insurance was introduced relatively early 
in Germany and relatively late in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the latter two countries, 
there were no reliable national records until the time of the Second World War. Until around 
1935, researchers had to make do with partial statistics and estimates.
This study is based on extensive literature research. For a long time, risk and its history 
were not considered interesting subjects for history research. In recent decades, however, 
there has been an increasing realisation in the fi elds of economics and sociology that risk 
and risk management are important areas of study. In 1983, H. van der Hoeven complained 
about the lack of publications dealing with the Dutch health-insurance system. In the past, 
the historiography of the health-insurance system was largely limited to a few creditable 
monographs about individual health-insurance funds, but this situation has changed for 
the better in recent decades. Following on from Van der Hoeven, a series of young Dutch 
historians – many of whom worked at the Nederlandsch Economisch-Historisch Archief (NEHA; 
the Netherlands Economic-History Archive) and the International Institute of Social His-
tory (IISG) – have published excellent original and in-depth studies about health care and 
health insurance.
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, the branche organisation of Dutch care insurers, itself provided a 
strong stimulus for research into the history of health-insurance funds through the publications 
and yearbooks of the Stichting Historie Ziekenfondswezen (Foundation for the History of Sick-
ness Funds (HiZ)). In 2002, the Kenniscentrum Historie Zorgverzekeraars (Centre for the History 
of Health Insurance (KHZ)) was founded with the support of Zorgverzekeraars Nederland and 
the Innovatiefonds Zorgverzekeraars (Health Insurers’ Innovation Fund). The KHZ is a research 
and documentation centre that focuses on care insurance at the interface between health care, 
social insurance and the welfare state in the Dutch and European contexts. Since 2007, the 
KHZ has also received fi nancial support from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.
This cooperation between the ministry and health insurers enabled the KHZ to publish 
the extensive study by K.P. Companje et al., Tussen volksverzekering en vrije markt: Verzeke-
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ring van zorg op het snijvlak van sociale verzekering en gezondheidszorg 1880-2006. In this book, 
the authors examine the relationship between health insurance and health care from the 
perspective of the Dutch welfare state. They also compare coverage of health risks in other 
countries of Europe. 
As one might expect, the emphasis in German publications is on the second half of the 
nineteenth century, with the high point being the introduction of compulsory health insurance 
in 1883. Compared with Dutch and Belgian research, German research pays greater attention 
to the predecessors of the health-insurance funds and the increasing role of the government 
before 1850. There is much less research on the functioning of German health-insurance 
funds in the twentieth century, with the exception of the Nazi period. However, the opera-
tion of the health-insurance funds is discussed extensively in studies on social legislation and 
the history of social security. 
Belgian health-insurance funds have been studied least in comparison to German and 
Dutch funds. The ideological struggle surrounding the creation of a system for compulsory 
insurance prompted the publication of many a ‘biased’ study.  After the introduction of com-
pulsory insurance at the end of 1944, few original research projects on the history of the 
health-insurance system were initiated. However, the history of the Christian mutualities – and 
to a lesser extent, the socialist mutualities – was researched in the context of broader studies 
about the Christian and socialist labour movement. The other national alliances were hardly 
studied at all. The Documentation and Research Center for Religion, Culture & Society at 
the Catholic University of Louvain and the AMSAB in Ghent have been particularly active in 
encouraging historians to study the health-insurance fund archives deposited with them.
The development of the health-insurance fund system will be studied in seven successive 
periods, refl ecting changes in the socio-political context. Chapter 1 briefl y describes the origins 
of modern-day health-insurance funds in the guild system before the French Revolution 
(1789). This is followed by a description of the infl uence of French revolutionary ideologies 
and the sudden or gradual abolition of the guild system (1820-1850). Chapter 3 is a concise 
account of the gradual development of interprofessional health-insurance funds (1820-1850). 
This is followed by a discussion of the period of liberal class society and the beginning of 
social struggle (1850- 1914). Readers may fi nd it surprising that this study pays a great deal 
of attention to the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
First World War. In our view, however, it was the evolution of health insurance and health-
insurance funds during this period that largely formed the foundation for the structure of 
health insurance as it is today. This chapter places particular emphasis on the early introduc-
tion of compulsory health insurance in the German Empire. In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to 
the ideological struggles relating to attempts in Belgium and the Netherlands to introduce 
compulsory insurance. As a deus ex machina, the German occupier fi nally brought an end 
to the struggle in 1941 in the Netherlands with the introduction of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit
(Sickness fund Decree).
Chapter 6 describes the development of the health-insurance system in the post-war pe-
riod. The apparently unlimited growth in the welfare state, with its system of ‘pillars’ drawn 
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along socio-political lines, was brought to an abrupt end by the prolonged depression that 
began in 1973. But crises are also challenges. In the search for ways to address growing 
defi cits, the health-insurance funds fi nd themselves in the eye of the storm. In the 1980s, 
politicians began wondering out loud  whether it was possible to organise health insurance 
more cheaply and effi ciently. 
The most important recent decisions on health-insurance reforms have been made since 
2000. Chapter 7 discusses how, in the period to 2007, governments, politicians, health-
insurance funds and health insurers and other social parties involved in the insurance of 
health care in the three countries, attempted to secure the healthcare and insurance systems 
for the future. Is the desired shift towards the market mechanism continuing? What form 
are the system reforms taking in the three countries, whether or not under the infl uence of 
supranational regulation from the European Community? 
Given the recent nature of these developments, this chapter was written by authors who 
are in a position to give individual and specifi c accounts of the relations and reforms in the 
countries discussed. Karel-Peter Companje, a lecturer at the KHZ, outlines the develop-
ment of the various forms of healthcare insurance in Germany: Pfl egeversicherung (long-term 
healthcare insurance), Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung (accident insurance) and Gesetzliche and 
Private Krankenversicherung (mandatory and private health insurances). What choices are being 
made in Germany with regard to tenability of the health-insurance and care system? Are 
decisions being made in favour of radical structural reforms, as in the Netherlands, or will 
existing structures be reinforced?
Karel  Veraghtert, the author of the original edition of this book, describes the possibilities 
and constraints with regard to reforming the Belgian healthcare and social-security system. 
How can access to care be balanced against the need for fi nancial control? How does the 
established position of the old mutualities or health-insurance funds ‘square’ with the com-
mercial activities of indemnity insurers? 
Ron Hendriks, board member of the aforementioned HiZ, discusses the changes in the 
Dutch healthcare system in its political and social context. How is the market mechanism 
affecting day-to-day practice and, above all, social solidarity?
In the concluding chapter, we will set out the main similarities and, above all, the 
historical differences and contradictions between healthcare insurance and the health-
insurance funds in the three countries studied. Hopefully this chapter will provide input 
for contempla ting the role and functioning of health-insurance funds and health insurers 
in the European Community.
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Chapter I
GUILDS AND HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS: 
SOLIDARITY DURING THE ANCIEN RÉGIME
Health-insurance funds as they exist today in the Netherlands, as well as in Belgium and 
Germany, clearly date back to the age of the guilds, which played a key role in the economic, 
social and political life of towns and cities from the Middle Ages until the system was abolished 
at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The guilds ope-
rated as organisations that, with the permission of the local authority, members of a particular 
profession were obliged to join. The main aim of a guild was to promote the economic inte-
rests of its members with due regard for the common good.1 Initially, the guilds were purely 
associations of small urban entrepreneurs who united to protect their common interests. In 
many towns and cities, the craft guilds quickly evolved into regulatory trade organisations 
recognised by the local authority. They fulfi lled several roles in the urban community (e.g. 
defence and administration).2 The guilds enjoyed a large degree of autonomy within the 
boundaries set by the local authority. They elected their own administrators and drew up 
their own rules and regulations, with which all members had to comply (e.g. admission to the 
(Source: Bijlokemuseum, Ghent)
Meat and bread tokens given as material assistance to guild members
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profession, organisation of work).3 Around 1500, there were almost four hundred guilds in the 
area that is now the Netherlands. The number increased signifi cantly during the Golden Age, 
reaching almost thirteen hundred by the end of the seventeenth century. Despite increasing 
political criticism, the guild system fl ourished until the end of the eighteenth century. The 
vitality and expansion of the guilds was sustained by increasing urbanisation and occupational 
differentiation. On the basis of national studies from 1796 and 1798, supplemented with 
information from local archives, Van Genabeek4 counted approximately 1,380 craft guilds in 
the Netherlands around 1800.
1. The origin of the Dutch health-insurance funds
It was only a small step from the protection of common interests within a guild to the solidary 
provision of mutual assistance in the event of death, accident and illness. Initially, fi nancial 
assistance came straight from the guild coffers, but this situation gradually changed. From 
approximately 1630, guildsmen in many parts of the Netherlands began to set up separate 
mutual relief funds, so that the day-to-day business of the guilds was not threatened by the 
provision of relief. With the permission of the local authority, the guilds added new regulations 
to their ordinances. This meant that they could collect regular contributions from members 
in order to fi nance relief funds. The contributions were deposited in a separate fund known 
as a bos, bosse, bus or beurs. In many cases, this was merely a ‘spin-off ’ of the mutual assistance 
previously provided directly from the guild coffers.5 Initially, the funds received very little 
income. As the provision of relief was extended, new sources of revenue were tapped and 
the funds were increased with various other forms of income such as entry fees, penalties 
and donations. Usually, no master was able to get away with not paying his contribution. The 
payment was compulsory, as was the guild membership. In many cases, this obligation was 
ratifi ed by the local authority, and in some cases even required members of the profession 
who lived outside the town or city, or who practiced the profession on a temporary basis, to 
make a compensatory payment to the guild.6
Guild membership, and therefore fi nancial support, was usually limited to masters. In pro-
viding support, priority was given to guildsmen (i.e. masters) who were unable to work due 
to illness or infi rmity. The fund was mainly for illness. Guildsmen who were elderly and/or 
needy, and widows and orphans, did not qualify for assistance unless there was money left in 
the fund after illness benefi ts had been paid out. In principle, journeymen, apprentices and 
servants in the paid employ of a master, particularly those living under the master’s roof, could 
rely on the support of their patron and his family if they fell ill. In exceptional situations, 
assistance could be provided directly from the guild’s coffers if an employer failed to provide 
the necessary assistance, but usually the only means of survival was the poor relief provided 
by the town or city. With the expansion of economic activity, and especially the growth of 
urban industries, masters employed a growing number of waged journeymen (and above all 
servants/apprentices). As their numbers increased, the master’s relationship with his journey-
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men and apprentices became more anonymous and distant. Some masters did not have the 
capacity or resources for so many employees.
In some cases, the guild itself took the initiative to set up a fund for apprentices within the 
guild organisation. The guild administration itself drew up the regulations, and apprentices 
were obliged to join and make a fi nancial contribution.7 In the event of long-term illness, 
journeymen and apprentices received assistance from their own fund, thereby relieving the 
burden on their master and the local poor-relief fund. Van Genabeek regards these mutual 
relief funds as the precursors of the factory funds and industry-wide funds of the nineteenth 
century. Other apprentice funds were much less infl uenced by the guild administration 
(patrons). These funds were managed by the members, in other words the journeymen and 
apprentices. Membership remained compulsory, thereby ensuring that not all their members 
were high-risk (e.g. due to advanced age). Compulsory membership also provided a continual 
infl ux of new, young members, which meant that the risk could be spread more evenly.8
These compulsory apprentice funds clearly enjoyed the support of the local authorities. A 
well-managed fund reduced the number of applications to the local poor-relief fund,  thereby 
reducing the fi nancial burden on the municipal coffers. Some local authorities therefore 
showed no hesitation in approving compulsory membership of the apprentice funds.9 Yet 
the number of compulsory apprentice funds remained low compared to the number of craft 
guilds for masters. The existence of compulsory apprentice funds evidently depended to a 
large extent on local circumstances and the existence of voluntary funds.
In addition to the compulsory solidarity created by the guild funds and apprentice funds, 
there were also a large number of voluntary occupation-related mutual relief funds.10 While 
voluntary funds were an exception among masters, the vast majority of journeymen and 
apprentices were members of such a fund. As early as the sixteenth century, occupation-
related mutual relief funds were set up in Amsterdam, Delft and Leiden, based on voluntary 
membership. In the course of the seventeenth century and above all the eighteenth century, 
there was a further rapid increase in the number of voluntary mutual assistance funds. The 
high mobility among journeymen and irregular employment among apprentices resulted in 
a high turnover of members, which sometimes threatened the fi nancial stability of voluntary 
apprentice funds. In order to prevent fi nancial crisis and loss of members, and ensure an 
infl ux of young members, some voluntary funds in the Netherlands eventually introduced 
compulsory membership with the approval of the local authority. There appear to have been 
almost two hundred apprentice funds, of which a minority were compulsory. Van Genabeek 
estimates the number of compulsory apprentice funds in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries at no more than thirty or so. It is noticeable that, even in large cities, these mutual 
relief organisations with compulsory membership were either entirely absent (Amsterdam, 
Delft) or very few in number (Rotterdam, Leiden, The Hague). Utrecht and Haarlem, on 
the other hand, each had six compulsory apprentice funds.11
Bos12 and Van Genabeek13 estimate that, in Amsterdam in 1811, almost fi fteen thousand 
artisans (i.e. approximately one-third of the total male working population) were insured 
through the guilds for illness, accident, old age and death. In other cities this percentage was 
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slightly lower, but was usually between 25 and 30%. Guild benefi ts were sometimes also paid 
to wives, children and apprentices, as well as to the guildsmen themselves. It is clear that, at 
the end of the Ancien Regime, the guilds still fulfi lled an important economic and social 
role in the towns and cities of the Netherlands.
 The voluntary or general non-occupation-related mutual relief funds were a further step 
towards modern national health-insurance funds. The reason for their establishment was 
twofold: on the one hand, exclusive orientation towards a certain professional group meant 
that voluntary mutual occupation-related funds were highly vulnerable. A crisis in the in-
dustry in question resulted almost automatically in a fall in membership. In order to avoid a 
disastrous loss of members, termination or even bankruptcy, some voluntary apprentice funds 
began to accept members from other professions, thus transforming themselves into general 
mutual relief funds. At the same time, voluntary funds were set up that, from the beginning, 
would accept any citizen as a member. Burial funds, which were designed to provide a decent 
funeral, were particularly successful. In many cases, general health-insurance funds based on 
the ability-to-pay principle were linked to burial funds. 
Notably, the type of support given was mainly direct fi nancial assistance, throughout the 
period of illness.14 Direct nursing or medical care, by physicians or surgeons associated with 
a fund, was provided only in exceptional cases. Sometimes medicines were also paid for. In 
most cases, care was almost exclusively ambulatory. The more affl uent patients were cared 
for at home by a physician or surgeon. Ordinary citizens resorted to herbal medicine or, if 
the situation was serious, sought treatment from a quack or a surgeon. When a guildsman 
was seriously ill, his guild-brothers took turns to sit by his bed at home, but they were not 
required to do so if the illness was contagious.15 Only the poor sought care in a hospitaal or 
gasthuis (hospital) – usually paid for by the municipal poor-relief fund – where they were 
‘treated’ by staff who often had very little medical expertise. These hospitals were therefore 
avoided by the wealthy and were mainly for the poor, the mentally ill, and those suffering 
from leprosy or the plague.16
As we have emphasised above, the guild funds and apprentice funds operated within the 
narrow framework of their city.  The basic system, namely the provision of mutual assistance to 
members of the profession, was the same everywhere. However, the day-to-day administration 
varied to a greater or lesser extent from city to city, and within individual cities, where each 
guild had a different emphasis that was refl ected in its benefi t system, among other things.17
In certain guilds, the levels of benefi t depended on the fund’s reserves. When reserves were 
low, payments were reduced or even suspended completely in extreme cases, thereby reducing 
the risk of bankruptcy in the event of an epidemic. However, this caused great uncertainty 
for those who were insured. Some guilds therefore decided in favour of a more graduated 
apportionment system. High expenditure on assistance was compensated by increasing the 
contribution. This had another obvious disadvantage. In the fi rst system, the amount of 
benefi t remained uncertain, but the new apportionment system meant that contributions 
could fl uctuate strongly. In order to prevent excessive fl uctuations in benefi t payments and 
contributions, the guilds began to establish separate funds in the seventeenth century. Where 
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possible, reserves were created though investment in bonds (including government bonds). 
By the end of the eighteenth century, some guilds had accumulated considerable capital as 
a buffer against unforeseen events, such as widespread outbreaks of contagious diseases like 
smallpox and cholera.18
Differences in the guilds’ benefi t systems were also exacerbated by the intervention of 
local authorities, which could, for example, either provide fi nancial assistance or limit the 
contribution. These interventions happened mainly in times of economic depression and 
unemployment, and were an attempt by the local authority not only to reassure artisans as to 
their livelihood, but also to quell political unrest and reduce the risk of lawless behaviour and 
disturbances. The national government remained very much in the background. In the Re-
public of the United Provinces, the regions and cities enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. 
2. Sickness funds in the cities of Flanders
In the Spanish Netherlands and later the Austrian Netherlands, the cities and their guilds 
also enjoyed considerable freedom. The guilds in the south, especially in Brussels and Ant-
Guild houses on the Graslei in Ghent, evidence of the former economic power of the 
guilds
(Source: Stam Gent)
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werp, appear to have established separate funds for needy and ailing guildsmen earlier than 
their northern counterparts. We also know that separate funds were set up for milliners’ and 
clothmakers’ apprentices and journeymen in Antwerp as early as 1608. Their founders were 
following the example of workers’ funds and guild funds in other countries. The latter were 
usually for masters only.19 In the case of the milliners’ funds, every impoverished participant 
received fi nancial support and had the right to a decent funeral. The Antwerp example was 
certainly followed in the seventeenth century in Leuven, Brussels (1621), Ghent (1630) and 
Bruges, among others. As was usual, the setting up of these new gezellenbeurzen (journeymen’s 
funds) was subject to the approval of the local authority. The aldermen were usually quick 
to approve the funds. They knew that the well-educated journeymen preferred to be cared 
for at home when they were ill because, as a rule only the poor ended up in a hospital, and 
because of the social stigma of personal failure and disgrace attaching to those in need.20
Moreover, the funds eased the burden on the town’s poor-relief institutions. 
It was not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century that the national government 
of the Austrian Netherlands began systematically to formulate a policy designed to combat 
poverty and its effects. Largely under the impulse of  Viscount  Vilain XIV (1712-1777), 
reforms and remedial measures were introduced to make poor relief less repressive and even 
Jean Jacques Philippe Vilain XIV, 
a progressive statesman and re-
former of poor relief in the 
Austrian Netherlands 
(Source: Leuven University Archives)
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preventive.21 Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) also had ambitious plans for reform in his 
Austrian empire. He expected a centralised welfare policy to be fairer, more effi cient and 
above all less expensive. Civic authorities would be responsible for caring for the sick. These 
ambitious plans immediately met with stiff resistance in the Austrian Netherlands because 
they were directly at odds with the particularism of the cities and guilds. The administrators 
of the cities and guilds were not willing to surrender their infl uential position in the local 
community to Viennese bureaucrats without a fi ght. Ultimately, nothing much changed in 
practice. Only Brussels was given a state-run hospital.
3. The German example: the Knappschaftskassen
As in the Netherlands, the guilds took care of their members in the event of illness, accident 
or death. In most of the German states, the government took little interest in the health of 
its subjects, let alone in providing health insurance. There were a number of exceptions. In 
Prussia, in particular, the government became more directly involved in health insurance for 
workers during the course of the eighteenth century. This intervention by the government 
was based on a double tradition.
Early on, miners had organised and insured themselves via their Büchsen. The fi rst record of 
a German miners’ fund dates from 1300, during the reign of Emperor Wenzel II of Bohemia. 
Some miners’ funds even set up their own hospitals, where non-members from the mining 
villages were also cared for. The Büchsen or Knappschaftskassen intervened mainly in cases of 
enduring misfortune. When a fatal accident occurred, a decent funeral was organised and 
the widow was given fi nancial support. Medical care and fi nancial support for short periods 
of four to six weeks were provided by the mine owners.22
From the sixteenth century onwards, this gradually extended system of insurance was 
made compulsory in the mining sector in twelve states by means of government Verordnungen 
(ordinances). A clear example of this type of intervention is the Prussian Knappschaftsgesetz of 
1767. Mining regions were required to set up insurance against Existenzrisiken (occupational 
hazards). In 1783, the Prussian government also designated the Knappschafte (miners’ associa-
tions) as institutions that were required to provide assistance during illness, before people 
could resort to the municipal poor-relief funds. In Prussia, the idea rapidly took hold that 
subjects who had fulfi lled their duty to the state had a right to expect assistance from the 
state in times of need.23
This was one of the underlying principles of the Preussische Allgemeine Landrecht (Prussian 
General Law) of 5 February 1794, the enactment of the government’s poor-relief programme. 
Under this national legislation, the local authorities were made responsible for implemen-
ting a public aid system. However, the guilds and their relief funds were allowed to continue 
operating under the new system. Fund membership was even made compulsory, but the 
funds were subject to the scrutiny of the local authority.24
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Summary
Health-insurance funds in the Netherlands originated under the guild system. In emergencies 
such as death, accident and illness, assistance was provided directly from the guild’s coffers. 
This situation gradually changed. In the mid-seventeenth century, many guildsmen started 
to set up their own separate relief funds. Compulsory membership and fi nancial assistance 
were usually restricted to masters only. Originally, journeymen, apprentices and servants in 
paid employment relied on assistance from their patron when they fell ill. Their growing 
number led to the establishment of apprentice funds (compulsory or voluntary), often with 
the support of the local authority. Many voluntary occupation-related funds were set up 
too. In Amsterdam at the beginning of the nineteenth century, approximately one-third of 
the male working population were insured through a guild for illness, accident, old age and 
death. The fi gure varied between 25% and 30% in other cities. 
The amount of benefi t paid varied widely. In order to reduce the differences, from the 
seventeenth century onwards the guilds began to accumulate reserves – some of which 
were considerable – as a buffer against unforeseen events. The type of support given was 
mainly direct fi nancial assistance, throughout the period of illness. Nursing or medical help, 
by physicians or surgeons working for a fund, were provided in exceptional cases only. The 
gradual spread of voluntary and general non-occupation-related funds was a further step in 
the direction of modern health-insurance funds.
The situation in the Southern Netherlands and Germany was much the same as in the 
Northern Netherlands. The guilds in the south set up separate funds for needy and ailing 
guildsmen earlier than the guilds in the north. Antwerp was early in setting up separate funds 
for milliners’ and clothmakers’ apprentices. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
the national government of the Austrian Netherlands began systematically to develop its 
own policy to deal with poverty and its effects. These imperial plans met with considerable 
resistance from the guilds. 
In Germany, too, the guilds and apprentice funds provided support in the event of illness and 
death. The miners’ funds are a striking example of early worker solidarity. With the exception 
of Prussia, the governments of the German states showed little interest in the health of their 
subjects. This gradually changed during the course of the eighteenth century.
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Chapter II
THE END OF THE GUILD SYSTEM, 1789-1820
1. The shock of the French Revolution
During the eighteenth century, the corporative social order in Europe was a subject of debate 
among state philosophers. As early as 1776, comptroller-general  of France Turgot made an 
unsuccessful attempt to abolish all corporations and guilds and bring an end to their privi-
leges and freedoms. His reforms met with strong resistance and he was dismissed from offi ce. 
A draft edict was drawn up in the Austrian Netherlands in 1786 to abolish the guilds, but 
these reform attempts were equally unsuccessful. The forces of democratic patriotism in the 
Republic of the United Provinces were not strong enough, and were defeated by stadholder 
Willem V and his pro-Orange party in 1787. Ideas about a new social order were emerging 
in many German states, too.
The breakthrough came with the French Revolution. During a tumultuous sitting on 
4 August 1789, the Assemblée (National Assembly) abolished the guilds in France, with the 
aim of applying their Revolutionary principles of égalité and liberté to labour relations. The 
d’Allarde Law of 2-17 March 1791, based on the principle of freedom of labour, ended the 
crushing monopoly of the guilds. On condition that they had a patent, every citizen was 
entitled to practice a trade, profession or craft. The Assemblée even regarded this freedom 
as a basic right.1 This far-reaching liberalisation of the labour market brought an immediate 
end to the centuries-old guild system in France. Initially, the craft journeymen welcomed 
the abolition of the restrictions imposed by the guilds. However, the freedom they had been 
granted quickly deteriorated into a series of strikes by journeymen (carpenters, blacksmiths 
and milliners), who united in order to use this new weapon to force their master-patrons to 
pay them higher wages. The agitation soon escalated into violence, threatening to disrupt 
the urban economy of France, and even took on a contra-revolutionary character. Powerful 
measures were imposed. The worried Assemblée responded with the Le Chapelier Law of 14 
June 1791, which dissolved all professional associations – those of patrons as well as employees. 
Under the threat of heavy fi nes and even imprisonment, workers and journeymen were for-
bidden to form associations, i.e. to take joint action in order to improve working conditions. 
The Le Chapelier Law stipulated: Citizens of the same trade or profession, entrepreneurs, those who 
have set up shop, workers and journeymen of any skill may not, when assembled, appoint a president, 
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secretaries, or trustees, keep accounts, pass decrees or resolutions, or draft regulations concerning their alleged 
common interests. Criminal law stipulated that any association formed by workers with the purpose 
of jointly discontinuing work, preventing other workers from commencing or continuing their work, and, 
in a general sense, with the purpose of hindering or discontinuing work and increasing the wage, shall be 
punished with a custodial sentence.2 Therefore the underlying motivation for the Le Chapelier 
Law was not, as is often claimed, an ideological obsession with freedom of enterprise and 
labour, but rather the expression of the French Assemblée’s wish to protect the common good 
of citizens from the particularism that they perceived in the workers’ strikes.
2. The Le Chapelier Law: the final blow for the guilds in the Southern 
Netherlands
Following the defeat of the Austrian army at Fleurus in 1794, the Austrian Netherlands were 
taken over by French Revolutionary forces. On 1 October 1795, the Southern Netherlands, 
together with the Prince-Bishopric of Liège, were annexed to France as nine new départe-
ments. The consequences of the annexation for the traditional guild regime were felt earlier 
and were more far-reaching than in the German states and the Northern Netherlands. The 
Le Chapelier Law, and therefore also the prohibition on associations, came into force in the 
Southern Netherlands at the end of 1795. The Le Chapelier Law had particularly harsh 
consequences for employees. Under this prohibition on associations, which remained in force 
until 1866 in Belgium and until as late as 1872 in the Netherlands, workers had no room to 
manoeuvre because every form of collective solidarity and organisation was illegal. When 
confl icts arose between masters and journeymen, individual workers had even less power than 
under the abolished guild system. The prohibitions on associations also applied to patrons, 
but it was easier for this relatively small group to circumvent the law. Despite the fact that 
their guilds had been dissolved, employers could still associate informally – and sometimes 
formally – within the framework of the cities’ offi cial Chambers of Commerce, which had 
been set up by the French government.
The French revolutionaries were quick to introduce radical reforms to the poor-relief. 
Church charity was largely replaced by the creation of a Bureau de Bienfaisance (public 
welfare offi ce) in each municipality and Hospices Civiles in every town and city. These new 
institutions were run by the local authority and were fi nanced, among other things, from 
the confi scation and sale of church property and from increases in local taxes. The central 
government showed far less interest in fi lling the gaps in health insurance for artisans and 
their employees following the abolition of the guilds. Hardly any measures were introduced 
to make up for the sudden loss of fi nancial relief from guild funds and apprentices’ funds. 
The French Revolutionary government had issued the decree of 19-24 March 1793 that 
provided for the creation of a Caisse national de prévoyance for the whole nation. The project 
was never implemented though, but the idea survived. Later, during the reign of Napoleon, 
special relief funds were set up for certain sectors or groups. The numerous accidents in the 
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After the dissolution of the guilds, the traditions of solidarity and foresight among workers 
were continued by mutual assistance societies, as in the case of the Vereniging van St. Eloy after 
the abolition of the St Eloy Guild in Ghent, ±1820
(Source: Stam Gent)
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mines led to the establishment of a national ‘precautionary fund’, provided for by the impe-
rial decree of 26 May 1813.3
3. The desperate struggle of the Dutch guilds
In the Northern Netherlands, the ideas of the leaders of the Batavian Republic, which was 
founded after stadhouder Willem V fl ed to England in 1795,  were very similar to the Revo-
lutionary opinions that were triumphing in France. It was therefore to be expected that, in 
the North, the guild system would soon come under threat from the calls for a new social 
order. The formal abolition of the guilds in 1798 was therefore not completely unexpected. 
Abolition was based on political rather than socio-economic motives. The national govern-
ment sought above all to strengthen its central power and restrict the autonomy of the towns 
and cities. In contrast to the Southern Netherlands, where annexation to France brought an 
immediate end to the guild system, the guilds’ struggle for survival in the Northern Net-
herlands dragged on for almost a quarter of a century.
In part, the prolonged struggle was due to the rapidly changing political constellations 
between 1795 and 1815. The authority of the Batavian Republic was undermined by per-
sistent confl icts between opposing factions. In 1806, Napoleon put an end to the internal 
squabbling by making his brother, Louis Napoleon, sovereign of the Kingdom of Holland. In 
1810, Napoleon annexed the new kingdom to France and made it part of the Continental 
System. French troops were driven out at the end of 1813, and the son of regent Willem V 
was crowned King Willem I of the Netherlands. In 1815, with the approval of the European 
great powers, he became sovereign of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which united 
the north and south until 1830.
The prolonged death throes were also due to the strong resistance of the guild administra-
tors themselves, who tenaciously and adeptly used their political and economic infl uence 
to reverse, evade or even sabotage – openly or underhandedly – the measures that had been 
introduced. The formal abolition of the guilds on 5 October 1798 had been a harsh blow for 
their members, given the importance of their association in terms of centuries-old privileges 
and social security. Many local authorities readily supported the resistance, since the abolition 
of the guilds threatened local social-security systems and, above all, would drastically increase 
the cost of poor relief at a time when municipal fi nances were struggling in a diffi cult eco-
nomic climate. The strong resistance bore fruit, because, after the political change of power 
in 1801, the guilds eagerly seized the opportunity to return to business as usual. In Utrecht, 
for example, contributions were again made compulsory for anyone practising a profession to 
which a relief fund was linked. Membership was even compulsory for newcomers.4 In January 
1808, Gogel introduced the Corporatiewet (Corporations Act). In theory, this brought an end 
to the guilds, but in practice they were merely replaced with corporations, which were sup-
posed to take over the social role of the guilds. Following the direct annexation to France in 
1810, the Northern Netherlands, like the Southern Netherlands, were subject to French law 
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and the 1791 ban on guilds. However, the legislation did not actually come into effect until 
1812. The French occupation ended the following year, which meant that, in practice, the 
legislation did not really have signifi cant consequences. The departure of French occupying 
forces rekindled the hope that the guild system could be fully restored. After hesitating for a 
long time, Willem I fi nally bit the bullet in October 1818. He abolished the guilds once and 
for all, and their property was handed over to the local authorities. 
4. The German guilds: between stone-dead and alive-and-kicking
The craft guilds and apprentices’ associations in the German states survived much longer 
than in the Netherlands, although their circumstances varied greatly from state to state. Fol-
lowing Napoleon’s victory and the Treaty of Lunéville in 1801, the areas on the left bank 
of the Rhine came under direct French rule, and were consequently also subject to the Le 
Chapelier Law, which meant that the traditional Knappschaftskassen in these regions also ceased 
to exist. Freedom of enterprise was proclaimed and the guilds also abolished in the German 
territories to the west of the line from Mainz to Hamburg, which fell into French hands 
after the battle of Jena (1806) between France and Prussia. However, the consequences of 
this measure varied widely from place to place, as in the Netherlands. The extent to which 
the ban on coalitions was enforced evidently depended very much on the local authorities. 
Some craft guilds and apprentices’ associations were disbanded straightaway, others suspended 
their activities voluntarily, and still others continued to operate in secret. Finally, there was 
a group that managed to continue operating openly and retain its structures and powers. 
French infl uence in central, southern and eastern Germany was much weaker, and the guilds 
continued to function virtually unchanged. In prominent states such as Saxony, Baden, Würt-
temberg and Bavaria, the national government left the guilds and apprentices’ associations 
alone, and they were able to continue operating openly and without intervention, as they 
had done for centuries.5
Summary
At the end of the eighteenth century, international politics were dominated by the French 
Revolution and its far-reaching political and social consequences. In France, the Le Chapelier 
Law brought a brutal end to the centuries-old guild regime. Following the defeat of the 
Austrian army at Fleurus in 1794, the Austrian Netherlands were occupied by France. In 
1795, the Southern Netherlands were annexed to France, and hence became subject to the 
Le Chapelier Law. All forms of collective solidarity and organisation – including the guilds 
and, later, trade unions – were banned by law until 1872. The French revolutionaries also 
tackled the church poor-relief system. Bureaux de Bienfaisance (Public welfare offi ces) were 
introduced with the aim of replacing church benefi cence. 
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY44
In the Netherlands, the guilds were abolished in 1798. The aim of the national government 
was to reinforce its central power and restrict the autonomy of the towns and cities. In contrast 
to the Southern Netherlands, where the guilds were abolished very quickly, the process in 
the Northern Netherlands took almost a quarter of a century. In 1808, Gogel introduced the 
Corporatiewet (Corporations Act). In theory, the act abolished the guilds, but in practice they 
were simply replaced with corporations, which were supposed to take over the social role of 
the guilds. The annexation to France in 1810 meant that the Netherlands were also subject 
to French law and the ban on guilds. After liberation from the French, Willem I brought a 
defi nitive end to the guild system.
In the states of Germany, the traditional craft guilds survived for longer than their coun-
terparts in the Netherlands, although their circumstances varied greatly from state to state. 
The Le Chapelier Law and the ban on guilds were implemented with varying success in 
areas of Germany that were under French rule. In the southern, central and eastern regions, 
there was little French infl uence, and the guilds continued to operate virtually as they had 
done in the past.
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Chapter III
THE BIRTH OF MODERN HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS
The abolition of the guilds was naturally a direct threat to the social safety net provided by 
guild and apprentices’ funds in the Netherlands. However, political revolution did not dimi-
nish the need for solidarity and mutual support among the members of individual professions. 
New forms of solidarity soon emerged, under all manner of titles. These new organisations 
often built on the traditions of the craft guilds, in particular the journeymen’s and apprentices’ 
associations. In some cases, the new organisations were actually a direct continuation of guilds, 
which were attempting to survive entirely or partly in secret and preserve their structures 
and operations during the diffi cult years, in the hope of better times.1
1. The guilds are dead – long live the mutual societies
a. Ghent sets the trend
Only a few studies exist of the survival strategy of the guilds in the Southern Netherlands and 
in particular their funds during the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. Two extensive studies 
of Ghent, which had a fl ourishing cotton industry that made it one of the main textile centres 
on the European continent, show that the French ban on guilds and coalitions was certainly 
enforced there, but after a number of years opportunities were created through loopholes 
and clever interpretations of the law. The Ghent city council also turned a blind eye to the 
transport guilds, and their monopoly was even restored in January 1803. This was not an 
isolated case. In other Flemish cities such as Antwerp, Malines, Brussels and Lierre, the guilds 
also retained their traditional privileges and monopolies. It is not diffi cult to understand why. 
On the one hand they were often production co-operatives avant la lettre, namely associations 
of equal co-operating partners. On the other hand, their specialised work (loading, unloa-
ding, weighing, measuring) was carried out on the basis of trust, and was of vital importance 
to traders and the urban economy. Local authorities therefore had no hesitation in allowing 
the transport workers’ associations to continue operating as fully fl edged guilds, either with 
the authorities’ approval and under their supervision, or even working directly for the city. 
The situation of the transport guilds was fully legalised in 1815 by a Royal Decree that 
authorised the local authorities, when required, to restore the guilds of certifi ed workers 
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who were responsible for the loading, unloading, measuring, weighing and processing of 
commercial goods. This meant that the monopoly of these guilds was fully restored. Today, 
this is still partly the case for Belgian dock workers.
This offi cial approval in Ghent, and possibly in other Flemish cities, opened the door to the 
activities of occupation-related funds for artisans. Some of the early funds continued opera-
ting either openly or in secret. Funds that were operating before the French arrived had not 
simply given up without a fi ght. Lis and Soly point to the fact that the approval previously 
granted by the town or city magistrates implied that the funds were bound by civil law. This 
meant that the government had to respect the formal powers and statutory entitlements of 
the organisations in question and their individual members. In 1796, the courts therefore 
ruled that the Brussels city council had wrongfully seized the monies of the funds, and had 
to return them because the funds were regarded as a charitable association. Nevertheless, in 
1798, the prefect of the De Dijle département declared the funds illegal and had their monies 
confi scated.2 After several years, the French regime decreed that the Le Chapelier Law did 
not apply to voluntary relief funds. In cities at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
local authorities were openly positive towards the establishment of new funds that would 
help to relieve the plight of craftsmen and workers in need. In the subsequent years, a number 
of new mutual societies – mainly mixed funds – with voluntary membership were open to 
masters and journeymen. Often they were an almost direct continuation of the funds run by 
the former guilds. Some of the funds even managed – possibly because the local authority 
turned a blind eye – to transfer the property of the former guild (archives, banners, fi nancial 
reserves) to the new fund.3 Membership and the weekly contribution were indeed no longer 
compulsory, but in practice the funds remained closed to other professions, and most artisans 
joined ‘their own’ guild.
In Ghent during the French period, only three funds were set up exclusively for journey-
men. By contrast, nine new journeymen’s funds were set up between 1828 and 1845. This 
is an indication of the increasing tensions between masters and journeymen in the mixed 
corporations run by the masters. These new journeymen’s funds were purely corporative 
too, and outsiders were excluded. 
Another notable development was the founding, before the mid-nineteenth century, of 
twelve funds for factory workers employed in the rapidly developing textile industry. Half of 
these funds were created by the management boards of a number of large textile factories, and 
were therefore genuine factory societies. In 1850, approximately 2,200 textile workers were 
members of factory societies in Ghent. The other half were autonomous mutual societies for 
factory workers. These independent workers’ societies had only a few dozen members. This 
means that, in an important textile centre such as Ghent, a total of at least thirty solidarity 
funds were active between 1800 and 1850.
However, not all the societies were treated favourably by the local authorities. The ap-
proach of Ghent’s city council was ambiguous, and it clearly applied double standards to 
the different types of funds. During the French period they were sympathetically tolerant of 
mixed-membership funds, and in particular of masters’ funds, and later even openly supported 
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Regulations for the fund of the Brepols & Dierckx Zoon paper factory in Turnhout, 1848
(Source:  Tram 41, Turnhout)
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them. The authorities and high bourgeoisie did not see these funds as a threat to their own 
economic and political power. However, the council was highly suspicious of autonomous 
journeymen’s funds, fearing that they were a veiled continuation of the militant compagnon-
nages of the Ancien Regime. In 1811, the city council intervened when it turned out that a 
journeymen’s fund had given fi nancial support to workers who, following a strike and street 
unrest, had been found guilty of breaking the Le Chapelier Law.4 Confi scated documents 
also showed that this journeymen’s fund was in close contact with other such funds, not only 
in Flanders but also in several French départements. This shows that, despite the Le Chapelier 
Law, a secret network of journeymen’s organisations existed in the French empire. Although 
the Ghent journeymen’s fund was offi cially disbanded by the courts, it continued to ope-
rate clandestinely. Members met in secret, elected administrators, and tried to preserve the 
organisation as far as possible until more favourable times.5
The Ghent council was openly hostile towards the textile workers’ autonomous mutual 
societies. Although small, the societies were feared by the patrons, who claimed – not entirely 
without reason – that they were no more than a cover for militant illegal activity within the 
companies. Several workers’ societies supposedly made up the militant foundation underly-
ing the expansion of Ghent’s powerful labour organisation during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The spinners in particular were among the earliest groups to attempt to 
set up their own fund. These skilled and relatively well-paid workers were the elite of the 
factory proletariat. They were a strong, militant, sizeable and hierarchical group with a semi-
independent status in the factories, and were highly respected by the workers’ community.6
The factory owners, and with them the local authority, were clearly afraid of this infl uential 
group, which held a key role in the companies and would use its fund not only to provide 
support in the event of sickness or death, but also to support strikes. In 1810, the spinners’ 
application for permission to set up a fund was fi rmly rejected. In 1815, the property of a 
fund that had been set up nevertheless in 1814 was confi scated. After this, the spinners pro-
bably continued their association in secret. In any case, they re-entered the public arena with 
a petition to the King in 1831, after Belgium became independent.7
The ban on coalitions appears to have been successfully enforced for several years in 
Ghent with regard to autonomous journeymen’s funds too, since no new journeymen’s 
funds were openly set up again until 1828. This was the result of the approval in 1827 of 
civic regulations that offi cially permitted welfare funds, but at the same time subjected them 
to strict supervision by the local authority. The regulations meant that the local authorities 
had changed their mind, and now emphatically supported the view that the Le Chapelier 
Law did not apply to the funds. Finally, they had come to regard the mutual societies as an 
instrument for providing relief and hence preventing social unrest.
Although the decree of 1827 also brought opportunities for industrial workers, it took a 
surprisingly long time (until 1849) for the weavers, who were the largest group among the 
textile workers, to set up their own autonomous fund. The creation of an autonomous fund for 
weavers, administered by the workers themselves, was probably held up by the factory societies 
that were set up in some fi ve large companies. These societies had a combined membership 
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of more than 2,000 workers – mostly weavers. A further possible explanation for the late 
creation of mutual societies for weavers is the fact that they were poorly paid, and therefore 
did not have the fi nancial resources to set up their own relief funds. The members of mutual 
societies had to be able to pay their regular – but usually modest – dues. Only workers who 
were employed on a more or less permanent basis were eligible for membership.8
It is clear that, in a leading industrial city such as Ghent, despite the ban on coalitions, an 
important network of mutual societies came into being during the fi rst half of the nineteenth 
century. Their membership base accounted for a not insubstantial percentage of the working 
population, especially in the craft trades. According to estimates, in 1828 they represented 
approximately one-third of those employed in most of the craft trades. In some sectors, 
the number was as much as half. These fi gures correspond remarkably closely to those for 
Amsterdam and the cities of Holland in general. However, their share declined rapidly in 
the decades that followed. By around 1850, depending on the trade, their membership still 
accounted for no more than 10 to 25% of those in employment.9 It appeared that the liberté
of the French Revolution had slowly but surely permeated the craft trades. The fi nal destruc-
tion of centuries-old guild structures was a long drawn-out affair.
Compared to the Netherlands, where interprofessional and even well-established general 
funds existed as early as the eighteenth century, it is notable that the Ghent funds – the au-
tonomous industrial funds, the craft-trade funds and the factory societies – largely retained 
their exclusive character until 1850 and did not admit members from other professions.
b. The other Flemish cities: a slow beginning
In contrast to Ghent, a true factory proletariat hardly existed in the other Flemish towns and 
cities during the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. A. Thijs points to a number of gradual 
but far-reaching shifts in Antwerp, which was probably more representative than Ghent in 
terms of the evolution of guild and journeymen’s funds in the Southern Netherlands. In 
contrast to Ghent, existing and new funds and societies became more mixed, and admitted 
both masters and journeymen of the same profession. This also happened in Brussels (1832) 
and Bruges (around 1850). The legal abolition of the guilds, and the loss of the security 
that they provided, undoubtedly helped to bring the journeymen and their patrons closer 
together – especially at a time when they had to unite to survive the uncertainty created 
by the rise of industrial capitalism. Mechanisation and increasing scale were threatening to 
seriously disrupt traditional social structures and relationships.10
The fact that compulsory membership no longer existed also meant that the membership 
base and fi nancial reserves of many funds were likely to fall below a critical minimum. In 
order to combat the ageing of the membership base, which would be fatal for the funds, 
they opened their doors to as wide a membership as possible. Even when masters and jour-
neymen united, their funds were sometimes no longer viable due to the sharp decrease in 
employment in their trade. Funds and societies therefore began to admit members from all 
sectors and became interprofessional. Around the mid-nineteenth century in Antwerp, there 
were no more than about ten funds with a combined membership of approximately 830. 
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY50
They account for a very small – albeit skilled – section of Antwerp’s working population. 
The bakers’ guild, which had 150 members, was the largest. Half of these societies clearly 
had their roots in the Ancien Regime, but four of them had been set up more recently, 
between 1848 and 1851. They belonged to a new type of fund/society that was to become 
more important in the decades that followed. Under the infl uence of the progressive liberal 
bourgeoisie, they distanced themselves from the Christian rituals of the old funds and adopted 
a neutral ideological approach. 11
Banner of the mutual assistance union De Dekens, Bruges, 1913 
(Source: KADOC)
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It is very diffi cult, if not impossible, to paint a precise picture of health insurance in Belgium 
in the mid-nineteenth century. According to Reszohazy, in 1850 there were 199 mutual 
societies in Belgium with a combined membership of 68,297.12 The undisputed leaders were 
the two Walloon industrial provinces of Hainault and Liège, which had the most members, 
i.e. 33,919 (49.7%) and 14,394 (21.1%) respectively. The overwhelmingly large share of these 
provinces is not surprising. With their coal mines, heavy industry, and glass industry, they 
employed by far the largest number of industrial workers. It is nevertheless strange that East 
Flanders, in which the textile centre of Ghent was located, with 6,579 (9.6%) members, 
lagged behind rural West Flanders with 6,817 (10%) members. The provinces of Brabant 
and Antwerp, which both had strong industrial sectors, scored abnormally low with 3,055 
(4.4%) and 1,278 (1.9%) members respectively. It is possible that Reszohazy’s study only took 
account of the members of mutual societies for industrial workers.
Summary
In Belgium, the enforcement of the Le Chapelier Law was gradually relaxed. A Royal Decree 
issued in 1815 empowered local authorities, when required, to restore the guilds of certi-
fi ed workers who were responsible for the loading, unloading, measuring, weighing and 
processing of commercial goods. This resulted in the restoration of the guilds’ monopolies. In 
many cities at the beginning of the nineteenth century, local authorities responded positively 
towards the establishment of new funds that would help to relieve the plight of craftsmen 
and workers in need. In the years that followed, new mutual-relief funds were set up. 
These were mixed funds, i.e. primarily for masters and journeymen. They were often a 
direct continuation of the former guilds. The local authorities, afraid of workers’ strikes, had 
an ambiguous approach towards the various funds. When Belgium became independent, the 
funds could operate openly again. Another notable development was the founding of twelve 
factory societies in the Ghent textile industry. Around the mid-nineteenth century, there were 
some two hundred societies with approximately seventy thousand members in Belgium.
2.  The Netherlands: a colourful patchwork of funds
a. Occupation-related and general mutual societies: a diffi cult existence
Publications by Bos and Van der Valk, and above all Van Genabeek’s thesis, have provided ex-
cellent surveys of mutual assistance during the nineteenth century in the Netherlands. This 
contrasts markedly with the lack of information on Belgium. Naturally, several comparisons 
can be drawn, but there were notable differences between north and south, despite political 
reunifi cation under the United Kingdom of the Netherlands between 1815 and 1830.
As in the south, the uncertain existence and eventual abolition of the guilds did not bring 
an end to the autonomous occupation-related mutual funds. Between 1800 and 1820, they 
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remained more or less stable in number at around 180. Compared with the situation around 
1790, this was a signifi cant decrease, certainly when considered in relation to the disappea-
rance of hundreds of craft guilds, which did not have a separate solidarity fund but continued 
to provide assistance to guild-brothers from their own coffers until the end of the eighteenth 
century. In addition, given the fact that membership in occupation-related funds was no longer 
compulsory, the membership base was considerably smaller than in the past. Many craftsmen 
were now excluded from the solidarity net of their professional organisation because they 
were unable or unwilling to pay the subscription. 
The Royal Decree of 1820, which regulated the expenditure of guild funds, clearly stipu-
lated that the ban on coalitions did not apply to funds set up for the purpose of mutual 
assistance. However, the welfare system of the guilds had to be administered as a separate 
organisation that also accepted persons who were not guild members.13 This Royal Decree 
even emphatically called upon the local authorities to encourage the creation of mutual 
relief funds, on condition that their voluntary character was respected. Those who wished 
to found a voluntary mutual society no longer required the approval of the local authority. 
Nevertheless, in some municipalities, the local council continued to exercise a certain amount 
of supervision, and law-abiding founders of new funds continued to ask the permission of 
the burgomaster and aldermen.14
Apart from providing a moral stimulus and granting offi cial approval, the local, provincial and 
national authorities took no initiative whatever. The economically diffi cult years and, above 
all, towering government debts left no fi nancial scope for creating alternatives to replace the 
extensive safety net that guilds had provided for craftsmen. From 1820, therefore, the market 
was entirely open for private initiatives. Notably, as in the Flemish cities (with the exception 
of Ghent from 1827), hardly any new occupation-related mutual societies were set up in the 
Netherlands. In fact, between 1820 and 1850, they actually decreased in number by more 
than a quarter, from 171 to 123.15 The loss of the straitjacket of the guild system – except for 
the transport guilds – was fatal, especially for the masters’ funds. The former apprentice funds 
were more resilient, partly because they also admitted masters and thus became mixed.16 In 
addition, more and more mutual societies became interprofessional. Usually, these funds also 
admitted members from other professions because, now that membership was no longer 
compulsory, they were confronted with a membership base that was declining and in many 
cases, ageing. Occupation-related apprentice funds increasingly became general funds, open 
to anyone who was able to pay. The number of general mutual societies increased rapidly 
between 1800 and 1850, in contrast to the occupation-related mutual funds. Even before the 
Royal Decree of 1820, the number of general mutual societies had increased by more than 
half, from 124 to 190. Between 1820 and 1850, they doubled in number to 368. This was 
not only due to the conversion of previously occupation-related funds into general mutual 
funds, but above all to new initiatives which, given the lack of government measures, were 
designed to combat poverty by stimulating mutual assistance. 
According to Van Genabeek, general mutual societies were systematically set up by social 
organisations. As members of those societies, workers learned, under the guidance of social 
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reformers, how mutual assistance could help them to survive periods of misfortune and sud-
den setbacks.17 The Maatschappij tot Nut van ’t Algemeen (Society for Public Welfare) played a 
pioneering role in this respect. The society was established in 1784. Its founders believed that 
education was the best remedy against poverty and immorality. Several local branches took the 
initiative to set up local funds or nutsfondsen. The fi rst two were created in 1809, in Alphen 
aan den Rijn and Blokzijl. The former was a sickness fund that concentrated exclusively on 
insurance to provide sickness benefi t and cover medical costs. The latter fund was broader in 
scope and also offered insurance for funeral expenses, accidents and even old-age pensions.18
The nutsfondsen gradually increased in number from 26 in 1850 to 60 in 1890. In most cases, 
they did not compete with existing mutual societies. The vast majority of nutsfondsen were set 
up in rural areas. Several were set up in rural Friesland between 1835 and 1840, mainly for 
agricultural workers who were employed on a seasonal basis and therefore had a limited and 
irregular income. Due to their limited fi nancial means, and hence the small fi nancial reserves 
of the fund, the amount of benefi t paid was often very modest. It was intended to provide a 
much-needed supplement to the support provided by local church funds, and possibly civic 
poor relief. The nutsfondsen were not mutual societies in the true sense of the word. In most 
cases, they were not (or not entirely) run by worker-members but by administrators of the 
local branch of the Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen. Sometimes non-members ran the fund 
in the capacity of experts. However, most branches made efforts to involve members in their 
administration, in accordance with the principle of popular education. This was particularly 
successful when the nutsfonds also had members from the middle classes.
When compared with Belgium, the wide distribution of general funds in the Netherlands 
is immediately striking. In Belgium, too, socially enlightened spirits such as Vilain XIIII in 
the eighteenth century, and Edouard Ducpétiaux in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, 
were very active. However, the south lacked a well-structured national organisation such as 
Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen, which had become fi rmly established with its branches 
in Noord Holland, Zuid Holland, Friesland, Groningen, Zeeland and Overijssel.
b. Nutsfondsen and commercial funds: plugging the largest gaps
Mutual societies covered only part of the insurance market. A signifi cant proportion of the 
population had no access to a mutual society in their town or village. Many inhabitants of 
rural communities had to manage without a local mutual society. Even where they did exist, 
certain occupations and large sections of the population (e.g. women and children) were 
excluded from membership. Moreover, many mutual funds were small-scale, and their fees 
and services were therefore not differentiated or geared to the needs of potential clients. The 
mutual societies too often treated their members as a homogeneous group, and failed to 
recognise the heterogeneous nature of the needs and fi nancial capacity of the population.
These gaps and weaknesses were exploited above all by directiefondsen, commercial funds, 
which penetrated the insurance market in the Netherlands and gained a not-insignifi cant 
market share. In contrast to the mutual funds, whose administrators often worked on a 
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voluntary, unsalaried basis and distributed any surpluses to members, the administrators of 
the commercial funds awarded themselves a sometimes enormous salary, as well as an annual 
share of the profi ts. Members had no say over fi nancial or other policy. As many as twenty 
commercial funds were founded before the Royal Decree van 1820. All of them offered 
insurance for death benefi t, which could be combined with sickness benefi t insurance (two 
funds) and/or insurance to cover medical costs (thirteen funds). After the Royal Decree of 
1820, the number of commercial funds increased from 22 to 55 in 1830, but only half of these 
also offered insurance for the consequences of illness. By 1850 they had increased further 
to 84, of which one-quarter and half, respectively, offered insurance for sickness benefi t and 
medical costs, although almost all of them offered funeral insurance.
A national survey in 1827 showed that, although the number of commercial funds was low 
compared to the number of mutual funds, they accounted for approximately one-quarter of 
all insured persons. They had a much larger average membership base of these commercial 
funds, than the purely mutual funds. This was helped by the fact that they offered differentiated 
tariffs according to the type of insurance, so that virtually any citizen – from not-too-poor to 
Stamped membership card of the Schiedam association Nut en Voorzorg, 1859 
THE BIRTH OF MODERN HEALTH-INSURANCE FUNDS 55
wealthy – could fi nd insurance to suit their own needs and pocket. Moreover, commercial 
funds were usually open to anyone, including women and children. In the light of later deve-
lopments, it is interesting to note that several commercial funds not only admitted members 
from a particular city or municipality but also, in contrast to other health-insurance funds, 
began to operate on a regional and even national basis. 
c. Doctors’ funds and company funds: a tentative beginning
Before 1850, in addition to the purely mutual funds, the nutsfondsen and the commercial 
funds, some twenty doctors’ funds had been set up – some in rural areas, others in urban 
areas. The structure and scale of the funds, and the reasons for setting them up, varied widely. 
In rural areas, the initiative was taken by individual doctors. They were confronted with a 
less-than-wealthy population, which meant that their services were not in great demand and 
there were too few private patients in these isolated rural communities. In order to secure 
a reasonable income for themselves, as well as enabling those of limited means to make use 
of their services, individual doctors set up their own small insurance funds. Each doctor was 
the sole producer and administrator of the fund. Patient-members usually had no infl uence 
or control19 over these small-scale funds.
The situation in the cities was completely different. Here, too, more and more doctors 
were facing the same problems with regard to making a living, particularly after 1830. The 
number of doctors was increasing, but in most cases they had only a very limited number of 
fi nancially solvent patients. The few wealthy private patients were cared for by a small group of 
more senior physicians. Those with limited means were often cared for by doctors employed 
by the funds. In order to keep the membership fee low and increase profi ts, doctors’ salaries 
were kept at an almost unliveable minimum. In some funds, a single doctor was responsible 
for no less than 2,000 or even 3,000 members.
Doctors in a number of cities gradually rose up against these medical abuses, and in particular 
their awkward income situation. They formed groups to set up their own funds. A doctors’ 
fund was set up in Schiedam in 1819, and for a long time it was the fi rst and only such fund. 
The breakthrough came in the 1840s with the creation of doctors’ funds in Zierikzee (1840), 
Nijmegen (1844), Vlaardingen and Dordrecht (1845), but the fi gurehead was the Algemeen 
Ziekenfonds te Amsterdam (AZA), which was set up in 1846. It was an immediate success. By 
1850 it had no less than 6,500 members and was the largest health-insurance fund in Am-
sterdam – and probably the Netherlands. 
The administrative structure, regulations and operation of the AZA served as an example 
for a whole series of new doctors’ funds. The founders of the AZA straightaway excluded two 
sections of the population from membership, namely the wealthiest citizens (to whom the 
system of income-related tariffs applied) and those of no means who were unable to pay the 
regular membership fee. Membership of the AZA was therefore open only to people of limited 
means, i.e. those whose incomes were within the income limits stipulated in its regulations. 
It does not require a great deal of imagination to recognise in this three-tier system the basis 
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for the modern health-insurance system in the Netherlands. Those who were admitted as 
members paid a subscription fee and were able to choose between the doctors and pharma-
cists affi liated to the AZA. Members had no say in the management or administration of the 
fund, which was run exclusively by its participants, i.e. the doctors who formed the General 
Meeting, which in turn appointed the medical committee and Supervisory Board. 
In Ghent, the management boards of several factories took the initiative to set up company 
funds to provide their employees with health insurance and funeral insurance. Such initia-
tives were rare in the Netherlands before the mid-nineteenth century. An early pioneer in 
this respect was the voluntary sickness and funeral fund of the textile factory H. Kretschmer 
& Co in Zutphen. The initiative was slow to take hold: in the 1820s it had only 45 mem-
bers, or 10% of the factory workforce. The low percentage of members refl ects the fact that 
membership was voluntary. Although membership was not compulsory, it appears that, in 
the majority of company funds (including those in Ghent), employees were at the very least 
put under considerable pressure to join a health-insurance fund set up and supervised by 
the management. The Kretschmer fund ceased when the company closed in 1849. In Rot-
terdam, shortly after the opening of the Feijenoord shipyard in 1825, G.M. Roentgen set 
up a health-insurance fund for his employees. The only companies to follow this example 
before 1850 were the P. van Vlissingen and D. van Heel machine factory (1838), the railway 
company HIJSM (1843), the Schutte & Weiler machine factory (1845) and the Netherlands 
Sugar Refi nery (shortly before 1850).20
Clearly, the small number of factory societies is due to the fact that the Netherlands had no 
large companies and no mining industry. In small companies, where the relationship between 
employer and employee was less distant, staff experiencing family problems often received 
assistance directly from their employer. Small and medium-sized companies formed a sector 
health-insurance fund, but this was an exception. In 1845, the owners of steam-powered 
diamond-cutting factories in Amsterdam set up a fund designed to strengthen their skilled 
employees’ loyalty to the company and the modern, expensive machinery.
Although it is diffi cult to form a global or detailed picture of the situation in the Nether-
lands as well as for Belgium, it appears that, as in Ghent, a large number of funds were active 
in the largest Dutch cities. In Amsterdam in 1842, before the creation of the AZA, there were 
already 71 funds for medical care. According to Van Genabeek, in 1842 almost one-quarter 
of the population of Amsterdam were insured for medical treatment with a local mutual fund 
or a commercial fund.21 This number is surprisingly high, given the fact that wealthy citizens 
– but above all the vast numbers of paupers – were in principle excluded from membership. 
However, it is clear that we must not draw any far-reaching conclusions for the Netherlands 
as a whole from statistics that relate to Amsterdam alone.
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Summary
As in the south, the uncertain existence and eventual abolition of the guilds in the north 
did not result in the disappearance of the occupation-related mutual societies. The disappea-
rance of hundreds of craft guilds, and the fact that membership was no longer compulsory, 
led to an enormous decrease in membership. The ban on coalitions did not apply to funds 
set up for the purpose of mutual assistance. Apart from offi cially approving these mutual 
societies, the local, provincial and national authorities took very few initiatives to support 
mutual-relief funds. 
After 1820, the market was opened up to private initiatives. In contrast to the situation in 
Flemish cities, hardly any new occupation-related mutual societies were set up, although the 
number of general mutual funds increased. In addition, general mutual funds were set up in 
rural areas on the initiative of social organisations and reformers. The Maatschappij tot het Nut 
van ’t Algemeen (Society for Public Welfare) and its nutsfondsen played a leading role in this. 
In addition to these non-profi t funds, there were also commercial funds whose administrators 
awarded themselves a salary – huge in some cases – and a share of the profi ts. The operational 
and fi nancial activities of these funds were not supervised. The commercial funds accounted 
for approximately one-quarter of all insured persons and their tariffs were differentiated ac-
cording to the type of insurance. Other advantages were that membership was open to almost 
anyone, they were not linked to a specifi c location, and they began to operate on a regional 
and national level. Before the mid-nineteenth century, twenty doctors’ funds had been set 
up, some in rural areas and others in urban areas. Their structure and scale varied widely, 
as did the reasons for setting them up. In rural areas, individual doctors were the ‘producer’ 
and administrator of their fund. Doctors in the towns and cities struggled to make a living, 
due to the level of competition. They gradually rose up against these medical abuses and the 
lack of social security, and formed groups to set up their own health-insurance funds. In the 
Netherlands, in contrast to Belgium and Germany, factory funds were fairly rare. 
3. The German funds: tradition and renewal
a. Health insurance: a local concern
In most German states during the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, as in the United Kingdom 
of the Netherlands (1815-1830) and in Belgium after 1830, the government remained passive 
towards health insurance in general and insurance funds in particular. The governments of the 
38 German states created by the Congress of Vienna made do with superfi cial monitoring 
of the fi nancial health of the funds in order to prevent misuse and, most of all, to keep the 
money from being used to fi nance illegal strikes – the eternal fear of the bourgeoisie. 
A whole series of mutual funds – some of them centuries old, others set up more recently – 
insured their members for illness, accidents and, above all, funeral expenses. The vast majority 
of funds recruited their members from the local craft trades and industries. Although the guilds 
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had been offi cially abolished in several German states, almost every craft trade and profession 
had its own health-insurance fund. In contrast to the Netherlands, these occupation-related 
funds (e.g. the mineworkers’ Knappschaften) continued to exclude ‘outsiders’ until well into 
the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth century. Attempts by the local authori-
ties to encourage these small (and too-small) funds to work together or merge were unsuc-
cessful. Bielefeld is a striking example. In 1826, an early attempt by the local authority to 
persuade the six small metalworkers’ funds to merge was unsuccessful. Only the blacksmiths 
and locksmiths were willing to form a single large fund. The four other professions resolutely 
refused to disband their own organisations. For these groups, autonomy and self-governance 
was apparently more important than spreading risk more effectively.22 In Germany, mutual 
funds therefore remained small, usually with less than one hundred members. Funds with 
several hundred members were in the minority, and funds that managed to attract more 
than a thousand members were highly exceptional.23 There were considerable differences 
in membership conditions, contributions, insurance offered, and benefi t payments. The 
contribution paid by members of funds in Westphalia and Lippe varied from DM 0.20 to 
0.30 per month, while sickness benefi ts ranged from DM 1.50 to 7.50 per week. Almost all 
funds were also burial funds that made provision for a decent funeral and death benefi t.24 In 
addition to sickness benefi t, some funds also insured for medical treatment, nursing, and even 
free medicines. Before 1850, then, there was no fundamental difference between the German 
mutual societies and those in the Netherlands and Belgium before 1850.
b.  Bavaria and Prussia: a shift in the approach of national government
In a number of German states, however, the government did introduce initiatives to stimulate 
and improve insurance for illness and work-related accidents for the working population. 
Typically, before 1850, the governments of the two most important German states – Bavaria 
and Prussia – had already introduced a number of important laws and regulations relating to 
health insurance and health-insurance funds. One of the main reasons for this intervention was 
the growing problem of poverty in the cities. In Bavaria in 1816, the government instructed 
the local authorities to set up their own municipal institutions to care for the poor and sick. 
The Bavarian government clearly intended to exclude the church from caring for the poor 
and sick, as had already happened in France and the Southern Netherlands. However, civic 
care was restricted to those who had been born in the municipality. In principle, as had been 
the case in the past, newcomers remained the responsibility of the municipality in which they 
were born. For the poor-relief administrators, however, it was a complicated, time-consuming 
and often fruitless task to recoup, from the relevant local authority, the benefi ts and medical 
costs paid to residents who were born elsewhere.
The legislation introduced in 1816 caused serious fi nancial problems for civic authorities. 
In order to control expenditure on poor relief, at the same time the national government 
therefore instructed craft journeymen and servants, who had often moved into the cities from 
rural areas, to set up their own health-insurance funds, since they were not usually admitted to 
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the existing occupation-related funds. These municipal funds would be fi nanced mittels kleinen 
Beiträge von Ihren Lohne (‘through a small contribution from their wage’). However, the modest 
contribution was not enough to provide full insurance. The government hoped – usually in 
vain – that the masters and patrons would also make a contribution. In practice, however, the 
local poor-relief boards had to subsidise the municipal health-insurance funds.25
These recommendations by the national government appear to have been inadequate 
because, in 1832, compulsory hospital insurance was introduced for certain sections of the 
population in Bavaria. It was proving too complicated and unsuccessful for local authorities 
to recoup the cost of hospital care for poor migrant craft journeymen and industrial workers 
from the municipalities from which they had come. Not surprisingly, these efforts brought 
too few results. Bills often remained unpaid, which meant that the hospitals’ defi cits mounted 
and local authorities were continually obliged to fi ll new fi nancial gaps. Insurance was made 
compulsory for this vulnerable group of workers who performed low-paid and irregular 
work. Another new measure was the compulsory share of the contribution to be paid by 
their employers. Compulsory insurance covered approximately one-third of hospital costs, but 
did not provide sickness benefi t for employees. Clearly, then, the local authority rather than 
the insured person benefi ted from this type of insurance. Other states in southern Germany 
soon followed the example of Bavaria. In northern Germany, by contrast, hospital insurance 
was usually introduced on a voluntary basis.26
The Bavarian government concluded this round of legislation in 1850 by requiring local 
authorities, where possible through the poor-relief system, to provide assistance to anyone 
living within their municipality. The criterion for poor relief was no longer the place of birth, 
but the place of domicile. In certain respects, the insurance system in Bavaria was similar to 
today’s general compulsory health insurance and, to a certain extent, can be regarded as its 
precursor, since it was organised by local authorities, on a (limited) interprofessional basis, 
on the initiative of the national government. Membership was compulsory for a large sec-
tion of the working population. The principle whereby the contribution was paid jointly by 
the insured person and his employer was incorporated in subsequent legislation relating to 
health insurance for employees.
The Prussian government was even more active than the Bavarian government when it 
came to health insurance for the working population. As early as 1783 and 1794, the Prussian 
government intervened in the fi eld of health insurance through the implementation of the 
Allgemeines Landrecht (common law). In the fi rst place, health insurance for guild journey-
men had to be organised and guaranteed through their journeymen’s societies.27 In Prussia, 
as in the Netherlands and Belgium, the basic conditions of the journeymen’s funds varied 
widely from city to city. In Berlin, for example, fund membership was compulsory for all 
journeymen. In Elberfeld, on the other hand, membership was voluntary. In the fi rst half 
of the nineteenth century, the rapid growth of the factory proletariat was already caus-
ing serious fi nancial problems for the industrial cities in the Rhine area.28 From the 1820s 
onward, a number of cities begged the national government to introduce clear legislation, 
preferably in the form of compulsory health insurance. 
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1842 saw the reform of the poor-relief system in Prussia. Under the new system, the place 
of domicile rather than the place of birth was the basis for providing fi nancial assistance. As 
a result, the rapidly expanding industrial cities in the Rhine area could no longer recoup 
from other local authorities either all or part of the enormous bills for hospital care and 
poor relief. Compulsory insurance was the only way to keep these costs at a reasonable level. 
Partly as a result of the serious economic crisis and the desperate plight of factory workers, 
the government was forced to implement the Allgemeine Gewerbeordung (common labour 
ordinance) in 1845. This legislation, issued half a century after the French Revolution, abo-
lished the privileges of the guilds and introduced freedom of occupation. This threatened to 
bring an end to the protection enjoyed by the craft journeymen and their apprentices. The 
act therefore contained special provisions to protect workers from the Wechselfällen des Lebens 
(vicissitudes of life).29 The local authorities were granted statutory powers to require craftsmen 
and workers to join a mutual society for health insurance. In addition, the authorities were 
encouraged to set up, where necessary, their own general (interprofessional) insurance funds 
for employees who were unable or did not wish to join the traditional occupation-related 
funds. A Verordnung of 9 February 1849 further specifi ed that employers had to pay between 
one-third and half of the contribution.30
However, for the time being there appeared to be an almost unbridgeable gap between 
theory and practice. Contrary to expectations, most local authorities made only limited use 
of their powers to prescribe the founding and compulsory membership of municipal health-
insurance funds. On the one hand they encountered resistance from employers who used all 
manner of clever interpretations of the law in order to avoid paying their contribution. On the 
other hand, the existing craft-trade funds fi ercely resisted the creation of competing general 
funds that were threatening to undermine their monopoly. Municipal insurance funds were 
created almost exclusively in new industrial towns and cities, where the hindering infl uence 
of traditional professional structures was minimal.31 In Düsseldorf in 1852, for example, the 
civic authority introduced compulsory membership for industrial workers. Six new health-
insurance funds were created following the introduction of this measure. 
The foundation for the basic structure of the German health-insurance system as it exists 
today was therefore laid around the mid-nineteenth century in Prussia. The existing funds, 
primarily those for the craft trades, were allowed to continue operating under certain condi-
tions as recognised Hilfskassen (health-insurance funds). The municipalities were encouraged 
to set up one or more Gemeindekassen (common funds). In addition, the government set up 
Ortskassen (factory workers’ funds) in the industrial regions. In contrast to the traditional craft 
trades, which lost their centuries-old privileges as a result of the Allgemeine Gewerbeordnung,
the Knappschaften retained their privileged position in the mining areas. Membership was no 
longer compulsory for mineworkers but, by the mid-nineteenth century, near enough 80 
to 90% of mineworkers were members of these occupation-related funds. Another notable 
development was the rapid increase in factory funds before 1850. Whereas some employers 
tried to avoid paying their contribution, others took the initiative to set up their own company 
health-insurance funds. These funds were founded on the basis of philanthropic ideals as well 
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as commercial motives. By around 1850, several management boards had set up factory funds 
for their employees. In Westphalia alone, there were 26 funds set up by individual companies 
and 14 funds that insured the employees of several companies. The Gewerbeordnung made it 
possible for management boards of factories to require workers who wished to insure them-
selves to do so via the factory fund. In the years that followed, the number of factor funds 
in Westphalia increased rapidly to no less than 188, with approximately thirty-fi ve thousand 
insured members in 1868 – considerably more than the combined membership of the vari-
ous voluntary funds (10,000) and Ortskassen (14,000).32
Summary
The governments of most German states, as in Belgium and the Netherlands,  adopted a ‘wait 
and see’ approach. Although the guilds had been offi cially abolished, the government openly 
allowed or turned a blind eye to any profession that organised its own fund or mutual society 
to insure members for illness, accidents and funeral expenses. In contrast to the Netherlands, 
these occupation-related funds remained closed to ‘outsiders’ until well into the nineteenth 
century and even in the twentieth century, and therefore generally remained small. 
In Prussia and Bavaria, two of the most powerful German states, the governments did in-
troduce initiatives to stimulate and improve insurance for illness and work-related accidents 
for the working population. In Prussia, this led to a radical reform of the poor-relief system in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Under the new system, the place of domicile rather 
than the place of birth was responsible for providing fi nancial assistance to those of little or 
no means. Compulsory health insurance was the only way for the cities to meet the cost of 
providing assistance for migrant workers from rural areas. In 1845, the Prussian government 
implemented the Allgemeine Gewerbeordnung. This legislation, issued half a century after the 
French Revolution, abolished guild privileges and introduced freedom of occupation. Local 
authorities were granted statutory powers to require craftsmen and workers to set up their 
own mutual health-insurance funds. 
The basic structure of the modern German health-insurance system was formed in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Hilfskassen were allowed to continue operating, subject to certain 
conditions. Local authorities were encouraged to set up one or more general health-insurance 
funds or Gemeindekassen. In addition, the government set up factory workers’ funds  or Orts-
kassen in the industrial regions. In contrast to the traditional craft trades, which lost their 
traditional rights as a result of the Allgemeine Gewerbeordnung, the centuries-old Knappschaften
retained their privileged position in the mining areas. A notable development was the rapid 
expansion in Betriebskassen or factory funds before 1850. These funds were founded on the 
basis of philanthropic ideals as well as commercial motives.
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Chapter IV
HEALTH INSURANCE AS A GOVERNMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, 1850-1914
1. Germany: the government obligates
a. The Prussians take charge
Between 1849 and 1853, 226 Prussian municipalities made it mandatory for employees to 
sign up with a health-insurance fund. Apparently the government was dissatisfi ed with the 
low rate of growth. In 1854 the Unterstützungskassengesetz (Relief Fund Act) was enacted, 
which greatly strengthened the Prussian government’s hold on health insurance. Through this 
law, local governments were also given the right to establish a fund and to oblige labourers, 
journeymen and apprentices to sign up for it. The law bolstered the government’s supervi-
sion of the health-insurance system.1 It enabled local governments to keep the voluntary
health-insurance funds from using contributions and general meetings for political ends or 
for organising strikes.2 The employer could be compelled to pay half the contribution. Fac-
tory owners who responded by deducting contributions from their workers’ wages faced 
the threat of prosecution. By introducing the compulsory employers’ contribution, which 
is what happened with hospital insurance in Bavaria, the government’s aim in the wake of 
the revolutions of 1848-1849 was to force employers to pay more attention to the working 
conditions and the health of their employees. At the same time, the employers’ contribution 
created fi nancial stability within the healthcare funds and reduced the pressure on urban 
poor relief. Not only was the compulsory employers’ contribution a unique phenomenon 
in Europe, but the legislature also handed the leadership of the funds over to a board made 
up of contributors who were proportionally represented on the basis of their contributions. 
For the municipal funds and Ortskassen (local health-care funds) this meant the introduction 
of joint self-rule by representatives of workers and employers. Conversely, the factory funds 
were directed exclusively by the managements of the various companies and the Knappschaften
by the mineworkers.
The Unterstützungskassengesetz of 1854 had an especially powerful impact on the mine-
workers’ funds. A unifi ed structure was imposed on the Knappschaftskassen, many of them 
centuries old. They were now offi cially to be known as insurance institutions, and all the 
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mineworkers of Prussia were obliged to join. The Knappschaftskassen were required by the 
government to disburse sick pay and widows’ and orphans’ benefi ts as well as accident, dis-
ability and old-age benefi ts. The government also established a uniform minimum insurance, 
and a Mindestleistung (minimum benefi t) was imposed for nursing, sick pay, lifelong disability 
benefi ts, funeral expenses, and widows’ and orphans’ benefi ts (up to fourteen years of age) 
in the event of death and disability. Finally, the self-rule of the Knappschaftskassen, although 
under the supervision of the government, was now offi cially confi rmed.
The efforts of the Prussian government achieved clear results. Throughout Prussia, the 
number of relief funds run by and serving the craft guilds rose from 2,219 in 1860 (with 
157,664 members) to 2,857 in 1870 (with 234,771 members). The number of funds for 
industrial workers rose from 779 in 1860 to 1,533 in 1870, while the number of members 
more than doubled within a single decade, from 170,847 to 358,232. These growth fi gures 
illustrate not only the rapid expansion of the health-insurance system but also the spectacular 
structural change in the Prussian economy. Industry, especially in the Rhineland and Ruhr 
Area, forced agriculture and the crafts far into the background.
The Prussian law of 1854 would serve as an example and be adopted in the coming years by 
the governments in other German mining states. Similar rulings were announced in Braun-
schweig (1867), Bavaria (1869), Wurtemberg (1874), Anhalt (1875) and Hessen (1876).3 So 
even before 1883, German politicians, entrepreneurs and labour organisations had acquired 
experience with an extensive, compulsory sickness and accident insurance system, albeit 
temporarily limited to the workers in one important industry. In around 1870 employees’ 
healthcare insurance was more highly developed in a number of German cities than in any 
other European country, although it would be a mistake to idealise it. Substantial differences 
still existed from state to state. Some German states followed developments in Prussia with 
great reluctance and years of delay. In Baden, for example, the guilds were not abolished until 
1862, only to be replaced by voluntary journeymen’s funds that craftsmen could join on a 
voluntary basis.4 The skilled manual labourers, who had once enjoyed the relative security 
of their guilds, thereby lost a degree of protection. However, the industrial workers of Baden 
were given the opportunity to join the journeymen’s funds on a voluntary basis. In Saxony, 
on the other hand, the government surpassed Prussia. In 1868 a law was approved (23 June 
1868) making all journeymen, apprentices and workers subject to compulsory insurance and 
contributions. In other words, general and compulsory health insurance was introduced in 
Saxony for most craft and industrial workers at the national level.
Besides important differences at the state level, there were also major differences within 
the same state and even within the same city. These were differences between the various 
healthcare funds in terms of admission requirements (self-employed, journeyman, labourer), 
contribution and insurance coverage. Moving house, or even making a change in place 
of employment or business, could seriously imperil the insured person’s social security. In 
addition, the fi nancial strength of most of the health-care funds was very limited. In 1864 
the average journeymen’s fund had only 84 members, and that of the factory workers 232 
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members, mainly thanks to the factory funds.5 This made the funds highly vulnerable when 
outbreaks of catastrophic contagious illnesses occurred.
b. Unity and centralisation: Bismarck steps in
Political and socio-economic factors would see to it that between 1865 and 1885 more unity 
and centralisation could be brought to bear on this tangle of health-insurance funds. In 1869 
an important step towards the political unifi cation of Germany was taken with the establish-
ment of the Norddeutsche Bund under Prussian leadership. In 1871, after the victory in the 
French-German war, the German empire was declared. The Prussian king became the new 
Kaiser, Wilhelm I, with Bismarck as chancellor of the greater German state. Bismarck’s aim 
was to strengthen central authority and create more unity in the new nation by streamlining 
the legislation of the states. By adopting this policy, however, he soon found himself crossing 
swords with the liberal urban middle class, who saw no good in a strong central government 
in Berlin and strove to maintain a decentralised system that was as broad as possible. Bismarck 
was also confronted with a rapidly growing German socialist movement that was seeking 
rapprochement with the First International, with Karl Marx as one of its most prominent 
leaders. German socialism grew into a political factor of signifi cance with the emergence of 
the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), brought about by the merging of two smaller 
parties during the Congress of Gotha in 1875. 
The serious economic slump that had been plaguing the European economy since 1873 
increased the misery of the proletariat and intensifi ed social differences. Demonstrations, riots 
and strikes had the industrial centres in their grip. Bismarck and the factory owners feared a 
socialist takeover like the one Paris had experienced with the Commune in 1871. To neutralise 
the socialist threat to his young German state, Bismarck took both repressive and progressive 
measures in the political and socio-economic arenas. When two attacks on the Kaiser were 
carried out, in May and June 1878, the chancellor eagerly seized the opportunity to outlaw 
the socialist party as a danger to the German empire. On the other hand, Bismarck attempted 
to bind the working masses to the German state with a progressive, centrally oriented social 
policy. After all, he was keenly aware that the rapidly growing working proletariat in the 
industrial cities and regions urgently needed a social safety net as a satisfactory alternative to 
the now defunct poor relief once offered in their small-scale agrarian or craft communities. 
In Bismarck’s eyes, national social legislation had to meet workers’ demands for things like 
a shorter work week, higher wages, humane housing and social security, insofar as it served 
the national interest. Pressure was also being applied outside the workers’ movement to do 
something about the problem of the poor and the workers. The Catholic and Protestant 
churches insisted that the government take measures to remedy the grinding and almost 
hopeless poverty. At the same time, the lamentation of the city governments − that poor 
relief was draining their treasuries dry and leaving them in wretched condition − continued 
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unabated. The fact was that many old or disabled workers who had no means of support 
ended up living from the poor coffers.
In 1876 Bismarck turned to the existing voluntary relief funds in an effort to obtain a 
fi rmer grip on the health-insurance situation and to improve and stimulate the funds’ 
operation by putting them under state supervision. To be permitted to continue their work, 
they had to be recognised by the government as eingeschriebene Hilfskassen and to submit to 
tighter government control. In addition, the insurance package had to comply with a set of 
minimum conditions in order to better guarantee the protection of enrolled workers. The 
tightening up of government controls, and especially the imposition of a minimum amount 
for paid benefi ts, had the opposite effect, however, and resulted in a drop in the number of 
funds. By 1881 only about half the workers were insured against loss of wages and medical 
costs. But Bismarck and the federal government were not the only ones who were becoming 
increasingly convinced that the government could and should intervene. A broad spectrum 
of the population began embracing the idea that a worker’s poverty had less to do with his 
personal, individual and moral failure than with the external or natural accidents of his life. It 
became a challenge and a charge for the state to fi nd a sound solution to the problem. Rather 
than the more selective poor relief, the solution would have to come from the expansion 
of a social insurance system with contributions from three parties: workers, employers and 
the government. Benefi t payments made through this social insurance could be fi nanced by 
contributions and withholdings based on work performance.
c. The law of 1883: the introduction of compulsory health insurance
In 1881 Bismarck put forward an initial proposal for the introduction of a centrally organised, 
national accident, medical and old-age insurance. However, his tightly centralised plans im-
mediately met with strong resistance among the urban liberal middle class in several states. 
They saw no benefi t in a programme of state socialism organised and directed from Berlin. 
The existing health-insurance funds also exerted intense pressure on the Reichstag MPs in 
order to safeguard their operations and autonomy, which is what had happened earlier in 
Prussia. In order to dismantle this broad and strong resistance, Bismarck fl oated the idea of 
one big social unity law. He designed a separate regulation for health insurance, which was 
passed by parliament by a large majority on 15 June 1883 as the Gewerbliche Gesetz betreffend 
die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter (Social Health Insurance Law for Labourers (KVG)).
With the KVG of 1883, the German government introduced compulsory health insurance 
for all workers and wage earners in industry, mining and skilled enterprises. All other emplo-
yees were entitled to join an existing Gemeinde or Ortskrankenkasse (municipal fund) without 
income limit and without obligation. The contribution was set at a percentage of the normal 
daily wage (usually 2 to 3%), one-third of which was to be paid by the employer. The fund 
took care of paying for medical expenses and medicines, and in the event of disability usually 
paid half the normal daily wage. Healthcare benefi ts were limited to thirteen weeks, however, 
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and in very exceptional cases to a maximum of one year.6 Women in childbed received the 
same benefi ts for a period of three weeks after the birth of the child. Death payments were 
also made, following the normal practice of the mutual funds.7 These Mindestleistungen (mini-
mum benefi ts) were compulsory for all funds. Naturally the health-insurance funds were free 
to provide more extensive support and higher fi nancial interventions to their members. The 
existing voluntary relief funds enjoyed a limited exception: they were allowed to pay a sum 
of money directly to their members to cover doctors’ fees or medicine, as they had done 
before, instead of arranging for a visit by a contracted health-insurance physician.
This law was Chancellor Bismarck’s attempt not only to provide the growing working class 
with more social security but also to take the wind out of the sails of the outlawed socialist 
party. Bismarck dropped the idea of tight state centralisation as well, and he integrated the 
existing health-insurance funds into his own system. Their statutes and operations would now 
be controlled by state government offi cials, however, instead of by the local authorities. On 
the other hand, the members of the health-insurance funds were allowed to form their own 
administrative boards, with proportional representation based on contributions. This meant 
that two-thirds of the board members were provided by the employees and one-third by 
the employer. From now on the factory directorates had to share the management of the 
Betriebskassen with their employees on the basis of contribution, which they usually did with 
reluctance. According to Bismarck, this drop of democratic co-management or corporatistic 
oil would make the gears of health insurance run more smoothly. In addition to the Gemeinde
(municipal)  and Ort (regional) funds, Betriebe (industrial)  and Innung (sectoral) funds captured 
the better part of the market. There were also specifi c funds for higher-risk professions, such 
as construction workers and seamen. Finally, the existing Hilfkassen, formed and managed 
by the workers themselves, were allowed to continue operating as long as their statutes were 
recognised and approved as insurance funds. The boards of the recognised relief funds were 
chosen exclusively by their worker-members.
The law of 1883 is generally regarded as the basis of the modern health-insurance system, 
not only within the German empire but throughout the Western world as well. However, 
the law of 1883 did not form a real break with the past, nor did it represent a spectacular 
innovation, as is sometimes suggested. Compulsory insurance for mineworkers and even for 
labourers (Saxony) already existed in several states. What the new law did was to impose this 
compulsory insurance on a large portion of the wage earners throughout Germany. This 
imposition of a far-reaching social law by the government of one of Europe’s major super-
powers did not go unheeded in other countries. In the years that followed, policymakers and 
labour organisations in many countries held up the German legislation as a shining example 
in their discussions and proposals. Each ideology found something in the law to suit it: the 
liberals were charmed by the relative freedom of the health-insurance funds, Catholics and 
Protestants were taken by the subsidiarity principle (albeit mitigated) and self-rule in the
voluntary healthcare funds, and the socialists would recognise (although not until the nine-
ties) the positive effect of state intervention.
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In the following years Bismarck fl eshed out the KVG with compulsory insurance against 
industrial accidents by employers. In 1889 he completed the last part of his original unity 
law with a disability and old-age act. This last law provided fi nancial support to workers who 
were disabled and to all employees seventy years of age and older with an annual income 
less than DM 2,000.8
d. Peaceful growth, 1883-1914
Although the law of 1883 can undoubtedly be called progressive and signifi ed a giant step 
forward in employee social security, the KVG was certainly not perfect. Skilled craftsmen and 
weak groups such as domestic servants, day labourers and apprentices were not included in 
the compulsory application of the law. Because of their irregular and low-paid work, these 
last three groups were often not in a position to pay a full contribution. It may be that by 
excluding them from the compulsory system, Bismarck was trying to prevent them from 
undermining the fi nancial stability of the compulsory insurance system before it had even 
begun. They were still required to be insured for hospital costs in many states, as they had 
been before, and this insurance was even expanded to cover out-patient treatment and the 
purchase of medicines. These workers remained excluded from other benefi ts, however, such 
as the right to sick pay.9
The vast group of agricultural workers were also excluded from the benefi ts of the KVG,
under pressure from the large landowners who did not want to contribute to the insurance. 
Obviously the Chancellor had no desire to offend this powerful group of landowners. Bis-
marck’s fi rst concern was clearly to defuse the time bomb of socialism in the industrial centres 
and regions. Apparently, for the Chancellor, not all German workers were equal.
There were still considerable inequalities between the funds themselves. The voluntary
relief funds and the municipal funds in particular, which the poorest workers usually joined 
because of the low contribution, often limited their intervention to the minimal legal re-
quirements. With the Krankenversicherungsgesetz (Health Insurance Act) of 10 April 1892, one 
more step was taken towards the levelling out of the health-insurance funds. Like the other 
funds, the voluntary relief funds were required to stop making direct payments for doctors’ 
visits and medicines. Now they also had to provide free help through one of the physicians 
and pharmacists connected with the fund. For a great many voluntary relief funds this seems 
to have created considerable additional expenses and as well as the suspension of the funds’ 
activities.
These weaknesses and loopholes in the law of 1883 should not be allowed to eclipse its 
positive effects, however. Until the First World War broke out, German health insurance ex-
perienced a period of peaceful growth. Advancing industrialisation automatically added to 
the membership rolls. The insurance was also gradually expanded to include other population 
groups. In 1892 the family members of those with compulsory insurance were included in 
the public health system as well.
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In around 1910 there were more than 8,200 municipal health-insurance funds in Germany, 
almost 8,000 factory funds, 4,800 regional funds, about 600 sectoral funds and a few dozen 
specifi c funds. Only the number of workers’ relief funds had decreased since 1883, from about 
1,800 to more than 1,200. Municipal and factory funds each accounted for one-third of the 
insured persons, the Ortskrankenkassen for 20% and the rest together for about 15%.
Despite the continuous growth, in 1910 only ten million citizens, or less than 20% of the 
total German population, were insured by the compulsory health-insurance system spread 
out over 24,000 funds. The whole system formed an almost unwieldy tangle of numerous 
mini-funds in addition to a few gigantic institutions. This fragmentation led to high ad-
ministrative costs, ineffi cient supervision and excessive discrepancies in tariffs and coverage. 
There were other parts of the social insurance system with obvious defi ciencies as well. For 
this reason, a thorough renovation of the entire social insurance system was carried out −the 
Reichsversicherungsordnung (Imperial Insurance Regulation (RVO)) of August 1911 − which 
included industrial accident insurance, old-age insurance and disability insurance. The changes 
in health insurance went into effect on 1 January 1914.
The main adjustments had to do with the small scale of the health-insurance funds and 
the expansion of the insurance to include new population groups. The thousands of often 
tiny municipal funds were shut down, and in most cases their members were transferred to 
the Ortskassen. The other funds were required to have a minimum number of members. The 
factory funds, for example, had to have at least one hundred members in order to continue 
operating. This meant that many voluntary relief funds and more than one-third of the factory 
funds and voluntary funds terminated their activities or merged. Interestingly enough, almost 
no changes were made to the mineworkers’ traditional Knappschaftswesen. The minimum 
membership size did not apply to these funds as long as they offered their members at least 
the same benefi ts as the Ortskassen. Compulsory insurance underwent considerable expansion 
with the application of the law of 1914 when six to seven million farm and forest workers, 
domestic servants, day labourers and seasonal workers were added to the rolls. At the same 
time, the income limit was raised from DM 2,000 to DM 2,500. Workers with a higher annual 
income could join on a voluntary basis and receive sick pay.
e. The socialists and health insurance
One of Bismarck’s goals in introducing his social legislation was to neutralise the socialist 
movement. Later, however, it appeared that his KVG had had a boomerang effect, and rather 
than weakening the labour movement it had strengthened it. The KVG expressly allowed the 
voluntary relief funds to continue operating as Ersatzkassen, an alternative for the Ortskran-
kenkassen, exclusively fi nanced and controlled by the members. As long as the socialist party 
was declared illegal, the underground SPD could use these funds as a legal alternative to bring 
workers together and to inform and infl uence them. After the Socialist Act was repealed 
in 1890, the party could function normally once again and no longer had to use the relief 
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funds as a cloak for their political activities. At the same time, the socialists came up with a 
remarkable change in strategy with regard to health insurance. After 1890 the socialist party 
tried to seize control of the thousands of Gemeinde- and Ortskrankenkassen. According to the 
law of 1883, two-thirds of their board members were to be chosen by the workers and only 
one-third by the employers. This provided an opportunity to capture the majority of seats 
in the Ortskrankenkassen, as long as the effort was united and coordinated. The manoeuvre 
was a spectacular success for the socialists. Now it was no longer necessary for some of the 
Hilfskassen, with their autonomous workers’ boards, to operate separately. A number of them 
shut down and siphoned off their members to a friendly Ortskrankenkasse or Gemeindekas.
Their dissolution was further facilitated by the negative fi nancial repercussions for the vo-
luntary relief funds or Ersatzkassen, created in the 1892 reorganisation of the health-insurance 
system. Despite the decline in the number of funds, the number of members increased slightly 
from 713,000 in 1885 to 914,000 in 1911. In the meanwhile, however, the total number of 
insured workers in Germany more than trebled, from 4,300,000 in 1885 to 13,357,000 in 
1911, so the relative share of the Hilfskassen shrank from 17 to 7%.
The boards of the Gemeinde- and especially the Ortskrankenkassen also formed a perfect 
training ground, where thousands of workers acquired administrative experience and execu-
tives for the party leadership could be recruited. They also taught the labour activists how 
to work with other social groups as employers. It was partly for this reason that the socialists 
evolved from an isolated group into a group that was socially accepted and even integrated 
within the German empire. In addition, the socialists were able to appoint many followers 
to key administrative positions in the health-insurance funds. It is estimated that just after 
the turn of the century at least 3,000 people were employed by the Ortskrankenkassen, while 
only 678 were working for the Freien Gewerkschaften (trade unions).10
The trade unions themselves also created their own health funds. A few very large wor-
kers’ funds developed that had strong connections with the socialist trade union. The largest 
of these was the Zentrale Kranken- und Sterbekasse, which in 1889 had no less than 77,000 
members. The liberal trade union, whose members were mostly skilled workers and crafts-
men, also managed a separate health-insurance fund for its members, as did the Catholic 
trade union, a not unimportant institution in Westphalia. Even before the First World War, 
however, the importance of the connection between trade unions and health-insurance 
funds began to fade. 
The strong position of the factory funds in Germany before the First World War is par-
ticularly striking. With nearly 8,000 funds, they insured almost one-third of the country’s 
workers. Early on, entrepreneurs in various sectors in Germany were won over to the idea 
of establishing their own company health-insurance funds. The forming of such a fund was 
based not only on genuine social concern but also on economic motives related to the work-
force. In the Kreis Bielefeld, for example, 22% of the 855 factory workers were insured in a 
factory fund by as early as 1855. As industrialisation progressed, the leaders of large industrial 
enterprises in particular became increasingly convinced that workers are more productive 
when improvements are made in their housing, food and health. In 1876, 13 of the 31 (40%) 
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industrial sites in the Kreis Bielefeld had their own factory funds, and almost 80% of the almost 
4,400 factory workers were members.11 In Prussia there were 1,591 factory funds in 1872 in 
addition to 263 funds that insured workers of more than one company.12 Before the act of 
1883, some companies (such as BASF) did not require their workers to pay any contribution. 
In most companies, however, the factory fund was nourished with contributions from the 
workers without this leading to management or co-management by the members.
After the introduction of compulsory health insurance there was a sharp increase not only 
in the membership but also in the market share of the factory funds. Indeed, membership 
in a factory fund often had its fi nancial benefi ts. A thorough analysis of the evolution of the 
funds between 1883 and 1909 showed that on average German factory funds paid out higher 
sick pay over a longer period of time. It was not unusual for the factory funds to pay a bonus 
Statute of the Weseke and Heide local healthcare funds, 1884
(Source: T. Siebeck, Hundert Jahre Krankenversicherung im Kreis Borken)
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Announcement of the founding of the BASF company health-insurance fund
(Source: L. Meinzer, 100 Jahre Betriebskrankenkasse der BASF)
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on top of the statutory sick pay for workers who had been employed for over six months. 
They also granted higher payments (on average) for death and pregnancy, worked with the 
lowest administrative costs and had the largest reserves at their disposal. On the other hand, 
their contributions were higher than average.13 However, these contributions were approved 
by the administrative boards when co-management with the workers became applicable 
under the law of 1883. Despite the fact that the law provided for a majority of workers to 
sit on the board, the factory management continued to exercise a strong hold on the factory 
fund. Indeed, the factory doctor generally functioned as a physician for the health-insurance 
fund. Very large companies even fi nanced and ran their own hospitals and sanatoriums (for 
tuberculosis patients, among others) for members of the factory fund. The factory directorates 
were able to exercise direct control over the absenteeism and recovery of their employees 
through these factory physicians and institutions. With the granting of benefi ts that exceeded 
the statutory minimum they also strengthened the bond with the company.
During the discussions on the Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO) of 1911, both the socialists 
and the factory owners tried to gain control of the factory funds, but to no avail. The socialists 
proposed a reorganisation of the health-insurance system, starting from a unifi ed structure 
based on the Ortskasse. Such a reorganisation would eliminate the powerful factory funds, 
which they labelled a weapon of the ruling class in the class struggle. The factory owners, on 
the other hand, hoped to strengthen the grip they had on ‘their’ health-insurance funds and 
proposed increasing the employers’ contribution − and therefore their own representation 
on the board − to 50%. The Reichstag rejected this proposal but went along with the idea 
that the approval of certain proposals required a majority in the two groups that made up a 
factory fund’s board of management.14
As in the Netherlands, there were also a large number of burial societies in Germany. But 
unlike the Netherlands, almost no commercial funds developed from these institutions. Because 
of the compulsory health insurance, factory workers with incomes of less than DM 2,000 no 
longer felt the need to obtain private insurance. In addition, workers with higher incomes 
could insure themselves on a voluntary basis with a non-commercial fund. The incomes of 
wealthy citizens were such that they could pay for their own medical expenses without the 
intervention of a health-insurance fund. According to the Deutsche Versicherungs-Zeitung there 
were only six commercial health-insurance funds of any signifi cance in Germany in 1914. 
Together they had arranged for approximately 43,000 insurance policies.15
f. Health-insurance funds versus doctors
Before the law of 1883, a direct and personal bond often existed in Germany between patient 
and doctor. The patient chose his doctor and paid him a fee. The level of this fee was usually 
set by the doctor on the basis of his client’s social situation. Since most health-insurance funds 
paid out basically one sickness benefi t, the fund rarely troubled itself with the level of this fee. 
The law of 1883 brought about a drastic change in this situation. Except for the voluntary
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Anonymous protest by the Krankenkas-
sen against the actions of the Leipziger 
Verband in the struggle to allow insured 
persons to have a free choice of doctor, 
1910 
(Source: T. Siebeck, Hundert Jahre Kranken-
versicherung im Kreis Borken)
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relief funds, the health-insurance funds were required to stop giving their members a cash 
reimbursement for each medical examination but to guarantee the medical intervention. 
This means that the health-insurance funds entered into contracts with the doctors for their 
members. This method was advantageous for both patients and doctors because it forced 
quacks, faith healers and non-qualifi ed surgeons to step aside for fully qualifi ed physicians. 
At the same time, however, the government actually eliminated the patient’s right to choose 
his doctor. For those subject to compulsory insurance, the health-insurance funds therefore 
became the legally instituted intermediary between doctor and patient.16
In the fi rst years after 1883, the agreements were drawn up without too much diffi culty. 
For the time being the number of people subject to compulsory insurance was still relatively 
small. But this changed: the number of people required to be insured increased very rapidly 
in both absolute and relative terms, so that the doctors were more and more dependent for 
their incomes on the size of the group of people in the public health insurance programme. 
Consequently the size and scale of the health-insurance fees became very important for physi-
cians. The health-insurance funds used their oligopoly to keep fees at an extreme minimum 
in order to keep their members’ contributions low. This was further facilitated by doubling 
the number of doctors in Germany between 1883 and 1905. Young physicians in particular 
found it very diffi cult to make a decent income.
There was growing opposition to the health-insurance funds, regarded by doctors as a Ter-
rorismus dem Kassenvorstände. But the national medical association, Deutsche Ärztevereinsbund,
established in 1873, failed to channel their discontent into co-ordinated action. Around the 
turn of the century, Dr Hartmann of Leipzig took the initiative to set up a new doctors’ alli-
ance in order to offer an effi cient response to the health-insurance funds during negotiations. 
Hartmann’s Leipziger Verband was highly successful. By 1910, 23,000 of Germany’s 32,500 
physicians had already become members. The Leipziger Verband strove for collective rather 
than individual agreements between doctors and health-insurance funds, for the right of 
the patient to choose his doctor and for payment for each consultation. Relations between 
doctors and health-insurance funds continued to deteriorate. Local and regional confl icts 
broke out all over Germany and usually ended in a victory for the doctors’ consortium. In 
1913 there was even the threat of a national doctors’ strike. It could only be avoided by di-
rect government intervention. A compromise was struck: all health-insurance funds would 
have one physician in their doctors’ pool for every 1,350 insured members, from which the 
members were free to choose. In this way patients were given freedom of choice, however 
limited. In addition, the agreements between the individual physicians and the individual funds 
would be controlled by a committee in which both the physicians and the health-insurance 
funds would be equally represented. This agreement, Das Berliner Abkommen, would remain 
in force for ten years.
The remarkable thing about this national agreement was that it was entered into by the 
two national doctors’ associations on the one hand (Deutsche Ärztevereinsbund and Leipziger 
Verband) and three national health-insurance organisations on the other: the Gesamtverband 
Deutsche Krankenkassen, the Hauptverband Deutscher Ortskrankenkassen and the Verband zur 
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Wahrung der Interessen der Deutschen Betriebskrankenkassen. The unwieldy fragmentation of 
the nineteenth century had gradually given way to a consolidation of forces in a few large, 
nationally structured organisations.
Summary
From 1850 on, the Prussian government tightened its grip on the health-insurance 
funds by means of legislation. Many Prussian municipalities required employees to join 
a health-insurance fund. The Prussian government also introduced the compulsory em-
ployers’ contribution. Its aim in doing so was to force employers to pay more attention to 
working conditions − a fi rst in Europe. This governmental effort led to a rapid expansion of 
the number of insurance funds throughout Prussia. Initiatives were taken in other German 
states as well, and as a result workers’ health insurance was nowhere as strongly developed as 
in the German states.
In the kingdom of Prussia and later in the empire of Germany, Chancellor Bismarck was 
confronted with a strong socialist movement that rapidly grew into a political factor to be 
reckoned with. The economic slump exacerbated social differences in the seventies and with 
that the fear of a socialist coup. By establishing a policy of progressive centralised govern-
ment, Bismarck attempted to bind the working masses to the state and to take the wind out 
of the sails of the socialist party. In his eyes, national social legislation would meet workers’ 
demands, such as a shorter work week, higher wages, humane housing and social security. 
It was partly for this reason that he had a health-insurance act ratifi ed in 1883. This law is 
regarded as the foundation of modern health insurance in the Western world. It introduced 
compulsory membership in a health-insurance fund for all workers and wage earners in 
industry, mining and skilled enterprises. 
Until the First World War, German health insurance experienced peaceful growth. Ad-
vancing industrialisation automatically added to the membership rolls. In 1910, one-fi fth of the 
German population were insured by 24,000 funds. This fragmentation led to a restructuring 
in 1914 in which the number of funds was cut in half. Instead of neutralising the socialist 
movement, which was what Bismarck had in mind, the sickness benefi ts act strengthened 
the presence of socialist militants sitting on the administrative boards of some of the health-
insurance funds. The position of the factory funds before the First World War was remarkably 
strong. The 8,000 factory funds insured one-third of all workers. By having their own institu-
tions and physicians, the factory directorates could exercise direct control over absenteeism 
and the recovery of their employees. As in the Netherlands, a large number of burial societies 
developed in Germany. But unlike the Netherlands, almost no commercial funds developed 
from these institutions. Indeed, because of compulsory health insurance, factory workers with 
incomes of less than DM 2,000 no longer felt the need to obtain private insurance.
Before 1883 there was often a direct personal bond between patient and doctor. The doc-
tor’s fee was based on his client’s social position. After 1883 the health-insurance funds were 
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required to stop giving their members a cash reimbursement for each medical examination, 
but they did have to guarantee the medical intervention, which meant that the freedom to 
choose one’s physician was eliminated. The health-insurance funds tried to keep doctors’ fees 
as low as possible. This led to resistance on the part of the medical establishment, expressed 
in the establishment of a new doctors’ association, the Leipziger Verband. Doctors strove for 
collective rather than individual agreements between physicians and health-insurance funds, 
freedom to choose one’s own doctor and payment on the basis of performance. The threat 
of strikes ultimately led to government intervention and a long-term agreement between 
the two national doctors’ associations and the three national health-insurance associations. 
The unwieldy fragmentation of the nineteenth century had given way to a consolidation of 
forces in a few large, nationally structured organisations.
2. Belgium: government support
a. The fi rst Mutualistische Wet, 1851
The German law of 1883 seemed to serve as a model in opening the way to a rapid introduc-
tion of compulsory health insurance in Belgium as well. In Belgium, the industrial revolution 
had been gaining steam in the heavy industrial districts of Wallonia and the Ghent textile 
region as the early nineteenth century progressed, but during the forties the country went 
into a severe economic slump. This crisis led to an unprecedented expansion of pauperism. 
Yet many upstanding Belgians believed that direct benefi ts paid to the least well-off should 
be kept to a minimum. They were convinced that, to a great extent, paupers had only them-
selves to blame for their wretched fate. According to the wealthy citizenry, lack of thrift, an 
immoral lifestyle and excessive drinking were the reasons why the least little setback would 
plunge many workers into destitution. The remedy was obvious. By a general application of 
quintessentially liberal principles − self-help, providence and thrift − the lower classes would 
be able to pull themselves up and would also be less likely to come knocking on the door 
of public poor relief. The government should limit itself to propagating these principles and 
to encouraging private initiatives. After all, self-help on the part of the workers was entirely 
in line with the liberal ideology. Each providential worker would be one more defender for 
society. In addition, the Belgian government hoped that, as in Germany, the private relief 
organisations would step in and relieve the cities and towns of some of the burden of assis-
ting the poor.17
Two tracks were followed in this policy. By establishing the Algemene Lijfrentekas (General 
Annuity Fund)  in 1850, the liberal Rogier government hoped to simulate workers to save 
for their old age. On the other hand, the government wanted to stimulate the operation of 
the existing private societies for mutual relief or mutualiteitskassen (mutual societies), which 
were mainly active in providing health and disability insurance.18 With the fi rst Mutualitistische 
Wet (Mutuality Act) of 3 April 1851, the government was attempting to translate its ideas of 
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providence, self-help and thrift into concrete form. It was also trying to counterbalance the 
dangerous workers’ dissatisfaction that had been triggered by the prevailing economic crisis 
and had been the cause of revolutions throughout Europe in 1848. At the same time it was 
aiming to put all the existing relief funds under stricter government supervision.19
This law made every direct government initiative regarding health and disability insurance 
superfl uous. The basis for the health-insurance initiative was the existing relief funds. In 1850 
there were 199 mutualities in 35 Belgian cities and towns, covering a total of 68,297 members. 
Besides these there were joint social welfare funds for mineworkers, national railway workers 
and fi shermen who could count on a bit of government support. All in all, these mutuali-
ties reached only a small portion of the working masses. Yet despite their limited effect, the 
government placed its hope on developing these mutual associations to stimulate health and 
disability insurance among the workers.20
The law of 1851 made it possible to recognise the relief funds as mutualities. Following 
on that recognition − a favour, not a right − was the granting of very incomplete corporate 
rights. This gave the funds a few benefi ts, such as exemption from stamp taxes and registration 
fees, the right to take legal action and the possibility of receiving donations. On the other 
hand, the law imposed strict government control: the accounts and membership lists had 
to be submitted and the mayor was permitted to attend all meetings. The law also expressly 
forbade the relief funds from organising a system of unemployment benefi ts (thereby ban-
ning the payment of strike benefi ts). Recognition could always be withdrawn in the event 
of negligence. If a fund was dissolved, all the monies could be expropriated and granted 
to another mutuality in the municipality by the authorities or to the municipal coffers for 
public assistance.21 In this way the legislators hoped to prevent some factory workers from 
building up strike funds under the cloak of a mutual society, in order to break through the 
ban on coalitions that was still in force. The government’s mistrust, it should be noted, was 
not unfounded. When the Broederlijke Maatschappij van Wevers van Gent (Brotherhood of the 
Weavers of Ghent) and its sister organisation De Maatschappij der noodlijdende Broeders (Society 
of destitute Brothers) were established in 1857 they operated ostensibly as mutualities, but 
internally they formed a militant socialist interest group.22 Actually the same was true for older 
journeymen’s organisations such as the milliners’ union in Brussels. It was these societies more 
than the modern mutualities that were the forerunners of the modern trade unions.23
Because of its strict conditions, the law of 1851 did very little to spread providential 
thinking among the workers. By 1853 scarcely 13 mutualities had been offi cially recognised. 
The limited benefi ts provided by the law clearly did not compensate for the government’s 
patronising attitude. Nevertheless, the central government tried to promote the mutuality 
movement by quickly establishing a Bestendige Commissie van Maatschappijen van Onderlinge 
Bijstand (Permanent Commission of Societies of Mutual Relief). The commission’s research 
results and advice were distributed far and wide. It also played a pivotal role in the competi-
tions that were held among the recognised health-insurance funds starting in 1864. Societies 
that were able to provide evidence of good organisation, accurate bookkeeping or impressive 
membership growth received honorary diplomas, medals and monetary bonuses.24 After a 
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while these recognised model mutualities enjoyed the full trust of the government, which 
is indicated by the fact that in the limited electoral reform of 1883 their board members 
automatically received municipal and provincial voting rights. It was clear that the govern-
ment was intentionally striving to form a mutuality elite and to promote the integration of 
its members into the middle class by granting it certain favours.25 What it was not doing, 
however, was offering the mutualities systematic fi nancial support. On doit éviter d’introduire 
comme règle le principe de l’intervention pécuniaire de l’Etat en faveur de ces associations. L’ouvrier doit 
compter, avant tout, sur lui-même, sur son travail, sur le fruit de sa prévoyance.26
Despite the incentive bonuses and awards for exemplary mutualities and their boards, the 
growth of recognised mutualities was slow and by 1870 numbered a mere 97. According to 
estimates there were 32,000 members of recognised mutualities in Belgium in 1886.27 Obvi-
ously, these offi cial fi gures take little or no account of the numerous relief funds that escaped 
government control, certainly after the repeal of the coalition ban in 1866. The fact that the 
offi cial fi gures were doubtless at great variance with everyday reality was clearly demonstrated 
by the situation in Ghent. Between 1850 and 1876 no less than 29 health-insurance funds 
were established, only two of which were given legal recognition.28
Founding of the fi rst socialist sickness fund in Fayt, Wallonia, 1870 (Source: Amsab)
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY82
b. Socialists, Catholics and neutrals
While the law of 1851 did very little to promote the expansion of the societies of mutual 
assistance, it did create a split between the existing societies. On the one hand there were the 
offi cially recognised, proper health-insurance funds. Often these were mainly liberal-minded 
mutualities, philanthropic initiatives or Catholic workers’ groups that were based on the 
patronage of local dignitaries. Requests to recognise funds or mutualities for people in the 
professions − societies with a middle-class orientation − were greeted warmly by the liberal 
government of the fi fties and sixties.29 This is not to suggest that the second group, namely 
Banner of the Christian mutual-assistance fund De Vereenigde Werklieden, Bruges, established 
in 1863 (Source: KADOC)
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the workers’ mutualities, were expressly excluded from recognition. But they were often an 
important part of multi-functional, mixed societies that also worked as co-operatives, trade 
unions and health-insurance funds and were therefore excluded from offi cial recognition by 
defi nition. This group in particular gradually found itself entering socialist waters.30
More and more, the mutualities in Belgium did take on a distinctly ideological character. 
Until about the mid-nineteenth century, the character of most mutual relief societies was 
almost unquestionably Christian. This usually limited itself to an external, superfi cial and 
socially determined piety indicated by the choice of a patron saint and a Mass said for the 
dead. These were not outspoken, militantly confessional societies, however. A change had 
occurred here since the forties. Gerard points out that the societies of skilled workers in the 
big cities initially supported the new revolutionary ideas, and that some of them evolved in 
the neutral or even the socialist sense of the word. In 1863 a federation of neutral mutualities 
had already been set up in Brussels: the Vrije Federatie van de Maatschappijen van Onderlinge 
Bijstand (Free Federation of Societies of Mutual Relief).31 Free-thinking liberals also tried to 
organise the workers, and to do so in a climate of growing clerical-liberal confl ict.
Both the socialist movement and socially-minded Catholicism strove to unite workers in 
their own health-insurance fund with pronounced socialist or Christian leanings. After the 
repeal of the ban on coalitions in 1866, some relief funds threw off their cover and openly 
revealed their double function of trade union and mutuality. Some socialist trade unions 
formed their own home-grown mutualities. In 1870, the fi rst outright socialist health-
insurance fund was set up in the Walloon municipality of Fayt under the infl uence of the 
First International. During the seventies, more and more neutral funds began to give in to 
the appeal of socialism. Naturally these socialist health-insurance funds were managed by 
boards chosen directly by the workers.
In the cities in particular, where socialist recruitment became an increasingly powerful force, 
Catholics became aware of the need to fi nd a solution to the social problem. Mutualities 
were perfectly suited to their approach, which was still basically paternalistic − so typical of 
Catholic thought and practice in the nineteenth century. The patronage and caritas of the 
Catholic middle class could easily be reconciled with the idea of assistance in a mutuality. 
On the Catholic side, after the mid-nineteenth century Catholic workers’ groups began to 
emerge at an increasingly rapid tempo, and they in turn founded mutualities. In addition 
to the old craft mutualities, the owners’ industrial funds and the mostly occupation-related 
socialist funds, a new type of mutuality emerged: the parochial health-insurance fund. Un-
like the existing mutualities and relief funds, these were often not limited to one particular 
professional group but were open to all workers and were therefore distinctly interprofessional 
in character. In the more rural parishes, moreover, agricultural workers were involved in the 
operation of the funds in addition to craftsmen and factory workers. Often these mutuali-
ties, under the leadership of the clergy, were integrated into the religious life of the parish 
as subdepartments of larger societies such as the Xaverians or the workers’ circles. Although 
often co-directed by the clergy, there was no all-inclusive unifi ed structure, on neither the 
diocesan nor the national level. Each parochial health-insurance fund worked as an inde-
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pendent entity that, depending on the circumstances, was directed either paternalistically or 
autonomously by the members.
Besides the neutral funds (most of them craft funds) and the strongly ideological socialistic 
and Christian funds, there were quite a number of owner health-insurance funds in the indus-
trial regions, although they were less common than in Germany. Few studies have been done 
on the evolution of these factory funds in Belgium and next to nothing has been published. 
The Ghent funds in the textile industry are the best known. Mention has been made here 
of the establishment by factory owners before 1850 of six funds that insured a considerably 
large number of weavers and spinners. Four more were founded between 1850 and 1861, 
after which not a single new fund was created until 1876. Naturally the leading factories 
each had a fund, but the total absence of new funds can be attributed to two causes. On the 
one hand, the Ghent cotton industry found itself in a totally paralysing crisis in the years 
before 1865 because of the American Civil War, which cut off the supply of raw American 
cotton. But an even more important cause of the stagnation of Ghent factory funds was the 
repeal of the ban on coalitions in 1866. Between 1866 and 1876, no less than 13 new funds 
were established by the workers themselves. More and more, the workers were attempting 
to organise independent funds under their own management.
The Ghent industrial funds seldom had written statutes, so the owner could set the workers’ 
contributions and payments at his own discretion. In fact the owner was all powerful: it was 
he who took the initiative to establish a sick-pay fund, set the contributions, manage the cash 
and could force his workers to save for their health insurance by automatically deducting the 
amount from their usually meagre wages. A commonly heard criticism from the workers was 
that the owner did not deposit these contributions in the health-insurance fund but used it 
for other purposes. That suspicion was understandable since the workers were not able to see 
how the money was being spent. Indeed it is striking that not a single factory fund in Ghent 
applied for government recognition, which required submitting the accounts for auditing. 
These owner health-insurance funds suffered from yet another defect. When a worker left the 
factory, he lost not only his right to compensation but also his right to his deposited monies. 
Yet because of the poor employment and economic conditions, workers changed jobs quite 
often. As a result, their efforts to save money often proved to be a waste of energy.32
In her in-depth study of the Ghent mutuality system, Quaghebuer points out one last 
category of funds: the café unions. Taverns in the working-class neighbourhoods functioned 
as centres for public life. It was at the bar that solidarity developed. Thus café savings schemes, 
which varied from making weekly deposits in individual savings tins to a joint client purchase 
of bonds, were perhaps the most common form of saving within the working-class environ-
ment until the end of the century.33 The innkeeper stimulated the setting up of a savings and 
health-insurance fund because he saw it as a way of gaining a regular clientele. Many of these 
funds did not last very long, of course: low wages, small and strongly fl uctuating member-
ships, lack of administrative experience on the part of the workers, imbalance between the 
contributions and the payments, and fraud soon proved fatal for many café funds. Just how 
widespread the phenomenon of these café funds was is diffi cult to determine, considering 
HEALTH INSURANCE AS A GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 85
their spontaneous, local and informal character. They escaped all government control, of 
course, as did most health-insurance funds.34
Interestingly, there is no trace of doctors’ and commercial funds in the motley Belgian 
health-insurance landscape. As in Germany, the Belgian funds, which grew out of mutual 
workers’ solidarity and the Christian duty to perform acts of charity and provide patronal 
care, apparently left too little room for the development of philanthropic or commercially-
inspired private health-insurance initiatives.
c. Following the German model, 1886-1893
The Mutualiteitwet (Mutuality Act) of 23 June 1894 is usually regarded as the real beginning 
of a new era for Belgian health insurance and mutualities. Although this law undoubtedly 
served as a strong stimulus for the further expansion of health-insurance funds in Belgium, 
preparations for this new phase had actually started almost a decade earlier. The fatal ven-
ting of workers’ discontent, which Bismarck cleverly managed to avoid in Germany with his 
social legislation, did occur in Belgium. In 1873, Belgian industry fell into the stranglehold 
of a long and worldwide depression. Factories and mines operated at a mere fraction of their 
production capacity, employment shot up year after year while the factory owners tried to 
keep a lid on their expenses, and therefore on the wages they paid. Conditions for the pro-
letariat became more perilous and hopeless as the years passed. In March 1886 the bomb 
exploded. A workers’ demonstration in Liège in commemoration of the Paris Commune of 
1871 grew into a bloody confl ict that rapidly set the Walloon industrial regions ablaze. Made 
desperate by the miserable working conditions and the reduction of their already meagre 
wages, mineworkers and metal workers abruptly put down their work and started out on a 
devastating rampage throughout Wallonia. Machines were destroyed, factories defaced and 
the homes of the bosses were attacked and set on fi re. The shocked Belgian establishment 
reacted with a harsh and bloody repression. The army was deployed to quell the uprising. 
The fi nal tally − 24 workers dead, 100 to 150 wounded and enormous damage to the facto-
ries and infrastructure − shocked the government into realising that a real poverty problem 
existed among the proletariat that had to be dealt with urgently and vigorously if an even 
greater catastrophe was to be avoided and the fatal workers’ revolution predicted by Marx 
was to be prevented. 
In his speech from the throne of 1886, King Leopold II made it clear that the government 
had fi nally grasped the importance of tackling the burning social problem. The Catholic 
party, which had an absolute majority in Parliament from 1884 to 1914, began searching 
for a way to temper and channel worker dissatisfaction. They hoped that by doing so they 
would achieve the same results as Bismarck did in Germany: on the one hand to offer the 
workers more security and on the other to take the wind out of the sails of the militant and 
even revolutionary groups of workers and to isolate them from the greater working masses. 
After the King’s appeal of 1886 the government installed an Industrial Labour Commission, 
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Newspaper illustration of the Catholic social congress at Liège in 1890 (Source: KADOC)
HEALTH INSURANCE AS A GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 87
and in the following year industrial and workers’ councils, with equal representation, for the 
main industrial sectors. In 1889 the Parliament approved a law on women’s and child labour, 
and the government began to develop an effi cient system for supervising worker safety.
In its fi rst report, the Industrial Labour Commission noted that the law of 1851 had done 
very little to encourage precautionary thinking among the workers. Practically no progress 
had been made in health and disability insurance. The commission estimated that scarcely 10 
to 12% of the Belgian workers were participating in a recognised or non-recognised mutuality. 
In fact, only the best-paid and trained workers were members. Most of the untrained workers 
simply earned too little to be able to pay a regular membership fee. It became increasingly 
clear that the liberal social self-help policy and Catholic charity had failed to do the job.35
Not only had the law of 1851 done little to advance the spread of health insurance among the 
working proletariat, but the existing system of small-scale workers’ mutualities had a number 
of obvious fundamental defects that were beginning to grow more serious with the passing 
of time. First, most of the societies lacked the necessary actuarial knowledge and expertise. 
The calculation of contributions and payments was not based on a thorough knowledge of 
the risks, which were often extremely varied, but usually was done intuitively. In addition, 
the workers of the same company or occupational group who joined a mutuality often ran 
the same occupational risks, were exposed to the same occupational illnesses and, when an 
economic slump occurred, were all sacked together at the same time. Paradoxically enough, 
the mutual relief societies, with their narrow and one-sided recruitment basis, combined the 
risks rather than spread them. This proved fatal for a fund on more than one occasion.
Finally, the workers’ mutual relief societies did not escape the dilemmas of small-scale 
collective action: to optimise their own chances of survival they had a tendency to exclude 
people whom they thought constituted too great a risk. Because of this a broad substratum of 
impoverished workers missed the boat.36 The pressure on the government to be more active 
increased from the bottom up. As in Germany, the Belgian socialist movement grew into a 
consistently better organised unit. The movement had its own co-operatives, trade unions, 
mutualities and press, and fi nally it had a national political umbrella organisation when the 
Belgische Werkliedenpartij (Belgian Workers Party (BWP)) was founded in 1885 as representative 
of social-democracy.
It was partly because of this powerful growth of the socialist movement that the social 
problem began attracting more attention from the Catholics even before the uprising of 
1886. This growing interest on the part of the Catholics was all the more important since 
after their electoral victory in 1884 the Catholics would come to dominate Belgian politics 
for years to come. In 1886, 1887 and 1890 large-scale Catholic congresses were organised in 
Liège. At each of these congresses there were almost 2,000 invited participants from inside 
and outside the country (including France, the Netherlands and especially Germany). The 
German infl uence at the congresses was very noticeable.37 Gradually the congress participants 
came to a consensus on compulsory health-care insurance for Belgian workers. During the 
third congress a concrete and detailed proposal was approved. The compulsory system would 
be built on the existing mutualities, if possible, with mutual relief funds and factory funds at 
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the core. In the absence of such societies the state itself could establish a fund. Mutualities 
were to be set up per professional group, but if that was not possible a municipal organisation 
could be created. The assistance provided would equal half the worker’s wages starting on the 
third sick day. In addition, the compulsory aspect of the assistance was limited to a maximum 
of thirteen weeks a year. If workers left the company they lost their rights. The management 
of the funds was granted to those responsible for the fi nancial resources, in proportion to the 
amount they had deposited. Both workers and bosses had seats on the management council. 
The general monitoring of the funds was entrusted to a provincial commission of twelve 
members, six workers and six bosses. Clearly the German inspiration was not far off, in view 
of the fact that this proposal was almost a carbon copy of the German system of 1883.38
d. The Mutualiteitwet of 1894: subsidised freedom
On 23 June 1894 the Belgian parliament unanimously approved a new Mutualiteitwet (Mutua-
lity Act). It contained little from the proposal of the Catholic congress of 1890, however. On 
the contrary, the main features of the insurance system of 1894 were an optional insurance 
organised by voluntary mutualities, with or without managerial intervention, which would 
be generously subsidised − as long as they were recognised by the government. Besides this 
fi nancial support from the national government, the mutualities could also count on funding 
from the municipalities and the provinces. Among the other advantages of government re-
cognition were the granting of almost full corporate rights and, not unimportant, exemption 
from taxes and from duties such as stamp duties. The obligations were limited to submitting 
the statutes, which had to remain in conformity with the law, and to annually submitting 
the accounts. This freed the mutualities from the crushing guardianship of the government 
contained in the law of 1851.39
So in the end the Liège proposals did not win the day. Indeed, the Liège proposal had run 
up against growing resistance from the employers, who were afraid of the steep contribution 
that would be asked of them. In addition, after the publication of the papal encyclical Rerum 
Novarum by Pope Leo XII in 1891, in which a great deal of attention was focused on the 
social problem and the relationship between the Church and the labour movement, corpora-
tism in the Catholic camp was drained of much of its infl uence. More emphasis was placed 
on autonomous health-insurance funds managed by the workers themselves. The workers 
had always been suspicious of the existing sickness and disability funds, which were often 
in the hands of the bosses or in which the local dignitaries had the last word. Independent, 
powerfully structured workers’ associations were responsible for the organisation of the social 
security system. Instead of compulsory membership, a new system was announced: subsidised 
freedom, an improved version of the liberal self-help concept. With subsidised freedom, based 
on generous governmental support of private, mostly Catholic insurance agencies, the 
government hoped to do all it could to support and expedite the expansion of an indepen-
dent Catholic social network. Moreover, the Catholic elite, in line with the recommendations 
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Information issued by the Bond Moyson about the pharmacy and bakery of the socialist 
cooperative Vooruit
(Source: Amsab)
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of the Labour Commission, saw mutualism as a means of achieving class co-operation. This 
function could be stimulated through benefi ts and subsidies. The mutualists were to serve an 
integrative function for the social elite in civil society. Mutualism would have a moralising 
effect and would keep the worker on the ‘straight and narrow’.40
The Catholic government chose to maintain the private mutualities within a non-com-
pulsory system, so it was up to the worker himself to plan ahead and insure himself. The 
government was prepared to support the choice of these provident workers and to foster 
mutualism in general by means of subsidies. The government adopted the same attitude 
with regard to voluntary pension and unemployment funds. The application procedure for 
recognition was greatly simplifi ed and the strict controls of 1851 were relaxed. The health-
insurance funds were required to deposit their cash in a savings bank, however, or to convert 
it into government bonds.
Not every was happy with the new law. The socialists, who had made their entrance in the 
Belgian parliament as the second largest party after the introduction of plural general voting 
rights in 1894, were particularly disillusioned. Their ideal was the gradual introduction of 
public charity in the form of one big insurance plan. In 1897 the socialist Denis submitted a 
legislative proposal for the introduction of a general old-age, health and disability insurance 
based on the German model.41 The neutral and especially the socialist mutualities were also 
opposed to the measure that prevented mutualities from running their own pharmacies. 
Many of the mutualities had strong ties with a cooperative pharmacy, which they had to 
break if they wanted to obtain recognition for their health-insurance fund and to receive 
subsidies. Nor were the mutualities permitted to have any ties with a political party. This 
measure especially affected the socialist mutualities. In 1898 a supplement and adjustment 
was added to the act of 1894. The monitoring of party connections was tightened up, while 
a back door was opened that allowed for the continuation of ordinary pharmacies as part of 
the service offered by a mutuality.42
e. Growth and concentration
The acts of 1894 and 1898 were undoubtedly important steps forward for the Belgian health-
insurance system. Between 1890 and 1900 the number of members of recognised mutualities 
tripled to more than 185,000. Despite this growth, the vast majority of the working class was 
still excluded from health insurance around the turn of the century. The voluntary mutualities 
were hardly ideal examples of worker solidarity. That solidarity was often limited to one’s own 
professional group, from which the poor were excluded anyway because they could not pay 
the premium. Under the pressure of limited fi nancial means, even the workers’ funds were 
forced to create built-in selection and exclusion mechanisms. Women and children were usu-
ally excluded. Candidates for the mutualities had to undergo a medical examination. The size 
of the contribution increased with the entrance age. The elderly were not accepted or could 
even be removed from the rolls when they reached a certain age. The support itself could also 
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be curtailed. Sometimes certain high-risk professions were even excluded as a group, such as 
the dockworkers in Antwerp in around 1900. Incurably ill members were bought out. The 
fi nancial limits of the health-insurance funds determined to what extent they could remain 
in solidarity with the weakest members. When a certain high-risk limit was exceeded, the 
health-insurance fund was forced to implement a hard selection process.43
The elimination of bad risks by the managers of the mutualities may have been tempered 
by ideological borders. The competition was stiff, particularly between the Catholic and the 
socialist mutualities. The mutualities increasingly grew into a very important element in the 
ideological battle between Catholics and socialists as instruments for recruiting members 
to their own side. Fund members were not only the clients of an insurance organ but were 
also being continuously immersed in the pool of a much larger social movement. In this 
membership battle, the socialist mutualities could count on considerable fi nancial assistance 
from their strong co-operatives, and the Catholic funds on generous donations from leading 
Catholic citizens and politicians who were eager to serve as honorary members. With this 
extra help and with the governmental subsidies, the mutualities could offer more gene-
rous assistance than the contributions of their members would normally allow. Unlike the 
Netherlands, even the reimbursement of expensive hospital bills was included in the Belgian 
health insurance programme.
The results of this battle of competitors would be decisive for the establishment of the 
Belgian mutuality landscape, not only during the following years but even up to the present 
day. In Ghent, the mutual competitors were by and large responsible for an absorption of 
what had been the neutral, often craft funds in the Catholic and especially the socialist wor-
kers’ movement. In Brussels, on the other hand, where a Vrije Federatie van de maatschappijen 
der Volksapotheken (Free Federation of the Societies of General Pharmacies) was founded in 
1861, the funds, whose roots lay mainly in the craft and lower middle class milieu, maintained 
their political neutrality.
Even regions with little industrialisation saw the rapid establishment of health-insurance 
funds, especially on the Catholic side. They effi ciently occupied the whole fi eld and thereby 
hampered the encroachment of socialist competitors. In 1901 in the rural arrondissement of 
Turnhout in the Antwerp Kempen, for example, the Verbond van Voorzienigheidskassen (Alliance 
of Providential Funds) was set up, and by 1911 it already comprised 29 Christian mutualities. 
The Christian trade union played a leading role in this expansion by undertaking a systematic 
and successful promotion of the Christian funds. This was a reaction not only against the 
weak socialist competition but also against the stronger factory-based health-insurance funds, 
which, according to the trade union, were maintained by the employers as anti-unionist 
weapons.44 Very little is known about the national evolution of these factory-based funds 
in Belgium. The evolution in Ghent and Turnhout seems to indicate that after the act of 
1894 this category of funds was forced by the ideologically-bound mutualities to take the 
defensive. The evolution in Turnhout suggests as much. A number of factory funds suspended 
their activities in the years leading up to the First World War. Factory owners siphoned the 
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members of their funds over to Christian mutualities to keep them from seeking membership 
with the more militant socialist funds.
Between 1900 and 1913, membership in the health-insurance funds almost trebled once 
again to more than half a million, united in almost four thousand mutualities with an average 
of just over one hundred members. This rapid and sustained growth was facilitated not only 
by the act of 1894. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the main conditions were met for 
an expansion and completion of the social security system. Industrial capitalism had created 
a more or less uniform mass of workers in Belgium who were exposed to easily identifi able 
risks that were typical of urban industrial life: industrial accidents, occupational illnesses and 
unemployment. Wage work had become the norm and made it easy to introduce insurance 
systems based on the regular collection of monetary contributions. The gradual increase in 
prosperity also allowed more and more workers actually to put money aside for the payment 
of insurance premiums.
The societies of mutual relief slowly evolved in terms of greater professionalism. However, 
their small size limited their scope of activities and sometimes created great diffi culties that 
could only be solved by a scale increase. The act of 1894 placed its emphasis on the autonomy 
of local health-insurance funds. The act also stimulated the formation of mutualistic federa-
tions at the regional and even the national level. Three important problems lay at the heart 
of greater co-operation between the separate health-insurance funds, which also occurred in 
Germany and the Netherlands. First was the problem of moving from fund to fund. With a 
federation, a member could retain his rights when changing societies. Next was the question 
of long-term illness and disability. Because of the fi nancial risks involved, a collateral insurance 
imposed itself whose costs could only be borne by several societies together. Finally there was 
the important expansion of benefi ts being offered. The local societies were no longer willing 
to limit themselves to paying out sickness benefi ts but also took care of reimbursing the doctor 
and the pharmacist. This demanded co-operation beyond the local level, however.45
During the fi rst phase, connections were formed between health-insurance funds with an 
ideological-geographic basis. Next, these regional alliances began co-operating within na-
tional alliances. In 1886 the neutral health-insurance funds had already set up an alliance, but 
it was not recognised by the government until 1908. In 1906, the Landsbond van Christelijke 
Mutualiteiten) (National Alliance of Christian Mutualities (LCM)) was recognised. In 1913 the 
socialistic national alliance was established, in 1914 the liberal alliance and in 1920 the employ-
ers’ alliance (factory funds). This gave the Belgian health-insurance system its basic structure 
which it has preserved practically unchanged to the present day: fi ve national alliances with 
local departments, regional associations and a national umbrella organisation.
These national alliances, with more than 500,000 members all told, quickly grew into 
formidable political groups. By means of friendly politicians, who were not uncommonly 
elected to parliament with support from ‘their’ mutuality, the health-insurance funds could 
infl uence political discussions and even serve as the guiding force. On the other hand, the 
social democrats and the Christian democrats used their health-insurance funds to propagate 
their political programmes among the workers. By means of these conditions, favourable for 
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Ridder de Ghellinck d’Elseghem, deputy chairman of the Landsbond der Christelijke Vereenigin-
gen van Vooruitgang in Belgium (chairman from 1922). De Ghellinck represented the interests 
of the Christian mutualities in the Belgian Senate
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY94
both groups, the mutualities were able to root themselves deeper and deeper into the country’s 
political life and became a part of the Belgian establishment that could not be ignored.
f.  The First World War throws a spanner in the works
Despite the strong expansion in the number of insured persons, the socialists and the Chris-
tian democrats continued to push parliament for a compulsory insurance system along the 
lines of those adopted not only in Germany (1883) but now also in Austria (1909), Great 
Britain (1911) and other countries. Ghellinck d’Elseghem, chairman of the Landsbond van 
Christelijke Mutualiteiten, submitted a proposal for compulsory health insurance in April 1912. 
This proposal was adopted by the Catholic government, expanded and submitted as a bill to 
Banner of the Socialistische Ziekenbond/Bond Moyson
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parliament in November 1912. The government bill was clearly inspired by the British act of 
1911. It provided compulsory insurance not only for industrial workers but also for workers 
in business and agriculture. However, the system would only apply to employees with an 
annual income of less than BEF 2,400. Employer, employee and the state together would pay 
the contribution, but not at equal levels: the employer paid two francs per insured person, the 
insured person himself paid twelve francs and the government supplemented his contribu-
tion with 25% or three francs. It is clear that, in comparison with Germany, employers had 
to pay only a modest contribution.
The basis for the whole insurance system was the right of the insured person to freely 
choose among all the recognised mutualities. So the new route did not signify a break with 
subsidised freedom. On the contrary, the compulsory insurance system would promote the 
establishment of new mutualities in numerous rural or semi-rural municipalities, making it 
possible for the power of the LCM, as the largest national alliance, to continue to increase.46
A not unexpected reaction against this proposal came from the liberals and especially from 
the socialists. In 1913 the socialist representative Huysmans submitted his own proposal. 
This provided for the establishment of at least one regional mutuality in every arrondisse-
ment. These funds would be without any political attachments and all wage earners without 
distinction could join. What Huysmans was aiming for was one central fund. The regional 
and national management of the health-insurance fund was to be organised by means of 
social consultation among employers, wage earners, government and − remarkably for the 
fi rst time − doctors.
Nor were the employers entirely happy: enlightened employers like Solvay, who was a 
captain of industry, supported the introduction of a compulsory system. The expansion of 
social security could help maintain social peace.47 Some also supported proposals to put an 
end to the competition handicap imposed on employers who paid compensation to their 
workers in the event of illness or accident. But the Comité Central Industriel de Belgique, the 
national employers’ organisation, thought it was still too early for the introduction of a general 
compulsory system.
The Catholic majority forced its will, however, and passed the government bill by a large 
majority in the House of Representatives on 8 May 1914. Before the bill became law, it had 
to be approved by the Senate, which seemed like a mere formality. Yet for the time being 
the compulsory health-insurance system did not materialise. Before the Senate could give 
its approval the First World War broke out. Belgium would have to wait for another thirty 
years for compulsory health insurance.
Summary
The rapid industrial progress that took place in Belgium in the fi rst half of the nineteenth 
century was halted by an economic slump in the forties. This led to increasing pauperism. Yet 
the liberal ideology continued to dominate and the Belgian government kept encouraging 
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private initiative. The government met worker dissatisfaction by placing the existing relief 
funds under stricter supervision, implemented in the fi rst mutuality act of 1851. This made 
it possible to recognise the relief funds as mutualities. The act made every direct government 
initiative superfl uous but did very little to advance the expansion of the number of mutual 
relief associations. It did create a split between the recognised and the non-recognised societies. 
The number of non-recognised support funds emerging from the socialist camp continued 
to grow. In response to the social problem, the Catholic church searched for a solution by 
setting up mutualities. In addition to the old craft mutualities, the employers’ industrial funds 
and the occupation-related socialist funds, the parochial health-insurance fund emerged that 
was inter-professional in character. In contrast to the Netherlands, there were no doctors’ or 
commercial funds in Belgium.
The long depression that began in 1873 served as a stimulus for the further expansion of the 
health-insurance system. Pressured by the bloody workers’ uprising in Wallonia, the Catholic 
party, which held a majority in parliament until the First World War, began searching for a 
way to reduce worker discontent. This led to a new mutuality law, among other things. In 
1886 only a small minority of the Belgian population were members of any recognised or 
non-recognised mutuality. Only the best-paid and trained workers were members. The exis-
ting system exhibited intrinsic, serious defects, such as the lack of know-how and expertise 
for calculating contributions among the mutualities. In addition, concentrating the same type 
of workers in one mutuality led to corresponding occupational risks and therefore to big 
insurance risks. Despite the preference of the socialists and the social progressive wing of the 
Catholic movement for a compulsory sickness benefi ts act based on the German model, the 
second Mutualiteitwet, based on the principle of subsidised freedom, was passed by parliament 
in 1894. The private mutualities were retained in a non-compulsory system. Recognition by 
the government now meant not only exemption from taxes but also the granting of almost 
full corporate rights. This freed the mutualities from the crushing guardianship of the go-
vernment contained in the law of 1851. The socialists, the second largest party in parliament 
since the introduction of plural general voting rights in 1894 did not support the new act. 
Their ideal continued to be a compulsory, centrally organised insurance system.
 As a result of the new act, membership trebled to 185,000 by 1900. Yet the majority of the 
poor workers were excluded from insurance on account of the large number of restrictions 
such as exclusion of certain age groups, risk groups, women and children or the eliminating 
of bad risks. The mutualities served as recruiting instruments for each particular ‘pillar’. This 
determined the development of the insurance landscape in Belgium and led to a continu-
ous increase in the number of funds. In contrast to the Netherlands, one or even several 
health-insurance funds were active in most villages. Between 1900 and 1913, membership 
increased to approximately 500,000, divided over about 4,000 mutualities. In addition to 
mutual competition, this growth was also stimulated by wage work and increased prosperity. 
Problems caused by the large number of funds were partly solved by means of gradual scale 
increases and mainly by the formation of federations. This led to the creation of today’s na-
tional alliances (Catholic, socialist, liberal, neutral and industrial) that developed into powerful 
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political pressure groups. Despite the increase in the number of voluntarily insured persons, 
the demand grew for compulsory workers’ insurance. A bill to that effect was introduced in 
parliament but became stalled at the last moment when the First World War broke out.
3. The Netherlands: the government looks on
a. Dutch society on the move
Between 1850 and 1890, the real national income grew by 80 to 100%. This economic im-
provement was greatly advanced by the gradual transition from a traditional craft society to a 
modern industrial state. Steam engines were introduced not only in the traditional making of 
textiles but also in other sectors such as food and chemical production. The transport sector 
profi ted from this strong domestic growth as well as from the high-paced industrial develop-
ment in the German Rhine and Ruhr area. Large-scale investments were made in harbours, 
canals, waterways and railways. The increase in the gross national product greatly exceeded 
the rapid population growth, and as a result per capita income rose by 30 to 35%.
Distribution of the proceeds from this economic expansion was extremely uneven, however. 
Large parts of the countryside were hit by a sharp and sustained slump in agricultural prices 
after 1875. Around the factories and in the rapidly growing cities an impoverished indus-
trial proletariat was concentrated, which hardly profi ted at all from the increasing national 
prosperity. In 1886, pent-up frustration was unleashed in Amsterdam, as in Wallonia, in an 
uprising against the government and the middle class known as the Palingoproer, or the Eel 
Revolt. When a police offi cer tried to put a stop to palingtrekken (eel-heading), a prohibited 
and coarse form of popular entertainment in which a live eel was tied to a post and attempts 
were made to pull its head off, a real people’s uprising broke out in the Jordaan district of 
Amsterdam that lasted some days and could only be suppressed by bloody army intervention. 
The outcome was stunning: 26 dead and about one hundred wounded.
As in Belgium, the deadly riots made policymakers realise that the changes that had taken 
place in the economic and social structure demanded a new political approach. Since 1848 
politics had been anchored in the concept of civic freedom: the liberal constitution of 1848 
introduced the right of association and assembly, further elaborated in the Assembly Act of 
1855. The ban on coalitions, which was gradually eviscerated, was fi nally abolished altogether 
in 1872. Dominating everything else, however, was economic freedom, which not only stimu-
lated entrepreneurial initiative but also exposed the social problem through the concentration 
of the urban proletariat. The liberal ideas of non-intervention and self-help held sway, and 
as a result the government rarely took any initiatives to fi ght poverty and social insecurity. 
Illustrative of this passivity was the almost total absence of not only the national but also 
the local government in the realms of health care and health insurance. In the Gemeentewet
(Municipalities Act) of 1851, municipal governments were given the job of supervising public 
health care. In many municipalities, however, hardly any attention was paid to this situation 
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in the years that followed. On the contrary, with the passing of the Armenwet (Poor Law) 
of 1854, local governments (Middelburg among them) stopped covering health-insurance 
fund defi cits. In 1872 medical inspectors wrote a circular in which they urged municipal 
governments to stimulate the establishment of health-insurance funds for the poor. Many 
local councils, however, continued to maintain an attitude of indifference, as they had always 
done, and showed almost no interest in proper medical care for paupers and the poor among 
their own citizens.48 In a growing number of municipalities, church relief was no longer able 
fully to bear the costs of medical care for the destitute and the poor. So after 1880, medical 
poor relief was increasingly reduced.49
Finding a solution became a matter of urgency. On the one hand the pressure from below 
was growing, as the Palingoproer had dramatically demonstrated. On the other hand it was es-
sential that an alternative be developed for the reduction of medical poor relief by the churches. 
The latter problem was partially solved by making medical care for the destitute a specifi c 
branch of the municipal government. To keep the costs as low as possible, the municipalities 
began to check applications closely. Applicants whose incomes were too high were referred 
to the health-insurance funds so they could still really qualify as poor. The problem of health 
insurance was pushed, slowly but surely, in the direction of the government.
Two directions were possible. On the one hand, the government could support voluntary 
private initiative, which is what happened in Belgium. Undoubtedly it could count not only 
on the support of the confessional parties that defended sovereignty in their own circle (ARP)
and the subsidiarity principle (Catholics), but it could also count on the many other groups 
that had set up health-insurance funds based on philanthropic or economic motives. On 
the other hand, there was a large group of supporters of the German system of compulsory 
insurance.
According to Van der Velden, it was mainly the progressive liberals who propagated the 
idea that the solution to the social problem lie in large-scale, compulsory insurance with 
suffi cient fi nancial guarantees.50 In addition, only the government had the organisational 
and fi nancial wherewithal to impose compulsory social insurance and to guarantee benefi ts. 
The system of often small-scale and fi nancially weak voluntary insurance plans provided 
too little security, according to the liberals. Because the fi nancial basis was meagre they also 
tried to exclude bad and large risks, so that many were still in danger of falling through this 
loose-mesh safety net.
b. A motley collection of funds, 1850-189051
1/ The growth of the workers’ funds
The structure of the Dutch health-insurance landscape would undergo no fundamental 
changes in the second half of the nineteenth century: mutual funds, nutsfondsen (local funds), 
doctors’ funds, commercial and factory funds all shared the market, although often in a cli-
HEALTH INSURANCE AS A GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 99
mate of competitive struggle. At the end of the century a new type of fund appeared: the 
trade union fund.
The fund market was made up in principle of the poor and needy. It is easier to say who 
did not belong to this category than to provide a clear picture of those who did. They 
were completely disconnected from those who made private payments, who were deemed 
wealthy enough to pay the doctor’s fees. These were regional fees that were laid down by 
the government in 1821, and the doctors did not signifi cantly depart from them. According 
to the Medical Practice Act of 1 June 1865, the local section of the Netherlands Medical 
Association (NMG) had the power to adopt fees itself. These NMG fees were higher than those 
set in 1821 and were linked to the kind of activity and tax rate under which the patient fell 
in order to be allowed to vote.52
A poor person earned too much, however, to seek medical care from the local poor relief, 
so the number of poor persons was not a stable statistic. It coincided by and large with the 
number of workers and fl uctuated according to the vicissitudes of the economic situation. 
In times of prosperity, destitute persons graduated to the ranks of the poor; in depressions 
they went the other way. What is clear, however, is that the number of destitute persons grew 
over time because of the rapid increase in the number of factory workers.
The number of occupation-related mutual funds dropped rapidly between 1850 and 
1870, from 123 to 86. This was followed by a period of stability: in 1890 there were still 83 
occupation-related funds with a little more than 17,000 members, or scarcely 1% of the work-
force. Their decline was amply compensated, however, by the advancement in the number of 
general mutual funds: from 368 in 1850 to 569 in 1890. These comprised more than 189,000 
members, averaging 333 per fund. After 1880 in particular their number skyrocketed, with the 
establishment of more than 150 new funds within a single decade, and by 1890 they insured 
11% of the workforce. Naturally the rising numbers and growing organisation of industrial 
workers contributed signifi cantly to this advancement.53 One striking development, however, 
was the breakthrough made by general funds into the agrarian areas, so that general mutual 
funds became a national rather than a regional phenomenon. The insurance being offered 
usually guaranteed their members a decent funeral. Assistance in kind was given in the form 
of medical and surgical treatment and medicines. The vast majority of funds also offered sick 
pay, although restrictions in time and space were often introduced. Great differences existed 
between the funds, moreover, especially when it came to sick pay. Funds in the western 
Netherlands often paid considerably higher benefi ts, which is striking but understandable 
given the higher wages earned there.
A new development, but one closely linked to the mutual funds, had to do with the health 
insurance programmes emerging from the trade associations, trade unions and employers’ 
unions. The Wet op de Verenigingen (Assembly Act) of 1855, and particularly the abolition of 
the ban on coalitions, opened the way to the unobstructed creation of trade unions. Em-
ployees from sectors such as typography and diamond processing created local associations. 
Later they combined forces regionally and even nationally, forming sectoral trade unions. 
Inter-professional workers’ associations developed, particularly in the smaller cities.
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Like the earlier craft guilds, the occupation-related trade unions and the inter-professional 
workers’ associations created support funds for members in their town or city to assist them 
fi nancially in times of unemployment, sickness or death. By 1890 the vast majority of trade 
unions − 153 out of 177 − offered sick pay. These benefi ts were often on the meagre side, since 
low-paid members could opt for lower contributions that were linked with lower benefi ts. 
Conversely, reimbursement of medical expenses in kind or in cash occurred among scarcely 
14% of the trade unions in 1890.
Almost the same picture could be drawn of the workers’ associations. More than 90% of 
the 234 associations paid sick pay in 1890, which amounted to a maximum of half the wage. 
The payment term was somewhat longer and could run up to 18 weeks. Health insurance 
through the workers’ organisations cannot be underestimated in terms of quantity. In 1890 
these organisations had about 85,000 members, of whom more than 75,000 (90%) were 
insured against illness (and medical expenses). As in the case of the mutual funds, the execu-
tive and management boards were in the hands of members who were chosen at general 
meetings.
The nutsfondsen also took a favourable turn. Their number grew from 26 in 1850 to 60 
in 1890. Few changes occurred among them, however, in terms of organisation or content. 
Nutsfondsen focused mainly on farm workers, so they existed chiefl y in smaller towns. This 
implied that most nutsfondsen were small in scale, with an average of scarcely 100 members. 
Since they concentrated on the poorest workers, their fi nancial capacity was small and benefi ts 
remained on the low side. The vulnerability of these small nutsfondsen became clear when 
the cholera epidemic of 1866 broke out. As a result of the sudden increase in the number of 
payments that had to be made within a short period of time, at least three nutsfondsen were 
forced to shut down.54 On the other hand, no matter how small their size, their activity 
contributed to the social security of several thousands of chiefl y low-paid farm workers who 
otherwise would have ended up on church relief.
The number of commercial funds that offered insurance for illness and medical expenses 
in addition to burial insurance increased more rapidly relative to the mutuals and the nuts-
fondsen. In 1890 only 66 of the 163 commercial companies offered healthcare insurance, and 
barely 29 of them insured against loss of wages due to illness. Apparently the market for these 
kinds of insurance was covered with increasingly greater effi ciency by other types of funds. 
In addition, the costs for fraud control, administration and messenger services were too high 
to generate suffi cient profi t relative to the resources budgeted and the risks taken. More and 
more commercial funds specialised in the lucrative task of burial and death insurance and 
ultimately in life insurance.55
2/ The phenomenon of corporate funds
As previously noted, very little study has been done on the infl uence of the factory funds on 
health insurance, which may be why it is so underrated. In Belgium, and even more so in 
Germany, these funds insured an important portion of the workers in large, heavy industrial 
companies before the First World War. In 1888-1890 the engineers Struve and Bekaar drew 
HEALTH INSURANCE AS A GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 101
up a detailed report of industrial statistics. To do this they conducted research in 3,154 large 
and medium-sized (at least ten employees) companies throughout the Netherlands. They 
arrived at the surprising fi nding that 75% of the almost 125,000 employees were working 
in companies that provided various forms of social services for their personnel. Not all the 
employees from those companies could take advantage of such benefi ts, but Van Genabeek 
estimates that no less than 50 to 60% of the employees in large and medium-sized businesses 
in the Netherlands enjoyed some measure of social security from their place of work.56
Approximately one-quarter of the employees in mainly small-scale companies (food and 
textiles) received wages that were fully or partly paid in the event of illness, accident, disabi-
lity or old age. In the smaller companies, management stimulated workers to join a private 
health-insurance fund by supplementing health-insurance benefi ts from the company coffers. 
Three percent of the employees were supported by their employers to join the company’s 
own organisations of mutual relief. Apparently by offering these allowances entrepreneurs 
hoped to encourage their workers to undertake self-help initiatives. Finally there was the 
largest group, comprised of one-third of the employees or more than 41,000 personnel, who 
worked companies with their own factory funds. The phenomenon of company funds was 
even greater when we consider the fact that Struve and Bekaar did not include the company 
funds of the railway and tramway companies in their study. Van Genabeek believes that most 
of the personnel from these transport companies, who together amounted to almost 15,000 
employees, were members of their company funds.57
It should be noted that company funds were most common in the larger companies 
where the risks could be better spread over a large workforce. They also occurred mainly in 
predominantly male trades. Clearly the idea was fi rst to protect the income of the man as 
head of the household and chief breadwinner against the risks of illness, accident and death. 
Following the same rationale, more adult women were insured against illness and the like 
than children.
Besides the funds that were organised within one individual company, there were also 
seven sector health-insurance funds in 1890 with 14,000 to 15,000 members. This meant 
that approximately 65,000 to 70,000 employees were members of a factory or sector health-
insurance fund. These fi gures gain in importance when we consider the fact that Struve and 
Bekaar’s statistics did not include any workers from the large group of small companies with 
less than ten employees.
The few researchers who pay any attention to these factory funds often wonder (and rightly 
so) about the motives of the entrepreneur-founders. Why would entrepreneurs organise their 
own fund that would mean direct or indirect supplementary expenses for the company? 
It goes without saying that their actions were often based on economic considerations. In 
modern companies equipped with expensive machines, the need for trained personnel grew 
very rapidly. Entrepreneurs searching for trained workers tried to lure these rare personnel by 
means of attractive social benefi ts (even at that time) and then to bind them to the company. 
A health-insurance fund fi t perfectly in such a policy. A health-insurance fund could also 
have a disciplinary and stabilising effect within the company, since the worker had to pay 
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his contribution on a regular basis and therefore had to have regular work-based income at 
his disposal to keep from jeopardising his right to payments and possibly other benefi ts. In 
addition the entrepreneur could lay down extra conditions, certainly if he fi nanced the fund 
partly or fully himself: punctuality at work, respect for working hours, avoiding drunkenness 
or immoral behaviour − even outside the factory.
All too often, however, the genuinely philanthropic or human motives of the entrepreneur 
were called into question or regarded as paternalistic and cast aside. It is undeniable, however, 
that despite the cutthroat competition many entrepreneurs took initiatives out of a sense of 
humanity to support their workers and to protect them from unforeseen risks. Some were 
inspired by their religious faith, others by the growing conviction that entrepreneurs also 
had a social obligation to their workers. In imitation of other countries such as Great Britain, 
attention gradually came to be paid in the Netherlands to abuses in the workplace and in 
factories. The founding of the Geneeskundig Staatstoezicht (State Health Inspectorate) in 1865, 
imperfect though it may have been, and the parliamentary endorsement of Van Houten’s 
Kinderwetje (Child Labour Act) of 1874 were the fi rst modest results.58 Public and political 
interest in the social problem gradually grew, partly under pressure from the young labour 
organisations and labour movements such as the Algemeen Nederlandsch Werklieden Verbond
(General Dutch Workers’ Alliance (ANWV)), Patrimonium and the Sociaal Democratische Bond
(Social Democratic Alliance (SDB)). A next step was the study commissioned by the Lower 
House in 1886-1887, carried out by the Verniers van der Loeff Commission, on conditions 
(and abuses) in industry. This commission actually suggested that employers had the moral 
obligation to see to the social security of their employees.59 Not only Catholic workers but 
also Catholic employers were undoubtedly infl uenced by the announcement of the papal 
social encyclical Rerum Novarum, issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1891.
Whether economic considerations, inner conviction or social pressure was the decisive 
motive is not always clear. In any case, the result was a very rapid growth after 1860 − with a 
clear acceleration during the thirties − of entrepreneurial initiatives such as the introduction 
of sickness and medical-expense insurance for employees.
The phenomenon of the factory and sector health-insurance funds in the Netherlands is 
deserving of more attention, and not only because of its quantitative size. The quality of the 
insurance it offered was also of great importance. In the evaluation of the German health-
insurance funds it has already been shown that the business funds scored higher than average. 
According to Van Genabeek these funds also averaged higher scores in the Netherlands, and 
they sometimes paid out benefi ts for longer periods than the standard mutual fund. R. Philips, 
in his study of medical conditions in Limburg during the nineteenth century, comes to the 
same conclusion concerning the funds in Maastricht.60
A number of factors may explain this possibly surprising fi nding. First of all, the factory 
funds had further fi nancial resources at their disposal in addition to the contributions. These 
came by way of gifts or fi nancial supplements made by the entrepreneur or the company. 
Fines that were imposed for things like unjustifi ed absence or tardiness were often deposited 
in the factory fund cashbox. In addition, the health-insurance fund could count on regular 
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income because the contributions in the big companies usually came from a permanent staff. 
Those amounts were sometimes deducted directly from the worker’s wages and deposited 
in the fund cashbox by the manager. Moreover, the costs of a factory fund could be pushed 
back because administration and fraud control were carried out within the company.
Apparently the good reputation of most factory and sector funds sometimes served to melt 
away distrust on the part of the workers with regard to employer initiatives. Van Genabeek 
points out that in 1867 the textile worker fi ercely resisted compulsory membership in the 
newly founded Ziekenfonds (Sickness fund) for Enschede and Lonneker, and with success. A 
few years later the fund already had more than 2,000 voluntary members, and a number of 
textile employers succeeded in making membership compulsory for their employees, this 
time without resistance.
The factory funds were labelled as organisations that were administered by the factory 
owners in almost dictatorial fashion, an unjust and unnuanced judgment. In his analysis Van 
Genabeek explains that the factory funds fell into three groups. In the fi rst group, decision-
making power was indeed fully in the hands of the employer. He and he alone decided how 
high the contributions would be, and he selected the employees who would be allowed to 
participate. Recording in or inspection of the books by member-employees was not tole-
rated, even if the employer had made membership compulsory. The second category consisted 
of a form of co-management, sometimes far-reaching. Employees participated in managing 
the health-insurance fund on a joint basis, or even with a majority. In daily practice the fi nal 
decision still lay with the employer because his fi nancial input was usually essential for the 
smooth functioning and survival of the fund. Finally there was a third group of factory funds 
in which the employees administered the fund completely autonomously and also took care 
of fi nancing, set the contributions and decided on benefi t payments. Financial input from 
the employer was welcome but did not give him participation in the board.61 According to 
Struve and Bekaar’s study, about 6% of the workers were part of such a fund.
3/ Doctors’ funds
Reference has already been made to initiatives made by medical practitioners to improve 
both the quality of medical care and their income position by creating their own healthcare 
insurance. The successful example of the Algemeen Ziekenfonds te Amsterdam (General Sickness 
Fund Amsterdam (AZA)), established in 1846 by two hundred doctors, surgeons and phar-
macists, was imitated in the principal cities throughout the Netherlands. The doctors set up 
their own funds in reaction to the increasing pressure on fees, mainly from the mutual and 
commercial funds. To keep expenses and contributions as low as possible, these funds had 
scaled down their benefi ts for contracted doctors to a minimum. They had also increased 
the doctors’ workload by adding to the number of insured persons per doctor. The doctors 
also reacted because they came to realise that the commercial funds were being particularly 
welcoming to wealthy patients. This was a frontal attack on the incomes of the doctors be-
cause these patients disappeared from their private practice.62 Doctors who ran their own 
funds were in a better position to control and defend the three-part division of their patient 
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rolls into destitute, poor and wealthy sick people, thereby safeguarding the income from 
their private practice.
In 1890 there were 27 active doctors’ health-insurance funds. The most successful was still 
the AZA, which that year insured about 16% of the total Amsterdam population. Besides the 
AZA there were almost one hundred other doctors’ funds in 1890, mainly in the countryside. 
Most of these funds were small-scale one-man initiatives, i.e. they were set up by the village 
doctor who cared for his members as the fund’s sole medical professional. Such a doctor could 
manage his fund as he saw fi t from an almost monopoly position. This sounds more brazen 
than it actually was in most cases: with their funds, most doctors tried to assure themselves of 
a tolerable income and at the same time guarantee their poorer patients decent medical care. 
In most country villages the doctor depended on a not very prosperous village community 
for his income, and he could not count on ample honoraria from the care of wealthy private 
patients. Country practices, because of the great distances involved and the poor transport 
infrastructure, demanded a great deal of time and physical effort at a relatively low income. 
For this reason doctors often resisted the idea of setting up their practice outside the cities. 
Most doctors never even considered settling in those remote and impoverished little hamlets where 
the performance of slavish labour is still not enough to maintain the kind of existence to which the modern 
physician believes he and his family are entitled.63 In the entire province of Limburg, for example, 
there were scarcely 40 active doctors and surgeons in 1890.
c. The long legislative path
1/ Politicians and doctors in action
When the great worldwide depression of the 1880s ebbed away, the industrialisation of the 
Netherlands intensifi ed. Industry was no longer limited to the cities and a few low-wage areas 
such as Twente and Noord-Brabant. The relative proportion of factory workers in the work-
force rapidly increased. Dutch politicians could no longer avoid the social insurance debate 
that had already been going on for more than a decade in the parliaments of Germany, Great 
Britain and Belgium. The passing of the fi rst social legislation in a few European countries, 
and especially the introduction of compulsory health insurance for industrial workers in 
Germany, did not go unnoticed and met with considerable response in the Netherlands.
The essential question was: who is responsible for the social security of the population 
− especially the working population − when that social security is threatened by risks such 
as sickness, accident or death?64 The answer to that question required arriving at clarity as to 
the role of the government. Political opinions in this regard were light years apart in around 
1890. The conservative old-time liberals rejected every obligation and every government 
intervention on principle. At the other extreme, starting in 1897, were the social democrats 
with the young Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP)) 
as their parliamentary voice. This party’s members of parliament did not hesitate to defend 
compulsory social insurance as a public responsibility.
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Between these two extremes were other parties that took a moderate position. The progressive 
Liberal Union and the Free-Thinking Democratic Alliance were champions of government 
intervention, on the condition that the sense of individual responsibility was not weakened. The 
progressive liberals in particular promulgated the idea that the solution to the social problem 
lay in large-scale, compulsory insurance plans with suffi cient fi nancial guarantees. They also 
believed that only the government was organisationally and fi nancially capable of imposing 
compulsory insurance and guaranteeing benefi t payments. The system of voluntary insurance 
schemes, which were often small-scale and fi nancially weak, offered too little security in their 
estimation. In addition, because of the narrow base of support the voluntary funds tried to 
exclude bad and large risks, which meant that many people threatened to fall through this 
loose-mesh safety net.65 The Protestants clung to the principle of sovereignty within one’s 
own circle, while the Catholics maintained the subsidiarity principle as the basis of discussion. 
Translating these basic ideas into concrete legislative texts on social insurance was much more 
diffi cult for the confessional parties. In 1895 Abraham Kuyper, leader of the Antirevolutionaire 
Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP)), launched a compulsory insurance plan for old age, 
Abraham Kuyper in the weekly newspaper De Amsterdammer of 17 January 1892
(Source: IISG)
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death, sickness, disability and unemployment. He clearly relied on Bismarck’s German model, 
therefore, rather than the recently passed Belgian Mutualiteitwet with its subsidised freedom. 
Other Protestants, certainly those in the Christelijk Historische Unie (Christian Historical 
Union (CHU))  but also in Kuyper’s ARP, opposed compulsory insurance and state socialism. 
The Catholics − in line with Rerum Novarum − defended the position that the worker had 
a right to adequate wages, not only for himself but also for his family.
The political discussion was continuously being stalled and even interrupted because of the 
fact that between 1890 and 1914 the coalitions changed with every election. Confessional 
cabinets and left-liberal cabinets followed each other in succession. With each new cabinet a 
new minister stepped forward with social insurance in his portfolio. The plans of the previous 
cabinet were investigated critically; at best they were adapted, but usually they were simply 
fi led away without much hesitation. The legislation for the creation of healthcare insurance 
dragged on and on like a penitential procession that lasted for decades.
A second factor that strongly infl uenced the parliamentary discussion and sent submit-
ted legal tests to the waste paper basket was the tremendous pressure of the Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (the Dutch Medical Association (NMG)). Since its 
establishment in 1849, the NMG had grown into an effi ciently organised organisation that 
contained the vast majority of Dutch physicians. In its fi rst phase, the association’s concern was 
mainly focused on the qualitative improvement of medical care in the Netherlands. During 
the second half of the nineteenth century it produced repeated reports that complained of 
abuses and wrongs, and proposed measures for better organisation of the medical care system. 
Gradually the NMG evolved into a professional society of physicians that defended material 
and fi nancial interests at the local and national level without losing sight of its initial goal.
2/ Alarming reports
The debate on workers’ medical, accident and death insurance gained its full momentum 
during the last years of the nineteenth century both inside and outside parliament. Initiatives 
to identify, analyse and rectify medical insurance problems followed each other in rapid suc-
cession. The staatscommissie Arbeidsenquête (Labour Inquiry Commission), which had visited 
and investigated a large number of factories, devoted some attention in its fi nal report of 
1892 to the medical care of workers and especially to the operation of health insurance funds. 
The conclusion of the report was that many workers could not pay for their own medical 
treatment and often had to appeal to the local poor relief.66 In 1891, before the commission’s 
report was published, the executive board of the Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen (Society 
for Public Welfare) had taken the initiative to carry out a thorough investigation of the Dutch 
health-insurance system. This revealed that, despite the existence of 650 funds, only about 10% 
of the Dutch population were insured by a fund. Quite substantial differences were reported 
between geographic areas. In Amsterdam, more than 40% of the population were insured by 
a health-insurance fund, and in many rural towns no-one was insured. In addition, only 15% 
of these funds insured against loss of wages due to sickness or accident and against medical 
expenses. A little more than half of the funds provided only sick pay, while the remaining one-
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third only offered insurance against medical expenses. The conclusion of the staatscommissie 
Arbeidsenquête − that the vast majority of workers were uninsured or inadequately insured − was 
confi rmed in even sharper terms by the Nuts-study. Not only workers and their families but 
apparently other population groups as well continued to run huge risks of being plunged 
into hopeless misery because of sickness and the like, despite the growing health-insurance 
system. The Nuts-study also pointed out a number of abuses that had already been observed 
but were now being emphasised once again. The report drew attention to the abnormally 
low reimbursements being paid to doctors and pharmacists by some funds, and the fairly 
widespread practice of registering even wealthy patients as members of a fund.
The Nuts-study was indirectly the signal for the NMG to swing into action. In 1897 the 
Amsterdam section took the decision to organise its own investigation. In collaboration with 
the Algemeen Ziekenfonds Amsterdam (AZA) and four other small doctors’ funds, the doctors 
undertook an inspection of a signifi cant part of the market and were able to report on the 
health-insurance world with a great measure of expertise. On the other hand, questions can 
be raised concerning the objectivity of the report, since it was drawn up by a directly inte-
rested party. The report came down especially hard on abuses committed by the commercial 
(Source: IISG)
Political debate during the parliamentary discussion of the Accident Act
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healthcare funds, the strongest competitors of the AZA. There was also clear resentment of 
the non-existent or minor involvement of doctors in the administration and operation of 
the mutual funds. In this report, too, there was much lamentation about the misuse of funds 
by wealthy private individuals.
The Amsterdam report was followed by a national investigation by the Nederlandsche Maat-
schappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (Dutch Medical Association (NMG)). The executive com-
mittee of the NMG had shrewdly realised the great importance of taking part in the discussion 
of the legal regulation of health insurance, armed with expertise and a fully prepared dossier. 
Indeed, workers’ organisations, the political world and the various NMG sections were becom-
ing involved locally and nationally in the health-insurance debate. In 1900 the investigation 
was assigned to a commission, but it was not until 1908 that the very substantial report − 2 
volumes, 830 pages − was fi nished. It arrived just in time to guide the health-insurance debate 
that had broken out in parliament in the direction desired by the NMG.
3/ Ups and downs
At around the turn of the century, the slow change in mentality resulted in a political 
breakthrough concerning the problem of social insurance: a majority of the States General 
appeared to have been won over to the introduction of compulsory social insurance. How far 
the obligation would reach, to whom it would apply and how the fi nancing, execution and 
controls would be carried out would give rise to decades of parliamentary discussions. The 
powerful social pressure groups of doctors, entrepreneurs and trade unions became hyperactive 
in their effort to manoeuvre the texts, proposals and drafts in the desired direction. 
The passing of the 1901 Ongevallenwet (Accident Act) was a fi rst important step − modest, 
but symbolic − in the direction of a full system of compulsory social insurance. This On-
gevallenwet, a product of the liberal Pierson government, seems to be a fi rst step towards the 
speedy realisation of a fully-fl edged compulsory healthcare insurance for all workers. The 
act was a clear signal that the government wanted to abandon its detached attitude towards 
social insurance. Everything seemed to indicate that a medical insurance act was right around 
the corner. Yet it would take decades before the system of social insurance really got off the 
ground. It was the healthcare insurance that would take the cake in this regard. Until the 
beginning of the Second World War, one bill after another would be submitted and rejected 
without the emergence of a satisfying legal regulation.67
After an electoral victory in 1901, the confessional Kuyper cabinet came to power. Abraham 
Kuyper, whose competence also included social affairs, was now given a unique opportunity 
to realise his plan of 1895. In 1904 he submitted an ambitious plan that provided permanently 
employed wage workers with a compulsory insurance to cover medical expenses and wages lost 
in the event of illness and that paid out death benefi ts. In addition, workers’ family members 
and even parents living with them over the age of 65 were also insured. Insured persons would 
have a right to 70% of their wage and to medical care up to a maximum of 180 days.68 The 
premium would be paid by the employer, who could deduct a maximum of two-thirds of 
the contribution from the worker’s wage, which meant that the employer himself would pay 
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at least one-third, as in Germany. To implement the plan, an appeal would be made to district 
government funds or to private funds recognised by the government. The government would 
provide supervision by means of a Supervisory Board consisting of a chairman (appointed 
by the Crown), a doctor, a pharmacist, an employer and an insured person.69
Kuypers’s rough draft did not become law; in the elections of 1905 his ARP suffered a 
crushing defeat, and the confessional government was replaced by the left-liberal De Meester 
cabinet. Minister Veegens, who took charge of social affairs in the new government, came up 
with a new bill that departed from the earlier Kuyper draft on only a few points, however. 
The main change concerned health-insurance funds: the private health-insurance funds were 
now granted the leading role in implementing the act and the planned district government 
funds would only perform supplementary tasks.70 The Veegens bill underwent the same 
unhappy fate as that of its predecessor: at the end of 1907 the De Meester cabinet stepped 
down, and this bill was never discussed in the Lower House either. In the new Heemskerk 
cabinet (confessional once again), the socially engaged Talma of the ARP was given the social 
affairs portfolio. He in turn submitted a bill in 1910 that provided for an ambitious package 
of social laws. The parliamentary debate became a year of agony for Talma, and the text of 
his bill suffered drastic pruning.
d. Passed …and yet back to square one
1/ The NMG: a fearful power
Reference has already been made to the formidable power that the NMG as a pressure group 
could exercise on political decision-making, both locally and nationally. During the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century, the NMG underwent very rapid growth in both absolute 
and relative terms. The number of doctors on the rolls doubled from about 1,000 mem-
bers, grouped into 31 local sections in 1880, to 2,000 members in 51 sections in 1900. The 
percentage of doctors on the rolls increased from 54% in 1880 to 85% in 1900.71 Although 
internal divisions were frequent, the NMG had undoubtedly grown into the sole representa-
tive voice for the Dutch medical corps around the turn of the century. With great authority 
it could defend the opinions of the medical establishment in the debate on health insurance 
and on other issues. The lobbying carried out by the NMG was all the more powerful because 
of the high level of membership, which gave the organisation a quasi-monopoly. This made 
it possible for the NMG to use boycotts or strikes − with great effi ciency, if necessary − when 
engaged in negotiations. With the establishment of doctors’ funds, the demarcation of private 
patients (which was largely successful) and with the exclusion of those patients from to the 
health-insurance funds, Dutch medical professionals had proven themselves alert in respon ding 
to social changes even before 1890. They would go on to demonstrate the power of their 
organisation with even more strength in the parliamentary debate on health insurance. Neither 
in Germany, where doctors did not really begin to organise until after 1890, nor in Belgium, 
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where physicians also lacked an effi ciently developed combat organisation, could doctors join 
in the debate on health insurance and health-insurance funds in the same vigorous way.
As the NMG increased in membership and power, it also became more radical. The focus 
of attention at the general meetings shifted slowly but surely from the promotion of quality 
of care to maintaining and improving the material position of medical practitioners. Young 
general practitioners were particularly concerned about their future, and not without rea-
son. After 1890 the number of physicians, and therefore also the competition among them, 
steadily increased, particularly in the cities. General practitioners also encountered growing 
competition from specialists in outpatients’ clinics and hospitals.72 The development of the 
medical professions in new areas such as dentistry and physiotherapy encroached on the 
traditional market. The growing number of physicians also constituted a threat for the addi-
tional income of doctors who served on church and municipal relief boards and health-care 
funds. Some of these boards did not hesitate to profi t from the rising supply of physicians 
and to reduce doctors’ fees.73
Van der Velden presents an excellent summary of the change in mentality and concern 
among the members of the NMG in around 1900: ... in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century 
the NMG would transform itself into an advocate of independent medical practice. The concomitant ideo-
logy was based on the understanding that not only was good care to be well remunerated, but also that 
independent practice that could best be guaranteed by independent professionals. Third parties such as 
the government, health-insurance boards or health-insurance agents were not to become involved in the 
relationship between doctor and patient. The NMG would distance itself more and more from government 
interference, and attention would be increasingly shifted to material interests and to defi ning the scope 
of the medical profession.74
2/ The NMG in the arena
The erosion and decline of the Talma bill had already been prepared some years before the 
bill was submitted. In a secret report of 1904 the NMG had responded to a rough draft by 
Kuyper. In its response the NMG, as national umbrella organisation, formulated for the fi rst 
time its main points regarding healthcare funds. These would function as a guideline for the 
doctors’ organisation for decades to come:
– Unlimited free choice of doctors for the patient
– Setting down a (low) income limit
– Representation of social groups (including care providers) on the boards of preferably 
local health-insurance funds75
The NMG also proved to be a supporter of a subscription fee for medical help on the basis 
of local tariffs. The NMG also rejected (cautiously at fi rst) a link between medical assistance 
and sick pay.
Especially this last part quickly developed into a real point of contention for the NMG. In 
the Veegens proposal, the doctors fi ercely objected to the link between the right to receive 
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medical assistance and the granting of sick pay. They demanded a complete separation of 
funds for medical care, sick pay and burial coverage. What they feared was losing their in-
dependence and having their fees reduced if the expenses for sick pay proved to be higher 
than expected.76 The NMG declared that doctors would never accept this linkage. This radical 
position, along with a few other objections, was formulated in an address to the parliament 
in early 1907.
In 1908 the Schreve commission delivered its long-awaited report to the board of the 
NMG. The report proved well worth the wait. Schreve and his colleagues produced a probing 
study of Dutch health-insurance funds. The report contained a clear overview of the Dutch 
health-insurance fund system, contained data on hundreds of health-insurance funds and, most 
importantly, shed light on the numerous weaknesses and the prevailing abuses in the existing 
insurance system. The report gave the NMG board abundant information for formulating a 
position in the debate on the health-insurance fund act and on the future functioning of 
health-insurance funds. In 1908, the general meeting of the NMG, after an exhaustive discussion 
of the Schreve report, drew up a list of decisions that would be used as the basis for future 
standpoints. Roughly speaking it was a recapitulation of the points from 1904, but now they 
were more concrete and detailed and were substantiated with examples and arguments. The 
principles of the health-insurance fund policy were:
– Freedom to choose one’s doctor
– A good legal status for employees – with subscription fees for general practitioners
– Good health care for insurance persons
– A locally operated healthcare insurance − beyond the infl uence of pillarisation77
Resistance to the linking of granting sick pay and healthcare insurance (understood below 
as including insurance for medical expenses) continued to be an important point for the 
NMG.
When the Talma bill on healthcare insurance was introduced in 1910 it became clear 
what an infl uential pressure group and powerful fi ghting organisation the NMG had become. 
The Talma bill was embedded in a detailed package of social legislation that also contained 
disability and old-age insurance. The bill as it was submitted immediately revealed that the 
NMG had scored an important victory even before the start of the parliamentary proceedings. 
Talma broke the link between insurance against loss of wages on account of sickness and 
insurance against medical expenses, the Talmamodel which came who be the foundation for 
the Dutch system social insurance system.78 As an argument for this division, which even 
Bismarck had not implemented in 1883 in Germany, Talma stated that it would be impos-
sible for the government to guarantee insurance for medical care as long as the responsibility 
for providing care rested with private initiative.79 The bill did stipulate that only those who 
were members of a legally recognised health-insurance fund could apply for sick pay. So a 
legal regulation for the health-insurance funds was unavoidable.80
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Talma and his health-insurance scheme
(Source: IISG)
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Talma proposed that the enforcement of the legal regulations on social insurance be placed 
in the hands of decentralised Raden van Arbeid (Labour Councils). These councils would 
consist of a joint representation of employers and employees, with a civil servant appointed 
by the Crown as chairman. According to Talma, the Raden van Arbeid would have to develop 
into statutory organs with prescribed authority. One of the tasks of these semi-offi cial organs 
would be to administer the insurance funds for the implementation of the sick-pay regula-
tions. This broad array of tasks given to the Raden van Arbeid, and especially the exclusion of 
existing private health-insurance funds from the healthcare insurance programme, met with 
fi erce opposition. It came from the employers (VNW) as well as from the doctors (NMG) and 
from the confessional parties, including Talma’s own ARP. They were uncomfortable with 
putting the implementation of the health-insurance programme in the hands of public bo-
dies, such as the health-insurance funds of the Raden van Arbeid. The CHU, on the other hand, 
thought the government ought to strengthen private initiative because the private funds 
would be more supportive of the workers, would work more effi ciently and could exercise 
tighter controls.81
Talma felt forced to adapt his visionary bill. Under pressure from the Lower House, the 
function of the Raden van Arbeid was limited to implementing social insurance programmes and 
their prescribed authority was scrapped. Only after this reduction was the Radenwet (Councils 
Act) of 5 July 1912 passed. The proposed draft of the Ziektewet (Sickness Benefi ts Act) was 
fundamentally changed as well. Private funds would now be involved in the implementation 
of the sick-pay regulation. The funds were even given a certain amount of freedom in setting 
the premiums, managing the monies and monitoring the insurance.82 After these political 
corrections were made to the original bill − actually it was a thorough erosion − Talma was 
given the approval of the Lower House on 25 April 1913.
With this approval of the Wet op de Ziekteverzekering (Councils Act and the Health Insurance 
Act), the Netherlands fi nally seemed to be falling in line with Germany − if only partially. Yet 
the plan miscarried. The elections of 1913 gave the Lower House a liberal-left majority and 
the Cort van der Linden cabinet came to power. This cabinet soon made it known, via the 
1913 speech from the throne, that its intention was to block the implementation of both laws, 
which had been passed and had even been published in the statute book. The new cabinet 
was able to stop the implementation of Talma’s laws, but in the Upper House it ran into a 
strong confessional majority that in turn was able to block new left-wing social legislation. 
With this political stalemate, combined with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, 
the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance unexpectedly ended up on the back 
burner, just as it had in Belgium.
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e. ‘Power struggle’
1/ The healthcare insurance landscape, 1890-1913
It is diffi cult, if not impossible, to gain a clear picture of exactly how many health-insurance 
funds there were in the Netherlands between 1890 and 1914 and how they evolved. The 
Schreve commission studied 616 health-insurance funds for its report, only eighteen of 
which had statutes that had been approved by Royal Decree. This does not mean that the 
vast majority were administered in random fashion. On the contrary, the absence of legally 
approved statutes meant that these funds regulated their own internal operations without 
the higher authorities having any real right of inspection. A uniform means of registration 
or offi cial control by the government was almost completely absent, the logical consequence 
being that offi cial statistics for all of the Netherlands could never be compiled.
Verdoorn counts 650 funds for 1891.83 Van der Hoeven, however, reports 485 health-insu-
rance funds for 1898, 230 of which were doctors’ funds, 87 mutual, 67 corporate, 74 com-
mercial and 27 mixed funds.84 What he means here, however, are only the health-insurance 
funds that insured their members against the costs of medical care. He also mentions 1,811 
support funds that only provided payments to compensate for loss of wages. Finally he notes 
the existence of 135 combined healthcare and support funds that insured their members 
against both the costs of medical care and loss of wages.85 This results in a total of no less 
than 2,431 funds at around the end of the nineteenth century. Six hundred and twenty of 
them were concerned with medical expense insurance, either exclusively or in combination 
with sick pay. Van der Hoeven’s results practically coincide with the fi gures from the Schreve 
commission, which compiled its report on the basis of a study of 616 funds. There must have 
been many more, however, since only one health-insurance fund is listed in the tables for the 
entire province of Limburg.86 Philips mentions the existence of at least six factory funds for 
Maastricht in addition to one or more doctors’ funds.87 Elink Schuurman, who wrote a manual 
for the workers’ health-insurance funds in the Netherlands in 1917, says that according to the 
report of the Directeur-Generaal van den Arbeid (Director-General for Labour) in 1911/1912 
there were no less than 1,862 funds, 140 of which had refused to disclose the size of their 
membership. The 1,722 funds that did report their fi gures comprised a total of 393,575 mem-
bers. The author does not explain how the Directeur-Generaal reached these fi gures, however, 
and he adds, on the basis of his very thorough knowledge of the situation in Noord-Holland, 
that a very large number of funds had escaped the notice of the Labour Inspectorate.
Not only the number of health-insurance funds but also the membership fi gures must 
be approached with suspicion. There are no uniform criteria for the membership statistics. 
Sometimes the fi gures seem to be underestimating the actual situation. Many health-insurance 
funds included only the head of the household in their statistics; others used a weighted 
count. The Middelburgsch Ziekenfonds (Middelburg Health-Insurance Fund) had 2,700 full 
members in 1908. Children were counted only as one-quarter of a full member, which 
means the total number of members was undoubtedly much higher.88 On the other hand, 
several authors call attention to the fact that it was not unusual for one person to sign up 
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for several health-insurance plans, sometimes even four or fi ve. Not every fund insured the 
same risks or provided a suffi ciently high benefi t to serve as a satisfactory alternative income 
in the event of illness. So while the membership fi gures per health-insurance fund are not 
incorrect in themselves, merely combining them can lead to the wrong conclusions as to the 
number of insured persons and the degree of healthcare insurance in the Netherlands. Seen 
from this angle, Verdoorn’s assertion that 41.7% of the Amsterdam population were mem-
bers of some health-insurance fund seems anything but reliable.89 The 210,000 members of 
health-insurance funds − the total for Amsterdam − does not mean that 210,000 different 
individuals were insured.
Although the scarce fi gures must be approached with the necessary caution, it is possible 
to make out a few broad lines in the development of the number of members. Clearly the 
number of fund members increased rapidly after 1890. As the prolonged world depression 
ebbed away, the economic climate in the Netherlands also improved and industrialisation 
made a defi nite breakthrough. The unmistakable rise in prosperity caused an increase in 
social concerns about hygiene and health, with the drastic reduction in infant mortality 
as a directly noticeable positive result. The growth in the number of industrial employees 
brought with it an almost proportional increase in the number of applicants for member-
ship in health-insurance funds. Several authors estimate than approximately 15 to 17% of 
the Dutch population in around 1904 were members of a health-insurance fund.90 There 
were great regional differences: 27.2% in the West; 12.9% in the East; 3.6% in the North and 
scarcely 0.51% in the South.91
Which categories of health-insurance funds absorbed this growing demand cannot be clearly 
deduced from the scarce fi gures. Doctors’ and corporate funds undoubtedly made a great 
leap forward between 1890 and 1905. According to Van der Velden, the number of doctors’ 
funds increased from 96 to 230, and the number of medical practitioners’ funds (more than 
one doctor) rose from 27 to 63: a joint increase of almost 140%.92 The factory funds took 
off as well. Struve and Bekaar counted 432 factory funds with 41,080 members altogether 
in 1890, but by 1911, according to the aforementioned study from the Director of Labour, 
there were 659 factory funds with 104,700 members. While only 7.5% of the total number 
of employees were insured by a factory fund in the sectors under investigation in 1889, this 
percentage had jumped to 19 by 1911. In addition, there were at least eight active sector 
health-insurance funds with a total of 14,316 members.93
Remarkably little is known about the evolution of the nutsfondsen (local funds) and the 
mutual funds. Studies of a few individual funds note a moderate to even rapid increase in 
the number of members. The healthcare insurance that emerged from the trade unions, on 
the other hand, seemed to have suffered from loss of interest. In 1890, 86 trade unions of-
fered their members sick-pay insurance, while in 1900 this number had shrunk to 66 and 
in 1905 it had dropped even further to 57 unions with 42,671 insured persons. In the same 
year, only four trade unions offered insurance to members for medical expenses. Apparently 
the Dutch labour movement chose this separation because the complications of healthcare 
insurance − with benefi ts in kind and the frequently tense relationship with the medical 
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profession − could be dealt with more easily than specialised health-insurance funds with 
their own coffers.94
For commercial funds, the period 1890-1914 was not a very prosperous one either. Making 
profi ts at the expense of health-insurance fund patients was less and less acceptable. In the 
Nuts report and the Schreve report, a great many abuses were ascribed to the owners of these 
funds, who were out for a quick profi t. Possibly as a result of increasing social criticism, the 
number of commercial funds seems to have stagnated after the turn of the century. In 1899 
at least 74 commercial funds were still active in the area of healthcare insurance. Schreve, 
whose report may have been incomplete, noted that there were still 56 commercial funds 
in Zuid-Holland in 1908, 12 in Noord-Holland and 4 in Utrecht. In Zuid-Holland in par-
ticular, where they probably insured 200,000 people, they continued to occupy a substantial 
part of the insurance market.
So compared with the situation in 1890, little seems to have changed in the Dutch health-
insurance fund landscape from the viewpoint of number and variety on the eve of the First 
World War. Companje’s description of the health-insurance world in 1890 remained unaltered 
a quarter of a century later: They constituted a motley crew. They did not work together, their agents 
competed with each other, their benefi ts package was limited and varied, their administration faulty, their 
actuarial basis dreadful.95
2/ The NMG on the offensive
Finally, in 1914, after years of long drawn-out discussions, the tentative conclusion was reached 
that the role of the existing health-insurance funds had not changed at all. To the outside 
world on the eve of the First World War, nothing was fundamentally different: insurance 
candidates were still taking out policies against sickness and/or to cover medical expenses 
on a voluntary basis, with a free choice of company, doctors’, general, commercial or mutual 
funds. The general public was yet unaware that within the health-insurance world a fi erce 
and principled struggle had erupted that would decide the basic structure of the Dutch 
health-insurance community for decades to come.
The NMG concentrated its struggle for preserving the material well-being of its members 
mainly on the health-insurance funds. The income from health-insurance fund patients was 
of particularly great importance for the rapidly growing group of young doctors. Fierce local 
discussions between health-insurance funds and medical practitioners broke out on a regular 
basis. Some health-insurance funds still too greedily accepted wealthy patients as members, 
which negatively affected the incomes of doctors with private practices. In other places the 
benefi ts were reduced or the doctors had to take on a larger number of fund patients. Private 
practice and contracts with poor-relief boards remained outside these discussions for the most 
part. Indeed, the NMG regarded private practice as a matter between individual doctors them-
selves. And the relations with the poor-relief boards and the city councils, generally speaking, 
gave cause for fewer problems, partly because the destitute had to hand in a referral letter fi rst 
before they could apply for cost-free medical help through the poor-relief system.96
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C.F Schreve, the architect of the NMG’s health-insurance fund policy
(Source: IISG)
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In 1902 the growing local dissatisfaction among doctors became national. To prevent further 
reductions in fees, the general meeting of the NMG decided that, in the future, all agreements 
between members and local health-insurance funds would be collective rather than indi-
vidual.97 At the same time, the doctors hoped use this collective approach to strengthen their 
position on the health-insurance fund boards. There was still no legal ruling or guidelines 
governing the composition of these boards. The NMG was thoroughly annoyed that doctors, 
except those in the doctors’ funds, usually had little or no representation on most health-
insurance fund boards, which meant that they had to swallow the decisions made by these 
boards without having had much say in the matter.
Kuyper’s sickness-benefi t bill of 1904 and that of Veegens of 1907 did not meet the ex-
pectations of the NMG, including the issue of doctors’ representation on the health-insurance 
fund boards. Talma’s sickness-benefi t bill of 1910, on the other hand, did take into account 
a number of NMG objections and demands. Article 100 of the Talma bill provided seats for 
one or more insured persons on the board of any health-insurance fund (appointed by the 
insured membership or by the general meeting of the health-insurance fund).98 While this 
meant that the doctors would not provide half the board members, they were given a key 
position on the health-insurance fund boards. During the discussion in the Lower House, 
the SDAP submitted an amendment by which the fund board would have to be chosen ex-
clusively by and from the insured membership. With this the NMP threatened to initiate a 
full-blown physicians’ boycott of all health-insurance funds and to refuse to enter into any 
contracts. The SDAP proposal was not adopted by the Lower House, however, so a national 
boycott was avoided.
While the parliamentary discussions of the Talma bill were in full swing, the NMG itself 
poured new oil on the fl ames. Although Talma had given all due consideration to the wishes 
of the NMG (including separating sick pay from medical expenses), the NMG felt that its prin-
cipal demands were not being met. Talma’s sickness-benefi t bill still made it possible to form 
a health-insurance fund board with a minority of doctors. The upper income limit was not 
legally fi xed, either. Finally, the free choice of doctors was not an integral part of the wording 
of the act: the health-insurance funds had to offer their members only a minimum choice 
between two collaborating doctors.99 In an effort to guide the parliamentary debates in the 
desired direction, the general meeting of the NMG held in July 1912 confi rmed their earlier 
fi rm position. In addition, the NMG developed plans and actions aimed at guaranteeing the 
position of doctors in the health-insurance funds. These viewpoints and action plans were 
articulated in a Bindend Besluit (Binding Resolution) .
Members of the NMG would not be permitted to render assistance to funds that were not 
recognised by the NMG. The NMG would only grant recognition to those funds that met the 
list of demands as it had been formulated by the NMG in 1908:
– Introduction of the right to choose one’s doctor
– Equal representation of insured persons, doctors and pharmacists on the fund boards
– Legally set upper income limit
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– No obligation on the part of health-insurance fund members to make a disability declara-
tion 
The NMG enjoined its members to comply with the Bindend Besluit under penalty of expul-
sion or suspension. It would only apply to newly established health-insurance funds, however. 
Acting on its own authority, the NMG set an income limit in the Bindend Besluit for health-
insurance fund members: a maximum of 1,200 guilders per year for families and 800 guilders 
for single people. The defi nitive limits would be laid down at the local level. In expectation 
of the fi nal outcome of the parliamentary discussion of the sickness-benefi t act, a temporary 
hold was placed on the implementation of the Bindend Besluit.
For the NMG, the passing of the Talma Ziektewet of 1913 was the last straw and the signal 
to take fi rm action. At its general meeting in Breda in July 1913, the NMG decided to openly 
attack and to apply the Bindend Besluit of 1912 in its entirety. To increase the pressure on 
recalcitrant health-insurance funds, the NMG ordered that each of the sixty association sections 
set up its own association health-insurance fund which would be the property of the NMG,
the Maatschappijfondsen or Association Funds. This would greatly ease the step from boycotted 
health-insurance funds to the funds recognised by the NMG. A Central Organisation (CO) was 
to combine and monitor the operation of these funds. Doctors who entered into contracts 
with new health-insurance funds would have to do so through this CO. Last but not least, a 
strike fund was created to help doctors who might run into diffi culties with the application 
of the Bindend Besluit.100
Many local sections of the NMG immediately went into action and converted existing 
doctors’ funds or set up their own funds under the name Algemeen Afdelingsfonds, AAZ-fonds 
or Maatschappijfonds (Association Fund). In the 1914 annual report it was announced that 
sixteen sections had already set up association funds. Twenty sections had had their statutes 
and regulations approved by the Hoofdbestuur (Executive Board (HB)) and the CO, but had not 
yet launched their fund due to time constraints. Six sections did have regulations and statutes 
but had not yet sent them to the NMG, and fourteen sections were still working on drafts.101 In 
none of the cities did the operation run as smoothly as the NMG board had hoped. Juch even 
sees the association’s funds as something of a Trojan horse,102 since the NMG quickly found 
itself directly confronted by and involved in the fi nancial problems of the health-insurance 
world. The rock-hard competition made it almost impossible to raise the low contributions. 
To top it all, the association funds were cut off from external fi nancial help, unlike the mutual 
funds and especially the corporate funds, which could count on the union or the company 
in times of emergency to overcome a diffi cult situation.
Establishing an AAZ fund was not without its snags either. Within several sections bitter 
struggles broke out between the general practitioners on the one hand, and the specialists 
on the other, over the use of referral letters and over the criteria used for determining the 
income codes for the various groups of employees: general practitioners, specialists, dentists 
and pharmacists. The AZA, the illustrious ‘exemplary fund’, was badly hit by internal confl icts.103
Not only did the specialists show little interest in separate NMG funds, but in most cities there 
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were ‘dissident’ doctors − doctors who were not members of the NMG and/or who ignored 
the NMG guidelines − who refused to leave their health-insurance fund patients out in the 
cold and continued to work. So the medical practitioners did not constitute a united front.
3/ The challenge is accepted
With the Bindend Besluit, the confl icting interests of the NMG, the mutually administered 
health-insurance funds and the labour movement were made manifest. The Bindend Besluit
was no less than an out-and-out declaration of war on the part of doctors, directed primarily 
at the mutual funds. The mutual funds were in a precarious position: either they give in to the 
NMG’s demand for equal representation and lose their control of the health-insurance funds, 
or they risk a boycott with the possibility of considerable membership loss and, fi nally, the 
demise of the health-insurance fund system. In the application of the Bindend Besluit, health-
insurance fund members risked being deprived of medical help. For the patients, switching 
to a fund recognised by the NMG − fi rst and foremost a Maatschappijfonds − was really the 
only possible alternative.104
The application of the Bindend Besluit and the establishment of the CO were sure to provoke 
a strong reaction from the other health-insurance funds. On 8 October 1913, the Landelijke 
Federatie ter Behartiging van het Ziekenfondswezen (National Federation for the Promotion of 
the Health-Insurance Fund System (LFBZ)) was established. Members included the AOZ and 
ZZ of Amsterdam, the De Volharding of The Hague, the Algemeene Rotterdamsche Vereeniging 
voor genees-, heel- en verloskundige hulp, the Goudsche Vereeniging and the Ziekenzorgfondsen of 
Utrecht, Haarlem, Delft and Hengelo. Together they represented 130,000 members.105 This 
relatively small federation combined all the resistance of the mutual funds in their effort to 
escape the grasp of the NMG.
As the First World War erupted in the outside world, a war erupted between the health-
insurance funds in the Netherlands that would go on for years and years.
Summary
The period between 1850 and 1890 was one of economic progress in the Netherlands. 
The proceeds from this growth were not equally distributed, however. This led to bitter 
poverty in the countryside and a growing workers’ proletariat in the cities. As in Belgium 
and Germany, frustration grew within this group and manifested itself in the Palingoproer, or 
the Eel Revolt, of 1886. This led to the realisation of the need for structural change, both 
economically and socially. The liberal non-interventionist policies and the self-help doctrine 
exhibited major defi ciencies in the industrialised cities and regions. The churches could no 
longer bear the burden of medical care for the poor and increasingly surrendered them to 
the local government.
The structure of the health-insurance funds continued practically unchanged throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The number of occupation-related funds dropped 
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dramatically while other types of funds − commercial in particular − quickly developed. A 
new phenomenon emerged in the form of the trade-union fund. The Algemeen Ziekenfonds 
Amsterdam (AZA) founded in 1846, was imitated in most of the cities of the Netherlands. In 
the countryside hundreds of doctors’ funds were also set up, most of them small-scale one-
man initiatives. After 1880 industrialisation accelerated in the Netherlands and the number 
of industrial workers increased. Despite the existence of 650 health-insurance funds, only 
one-tenth of the Dutch population were insured by a fund in around 1890.
Various commissions undertook studies of the functioning of the Dutch health-insurance 
fund system. As in Belgium and Germany, a protracted social insurance debate took place in 
the Netherlands under constantly changing cabinets. Opinions on the role of the government 
differed sharply. One factor that strongly infl uenced the parliamentary discussion and caused 
bills to founder was the formidable power of the doctors’ organisation NMG. Following the 
proposal for compulsory insurance submitted by Kuyper in 1895, the States-General ap-
peared to support the introduction of such a system at around the turn of the century. Yet it 
would take decades before the system of social insurance actually got off the ground. Until 
the beginning of the Second World War, bill after bill was submitted without resulting in any 
satisfactory legal provisions for medical expenses.
Unlike Germany and Belgium, particularly the latter, Dutch doctors had an effi cient, 
developed professional organisation in the NMG. At around the turn of the century, 85% of 
all doctors were members of this group. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the NMG
increasingly shifted its focus to maintaining and promoting the material position of medical 
practitioners and to delineating the scope of the medical professions. The factors responsi-
ble for this change were the growing competition and the expansion of specialisations and 
medical professions.
After 1890, membership in health-insurance funds rapidly increased. The end of the de-
pression brought about an improvement in the economic climate, and industrialisation made 
its defi nitive breakthrough. The growing prosperity led to increased focus on hygiene and 
health. By around 1904, 15 to 17% of the population were members of a health-insurance 
fund. This growth was mainly set off by an increase in the membership of doctors’ funds, 
nutsfonds (local funds), mutual and corporate funds. The trade union and commercial funds 
stagnated or even declined in number.
Compared with the situation in 1890, few far-reaching shifts took place on the eve of the 
First World War. One exception was the eruption of a fundamental struggle that was decisive 
for the structure of the Dutch health-insurance fund system for decades to come. In 1902 
the NMG decided that, in the future, its doctor members would enter exclusively into col-
lective agreements with the local health-insurance funds rather than individual agreements. 
This was an attempt to strengthen their position on the health-insurance fund boards. In 
contrast with the bills for a sickness-benefi t act submitted by Kuyper and Veegens, the Talma 
bill of 1910 did take the demands of the NMG into account. Talma introduced an article 
giving doctors a central role on the health-insurance fund boards. Despite this accommoda-
ting gesture, the NMG felt too little had been done to meet its requests (free choice of doctor, 
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY122
equal representation on the board, legal ruling on the income limit). In a Bindend Besluit, the 
NMG developed plans and actions for guaranteeing the position of doctors within the funds. 
This meant that NMG doctors would not be permitted to work with funds not recognised 
by the group. The Talma Ziektewet of 1913 gave the NMG the reason it needed to establish 
its own Maatschappijziekenfonds in each of the group’s sixty sections, these funds to be the 
property of the NMG.
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Chapter V
WAR, PEACE, WAR, 1914-1945
The passage of war, the misery, the termination and the consequences of the First World War 
were very dissimilar for Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany, one of the most 
powerful countries of Europe in 1914, emerged from the war as an economically broken 
and humiliated land and would be politically frustrated for years to come in its search for a 
new path. Belgium, as a neutral country, was swept into the war by the German invasion of 
4 August 1914. For four years, most of the country was occupied by German troops, admi-
nistered as a war zone and ransacked by the occupier. The Netherlands managed to preserve 
its neutrality and came out of the European power struggle materially unscathed. These were 
economically diffi cult years to be sure, in which the standard of living declined dramatically 
due to shattered trade relations. Compared with the misery of the war as experienced by 
its neighbours, however, the Dutch population and its business community really couldn’t 
complain.
1. Germany from crisis to crisis
Germany underwent an especially pernicious period in both political and economic terms 
between 1914 and 1945. War, defeat, monetary upheaval, diffi cult recovery, economic depres-
sion, the Nazi regime and another war followed closely on each other’s heels.
a. War
The full application of the Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO) of 1911 for healthcare insu-
rance was quickly thrown out of gear by the outbreak of the First World War. After years of 
bruising battles, the German army surrendered and the bloody war ended with a domestic 
uprising of soldiers and civilians, the fl ight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands, the 
German capitulation and the armistice of 11 November 1918. The German monarchy, with 
its centuries-old Hohenzollern dynasty, made way for the Weimar Republic. 
German social security in general and compulsory healthcare insurance in particular 
emerged surprisingly intact from the long war which had brought all the great nations of 
Europe to the brink of economic and political bankruptcy. Soon after the war broke out, 
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the national government had taken steps to keep the costs of healthcare insurance within 
reasonable limits. During the war, health-insurance funds were permitted to pay only their 
members’ basic benefi ts provided by law. Extra benefi ts and subsidies were suspended. On 
the other hand, the health-insurance fund contribution paid by employees and employers 
had to be restricted and could amount to no more than 4.5% of the basic wage. Any health-
insurance fund defi cits that might arise from this restriction had to be made up by the 
municipalities for the Ortskrankenkasse (OKK) and the Landkrankenkasse (LKK), by employers 
for the Betriebskrankenkasse (BKK) and by the trade union or professional organisation for the 
Innungskrankenkasse (IKK).1 The German government was eager to limit the war taxes burden-
ing the working population in an attempt to preserve popular favour. Defi cits in the funds 
were caused not only by the lowering of the contribution limit but also by the reduction 
in incomes due to a diminishing membership. The main culprit here was wartime infl ation. 
Workers’ nominal wages were adjusted to the skyrocketing prices, although only partially 
and with extreme slowness. With rigid income limits having been set for membership in 
health-insurance funds, the result of merely nominal wage increases was that more and more 
insured persons were tumbling out of the compulsory insurance system. Because of the wage 
adjustments − without a concomitant increase in the maximum permitted wage level − they 
rose above that level, and if they wanted to continue to be insured against medical risks they 
were forced to look for insurance outside the compulsory system. Many could not afford 
the premiums, however, and gave up on insurance altogether. So it’s not surprising that on 
2 December 1918, only a few weeks after the Armistice, the new government raised the 
income level of 1912 from DM 2,500 to DM 5,000. This would be the beginning of a series 
of rapidly increasing adjustments.
b. The Weimar Republic, 1919-1933
1/ Stable structures
The German social insurance system held up remarkably well during the tumultuous post-
war years. The structures and operation of compulsory healthcare insurance were particularly 
stable. Perhaps it was the deeply imbedded form of self-governance at the local, regional and 
national levels that made it possible for the health-insurance funds to be fl exible in plan-
ning their own policy and in responding promptly to rapidly changing conditions, rather 
than being swept along into the general economic and political chaos. The involvement of 
the members in the fortunes of their health-insurance funds was further reinforced by the 
govern ment’s decision to alter the joint representation of employees and employers in the 
funds’ administrative boards, which had been introduced by the RVO in 1911. With the Verord-
nung of 3 February 1919, the government gave in to the inescapable demand of the rapidly 
growing workers’ movement to reintroduce the original structure of representation on the 
boards according to the law of 1883, namely two-thirds members and one-third employers. 
This ratio corresponded with the relative fi nancial contribution made by both parties: two-
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thirds from the members, one-third from the employer. At the same time the veto power 
was abolished. This right had been given to the two interest groups by the same RVO.2 Joint 
representation for the BKKs was retained, while the board of the IKKs was chosen entirely by 
the members of each trade union or professional organisation. 
Hardly any far-reaching measures in the health-insurance fund system can be noted for 
the diffi cult years of the Weimar Republic. At fi rst glance the compulsory healthcare insu-
rance system seems to have undergone a favourable development. The number of persons 
with compulsory health-insurance rose by one-third between 1914 and 1929: from almost 
17,000,000 to almost 22,500,000. Including the family members of those insured, this meant 
that almost 60% of the entire German population was insured through the compulsory 
health-insurance system. Two factors were responsible for this rising number of insured 
persons. First, the favourable economic period between 1924 and 1929 was responsible for 
a sharp increase in employment and therefore in the number of wage-earners qualifying 
for compulsory healthcare insurance.3 In addition, compulsory insurance was broadened 
considerably between 1918 and 1928 by the regular raising of the Versicherungsplichtgrenze. In 
1928 this maximum income level for membership amounted to approximately four times 
the average income. This implied that relatively high wage-earners were included in the 
compulsory insurance system.
The membership fi gures were driven up even further by the introduction of new categories 
of employees in the compulsory health-insurance system. These included people working 
at home in 1922 and teachers and nursing personnel in 1923. So the system was gradually 
opened and expanded for employees from the tertiary sector, although the vast majority of 
members were still from industry.
These millions of members were still spread over thousands of health-insurance funds of 
very different sizes. In 1913 21,492 health-insurance funds were still registered. Because of the 
introduction of the RVO and because of the vicissitudes of war, that number was cut by more 
than half, to 9,203 funds in 1919. After this drastic thinning out, the process of concentration 
continued, slowly but without interruption. Except for the good economic years between 
1924 and 1929 their number decreased by an almost constant 200 to 300 a year, so that in 
1932 there were only 6,632 funds left. Undoubtedly the principal cause of this decline was 
the dreadful economic climate after 1929. Health-insurance funds in fi nancial straits had 
few choices: to seek out strong partners with which to merge, to be gobbled up or simply 
to suspend their activities, liquidate their assets and call it quits. The government also passed 
a few tentative, limited measures to stimulate the merging of health-insurance funds. Imme-
diately after the war, the founding of new factory health-insurance funds was prohibited. In 
1923 this measure was relaxed and the founding of new corporate funds was permitted, but 
only on the condition that the works council agree with the directorate’s proposal. The law 
of 27 March 1923 prohibited the existence of an OKK and an LKK in the same place. Finally, 
the law also facilitated the merging of two or more health-insurance funds.
The government also tried to get a grip on the unmanageable tangle of the Knappschafts-
wesen. After the war there were still 118 Knappschaftsvereine left for the mineworkers. Each 
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fund had its own statutes and autonomously set its own limits on contributions and benefi ts. 
Whereas other health-insurance funds had basic benefi ts packages imposed on them by law, 
this was not the case with the Knappschaftsvereine. At best there were mutual, regional (Land)
agreements. In 1923 these Knappschaftsvereine were also subjected to a national regulation, 
without doing harm to the specifi c benefi ts of each individual Knappschaftsvereine. At the 
same time a national umbrella organisation was formed that could function as the contact 
point for the national government. These national associations were already in place before 
the war for the other categories of health-insurance funds − except for the LKKs, which were 
not organised nationally until 1919. The only notable change in the health-insurance fund 
structure before 1933, albeit limited, was the establishment of a separate fund for seamen, 
created by the law of 16 December 1927.
2/ Financial concerns
The positive membership growth between 1918 and 1929 did conceal a harsh survival 
struggle, however, that lasted many years. The value of the German mark collapsed with 
lightning speed after the Armistice was signed. Money was scarcely worth the metal or paper 
from which it was made. The prices of consumer goods skyrocketed. Never in the history of 
Europe had monetary depreciation occurred on such a scale. The entire economy was in a 
state of collapse, and businesses and banks folded in massive numbers. People living off their 
interest − mainly the elderly who had spent all their lives laying money aside for their old 
age − looked on with desperation and helplessness as the purchasing power of their savings 
melted away due to hyperinfl ation.
The wave of infl ation inundated the health-insurance funds as well. Their pre-war reserves, 
laboriously built up over the years, came out of the war in tatters and, struck by infl ation, began 
to erode perceptibly before the funds could effectively respond. By law, the health-insurance 
funds were required to invest at least one-quarter of their reserves in government bonds. 
Before the war, however, many health-insurance funds had invested most of their reserves 
in long-term fi xed-interest German Empire bonds. After the one-two punch of wartime 
infl ation and post-war hyperinfl ation, very little of their reserves were left. Forty years after 
the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance they were back to square one, or worse: 
they found themselves looking at a defi cit.
To pull themselves out of the fi nancial hole, the funds raised the salary contribution in 
1924 from 4% to 5.5 or even 6%. Naturally the maximum income limit for compulsory 
healthcare insurance was continually being adjusted. In 1912 the limit was DM 2,500. In 
1919 it was DM 5,000, in 1922 it rose to DM 72,000 and on 12 November 1923 it reached 
the almost inconceivable amount of DM 15 trillion! At that point the government fi nally 
took drastic action.
After the currency revaluation the income level was reduced to 1,800 Reichsmark, and 
between 1927 and 1949 it stabilised at 4,500 Reichsmark. With the currency back on a 
sound footing, the German economy fi nally had a few years of rest and relatively favourable 
development. The Wall Street crash on ‘Black Thursday’, 25 October 1929, abruptly inter-
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Costs and expenditure of the Krankenkassen in 1931
rupted this brittle recovery, however. To get back on its feet, and mainly to pay the oppressive 
reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, the German government and 
business community had relied heavily on short-term American capital loans. This fi nancial 
time bomb ticking beneath the German economic recovery fi nally exploded in early 1931. 
After the depression hit their own country, the insolvent American banks were no longer able 
to renew their short-term foreign loans. On the contrary, when their foreign loans expired 
they began demanding payment of outstanding capital on a massive scale.
The American depression quickly spread to Europe. Economic growth was abruptly halted 
and a severe economic crisis set in that lasted for years. Because of its precarious budget, the 
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burden of reparations and towering foreign debts, Germany − more than any other European 
country − was quickly hard-hit. The German GNP and employment dropped by more than 
one-third between 1929 and 1932; the number of jobless shot up to six million in March 
1932. The German banking system began to totter, and to avoid a complete downfall the 
national bank announced a moratorium on 13 July 1931.4
Because of the rise in unemployment and the reduction in the volume of paid wages, 
contributions to the health-insurance funds dropped as well, of course. The depression made 
it impossible to increase contributions. In the depth of the depression, neither employees 
nor employers were prepared or able to shoulder heavier expenses. Most health-insurance 
funds had hardly had the time to build up new, much-needed reserves after the depression 
of 1923, which meant that hundreds or even thousands of funds were now threatened with 
fi nancial doom.
For this reason the national government stepped in with the enactment of the Emer-
gency Act of 26 July 1930. In order to save compulsory health-insurance from bankruptcy, 
expenses would have to be drastically lowered. The most sweeping measure was the fi xing 
of a maximum daily amount for sick pay and especially the introduction of own contribu-
tions (50 Reichspfennig) for medicines and doctors’ visits. In addition, the payments had to 
be limited to the basic package. At the same time, interestingly enough, the basic package 
included healthcare insurance for the whole family. Previously a supplement had to be paid 
for such coverage. To prevent the health-insurance funds from passing these additional costs 
on to employees and the business community, a ceiling of 6% of the basic wage was placed on 
health-insurance contributions, which was later even reduced to 5%. So the health-insurance 
funds were required to tighten their belts and to make major cuts in the extra benefi ts and 
supplementary payments awarded to their members.
3/ Doctors and health-insurance funds: armed peace
With their precarious fi nancial situation, the curtailment of their payments and the introduc-
tion of non-refundable expenses, the health-insurance funds and their members began to 
look extremely critically at the high incomes − too high in their eyes − earned by doctors. 
The health-insurance funds thought that, in times of economic crisis and austerity, doctors 
too should do their part to restore fi nancial balance to the funds. The tension between the 
Hartmann Bund, also known as the Leipziger Verband and the health-insurance funds quickly 
intensifi ed. The Hartmann Bund, which was far and away the largest German doctors’ associa-
tion even before the First World War, had quickly outstripped its weaker competitors after 
the war. In early 1925, 38,000 of the approximately 43,000 German doctors were members 
of the Hartmann Bund, which was correctly regarded by the government both nationally 
and in most districts as the doctors’ representative.5
The relationship between doctors and health-insurance funds was in a state of constant 
tension after the First World War. As early as 1920, doctors’ strikes broke out in several cities 
because the health-insurance funds, themselves in fi nancial straits due to the consequences 
of the war, were too slow in adapting the doctors’ fees to the rapid rise in the cost of living 
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(if they adapted the fees at all), causing the doctors’ real income to drop sharply. The tension 
increased in the years that followed. In December 1923, the Berliner Abkommen, the ten-year 
agreement between doctors and funds that had been signed in 1913, came to an end. Neither 
party was inclined to extend the agreement without further ado. Negotiations were bumpy 
and major doctors’ strikes broke out in the autumn of 1923. In order to guarantee patient 
care, the government decided to step in.
With the decree of 13 October 1923 the Reichsausschuss, a government commission, 
was installed that was supposed to exercise control over the relations between doctors and 
health-insurance funds. Seated on this commission, in addition to the neutral government 
representatives, were representatives from the national organisations of health-insurance 
funds and doctors, all on an equal footing. This commission was charged with laying down 
regulations for:
– Admitting doctors to the funds practice
– Determining the general content of the agreements between funds and doctors
– Establishing the fees
– Monitoring health-insurance fund doctors6
An arbitration board was also set up to settle disputes. The installation of the commission and 
arbitration board occurred by direct government intervention, without giving the health-
insurance funds and doctors the opportunity for any real involvement. For this reason, when 
the Berliner Abkommen came to an end the Leipziger Verband called for a general strike. In early 
1924 an accord was reached in which the government promised to consult the two parties 
for any future legislative change. With this government action, contacts between doctors 
and health-insurance funds were institutionalised through their regional and representative 
national organisations. The agreements gradually became a matter of public law. Individual 
agreements between doctors and health-insurance funds disappeared, to make way for regional 
agreements under government supervision.
4/ Substantial reforms
The improvement in the economic situation after 1924, with increased employment lea-
ding to better incomes for both health-insurance funds and doctors, resulted in peaceful and 
smooth negotiations for a few years. The depression, as noted earlier, brought an end to the 
relaxed relations between the two parties. The growing criticism of high doctors’ incomes 
in times of severe crisis, the mutual recriminations and the threat of new doctors’ strikes led 
once again to direct government intervention in early 1932 in order to safeguard patient 
care. With the Emergency Decree of 14 January 1932, the government carried out drastic 
action in the organisation of compulsory healthcare insurance. Doctors were required to 
join a doctors’ organisation in their own district, which was given the status of an associa-
tion governed by public law. In concrete terms this meant compulsory membership in the 
Hartmann Bund.7 This doctors’ organisation was given full responsibility by the government 
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for the medical care of fund patients and the objective and judicious writing of certifi cates of 
work disability.8 In the future the doctor would no longer receive a fee per consultation, but 
the health-insurance funds in the district would pay Kopfpauschale (a fi xed annual amount per 
member) to the Kassenärztliche Vereinigung (recognised doctors’ organisation). This organisation 
in turn was permitted to distribute the overall sum among the member doctors according to 
its own criteria. Annual negotiations were held between the health-insurance fund and the 
district doctors’ organisation to reach an agreement concerning the maximum fi xed pay-
ment, based on the basic income of workers in the region. The end result was laid down in a 
contract. There was no uniform Kopfpauschale for all of Germany, although at their regional 
negotiations both parties did have to take into account the existing umbrella conventions to 
which all national organisations were party.
Co-ordinating all this was a government commission, the Reichsausschuss, consisting of fi ve 
representatives each of the doctors and health-insurance funds along with three neutral experts, 
appointed by the national Minister for Labour. The Reichsausschuss itself was allowed to make 
binding rulings. This drastic action and substantial reform of the compulsory healthcare insu-
rance gave the health-insurance funds and the Hartmann Bund an extreme form of fi nancial 
responsibility, self-governance and self-control. The heart of the self-governance, however, 
had now been shifted from the local to the regional and national level.9 This also implied 
more professional leadership: voluntary, unpaid board members gradually had to make way 
for professional administrators with experience in negotiating techniques and management, 
especially in the larger health-insurance funds.
The Emergency Decree gave the doctors’ organisation the status of an organ governed by 
public law that was charged with ensuring the care of fund patients. As compensation for 
this rigorous obligation and heavy responsibility, the doctors’ organisation was given what 
amounted to a monopoly of the care of health-insurance fund patients. Indeed, the Kas-
senärztliche Vereinigung itself appointed the health-insurance doctors and exercised control 
over them as an organisation responsible for providing medical care.10 As a result, compulsory 
healthcare insurance was almost completely shielded from free market forces. Opposing a 
virtual monopoly on supply by the Hartmann Bund was a virtual monopoly of the demand 
for medical services by the health-insurance funds, which comprised the patients. In the 
German compulsory healthcare-insurance system there was, to all intents and purposes, a 
monopoly (supply)/monopsony (demand) situation.
Abandoning the individual fee in exchange for a fi xed remuneration per fund patient 
proved to be both a complete innovation and an enduring one − right up until today. This 
arrangement made it possible for the health-insurance funds to formulate their budgets 
on a more reliable basis and to determine the level of contributions in a sound manner. In 
exchange for giving up their individual fee the doctors received a few important additions. 
Aware that each new doctor brought with him a new supply that created a new demand, 
the health-insurance funds had been trying since the introduction of compulsory healthcare 
insurance in 1883 to limit the number of physicians who were attached to their fund. In 
1923 this number was fi xed nationally at one physician per 1,350 member patients. This 
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meant that with the smaller funds the choice of the funds patients was often limited to one 
or, at the most, two or three doctors. The excluded physicians had to limit themselves to 
their private practice, which sometimes led to major fi nancial problems for young beginning 
doctors and resulted in considerable tension within the doctors’ organisation. Indeed, in 1929 
more than 60% of the German population were compulsory members of a health-insurance 
fund. The system of compulsory healthcare insurance had gradually evolved since Bismarck 
from a compulsory insurance for industrial workers to a system that insured the majority 
of the population. On the other hand, approximately 75% of the doctors − 37,246 out of 
49,974 − were excluded from a health-insurance fund practice and therefore had to rely on 
a minority of the population for their income.
In 1930 the health-insurance funds fi nally agreed to broaden the access to fund medical 
practice to one thousand members per doctor, and in 1931 the bar was lowered even further 
to six hundred members per doctor. Fund patients were also permitted to freely choose from 
the list of physicians selected by their health-insurance fund.11 It soon became evident that 
the doctors as a group did not suffer any fi nancial disadvantage from the introduction of a 
fi xed remuneration per fund member. On the contrary, the share in the outlay that the funds 
paid for doctors’ expenses rose by more than 3%. That same year, the share in the outlay for 
sick pay dropped by 4%, which indicates a drop in the number of sick days and absenteeism 
among employees. Doubtless under the infl uence of the depression, the amount of sick pay 
also decreased: from an average RM 2.35 in 1929 to RM 1.43 per day in 1932, or by almost 
40%.12
c. The Nazi regime, 1933-1945
1/ New expansion
When President Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 
1933, it dealt the fi nal blow to the young Weimar Republic and ushered in the Nazi regime. 
German historians differ sharply in their views of the impact that this change of power had 
on the structure and content of German healthcare insurance. Kohler and Zacher are of the 
opinion that National Socialism was not really interested in social insurance, which explains 
why there are no substantial changes to be noted in the health-insurance system.13 Others, 
with Töns as the clearest exponent, point out that the Nazi regime did quickly pass a number 
of drastic provisions, all of which were immediately revoked right after the capitulation of 
Germany in 1945 and therefore did not have a lasting effect.14
Judging purely on the basis of the evolution of membership, compulsory healthcare insu-
rance changed course during the thirties. After a striking decrease between 1929 and 1932, 
membership underwent a powerful increase between 1933 and 1938: from more than 19 
million to almost 24 million, a rise of more than 25%.15 Clearly the main explanation for 
this was the economic recovery, when industrial production doubled. Indeed, as industrial 
activity increased, unemployment quickly dropped from 5,600,000 jobless in 1932 to scarcely 
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400,000 in 1938. Industrial workers still made up the vast majority of those with compulsory 
insurance and naturally, as their number increased, the number of insured persons rose at 
almost the same rate.
Table V.1 Germany: Membership development, industrial production and unemployment, 
1928-1938
 1928 1932 1935 1938
    
Industrial production 100 58 96 122
(1928 = 100)    
Unemployment (x 1 million) 1,4 5,6 2,2 0,4
Membership compulsory healthcare insurance  19.1*) 21.5 24,0
(x 1 million)
*): 1933
Source: H. Köhler, Einige langfristige Zeitreihen zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der gesetzlichen Kranken-
versicherung, 62.
To a lesser degree the increase was further abetted by giving new groups access to compulsory 
healthcare insurance, such as artists and midwives. From 1 August 1941, pensioners (who 
did not belong to the group under compulsory insurance ) were admitted to the healthcare 
insurance of the OKK as voluntary members. The monthly contribution for these pensioners 
was largely paid by pension insurance (RM 3.30), in addition to a personal contribution of 
RM 1 per pensioner.16
The economic growth that started in 1933 also allowed for a systematic expansion of 
services and benefi ts. In an extremely opportunistic move, Hitler had the own contributions
halved a few days before the national elections of 5 March 1933, thereby giving the NSDAP
and its coalition partner, the DNVP, the absolute majority. The basic insurance package was 
expanded considerably in the following years. The duration of nursing care was no longer 
restricted. In 1941, out-patient nursing was also included in the standard healthcare insurance 
package. The disbursement of sick pay was extended to 26 weeks and could even run to a 
whole year under certain conditions. In addition, sick pay was increased in 1938 from 50 
to 60% of the basic wage.17 Dental care was added to the standard package for each insured 
person and all family members living with him. Maternity care provided the mother with 
twelve weeks of pregnancy leave: six weeks before and six weeks after the birth. The amount 
of maternity allowance was based on the mother’s normal wage. Just before the end of the 
Second World War, the doctors’ policy excess was dispensed with entirely; policy excess for 
medicines, on the other hand, was doubled to one-half RM.18
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Registration card as proof of membership of the Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse, 1942
(Source: DAK infodienst)
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It is also striking that this better coverage of medical risks did not bring with it an increase 
in the contribution. On the contrary, as the economy recovered and employment increased, 
social security − and therefore healthcare insurance as well − was freed from its perilous 
situation. In 1935 the contribution for healthcare insurance was even reduced from 5% to 
3.6% of the basic wage.19
2/ Structures remained intact
Hardly any changes were made to the organisational structure of the healthcare insurance 
system. For a few months after the assumption of power, the Hitler regime played with the 
idea of implementing radical reforms in healthcare insurance. The existence of thousands of 
local health-insurance funds, often of a very modest size, clashed with the vision of unifor-
mity and centralisation. For a short time, two ideas were being considered. Some preferred a 
national insurance with the same premiums and the same benefi ts for each German worker. 
Others launched the idea of a co-ordinated network of business funds for all of Germany. 
The intention of both proposals was to break the power of the Ersatzkassen or Hilfskassen 
and especially the OKKs, which were regarded as bulwarks of the communist and socialist 
trade unions.20
Soon, however, the Nazis realised that a new, austerely bureaucratic apparatus ran the great 
risk of setting itself too far apart from local needs.21 In the introduction to the Aufbaugesetz of 
5 July 1934 (framework act for the reformation of social insurance programmes), the regime 
distanced itself from a centrally organised healthcare insurance programme and explicitly 
stated that it preferred to retain the existing organisational structure.22 In 1942, when the war 
was at its height, the Reichsarbeitsministerium once again toyed with the idea of establishing a 
united fund for healthcare insurance per region Gau. Each German citizen would pay the 
same contribution and enjoy the same benefi ts. Only factory funds and the Reichsknappschaft
for mineworkers would be allowed to exist independently.23
In daily practice at the local and regional level, the Nazis left the existing structure of 
local and regional health-insurance funds and alliances almost intact. Territorial defi nitions, 
membership and insurance services were changed very little if at all. The Nazi regime did 
take a few measures to push back the number of health-insurance funds. The establishing of 
new health-insurance funds was forbidden by the decree of 10 October 1934. In addition, 
Innungskrankenkassen existing in the same district − which were often extremely small − were 
made to merge, except for the IKKs, which numbered more than 1,500. With the tenth Auf-
bauverordnung of 26 September 1935, the OKKs were affected by a similar measure. If several 
OKKs existed in the same district, they could be forced to merge if it was felt that such a move 
would raise economic effi ciency. Starting in 1936 the establishment of new Ersatzkassen was 
also prohibited. By introducing these measures, however, the Nazis were not departing from 
the attempts at scale expansion undertaken by earlier governments since the introduction of 
the compulsory healthcare-insurance system.
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY138
3/ Health-insurance funds in the clutches of the government
More members, lower contributions, higher benefi ts, an effi cient organisation: seen from the 
outside it looked as if the problems of the compulsory healthcare-insurance system during 
the thirties were almost nonexistent. Appearances can be deceptive, however. As could have 
been expected, the Nazi ideology came into confl ict with the basic principles of self-govern-
ment and self-administration. These democratic principles, which had given the German 
compulsory healthcare insurance system a completely unique place in Europe, were quickly 
and effi ciently dismantled by the Nazi regime. As mentioned earlier, the composition of the 
OKK boards was a thorn in the eye of the Nazis. It cannot be denied that many OKK boards 
were staffed by representatives who had been appointed by the trade union or by left-wing 
parties.24 Until 1933, after years of systematic selection policies, these OKKs had grown into 
left-wing bulwarks that opposed the growing power of Hitler and his NSDAP. After seizing 
power, the Nazis wasted no time dismantling these hotbeds of resistance. With the Verordnung
of 17 March 1933, the Reichsarbeitsminister (Minister for Labour (RAM))  was able to bring all 
health-insurance funds and their regional and national alliances under central control, elimi-
nate the organs of self-government and replace them with a Leiter. Scarcely a few weeks later, 
on 7 April 1933, this possibility was already being put to effective use: a Reichscommissar was 
appointed for the fi ve existing national alliances to replace the elected board. A Reichscom-
missar also came to head the largest health-insurance funds. With lightning speed the regime 
thus switched from a policy of supervision and monitoring to one of leadership and the 
elimination of co-management.25
A few weeks later the Nazis began to cleanse the health-insurance funds of Jews and 
Marxists. As a result of the cleansing laws, the so-called Arier- und Kommunistengesetzgebung of 
April 1933, 2,800 doctors or about 8% of the total number of doctors were excluded from 
practising in the health-insurance fund system. At the same time, between 2,500 and 4,000 
health-insurance fund employees were dismissed as staatsfeindliche (subversive) elements.26 The 
OKKs were especially hard-hit. About 30% of the OKK employees were sacked on account of 
their political convictions. Other health-insurance funds, especially the factory funds, were 
hardly touched.27
The Aufbaugesetz of 5 July 1934, which aimed at radically reforming the social insurance 
system, introduced the Führer principle into the compulsory healthcare insurance programme 
as well. At the head of each health-insurance fund the Aufbaugesetz placed a Leiter, who took 
over the powers of the elected administrative organ. He was assisted by an advisory board, the 
Beirat, composed of insured persons and managers. This Beirat was also to include a seat for 
a doctor. It is striking, however, that in comparison with the Netherlands, German doctors 
had little say or involvement in health-insurance funds. When important decisions were made 
concerning matters like adapting contributions and drawing up budgets, the Leiter had to ask 
the Beirat for advice. The Leiter took decisions personally and alone, however, and was not ac-
countable to the members of the Beirat − although he was accountable to the Aufsichtsbehörde
(district inspector). In the event of serious disagreement between Leiter and Beirat, the district 
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inspector made the decision. The highest organ for decision-making and supervision for all 
health-insurance funds, including the Arbeiterersatzkassen, was the Reichsversicherungsamt.28
Since the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance, the Ersatzkassen had always 
been able to retain a relatively large amount of freedom during all attempts at reform as far 
as statutes, administration and insurance requirements were concerned, so bringing them into 
line with the other health-insurance funds was a remarkable move. The Nazis put an end 
to this freedom. In 1935 the Ersatzkassen were split up into separate funds for workers and 
civil servants. Their insurance package was brought into line with that of the other funds in 
the compulsory healthcare insurance system. In addition, everyone who did not qualify for 
compulsory healthcare insurance, and was thus a voluntary member, was forced to leave the 
Ersatzkasse and turn to a private insurance company for insurance.29
The government’s grip on the health-insurance funds and healthcare insurance tightened 
more and more. The decree of 14 April 1938 made it obligatory for health-insurance funds 
to invest 70 to 90% of their reserves in state funds. All these reserves would be lost when the 
Germans were defeated in 1945.30
4/ Health-insurance fund doctors under state control
Central supervision was imposed on the supply side (health-insurance fund doctors) as well 
as the demand side (health-insurance funds). With the Regulation of 2 August 1933, the 
Kassenärztliche Vereinigung Deutschlands (KVD) was established as a professional organisation 
under public law. In each district, the KVD was the only representative of fund doctors in their 
relations with the health-insurance funds. An individual health-insurance fund doctor could 
only contact a health-insurance fund by way of the KVD. The selection and appointment of 
health-insurance fund doctors was the exclusive right of the KVD. The health-insurance funds 
were also denied any say in the appointing of fund doctors. This made it possible for the 
regime to strengthen its control of such organs as the OKKs. All it took was the appointment 
of a regime-friendly physician − preferably a member of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Ärztebund (NSDÄB) − to control (along with the Leiter) the daily operation of a health-
insurance fund and its staff. The KVD was also the organ used for negotiating with the leaders 
of the health-insurance funds to arrive at a fi xed payment per fund member. Although the 
KVD strove to reach a uniform amount, differences remained because of the regional wage 
differentiation. Naturally the KVD also divided the common income pot among the health-
insurance fund doctors. By means of the various control possibilities (Leiter, KVD), the regime 
had a clear view of the fi nancial fl ows within the health-insurance funds that were part of 
the compulsory healthcare insurance system.31
It goes without saying that the KVD came to occupy the place that the Hartmann Bund had 
held since the reforms of 1932. The chairman of the KVD took over the leadership of the 
health-insurance fund sector from the chairman of the Hartmann Bund, whose title was that 
of Reichsärzteführer. The Nazi regime aimed at a gradual streamlining and encapsulating of the 
pluralistic doctors’ organisation, and apparently it was successful. It was systematically unifi ed 
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and clearly centralised as well. For the individual health-insurance fund doctors, the room to 
manoeuvre was gradually curtailed at both the local and the national level.
One indication that compulsory healthcare insurance was in the grasp of the government 
was the almost total absence starting in 1933 of the confl icts that regularly fl ared up between 
the health-insurance funds and the doctors, when the medical men often used strikes as 
their ultimate negotiation weapon. After 1933 there was hardly a trace to be found of such 
confl icts. Evidently it was the improved economic situation, with rising incomes and the 
guiding hand of the government (which tolerated no internal quarrels), that brought about 
the smooth realisation of the annual accords.
Summary
The operation of the RVO (Reichsversicherungsordnung) of 1911 was quickly thrown into con-
fusion by the outbreak of the First World War. Compulsory healthcare insurance, however, 
came out of the war intact. Financial problems did arise, though, due to the lowering of the 
contribution level and the decreasing membership. Wages were adjusted to the sharply rising 
prices, and as a result the maintenance of the wage limit meant that more and more people 
became ineligible for compulsory insurance. During the years of the Weimar Republic, few 
changes took place in the healthcare insurance system. Because of economic progress, the 
raising of the insurance limit and the admission of new categories of workers, the number of 
insured persons continued to rise, and as a result about 60% of the German population were 
involved in the compulsory insurance system in 1929. The depression that took place in the 
thirties hit Germany hard, and the health-insurance funds shared in the blows. An Emergency 
Act aimed at a drastic reduction of expenses was even supposed to save the health-insurance 
from the threat of bankruptcy in 1930.
The dire economic situation led to fi erce tensions between doctors and the health-insurance 
funds, so that in 1923 and 1932 the government even felt it was obliged to become directly 
involved. As a result of these government interventions, doctors were required to join the 
district doctors’ organisation, which had the status of an organisation governed by public 
law. The government made this organ fully responsible for the medical care of fund patients. 
The individual fee was replaced by a fi xed remuneration per fund patient to the doctors’ 
organisation.
During the early years of the Nazi regime, the number of people in the compulsory insu-
rance programme rose considerably due to economic progress, the admitting of new groups 
of insured people and the doubling of industrial production. This growth resulted in the in-
creasing expansion of services and benefi ts and lower contributions. The Hitler regime barely 
touched the existing structures of the funds, but the democratically elected health-insurance 
fund boards were cast aside. In their place came an appointed manager, assisted by an advi-
sory board consisting of insured persons and managers. The government also systematically 
cleansed the health-insurance fund boards of Jews and Marxists.
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2. Belgium: voluntary healthcare insurance stands fi rm32
a. The misery of war
With the invasion by the German army on 4 August 1914, neutral Belgium was dragged into 
the First World War. For more than four years the Belgian army fought in the trenches of the 
Yser to keep a small corner of Belgian land out of German hands. The rest of the Belgian 
territory was occupied by the German army a few weeks after the war began. Industrial pro-
duction was shattered by the systematic dismantling of factory installations. The best machines 
were taken to Germany; the rest were reduced to scrap that was destined for arms production. 
The livestock population was drastically reduced; the transportation infrastructure was badly 
damaged. In his brilliant book The Economic Consequences of Peace (1919), the famous English 
economist Keynes estimated that the immediate war damage in Belgium was approximately 
3.5 billion gold Belgian francs, or 7% of the nation’s assets. If the loss in reserves and foreign 
investments (including Russia) is added, and the economic burdens of the war, the result is 
an impoverishment of up to 20% of the nation’s assets before the war.
This dry enumeration of economic losses should not be allowed to overshadow the 
enormous human misery involved: 40,000 soldiers and 9,000 civilians lost their lives in acts 
of war. The standard of living plummeted and thousands lost all their worldly possessions. 
The population, largely cut off from the necessary foreign food supply, suffered from famine 
for four years. The unavoidable result of this precarious situation was a rise in mortality by 
40,000 individuals per year.33
The misery of war and the unbalanced diet let to a general weakening of the population. 
Because of the mass unemployment and general impoverishment, many people could no 
longer afford to pay for medical care or pharmaceuticals. During the last two years of the war, 
the general state of public health deteriorated very rapidly, especially for the elderly, pregnant 
women and children. Morbidity skyrocketed, and diphtheria and tuberculosis were rampant. 
In some areas the number of births dropped to less than half the pre-war level.
The hardship suffered by the population was also evident in the daily practice of the health-
insurance funds. Because of the outbreak of the First World War the compulsory healthcare 
insurance act, which had been passed in the House in 1914, could no longer be dealt with 
in the Senate, and the promising bill remained a dead letter. Voluntary healthcare insurance 
with a health-insurance fund was the only way a worker could protect himself and his fa-
mily. In many places, however, the war made deep inroads into the mutualist network. While 
farmers could still profi t from rising prices for their products, many workers in the industrial 
regions and the cities lost their jobs and were forced to suspend their contributions to their 
health-insurance funds. On the other hand, malnourishment caused an increase in the number 
of sick, which drained the funds’ coffers. On top of this, the government subsidies that had 
not been introduced until the act of 1912 were blocked when the war broke out and were 
no longer being paid.
Fortunately the Nationaal Hulp- en Voedingscomité (National Help and Nutrition Committee 
(NHVC)) came to the rescue. This national organisation, founded with the fi nancial support of 
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prominent people from industry and the banking world, gave top priority to providing food. 
For the transport of food from abroad the NHVC depended on the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium under the leadership of Herbert Hoover, who would later become president of the 
United States. As one of its fi rst measures, the NHVC launched the medical-pharmaceutical 
service for the unemployed and their families. After negotiating with the mutualities, the NHVC
began subsidising the repayment of doctors’ and pharmacists’ expenses made by the medical-
pharmaceutical services of the recognised mutualities, on the condition that the benefi ts to 
members’ families be expanded.34 Starting in 1915 the NHVC also began paying 75% of the 
state allowances to recognised health-insurance funds that had been granted earlier.
Despite this generous fi nancial help, many companies had to freeze their activities tempora-
rily or even permanently, while others limited their work to subsidised medical-pharmaceu-
tical services but were forced to put an end to sick pay.35 Even in a rural arrondissement like 
Turnhout in Antwerp’s Noorderkempen, almost half the Christian health-insurance funds 
terminated their activities.
b. Reconstruction
1/ The government makes an appearance
Until about 1890, the Belgian government’s social spending programme was practically 
non-existent. Essentially social policy was limited to poor relief, and that was the almost 
exclusive province of the lower governments. Only in times of extremely dire crisis did the 
central government intervene to prevent a total disintegration of the social fabric. Starting 
in the late nineteenth century, more and more of the social policy was determined by the 
central government. The First World War heralded a new phase: the expansion of the role of 
the state in the social realm. After fi ghting four years of trench warfare in the name of their 
native land, the tens of thousands of front soldiers could no longer be denied full political 
and social equality before the law. Universal male suffrage (1919) strengthened the position 
and infl uence of the workers’ parties.
In a spirit of national solidarity, and fearing social unrest, the regime was prepared to make 
far-reaching concessions − also (and perhaps even chiefl y) at the social level. It had already 
become clear before the war that the system of subsidised freedom in the realm of social 
insurance was showing signs of serious defi ciency. The main benefi ciaries were the middle 
classes, who had the least diffi culty paying the required premiums. The least well-off, the very 
people with the greatest need of social protection, fell by the wayside because they could not 
or would not pay the premiums. Since the system was voluntary, there was little that could be 
done within the existing framework. The idea that only a compulsory insurance system like 
the one in Germany could remedy the situation had penetrated political circles even before 
1914. Earlier on we saw how the only thing blocking the fi nal approval of a compulsory old-
age, sickness and disability insurance was the outbreak of war. So the adaptation and expansion 
of the state’s role in the social realm after the First World War was strongly infl uenced by 
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two elements: the fl agrant failure of existing social protection and the pressure from within 
society itself. That pressure was extremely strong due to the spectacular growth of the socialist 
movement and, to a lesser degree, the Christian-Democratic movement.36
When the fi rst post-war national elections were held in 1919, the socialist Belgische Werk-
lieden Partij (Belgian Workers’ Party (BWP)), emerged from the struggle as the great victor. The 
Catholic party, in power only since 1884, lost its absolute parliamentary majority for good 
(except for the years 1950-1954). From now on, Belgium would be led by coalition govern-
ments. Under pressure from the BWP, which as the second largest Belgian party participated 
in the post-war government of national unity, the government pursued an active social policy. 
In the twenties an impressive series of important social laws were passed in rapid succession, 
such as the introduction of the eight-hour working day  and the 48-hour week (1921), the 
introduction of the compulsory old-age pension for workers (1924), the occupational illnesses 
insurance act (1927) and child benefi t act (1930).37
2/ Compulsory healthcare insurance in dire straits
When it came to many of the social services each consecutive government energetically 
grabbed the bull by the horns, despite the diffi cult budgetary conditions. In the impressive 
list of post-war milestones, the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance is conspi-
cuously absent. The war popped up as the unexpected spoilsport. Generally speaking it can 
be said that, immediately after the war, the three big parties that would dominate interbellum 
politics in Belgium − Catholic, liberal and socialist − were in agreement over the principle of 
a compulsory social insurance system in which the state, the employers and the employees 
would each take on a share of the burden. There was great disagreement, however, concer-
ning the actual organisational form of the social insurance programmes.
Here the socialist and Christian national alliances, which together comprised about three-
quarters of the mutualists and were supported by their political allies in the BWP and the 
Catholic party, were diametrically opposed to each other. The socialists, who occupied a 
key position in the fi rst post-war government in the person of Minister for Labour Wauters, 
strove to create an insurance system in which the workers’ contributions would be kept to a 
minimum. The expenses would have to be borne mainly by the employers and the state. The 
socialists also supported a unifi ed system in the form of a single neutral, national organisation. 
This would be led by a joint council with representatives of the members and the employers. 
They labelled the existing system administratively ineffi cient, economically unhealthy and 
counter-productive to the proper distribution of medical care.
The Christian mutualists, on the other hand, fi ercely defended the subsidiarity principle 
in a pluralistic system that would have to be subsidised partly with government funds. The 
Christian mutualists still regarded precautionary measures on the part of the workers as the 
basis for social insurance. The only contribution they desired from the employers and the 
state was to supplement the workers’ limited options for saving. The government was to be 
given the chance to provide as much assistance as possible without harming the ideological 
freedom of the insured persons. They felt that the existing mutualist structure of primary 
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funds, regional associations and national alliances was the most successful in meeting these 
conditions. The various organisations in that structure would retain their independence as 
long as they conformed to the legal provisions that would uniformly regulate all the services 
throughout the country.38
When the bill for compulsory insurance for sickness, disability and old age was being dealt 
with once again in 1919, the Senate made a few changes in the original draft that the House 
had approved on 8 May 1914. On the day that the amended bill was to be discussed, Minister 
Wauters blocked the social insurance bill introduced by the pre-war Catholic government. He 
appointed a commission in which the socialists occupied an important position to study the 
problem once again. This was the beginning of a sparring match between the socialists and the 
Catholics that would go on for years. The activities carried out by the Wauters commission 
resulted in the Wauters Act (20 August 1920), which temporarily established a free pension 
programme, and a new bill for sickness and disability insurance. In principle this bill did not 
depart from the pre-war bill. Besides guaranteeing a free choice of insurance organisation, 
the bill provided for a three-part contribution (from the employee, the employer and the 
state). The minimum package of services that the mutualities were to offer in order to qualify 
for government subsidies was adapted to post-war needs. The bill went awry, however, as a 
result of the fi nancial crisis that began to manifest itself in Belgium in 1922. Implementation 
would have cost the national treasury 445 million francs per year.
It was not until 1927, when a drastic reorganisation had put an end to the budgetary and 
monetary crisis, that the Christian Democrats tabled a new bill on the motion of Minister 
Moyersoen. The principal new provisions consisted of the fact that the employers’ contribu-
tions would be made dependent on wages (amounting to 2%) and that a National Insurance 
Fund would be set up. This fund would be charged with the administration and distribution 
of the employers’ contributions and the state allowances. This idea was retained in later bills 
and constituted the basis for the Rijksinstituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering (National 
Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (RIZIV)), which was set up after the Second 
World War.
The socialists replicated the Catholic bill with the Jauniaux bill (1928). This piece of legis-
lation paid tribute to the idea of the neutral united mutuality that was to be organised on a 
regional, provincial and national level. The Catholics raised strong objections to this proposal 
because the principle of the united mutuality did not square with their idea of ideological 
freedom of choice and would undermine the basis of their social action. Indeed, the establish-
ment of a national united mutuality would obliterate the whole Christian mutuality network, 
and the organisation of social insurance would end up fully in the hands of the government. 
Since the socialists continued to strengthen their position in parliament and in the govern-
ment during the twenties − they were the largest party in the parliamentary elections of 
1925 − the Catholics felt threatened, and not without reason.
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3/ The power of numbers
The First World War brought about enormous changes in the former balance of powers on 
the political level as well as the mutualist level. The Landsbond van Christelijke Mutualiteiten
(National Alliance of Christian Mutualities (LCM)) in particular emerged from the war years 
the worse for wear: the number of members dropped between 1913 and 1919 from 188,690 
to 113,367. The war had shattered many local sections, and immediately after the Armistice 
the national board, too, was extremely defective.
The socialist mutualities, on the other hand, profi ted from the post-war climate that had 
empowered socialists all over Europe. The closely-knit, centralised operation of the socialist 
movement may explain why the socialist mutualities were better able to get through the 
diffi cult war years than their competitors. After all, they could count on the fi nancial support 
of the organisations within the socialist community, which emerged from the war stronger 
as a bloc and immediately launched an impressive expansion. Like the trade unions, political 
parties and cooperatives, the socialist health-insurance funds reported very strong growth 
fi gures. In 1919 they had no less than 283,484 members, so the pre-war ratio with regard to 
the Christian mutualities had now turned fully in their favour.
Throughout the twenties the mutualist movement continued to grow, still on the basis of 
voluntary membership. As in Germany, this growth was stimulated by a positive economic 
climate after 1925. After a drastic monetary and fi nancial reorganisation in 1926 the Belgian 
economy began to expand enormously. Between 1926 and 1930 the standard of living for 
the ordinary worker was fi nally above the pre-war level, so more money became available 
for voluntary social insurance. In 1920 the mutualities had almost 670,000 members and by 
1930 this number had increased to more than 1,100,000. Despite this robust growth, there 
was still a large group that was not insured for medical risks. In 1931 the number of workers 
who were not members of a mutuality was estimated at about one million.
The number of health-insurance funds decreased, just as it had in Germany. In Belgium, 
however, this happened at a much slower pace: in 1919 there were no less than 4,127 mutu-
alities with an average of scarcely one hundred members per fund. In the years that followed, 
that number slowly shrank to 3,945 in 1925 and 3,390 in 1930, with an average of about 353 
members.39 Unlike Germany, where the government took measures to curb the establishment 
of new health-insurance funds and to stimulate the merging of existing funds, the Belgian 
government made little effort to achieve greater effi ciency and lower implementation costs 
by scaling up the health-insurance funds. Perhaps the matter was too politically delicate for 
such radical measures. The big national alliances had a powerful foothold within the political 
parties and even in the government for vigorously defending their interests. The Catholic 
and socialist politicians in particular were careful not to offend this important electoral rank 
and fi le.
In 1930 the socialist mutualities still had the largest market share, with 495,000 members 
or 44% of the total. The Christian mutualities recovered from their immediate post-war 
diffi culties and had trebled their membership in relation to 1919 to 356,000 (32%). The 
rapid growth of the Christian mutualities was striking. Unlike the streamlined management 
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of the socialist mutualities there were many tendencies in the national alliance of Christian 
health-insurance funds, which did not promote internal cohesion or clear external policies. 
As one of the earliest forms of Catholic social action, the Christian mutualities had a marked 
middle-class and paternalistic character until the First World War. The social complexion of 
the membership, moreover, was highly varied. Even before the war this diversity had been 
responsible for confl icts within the Christian camp, among them with the ACV, the Christian 
trade union.
After the war the discussions began again. The Christian workers’ movement (such as 
the BWP), facing a powerful socialist bloc, was intent on forming an organic whole of trade 
unions, co-operatives and mutualities, coupled with political actions. From this desire grew 
the Algemeen Christelijk Werkgeversverbond (General Christian Employers Alliance (ACW)) in 
1921. In several places in Flanders tension grew between this ACW and the mutualities, which 
were led by the middle class. In some places workers established their own mutualities; in 
other places existing mutualities were integrated within the bosom of the ACW.40 In Flanders 
in around 1930, most of the Christian mutualities were dominated by employees and were 
regarded as part of the local Christian workers’ movement. In Wallonia, on the other hand, 
the conservatives stubbornly defended their positions on the boards − and kept them for the 
most part. Nationally this ambivalent situation led to great tension within the Landsbond van 
Christelijke Mutualiteiten. Tedious compromises constantly had to be struck and uncertainty 
was never absent.
The neutral mutualities with 140,000 members (13%), the liberal health-insurance funds 
with 55,000 members (5%) and the occupation-related mutualities with 70,000 members 
(6%) together accounted for about one-quarter of the total.41 It wasn’t until 1928 that the 
Landsbond van de Beroepsmutualiteiten (National Alliance of Occupation-Relation Mutuali-
ties)  was established as a national umbrella organisation of mutualities founded by employers. 
Compared with Germany, the Belgian factory funds insured only a modest proportion of 
their employees. As noted earlier, several employers had already set up factory funds in the 
nineteenth century that paid limited benefi ts to workers in the event of illness or accident. 
Some employers even openly supported the legal requirement to provide such services, ho ping 
thereby to put an end to the competitive handicap that hampered employers who offered 
social benefi ts as opposed to those who did not. The generalisation of social insurance could 
help maintain the social peace and restore a level playing fi eld.
After the First World War, employers launched a double offensive. On the one hand they 
tried to break through the power position enjoyed by the Christian and socialist mutuali-
ties, with the allied trade unions following close behind, by establishing occupation-related 
mutualities and employers’ unemployment funds and by extending new company-based 
benefi ts such as child allowances. On the other hand, the employers’ organisations were eager 
to be closely involved in the actual development of the social legislation to avoid an overly 
exclusive seizure of the labour organisations.42 The directorates of a few large Walloon steel 
companies were particularly active and stimulated the expansion of existing factory funds or 
set up new ones. Some factory funds could count on vigorous support from the directorate 
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for their medical-pharmaceutical service. Despite their modest share, the development of 
the occupation-related mutualities was followed with great attention and distrust by both 
the trade unions and the major national mutualist alliances. It was even observed that bosses 
in Walloon factories were trying to use low contributions to strengthen workers’ ties to the 
company through the mutuality, thereby giving strikes less chance of success.43
With the founding of the Landsbond van de Beroepsmutualiteiten, the local mutualities in 
Belgium fell under the co-ordination of fi ve national alliances in around 1930 and the 
national organisation assumed the fi nal form that it still has today. These national alliances, 
which up to the present day hold a virtual monopoly on healthcare insurance, became the 
spokespersons for their insured members in contacts with the government and partners in 
negotiations for the doctors.
4/ From health-care insurance to health care
Although these efforts did not result in compulsory healthcare insurance, this is not to say 
that no new healthcare insurance initiatives were taken. On the contrary, the mutualities, with 
their voluntary insurance, played a key role in the development of democratic healthcare. They 
The growth of the National Alliance of Socialist Mutualities 
(Source: Gezondheid. 75 jaar Nationaal Verbond van socialistische mutualiteiten 1913-1988)
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enjoyed very extensive freedom of movement. When it came to contributions, payments and 
benefi ts, the local health-insurance funds and their regional alliances had legally guaranteed 
autonomy. This meant that the benefi ts for members differed from region to region and even 
from one municipality to the next. The competition between the socialist and the Christian 
mutualities in particular worked as a constant stimulus for the organisation of new or ex-
panded services.44 Not only did the mutualities expand their preventive healthcare services, 
but they also took initiatives in the realm of curative medicine. In exchange for government 
subsidies, the mutualities (especially at the regional alliance level) were the engine behind the 
still modest task that the government had set for itself in the area of healthcare.45
The development of the service package can be easily followed by studying the initiatives 
that the Christian mutualities developed after the First World War. The services they provided 
took shape on three levels: local, regional (alliance) and national (national alliance).
Functioning at the level of the local companies were the three original and oldest services. 
The primary service insured against loss of wages due to sickness for a period of six months. 
The member then moved to the alliance’s disability fund. The medical-pharmaceutical service 
took care of reimbursing doctor and pharmaceutical costs with the exception of treatment by 
specialists, for which the alliance was responsible. This service was greatly expanded in 1920 
as a result of the ministerial subsidy, which stipulated the familial character of the service as 
a precondition. In other words: not only the working member but also his family members 
could enjoy the benefi ts of this service. Finally, the local health-insurance fund covered the 
funeral expenses of working members in the form of a fi xed allowance.
Chart V.1 Overview of the mutualist services in Belgium
Services for
Reimbursement Health Prevention Other*)
National alliance death tuberculosis nurse transfer




Funds for the elderly
Primary funds daily allowance medical-
pharmaceutical
*): see the following text
Source: R. Reszohazy, Geschiedenis van de kristelijke mutualistische beweging in België, 243.
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The regional alliances offered four important services in the twenties: the transfer service, the 
disability fund, the surgical service and the maternity service. The fi rst two already existed 
before the war. The job of the transfer service was to make sure that a member could switch 
from one local company to another without an interruption in his insurance. The disability 
fund insured against loss of wages in the event of protracted illness, up to the age of 65 if 
necessary. Before the war, workers were usually referred to public assistance for operations and 
nursing care. After the war, the surgical service made sure that, from then on, any member of 
a recognised mutuality could count on treatment by medical specialists and admission to a 
hospital. Some alliances could even manage to open their own out-patient clinic. For a long 
time, however, the surgical service constituted a weak fi nancial link and source of concern 
within the mutuality system. The alliance also provided a maternity service that offered 
childbirth coverage, convalescence benefi ts and pre-natal consultations.
At the national level, the alliances took responsibility for three overarching services: the 
transfer service, the anti-tuberculosis service and the death fund. All three assumed their fi nal 
form after the war. The transfer service provided for a smooth transition when members 
moved from one alliance to another. With the anti-tuberculosis service, the national alli-
ance hoped to join in the struggle against one of the most serious social illnesses of the age: 
consumption, or tuberculosis. The mutuality not only made payments for nursing care in 
A ward at the Mont-sur-Meuse tuberculosis hospital run by the LCM, 1925 
(Source: KADOC)
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offi cial sanatoriums but it also organised its own nursing homes. The death fund provided a 
supplement to the alliance’s burial benefi ts. Finally, there was still a mixed national alliance 
service in the form of visiting nurse care. The job of these nurses was to track down certain 
illnesses, especially tuberculosis, to give advice concerning hygiene and disease and to visit 
expectant mothers.
During the interbellum period, the so-called health services were more important than 
the original services. They became the mutualities’ raison d’être: the payment of benefi ts in the 
event of illness and disability. The same evolution took place in other mutualities, especially the 
socialist health-insurance funds. Typical of the socialists, however, was stronger centralisation. 
They emphasised the alliance more than their Christian competitors did. The companies had 
a regional character with local sections. The socialists primarily defended group medicine 
and the out-patient clinic formula.
These were the ideas behind the rapid development of mutualist hospitals and out-patient 
clinics in the big cities and industrial centres. The out-patient clinics were equipped with a 
diagnostic centre and a surgical department and − very important − gave their patient-members 
a sense of security as far as fees were concerned, unlike the other private clinics.47 With regard 
to out-patient clinics, co-operative pharmacies, children’s holidays and medical-social institutes, 
in general the socialist mutualities had a clear lead on their competitors.48
5/ Between etatism and subsidised freedom
This expansive development of mutualist activities, especially in the area of preventive and 
curative healthcare, was only possible with strong government support. After the war subsi-
disation began to gain momentum, not least because the participation of the socialists and 
Christian Democrats in the government led to increasing interventionism and a more active 
social policy. One of the fi rst and undoubtedly more far-reaching measures was the heavy 
subsidising of the medical-pharmaceutical services (1920), which in fact was a continua-
tion of the Nationaal Hulp en Voedings Comité wartime regulations. Almost all branches of 
the mutualist services would gradually become subsidised before the Second World War. In 
1938, the last normal fi scal year before the war, the government subsidy amounted to more 
than 95 million francs, or 31.88% of the contributions. Added to this were the provincial and 
municipal allowances, so that more than one-quarter of the mutualities’ income probably 
consisted of government subsidies.
One good turn deserves another. More and more terms and conditions having to do with 
compulsory service were attached to these subsidies. Other requirements besides minimum 
contributions and benefi ts concerned the scale of the company and good management. 
The subsidising of medical care was attached to the familial character of that care (1920), 
and the subsidising of the anti-tuberculosis service went hand in hand with the obligation 
to set up a nursing service (1929). The subsidising of basic treatment − a service of the local 
health-insurance funds − was made conditional on submitting to the alliance’s inspection 
and monitoring service (1931). The decree of 30 June 1936 of the socialist Minister Delattre 
went furthest. It imposed on the companies a minimum of 200 active members and raised the 
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subsidies if a service was organised nationally. By increasing the scale, the minister’s aim was 
to cut down on expenses and make it easier to balance the fi nances of the health-insurance 
funds.49 Although the mutualities retained full fi nancial responsibility and were still the owners 
of the funds, their hands were tied for the most part. In other words, the mutualities hovered 
between strong government control and subsidised freedom.
Chart V.2 Chronological overview of subsidising by the national government, Belgium 
1912-1926
1912 Disability funds
1920 General medical care (expenses for general practitioner and pharmacist)
1921 Anti-tuberculosis fund
1927 Basic treatment
1931 Expansion from general to particular medical care (surgery, hospitalisation, preventive 
medicine); cancer
1936 Insurance for women and families (marriage premium and premium for death of 
spouse); death benefi ts (funeral costs)
Source: E. Gerard, De christelijke arbeidersbeweging in België, 1891-1991, volume 2, 101.
Gradually, the centre of mutualist activities shifted from the local, often small section to the 
national level. On both the socialist and the Christian side, the development of healthcare 
services provided a strong stimulus to the centralisation process that took place within the 
mutualities from 1920 to 1930. Gradually the guidelines of the alliance and the national 
federation were followed more strictly by the local sections. 
This evolution towards greater centralisation was not always without diffi culties. Many 
local health-insurance funds continued to defend their independence and autonomy. During 
the twenties there was still a wide diversity among the companies in terms of the services 
being offered and the level of contributions and benefi ts. Since most healthcare services were 
developed at the alliance level, however, and government subsidies were attached to certain 
conditions, an unavoidable uniformity gradually spread among the local health-insurance 
funds. The regulations became more and more complex and could only be understood by 
a limited group of experts. For expanding services such as those for chronic illnesses, it was 
necessary to spread the risks. Other services (sanatoriums, consultation bureaus, out-patient 
clinics) required high investment and operating costs and had to be furnished collectively. 
Moreover, the strong competition between socialist and Catholic funds prompted the distribu-
tion of out-and-out propaganda and co-ordination at the national level. As this development 
continued, volunteer and ordinary members gradually disappeared into the background. There 
was a world of difference between the mutual relief of the nineteenth century (a small-scale 
occupation-related mutuality, the so-called friendly society, with payment at the general meeting 
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and fi nes for failing to attend meetings, and house calls) and the health-insurance fund, with 
its expanded service package, professional framework and national organisation.
Banner of the sickness- and pension-fund organisations at Ghent, 1928
(Source: Stam Gent)
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6/ Doctors versus the health-insurance funds
During the war years and immediately after the First World War, tensions between the 
mutualities and the doctors greatly increased. There wasn’t a single national convention that 
laid down offi cial rates for medical care, like the Berliner Abkommen in Germany. This left the 
doctors completely free to set their own fees. The health-insurance funds tried to draw up 
agreements with the doctors’ syndicates per city or per region in an attempt to contain their 
expenses. When it appeared impossible to come to an agreement, they tried to control their 
fl ow of expenditures by limiting their members’ free choice of doctors to those who granted 
preferential rates. In the rural areas in particular, where doctors had less competition to fear, 
problems often occurred with doctors who refused to abide by the agreements.50
To encourage the making of agreements between mutualities, doctors and pharmacies 
and to more easily settle rate confl icts, the Minister van Arbeid en Nijverheid (Ministry of 
Labour and Industry) established a joint commission in 1920. The only success this com-
mission achieved was to set a fi xed rate for pharmaceutical products. It failed to do the same 
for doctors’ fees. But the mutualities worked out a fl exible regulation that allowed them to 
exercise more control over their expenditures for medical care, yet granted their members 
free choice of doctors.
Unlike the German sickness funds, the Belgian health-insurance funds allowed this free 
choice because since 1920 the reimbursements they paid out to cover doctors’ and pharmacists’ 
expenses (the medical-pharmaceutical service) had been subsidised to a considerable extent by 
the government. A double restraint was built in to keep doctors from abusing this arrangement 
by charging abnormally high fees or artifi cially raising the number of consultations. First, a 
maximum doctors’ fee was set based on a normal fee for a house call to a worker’s home; 
higher fees would not qualify for reimbursement. In addition, in 1923 − almost ten years 
earlier than in Germany − a system of own contributions was introduced. In most cases this 
amounted to one-quarter of the fi xed maximum. The principle of policy excess, in almost 
the same proportion, was also used for the repayment of pharmacists’ costs.51
In 1928, provincial joint medical-mutualist commissions were set up by Royal Decree to 
fi x regional rates, confi rm local agreements and learn about disputes. When an agreement 
was entered into, it generally would prescribe the choice of doctor (a completely free choice), 
a rate for mutualists (preferential rate) that fl uctuated with the price index and a special rate 
for well-to-do mutualists. So the mutualities recognised the doctors’ right to charge moneyed 
members a rate that was adjusted to their income or to the status of their profession. Natu-
rally the annual negotiations did not occur without resistance. But major national confl icts 
or even healthcare workers’ strikes like those that occurred in Germany did not take place 
in Belgium during the interbellum period.
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c. From depression to war
1/ Compulsory healthcare insurance sinks into oblivion
Between 1926 and 1929 the Belgian economy rallied at a very rapid rate. After the laborious 
post-war recovery period, the dream of unlimited growth seemed to be coming true during 
these années folles, which meant that when disillusionment abruptly struck it would hit all the 
harder. The consequences of the spectacular collapse of the New York stock market, the Wall 
Street crash of October 1929, were quickly felt in Europe. As in other European countries, 
economic activity in Belgium quickly foundered as well. Export industry in particular took a 
serious beating. With the collapse of the economy the unemployment fi gures skyrocketed.
This had dramatic consequences for the incomes of the workers involved. Many had 
neglected to sign up for a voluntary unemployment fund, found themselves without any 
income whatsoever and were forced to turn to the local poor relief: the municipal Commis-
sie van Openbare Onderstand (Public Assistance Commission (COO)) . Those who had insured 
themselves hoped their insurance fund would be sound enough to withstand the storm of 
the depression. For many, those hopes were quickly dashed. The funds were not designed for 
massive payments and soon threatened to fold. The crisis prompted the government to take 
strong steps and intervene in the voluntary unemployment-insurance system to keep it from 
collapsing. In 1932 no less than 28% of government expenditure went to social insurance. 
In addition to pensions, it took responsibility for most of the support for the unemployment 
funds.
Decreasing incomes and the increasing cost of keeping the unemployment funds afl oat 
obliged the government to make drastic cutbacks in other areas in order to prevent a serious 
budgetary derailment. Although voluntary healthcare insurance accounted for only a relatively 
modest portion of government expenses, it ended up as the victim, along with other social 
payments. In the budget of 1932 there was a 10 to 20% cut in the allowance.52 Naturally it 
was out of the question to think about new initiatives involving higher expenditures. After 
years of parliamentary debates and the introduction of several bills, the idea of compulsory 
healthcare insurance had to be quietly put aside for the time being. The principle of govern-
ment intervention on behalf of the voluntary mutualist services was left intact.
In 1935 the Belgian franc was devalued by 28%. With this substantial currency deprecia-
tion, Belgian products fi nally became more attractive on the foreign market, the economy 
was revived and operating profi ts rose. After many long years of hardship, the workers wanted 
their share of this rising prosperity. Throughout 1936 major strikes broke out. To put an end 
to the strike movement, the government established a Nationale Arbeidscommissie (National 
Labour Commission). For the fi rst time in the social history of Belgium, the representa-
tives of employers’ and employees’ organisations met together at the national level. With the 
government as mediator, they reached an accord concerning wage increases, child benefi ts, 
a limited annual paid holiday and the introduction of the 40-hour week in certain branches 
of industry.53 The question of compulsory healthcare insurance had been timidly raised once 
again during the negotiations, but this proved to be a particularly inappropriate time for such 
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a discussion. A Ministry of Public Health was established, however, and, as noted earlier, new 
state subsidies for various mutualist services were approved including services for surgery, 
tuberculosis and cancer. Subsidised freedom had reached its apex.
Unfortunately, the euphoria ushered in by economic recovery and the new social achieve-
ments was short-lived. Signs of crisis began to manifest themselves once again in mid-1938, 
and they were intensifi ed by the tense domestic and foreign political situation. Like most 
West European countries, the Belgian government rapidly began gearing its budget to its 
leading priority: national defence and armaments.
2/ War again
Then came May 1940, the German invasion, the Eighteen-Day Campaign and capitulation, 
followed by a second long occupation. In contrast to the First World War, the mutualities were 
able to carry on their activities without insurmountable diffi culties. All insurance services were 
continued thanks to the resumption of work and the payment of government subsidies. At 
fi rst the occupying power tried to reorder Belgian political and social life by designing plans 
for the introduction of a united mutuality. These plans were not designed by the Germans but 
by the former socialist leader Hendrik de Man, who aspired to put a united trade union and 
a united mutuality in place. Naturally the plans were fi ercely resisted by the national alliance 
of Christian mutualities, but they could count on some sympathy from socialist quarters. In 
early 1941, however, a change took place in the socialist national alliance, which abandoned 
its plans for a united mutuality.
In the meantime, the initiative had been taken over by the German occupying power and 
the Belgian administration, which made an inquiry into the introduction of compulsory 
healthcare insurance. In early 1941, the Germans began to urge for a simple and non-political 
system with an offi cial insurance organisation as its cornerstone, to be deducted from wages. 
The national alliances would be permitted to continue provided they did not recruit any 
new members from those in the compulsory system. After a year of silence the German 
viewpoint changed. The Germans stuck to their plan for an offi cial insurance organisation 
but dropped their restrictions on national alliances. They would be allowed to continue their 
work as ‘adopted insurance organisations’. Apparently the creation of a united insurance system 
had been put on the back burner. As the war developed, the reorganisation of the healthcare 
insurance system disappeared from the German agenda.
Summary
Belgium emerged from the First World War diminished on all fronts. The healthcare funds 
were hard-hit as well. Many companies had to put a temporary or permanent stop to their 
activities. The war made it clear that the system of subsidised freedom for social insurance 
showed signs of serious weakness. After the war, the question of introducing compulsory 
healthcare insurance was raised once again. The introduction of the system was hindered 
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by the vast differences of opinion having to do with forms of implementation. The socia-
lists and the Catholics opposed each other for years. Immediately after the war, the socialists 
had been able to strengthen their position in parliament and in the government, mainly at 
the cost of the Catholics. The socialist mutualities grew as well, while the Christian health-
insurance funds struggled with a declining membership. This evolution would be reversed 
during the thirties.
After a substantial devaluation in 1926, the Belgian economic situation improved. Many 
new initiatives were taken in the area of healthcare insurance. The mutualities played a key role 
in the development of democratic healthcare. The competition provided a constant stimulus 
to expanding and improving the service package. Services were offered locally, regionally 
and nationally. The latter level would play an increasingly greater role. The development of 
the funds’ service package was only possible with governmental support, however, which 
came with gathering momentum after the First World War. There were conditions attached 
to this government support, however, so that the mutualities were increasingly hovering on 
the border between etatism and subsidised freedom.
During the First World War, and especially during the post-war period, tensions grew 
between doctors and funds. In Belgium there were no offi cial rates for medical care. The 
doctors were totally free to set their own rates. The mutualities tried to enter into agreements 
with local doctors’ syndicates on behalf of their members. The Belgian health-insurance funds 
worked out a regulation that allowed them more or less to manage the payments made for 
health care and to give their members a free choice of doctors.
Until 1929 the Belgian economy grew at a rapid pace. The Wall Street crash of October 
1929, however, also left its mark in the Belgian economy in the following years and led 
to high unemployment. The unavoidable governmental cutbacks also affected voluntary 
healthcare insurance. The discussion of the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance 
grew silent: there was no money available. In contrast with the Netherlands, the voluntary 
insurance system survived the German occupation.
3. The Netherlands: drawn-out indecisiveness and sudden breakthrough
a. War on the border
Unlike Belgium, the Netherlands were able to maintain its neutrality in 1914 and to keep the 
destructive brutality of war outside its borders. That is not to say that the Dutch population 
was completely spared any suffering, despite the government’s clever political manoeuvring. 
The wartime climate, the general mobilisation and the disturbance of international trade 
relations caused a disruption of economic life and a steep rise in unemployment during the 
fi rst months of the war. A hoarding frenzy quickly triggered an unprecedented increase in 
food prices.
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Nor did the health-insurance funds escape the pernicious repercussions of a long, drawn-out 
fi ght for power in Europe. Many of the insured persons who lost their jobs found themselves 
in fi nancial diffi culties. They could no longer pay their premiums and had to rely on municipal 
poor relief for their medical care. In addition, mobilisation forced some health-insurance funds 
to neglect their own daily activities. Mobilisation affected health-insurance fund personnel as 
well, mainly the mutually managed funds that had only a few doctors on the payroll.54
Naturally the war also interrupted normal political life and parliamentary activities. Even 
so, Minister M.W.F. Treub of the Cort van der Linden cabinet, which had taken offi ce in 
August 1913, submitted a bill in November 1915 that linked the granting of sick pay with 
medical treatment. To implement the bill the minister envisioned local and district funds, 
established by the government, in addition to special funds. The existing health-insurance 
funds would be admitted to the system as long as the majority of board members were insured 
persons.55 Members would also constitute a majority on the local boards yet to be set up, 
while the district boards would consists of two member-workers, two member-employees, 
one member-physician and one member-pharmacist. The board of the Rijksverzekeringsbank
(National Insurance Bank) would supervise the district boards and guarantee re-insurance. 
This was a complete break with Talma’s pre-war council system and a genuine declaration 
of war on the NMG and its Maatschappijfondsen, where the majority of the board was fi rmly 
in the hands of the staff. Treub’s proposal was rejected. He stepped down on 28 January 1916 
before his bill could be discussed in the Lower House.
In late 1918 there was one general fund established for mineworkers that provided assis-
tance in the event of illness, old age and disability. It comprised a health-insurance fund with 
quite extensive benefi ts, a pension fund and − separate for each mine − a fund for insuring 
sick pay.56 So the mineworkers as a group were the fi rst to have an extensive social insurance 
package, and they served as an example to the other workers of the Netherlands. From a 
European standpoint, however, the Dutch fund was not exceptional. Mineworkers in Ger-
man, with their centuries’ old Knappschaftskassen, and in Belgium (Sunday rest, eight-hour 
days) also occupied a unique and privileged position.
b. Many words, few deeds: the failure of the legislature
1/ An outstanding point of departure
In July 1918 national elections were held in the Netherlands for the fi rst time, with universal 
male suffrage and proportional representation. Social insurance played an important role in 
the electoral contest. A coalition consisting of the R.K. Staatspartij, the ARP and the CHU
declared they would wage a fi ght to enact the Talma laws of 1913 (which were already on 
the statute books) as soon as possible. They won by a nose, and for the fi rst time a cabinet 
took offi ce under the leadership of a Catholic: Ruys de Beerenbrouck.
A new department was created, that of Arbeid (Labour), which was entrusted to Minister 
Aalberse. Aalberse’s ideas with regard to social security were closely in line with those of 
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Talma. The worker had a natural right to wages that had to be suffi cient to provide for the 
necessities of life, even if he could no longer work. It was the state’s duty to protect that 
right. The compulsory workers’ insurance did nothing but realise this right of the worker to 
a just minimum wage.57
Internationally, the revolutionary conditions in Russia and Germany worked to the ad-
vantage of the rapidly growing labour movement. The middle classes followed the dramatic 
developments in Russian and Germany with increasing anxiety, and feared that the foreign 
workers’ unrest and revolutionary fi re would spread to the Netherlands. Many strikes for 
increased wages and shorter working hours had already broken out in 1916, 1917 and 1918. 
The social-democratic party SDAP and the labour union NVV continued to gain power and 
were determined to use the fear of revolution to force factory owners and the government 
to grant concessions to the workers.58 Although SDAP leader Troelstra misjudged the Dutch 
appetite for revolution in November 1918, the government − and with it the entrepreneurial 
class − was prepared to make important concessions and reforms. Not only were the trade 
unions recognised as full discussion partners, but the social legislation, with the eight-hour 
day and the 45-hour week as selling points, was quickly expanded. Economic conditions in 
the Netherlands were also outstanding immediately after the war. Reconstruction abroad 
brought massive and lucrative orders to the Dutch business community, causing a substantial 
increase in government income. There was plenty of room for social expansion in both the 
government and the business world.
2/ The Ziektewet (Sickness Benefi ts Act): a promising start and a rapid failure for Minister 
Aalberse
So all external conditions seemed favourable for a speedy introduction of the Ziektewet
(Sickness Benefi ts Act) and compulsory healthcare insurance. The new government imme-
diately repealed the Treub bill and proposed the quick submission of a new bill by Minister 
Aalberse for insuring sick pay and medical costs. In 1919 the Royal Commission known 
as the Commissie-Koolen (Koolen Commission) was appointed and charged with designing 
a bill that would lay down the rules for medical treatment and its inclusion in a healthcare 
insurance package. The report and preliminary draft of the amendment to the Ziektewet
left the basic design of the Talma Act practically untouched and was presented to the Hoge 
Raad van Arbeid (Higher Labour Council (HRA)) for discussion. That was where things went 
wrong. Aalberse clashed with an unexpected and ostensibly artifi cial coalition consisting of 
employers and the largest trade union, the NVV.
Before the First World War, corporate health-insurance funds had been set up in more and 
more factories or business sectors. In some companies the workers could become volun-
tary members for a modest contribution; in other enterprises all the workers were insured 
without having to pay any monetary contribution and the employer paid the full premium. 
The trade union was horrifi ed by the stipulation in the Aalberse bill that, in future, workers 
would have to pay half the contribution for the Ziektewet. In addition, most employers were 
prepared to keep their sick employees on 80% wages for six months, while the Talma bill 
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Minister P.J.M. Aalberse (Source: IISG)
guaranteed only 70%. This meant that many workers would have to forfeit part of their net 
income in order, paradoxically enough, to receive a lower payment later on. On the employers’ 
side there was a clear willingness to pay; this was evident from the voluntary establishment 
of so many industrial health-insurance funds during the previous decades. A number of the 
so-called mutual risk associations, which arose in response to the Ongevallenwet (Accident 
Act) of 1901 to bear the risks of compulsory accident insurance for the employees, had also 
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been bearing the risks of voluntary sick-pay insurance programmes since 1916, for which 
employers had set up a central implementation organisation known as Ziekte-risico (Sickness 
Risk).59 Entrepreneurs wanted to maintain control over their money and refused to part with 
their health-insurance funds for the benefi t of a state insurance programme which would 
still have to be paid for by employees and employers.60 So to a certain extent the interests 
of both employers and employees ran parallel, which explains why Aalberse found himself 
confronted by such an unusual coalition.
Dr Postuma, member of the fact-fi nding committee of the Hoge Raad van Arbeid, also 
wanted recognition for the existing employers’ health-insurance funds. Further research 
was conducted and the results were embodied in a joint sickness benefi ts bill by the li-
beral employers and the NVV. This was the so-called Proeve Postuma-Kupers (Postuma-Kupers 
Draft). The aim of the Draft was to put the implementation of the Ziektewet in the hands of 
incorporated industrial insurance associations with management boards in which emplo-
yers and employees were equally represented. The industrial insurance associations would 
be subordinate to the employers’ organisations, however. For employers who did not want 
to join these associations, the Draft provided for the establishment of a Ziekte-Garantiefonds
(Healthcare Guarantee Fund), so that workers employed by unorganised employers would 
also be required to deposit a percentage of their paid wages in this fund.61 A Supervisory 
Board would be responsible for overseeing the work and would consist of representatives of 
the employers, workers and the government. So the Draft gave preference to decentralised 
implementation rather than the centralisation intended by the Raden van Arbeid (Labour 
Councils). In addition, the government’s task would be limited to laying down general rules 
and participating in supervision.
In June 1921 the Hoge Raad van Arbeid ruled by a large majority that the test of a sickness 
benefi ts act, in accordance with the Postuma-Kupers Draft, was preferable to Minister Aal-
berse’s amended Talma Ziektewet. Now the discussions came to a defi nite dead end. Aalberse 
had serious doubts concerning the operation of the Guarantee Fund. A parliamentary stalemate 
occurred. Fierce resistance to the proposed Draft arose from SDAP circles, although the text had 
been drawn up with the help of the NVV leadership. The SDAP had great diffi culty accepting 
the idea that the industrial insurance associations would be subordinate to the employers’ 
organisations, which would therefore have the implementation of the Ziektewet under their 
control. Finally the NVV leadership changed its mind, pressured by the rising criticism from 
within its own constituency, and distanced itself from the Draft.62 A great deal of criticism 
was also heard from within the ARP, the CHU and from a minority of the R.K. Staatspartij. 
They held on to Talma’s original scheme in which implementation would be in the hands of 
the Labour Councils.63 In the meantime, the political and economic climate had developed 
in a way that was unfavourable to a rapid introduction of social legislation. Whereas in 1918 
the danger of revolution had put the conservative parties under considerable pressure, in 
1921 an accelerating economic crisis took the wind out of the sails of the progressive parties. 
Politicians paid more and more attention to entrepreneurs who urged that cutbacks be made, 
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Minister Slotemaker de Bruïne and the shower of amendments to the Ziektewet
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social payments be scaled down and working weeks extended. Parliamentary discussions of 
the Ziektewet arrived at an impasse that lasted for years.
3/ Results at last: the Ziektewet
In the end it would be Minister J.R. Slotemaker de Bruïne of the De Geer cabinet who 
brought the Ziektewet to fruition. Soon after taking offi ce in 1926, Slotemaker de Bruïne 
submitted for discussion a preliminary draft of a bill to amend the Ziektewet to the Hooge 
Raad van Arbeid. This preliminary draft was based on the principle of compulsory insurance, 
although it was exclusively concerned with healthcare insurance. It is striking that in com-
parison with Belgium and Germany, the Netherlands’ position was entirely unique in this 
regard. In Germany and Belgium, the disbursement of sick pay was part of the traditional 
package of health-insurance fund services. It is also striking that, unlike the case of voluntary 
unemployment insurance, the government did not propose to grant any subsidies for the 
implementation of the Ziektewet. The premiums for the Ziektewet would be paid in their 
entirety by the employer and the employee.
The fact that the employee was also obliged to contribute to the premium was a novelty 
in the world of Dutch social insurance. The employee contributed nothing for accident and 
disability insurance, but for healthcare insurance an average of 1.7% was deducted from his 
wage.64 The fi nal approval of the Slotemaker de Bruïne bill was greatly helped by an accord 
drawn up in early 1928 between the Catholic employers and the Catholic trade union. In this 
accord, the industrial insurance associations, along with the Labour Councils’ health-insurance 
funds, remained the implementation organs for the Draft. To dispel the trade unions’ fear 
of domination by the employers, double safety measures were built into the proposal. The 
heart of the implementation lay with the central employers’ and labour organisations: only 
the industrial insurance associations that had been set up by them and that were managed on 
the principle of equality could be recognised as an implementing body by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. In the original Slotemaker de Bruïne preliminary draft, the recognised special 
health-insurance funds and the corporate health-insurance funds were also included as im-
plementing bodies. They were omitted from the fi nal bill, perhaps as a result of the Catholic 
accord; the offi cial reason was to avoid fragmentation in the implementation. On the basis 
of this accord, a bill was submitted that was approved by a large majority in both the Lower 
and the Upper House.65 In the Lower House this large majority was partly facilitated by 
raising the wage limit to 3,000 guilders and by raising the benefi ts percentage from 70% to 
80% of the normal wage. Fixing the wage limit at 3,000 guilders in the Ziektewet would be 
especially important later on for the healthcare insurance provided by the health-insurance 
funds. Through the implementation decree of 28 June 1929, the act came into effect on 1 
March 1930. In actual practice it soon became apparent that great numbers of employers 
preferred the industrial insurance associations (90%) to the Labour Councils.66
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4/ The Medical Expenses Act: from war to war
a/ All promise, no delivery: Aalberse 1920-1925
Seventeen years after the approval of the Talma bill, the Ziektewet fi nally came into effect. Its 
natural complement, the Ziekenverzorgingswet (Health-insurance Act), had many more trials 
to suffer and was fi nally realised during the German occupation in 1941. Nevertheless, for 
the rapid realisation of a medical-expense insurance programme, the post-war start had been 
very promising. On 3 August 1920, Minister Aalberse submitted his draft healthcare scheme 
to the Lower House. The scheme would affect not only workers but also everyone who lived 
below a certain income limit (the proposal was 2,500 guilders). The basic principle of his bill 
was the realisation of a voluntary insurance for medical expenses. An insured person would 
only have a right to sick pay if he was registered with a recognised health-insurance fund. 
The implementation of the healthcare insurance programme would remain in the hands of 
the health-insurance funds. Health-insurance funds would be given a state subsidy and would 
be admitted if they satisfi ed certain conditions. These conditions had to do with:
– The fund’s fi eld of activity
– The extent of the medical help, with a description of the minimum demands, rights and 
duties of the insured persons and medical professionals (free choice of doctors and fi xing 
of a wage limit)
– The maximum number of registered insured persons for each fund-related practice
– The composition of the board
– The decision-making procedure 
– Financial administration (e.g. non-profi t basis) 
Interestingly, nursing care in hospitals and sanatoriums and district nursing services were 
both included in the compulsory insurance package. The state would provide subsidies to 
authorised health-insurance funds for hospital nursing and specialist treatment and to help 
cover administrative costs. The government would make available a substantial sum of ten 
million guilders a year for this purpose and would also take responsibility for modernising 
the hospitals.67
The Aalberse bill was clear on two of the three most important historical matters of dispute 
and endorsed the views of the NMG: the free choice of doctors and the establishment of a fi xed 
income limit. The third matter of dispute, the composition of the boards, remained undecided, 
however. Each fund was free to arrange its board according to its own wishes, although the 
doctors were accorded at least one advisory function in each health-insurance fund.
The bill was a neat entity: it contained a very wide and comprehensive package of provisions 
covered by healthcare insurance at an acceptable premium, thanks to the large government 
subsidy, and it recognised the necessity of involving the national government in the insuring 
of healthcare and in granting doctors their most important requests.68 Except for a few minor 
comments, the NMG found the bill quite acceptable. In an effort to avoid a possible doctors’ 
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boycott, the Landelijke Federatie of the mutual health-insurance funds insisted on an addition 
that would require doctors to make themselves available to patients of all funds functioning 
in their place of residence. The Landelijke Federatie also wanted the law to include the op-
tion of fund-related doctors and fund-related institutions. These objections did not seem 
insurmountable. The speedy approval of a comprehensive and balanced insurance system, 
which neither Germany nor Belgium enjoyed, was just within reach. And yet − once again 
− something went wrong. In late 1921, Minister Aalberse withdrew his promise of subsidies 
because of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. In one fell swoop the fi nancial 
foundations beneath the proposed insurance system were swept away. Only in 1925, four 
years later, did the minister fi nally submit his bill. In this version all the provisions that placed 
monetary burdens on the state were scrapped due to the economic slump. All that remained 
of the original scheme was a bare-bones Ziekenfondswet (Health-insurance Act) whose only 
aim was to properly regulate the organisation of the health-insurance funds. Even this feeble 
bill failed to obtain the approval of the Lower House.
b/ The Medical Expense Act crushed between principles
After putting the Ziektewet back on the parliamentary agenda, Minister Slotemaker de Bruïne 
tried to do the same with the Ziekenfondswet (Health-insurance Act). On 9 November 1927 
he submitted a second memorandum of amendments which was closely in line with the 
Aalberse bill of 1925. The memorandum provided for the possibility of stipulating a minimum 
number of members for a single health-insurance fund and for the possibility of withdra wing 
recognition if a health-insurance fund remained seriously in breach. In addition, the bill made 
it possible for health-insurance funds to appoint their own doctors and pharmacists for an 
unlimited period of time. In his proposal Aalberse had provided for a period of only fi ve 
years. The NMG, which saw this as infringement of the principle of free choice of doctors, 
and the Landelijke Federatie, which stubbornly continued to condemn the same principle, 
both rejected the proposed amendment. A direct confrontation of viewpoints in parliament 
did not occur, however. Once again, the draft never reached the stage of public proceedings 
due to the cabinet stepping down.69
On 8 October 1930, Minister Verschuur of the Ruys de Beerenbrouck cabinet submit-
ted a memorandum of amendment to the Aalberse bill. It provided for a few changes that 
immediately aroused strong resistance. The suspension of article 124 from the recently in-
troduced Ziektewet (Sickness Benefi ts Act) was particularly disquieting. That article provided 
for a subsidy of about six million guilders, which was to be deposited in a fund each year by 
the Act’s implementing body. This fund was intended for the medical treatment of insured 
persons in accordance with the Ziektewet. The opposition became so great that the minister 
withdrew his bill in the spring of 1931.
Because of the severe economic depression, which made it impossible to grant any substantial 
government allowance, the Ziekenfondswet disappeared from the parliamentary agenda in the 
years that followed. Grave economic and social problems such as the fi ght against a threatening 
devaluation of the guilder (which had been going on for years) and towering unemploy-
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ment demanded the government’s full attention. It would be 1936 before the Ziekenfondswet
came up again for discussion. A new bill − the fourth memorandum of amendment to the 
original Aalberse bill − was submitted by Minister Slingenberg of the third Colijn Ministry 
(1935-1937). This bill went a long way (perhaps too far) towards meeting the demands of 
the doctors:
– Free choice of doctor
– Establishing an income limit
– Equal representation
– Establishment of a minimum fee by the government
– Creation of a Central Council over the health-insurance funds (one half to consist of 
employees and the other half of representatives of the health-insurance fund)
The bill seemed tailor-made for the men of medicine and immediately met with fi erce op-
position from the Landelijke Federatie as well as from the NVV and the CNV.70 Despite a few 
slight adjustments in a fi fth and sixth memorandum of amendment, the bill was removed 
from the agenda by the Lower House in March 1937 because the preparation time had been 
inadequate.71
c/ Romme changes direction
Slingenberg’s successor, Minister Romme, withdrew the bill for good on 21 September 
1937 and announced a brand-new bill in early 1939. Romme instructed Director General 
C. van den Berg of the Public Health section of the Department of Social Affairs to draw up 
a new bill. Van den Berg made a radical break with the earlier proposals and came up with 
a completely new proposal in which the emphasis lay on a few general provisions which 
were to regulate the supervision of the existing funds without the intervention of all sorts 
of detailed bureaucratic rules imposed by the government.72
Unfortunately − this is beginning to sound monotonous − this proposal was never com-
pleted because of Romme’s untimely departure. His successor, the social democrat Van den 
Tempel, came up with yet another new preliminary draft that was more or less along the 
lines of Romme’s proposal − i.e. a law that was basically limited to the establishment of a 
Health-insurance fund Council and generally to the supervision of the health-insurance 
funds and the hospital nursing funds. The policy marked out by Romme and Van den Berg 
and later adopted by Van den Tempel shifted the emphasis in government regulation from 
substantive to organisational control. The outbreak of war, however, prevented a discussion 
by the advisory bodies.
5/ Government support: frugality, principles or weakness?
What was remarkably constant in the series of bills was the government’s reluctance to in-
tervene in an active and direct way by means of fi nancial support to the healthcare insurance 
programme and the world of the health-insurance funds. All the ministers, from Aalberse in 
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1925 to Van den Tempel in 1939, adopted the same unwilling position. The only exception 
was Aalberse’s promise in 1920 to help in fi nancing the healthcare insurance programme, 
among other things. But that promise was withdrawn at lightning speed when the eco-
nomic perspectives grew dark and the revolutionary storms abated. Even so, the Dutch 
government did grant subsidies in the social sector − be it in dribs and drabs − even before 
the war broke out. The fi rst support was granted in 1904 to the Vereniging ter Bestrijding van 
Tuberculose (Society to Combat Tuberculosis), in 1918 the government began supporting the 
home nursing services, and in 1925 the societies for the advancement of children’s hygiene, 
children’s institutional care services and day nurseries began receiving government subsidies 
as well. It is true that this fi nancial support was mainly used to direct and stimulate private 
initiative.73 This subsidy mechanism proved an attractive solution for keeping government 
costs down on the one hand and supporting the confessional principles of local autonomy 
and subsidiarity on the other.74
Why was so little government support granted in the Netherlands in comparison with 
Belgium, where the system of voluntary insurance was also prevalent during the interbel-
lum period? One explanation can be found in the strong ties that existed between the 
health-insurance funds in Belgium and the political parties. The Catholic and the socialist 
parties in particular tried to attract voters via the health-insurance funds and to bind them 
to their party. With the Mutualiteitwet of 1894 the Catholic government, with an eye to the 
introduction of universal suffrage, tried to placate the Catholic and neutral health-insurance 
funds by means of a generous subsidy regulation. The same law tried to deny party-linked 
health-insurance funds (mainly socialist) from having access to this attractive subsidy pot. The 
socialists responded with subsidies via lower provincial and municipal administrative boards, 
in which they were represented. So before the First World War there was an historically 
rooted system of subsidy fl ows for health-insurance funds at three levels: national, provincial 
and municipal. It was on this ‘achieved basis’ that further growth would take place during 
the interbellum period in Belgium.
These strong, direct and (for the Belgian health-care funds) lucrative ties did not exist in the 
Netherlands. Only a limited number of the Dutch health-insurance funds could be regarded 
as clearly ‘ideological’. Most mutual health-insurance funds were indeed free of political con-
nections, according to their statutes, but in daily practice they were close to or part of the 
social democratic camp. They represented only a minority (although a not inconsequential 
minority) of all health-insurance funds (about 27% in 1936). According to estimates, the 
health-insurance funds of the Dutch Catholic workers’ movement, which started its own 
health-insurance fund in 1926, accounted for a mere 4 to 5% of the total number of members 
in 1939. This contrasts sharply with the dominating positions that the socialist and Catholic 
workers’ funds occupied in Belgium in around 1930, with 44% and 32% respectively of the 
total number of health-insurance fund members.
Here it should be noted that in some Dutch regions and cities the ‘ideological’ funds 
sometimes occupied interesting key positions in the healthcare insurance system and were 
troublesome competitors for the other funds. The rest of the insured persons in the 
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Netherlands were insured by ‘neutral’ health-insurance funds: the Maatschappijfondsen, com-
mercial funds, corporate funds and local funds (nutsfondsen). These funds may not have been 
of any particular political hue, but they did often have outstanding political contacts at their 
disposal which they knew how to mobilise effi ciently in the event of crucial parliamentary 
discussions. Compared with Germany, and certainly with Belgium, the Dutch health-insurance 
funds were nevertheless unable to exert enough political pressure to mobilise the politicians 
for fi nancial help.
6/ The poor patients: victims of a passive government
The absence of clear health-insurance fund legislation during the interbellum period meant 
that there was no mandatory provision placing a minimum on what had to be insured, and 
that each health-insurance fund could put together its own insurance package. On this point 
nothing had changed since the medieval guild funds. When choosing between health-insurance 
funds in his place of residence or region, an insurance fund candidate could base his deci-
sion on several criteria: for some the ideological background of the fund was undoubtedly 
important. But even funds with a clear denominational identity had to bear in mind that 
most candidate members looked at the quality of the services being offered and the price of 
the premium. A candidate could start looking for a good buy on the healthcare insurance 
free market, i.e. a health-insurance fund that offered the most interesting insurance package 
at a reasonable price. The fi erce competition among local health-insurance funds meant that 
a fund usually had little room to manoeuvre and would keep a close watch on the insurance 
packages and premiums of other funds. Indeed, after the war permanent consultative bodies 
were set up in most big cities between local medical commissions and the health-insurance 
funds. Here the premiums, benefi ts and the other conditions for the city were fi xed, which 
drastically curtailed the administrative freedom of most of the funds.75
The annual income of the average insured person was too low, moreover, to allow him 
to request an extensive insurance package in exchange for a high premium. In an insurance 
system without the fi nancial intervention of the employer (as in Germany) or the govern-
ment (as in Belgium), many health-insurance funds (most of them small) had to restrict 
themselves to a minimum package that mainly covered the fees of general practitioners 
and the necessary medicines. Paying the general practitioner by subscription remained the 
standard rule, although health-insurance funds on all sides also reimbursed per treatment.76
The non-dispensing GPs received an average fee of three guilders per year per person; the 
dispensing GPs usually received fi ve guilders.77
Health-insurance funds also paid pharmacists for medicines on the basis of a subscription 
system, sometimes with a few restrictions with regard to special medicines. Some health-
insurance funds introduced their members to direct reimbursement for medicines. To keep 
GPs from being too liberal in their prescription-writing, many health-insurance funds used a 
moderation system, of which the Zaanland system was the most common. It was introduced 
in Zaandam in 1929, and according to the system GPs were permitted to prescribe up to 
an average amount per year. If the doctor exceeded this amount he would have to pay back 
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the surplus. The great advantage to the Zaanland system, which was mostly in use among 
the Maatschappijfondsen, was that the health-insurance funds were able to estimate the costs 
for medicines quite precisely when drawing up their budgets.78
The insurance contained in the Aalberse bill of 1920 provided for specialist care, hospital 
and sanatorium nursing. A large number of health-insurance funds did little or nothing in this 
regard. Funds that did include specialist care in their package had to demand high premiums, 
which were out of the reach of the poor. In 1925 the commission for the Unifi catierapport
(Unifi cation Report) found that that the existing specialist care provided by the health-insu-
rance funds was inadequate. In the small cities and rural areas people still relied too heavily 
on the help of free out-patient clinics and hospitals in the larger urban centres. Sometimes 
the specialist care there was covered by church poor relief or by the municipality. Even in 
the larger cities, specialist care was insuffi cient according to the commission. In Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Groningen, Haarlem and other cities, only the out-patient care was covered by 
the health-insurance funds.79
The situation gradually improved. Out-patient clinics were created mainly in the larger cities, 
sometimes organised by the health-insurance funds, where for a modest price patients could 
buy a card that entitled them to specialist care. Some health-insurance funds covered the cost 
of this card. Health-insurance funds that covered specialist care tried to keep their expenses 
within reasonable limits by means of a so-called specialist fund. The local funds fi lled the fund 
with a fi xed amount per fund member and the local specialist association was responsible 
for distributing it according to its own criteria.80 Naturally local conditions throughout the 
Netherlands made it possible for great discrepancies to occur under this regulation.
Dentistry constituted a special form of specialist care. Many health-insurance funds did 
not provide for this care because the insurance premium required was too high. Health-
insurance funds that did cover dental care usually limited their assistance to extractions. In the 
rural areas where there were no dentists, pulling teeth was often done by the GP. Even the 
smaller cities had hardly any dentists. The situation in the largest cities was better − especially 
in The Hague, Utrecht and Amsterdam, where effi ciently operating health-insurance fund 
out-patient clinics were located. In other cities, health-insurance funds drew up contracts 
with individual dentists.
The costs for sanatorium and hospital nursing increased by leaps and bounds after the war. 
Admission to a hospital was usually avoided as much as possible in the nineteenth century 
because most hospitals had such a bad reputation. This negative attitude quickly changed with 
the improvement in the quality of medical and nursing care after the First World War. Here, 
too, most health-insurance funds recoiled from the rapidly rising costs, which were diffi cult 
to monitor and to budget with any precision. The need for minimal insurance became so 
great, however, that numerous local, private initiatives were launched and hospital nursing 
associations were established. The supply of insurers was considerable. The choice was not 
only between health-insurance funds and private insurance companies but also (and mainly) 
hospital nursing associations. In 1930, approximately two million people were insured for 
hospital nursing care. The premiums were usually nominal, sometimes income-linked.81 For 
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those who could not afford to pay the premiums and remained uninsured, the municipality 
had to step in with fi nancial assistance on the basis of the Armenwet (Poor Relief Act). Some 
city councils (including The Hague) had made an arrangement with the health-insurance 
funds for this purpose. Undoubtedly progress was made in healthcare insurance during the 
interbellum period. An increasing number of health-insurance funds were providing broader 
benefi ts packages.
In comparison with Germany, however, the situation was unsatisfactory. Companje drew 
up an excellent summary of the situation as it stood on the eve of the Second World War: 
The jewel in the crown of the institutions run by the mutual funds: the hospital of the De 
Volharding fund in The Hague
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Treatment by general practitioners and the provision of medicines remained the principal benefi ts. Benefi ts 
packages were often supplemented by dental and obstetric care. The need grew to draw up agreements that 
would provide for paramedical care like physiotherapy. Specialist care became more and more complex, 
but the insurance of clinical specialist care in combination with hospital nursing care remained a problem. 
This need was met by the municipalities and the hospital nursing associations, but the funds themselves 
could scarcely cover it without sharply raising their premiums.82
c. The Dutch health-insurance fund system: growth, struggle and immobility
1/ Rising membership
Seen in purely quantitative terms the Dutch health-insurance fund system underwent a posi-
tive evolution during the interbellum period. The number of members continued to surge 
to new record heights. In 1936 Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS)) 
began to publish a reliable report of the number of members of Dutch health-insurance 
funds, which makes it possible to follow membership development year by year. Despite the 
fact that insurance was voluntary, these fi rst statistics show that more than 3.5 million Dutch 
people were insured for medical expenses by a health-insurance fund.
Remarkably, even the years of economic depression failed to really curb the growth in 
membership. The health-insurance funds came through the depression in relatively good shape. 
Better paid workers dropped below the income limit because of the depression and became 
eligible for membership in a health-insurance fund. On the other hand, many long-term 
unemployed workers risked losing their membership because they could no longer afford 
to pay the premium. Here and there such people were able to continue their membership, 
however, because funds, doctors and municipalities each paid part of the premium. In 1934 
this even became compulsory for municipalities. According to Van der Velden, the number of 
health-insurance fund members declined during the fi rst years of the depression, but starting 
in 1934 a slow increase can be noted. 83 In the cities throughout the entire depression period, 
from 1930 to 1936, there was on balance a stagnation in membership growth in absolute 
terms, while in the rural areas there was still evidence of intrinsic growth.
This growth would continue during the following years: by 1 October 1941 the health-
insurance funds had more than four million members. Even more important than this absolute 
number was the percentage of the population that was insured by a health-insurance fund. 
At the beginning of the century this amounted to about 17%, rising to 27.9% in 1926, to 
almost 39% in 1936 and reaching 45.6% in 1941.84
This remarkable increase in membership levels for the Dutch health-insurance funds was 
prompted by many factors. On the one hand there was an unmistakable rise in the stan-
dard of living, so that workers had more opportunity and were more able to afford to pay 
an insurance premium. Between 1910 and 1922 the real incomes of the wage-dependent 
population rose by about 35%, despite the war years. While scarcely 10% of the Amsterdam 
population had an annual income of between 1,000 and 2,500 guilders in 1900, and 65.9% 
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were regarded as destitute, by 1930 these percentages had risen to 44.9% and 10.1% respec-
tively. This increase in income was responsible for the defi nitive breakthrough in voluntary 
healthcare insurance.85 The rise in the prosperity and social advancement of the working 
population expelled them from the large group of people living from public assistance and 
poor relief and promoted them within the social hierarchy to the growing group of people 
eligible for insurance through the health-insurance fund. Naturally there were others whose 
rising incomes put them over the income limit. Theoretically they no longer qualifi ed for 
fund insurance and would have to switch to private care. In practice, however, the funds often 
turned a blind eye to these attractive, fi nancially powerful members, as is indicated by the 
incessant fl ow of complaints from the care providers.
It wasn’t only upward social mobility that was responsible for membership growth among 
the health-insurance funds. The slow sectoral shifts within the active Dutch population 
also brought with it a gradual increase in the potential for membership recruitment. The 
continuous movement of workers from the agrarian to the industrial sector resulted in a 
growing number of employees, concentrated in the rapidly growing cities. This urbanisation 
led to individualisation and the need for insurance. Migration to the city implied the loss of 
rural solidarity, with its relative security (as imperfect and minimal as it may have been) in 
the event of illness of accident. Joining forces, becoming members of a new group based on 
solidarity, and taking out insurance were much-needed alternatives for the immigrants from 
the countryside. The level of organisation among industrial workers was traditionally much 
higher than that of farmers and farm labourers, so the demographic shift from countryside 
to city almost automatically meant increased membership for the health-insurance funds. In 
1937 the insurance level in the big cities was almost 55% with a national average of 40%, while 
Table V.2  Proportion of the population (%) insured with a health insurance fund, the Netherlands, 
1902-1941
 1902/3 1926 1936 1940 1941*)
North 3.6 8.9 14.8 22.9 43.8
East 12.9 22.7 34.9 42.3 53.9
West 27.2 42.1 49.7 54.8 67.3
South 0.5 16.6 27.3 35.7 48.5
     
Netherlands 17.7 27.9 38.8 45.6 58.4
*) after the introduction of the Ziekenfondsbesluit (Sickness fund Decree)
Source: H. van der Velden, Financiële toegankelijkheid tot gezondheidszorg in Nederland, 233.
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the agrarian areas scored much lower than that average. The northern regions in particular 
had remarkably few active health-insurance funds.86
2/ Stability and fragmentation
Chronological comparisons are diffi cult because it is diffi cult to tell which funds covered only 
medical costs and which were a combination of healthcare/burial fund and insurance for 
medical expenses. Even so, during the interbellum period there seems to have been evidence 
of stabilisation regarding the number of health-insurance funds. Statistics Netherlands counted 
648 funds on 1 January 1937. Compared with estimates from before the First World War this 
signifi es very little change. The rising number of members apparently had little impact on 
the number of health-insurance funds. The average size of the health-insurance funds did not 
increase because of direct government intervention, as in Germany, but merely as a result of 
market forces. This means there were no small (or excessively small) health-insurance funds. 
The Postuma-Kupers Draft foresaw diffi culties in placing implementation of the Ziektewet
in the hands of private health-insurance funds because these funds were too fragmented, 
their membership was too small, their fi nancial reserves too limited and their support base 
too narrow, which meant they formed too great a risk.87 For this reason, in his bill of 1930 
Minister Verschuur made it possible to refuse recognition to health-insurance funds that 
were not large enough. In 1937 there were still 214 doctors’ funds averaging scarcely 700 
persons each, while the national average − not including these doctors’ funds − was about 
8,000 persons.
The fact that their number stopped growing does not mean that no new health-insurance 
funds were being established. New funds were set up during the twenties, mainly stimulated 
by the NMG. The Maatschappijfondsen played an important part in the gradual spreading of 
health-insurance funds across large parts of the countryside. In 1926 the catholic trade 
union RKWV began setting up its own Catholic health-insurance funds, which resulted in 
the founding of new funds mainly in the southern Netherlands. On the other hand, the 
number was reduced when funds shut down, were absorbed or merged with existing funds. 
Doctors’ funds in particular were absorbed into the new NMG health-insurance funds, the 
Maatschappijfondsen or Association Funds.
a/ Maatschappijfondsen: a unique power position for the doctors
Hidden behind the positive quantitative development of the health-insurance fund system, 
an uncommonly fi erce struggle was taking place in the world of health-insurance funds that 
lasted a quarter of a century. In Germany, too, and even more so in Belgium, there was intense 
competition among the national alliances at the national level and the local funds at the local 
level to recruit members and increase their market share. On a regular basis, however, the 
funds in these countries joined hands to appear before parliament and the government as one 
strong pressure group with a common packet of demands. It was mainly in rate negotiations 
with the doctors’ organisations that they acted as one bloc.
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In the Netherlands the competitive situation was very different. First of all, two types of 
health-insurance funds were active that did not exist in Germany or in Belgium: commer-
cial funds and the Maatschappijfondsen. The Maatschappijfondsen were more important than 
the commercial funds. During the interbellum period their membership, in 84 funds, rose 
to 1,180,000 in 1937. This meant that one-third of all health-insurance fund members had 
signed up with an Maatschappijfonds. Add to this the members of the more than two hundred 
doctors’ funds and the result is almost 38% of the members of health-insurance funds that 
existed on the eve of the Second World War, all of them organised by doctors themselves and 
to a large extent controlled by them, too. 
This was the fruit of years of systematic action by the NMG. During the First World War a 
number of NMG sections joined in the struggle with the local health-insurance funds and a 
large number of Maatschappijfondsen were set up. Not only did the funds themselves increase 
in number but they accounted for a growing portion of insured persons. During the twenties 
the NMG took to the road. A network of regional Maatschappijfondsen was systematically woven 
across the entire country, including the rural areas. Even during the years of the economic 
depression the expansion continued: between 1929 and 1936, 33 new NMG funds were added. 
Not all of these new funds were successful, but with its funds the NMG undoubtedly made 
an important contribution to the development of the health-insurance fund system in the 
rural areas during the interbellum period.88
Because the NMG funds held such a large market share, the power relationships that existed 
in the Dutch health-insurance fund world were very different from those in Germany and 
Belgium. In those countries, the health-insurance funds could form a united front and take a 
strong position against the medical establishment. In the Netherlands, however, the situation 
was much more complicated and the positions were just the opposite. Because the doctors 
had control over the Maatschappijfondsen, the Dutch health-insurance funds were not able to 
negotiate as one bloc or to defend their points of view to the government. On the contrary, 
the NMG could use its Maatschappijfondsen to put pressure on the other funds, especially the 
mutual funds, and to attract the necessary attention from the legislature by means of its basic 
positions.
The Maatschappijfondsen worked autonomously, subject to approval for changes in its 
regulations and supervision of its management. Annual consultations began in 1926, and 
co-operative structures gradually developed. One of them was the Centrale Administratie 
Verzekeringsinstellingen in Nederland (Central Administration of Insurance Agencies in the 
Netherlands (NV CAVINED), founded in 1928. This administrative offi ce was an attempt by a 
few members of the Commission of General Practitioners to improve the administration 
of the Maatschappijfondsen. In 1930 they were granted administrative management of new 
CAVINED funds, a group of Maatschappijfondsen with uniform procedures and uniform fi nancial 
administration.89 This is not to say that the NMG and its Maatschappijfondsen always operated 
as a close and united bloc. Mainly during the thirties a prolonged struggle raged between 
the executive board of the NMG on the one hand and a number of health-insurance funds 
and the Commission of General Practitioners on the other concerning the establishment of 
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a separate federation of Maatschappijfondsen. Fierce confl icts also broke out on a regular basis 
between the GPs and the specialists or between the doctors and the pharmacists regarding 
the distribution of fees. Compared with the Maatschappijfondsen, however, the other funds 
were still far from creating a centralised administration, outlining a common policy and co-
ordinating joint actions.
b/ The mutual health-insurance funds: strong and weak links
While the vast majority of insured workers in Germany and especially in Belgium were 
either open or hidden participants in the organised labour movement through membership 
in their health-insurance fund, this was much less true in the Netherlands. The mutually 
managed funds comprised 967,000 members in 1936, or only 27% of the total. The large 
group of mutual funds was very heterogeneous. The principal difference was between the 
old traditional funds (some even dated to the fi rst half of the nineteenth century) and the 
much younger mutuals that originated in the modern workers’ movement, such as AOZ and 
Ziekenzorg in Amsterdam.
The fi rst group, often managed from generation to generation by a relatively small group 
of people, was primarily interested in offering its members a good product at a reasonable 
price. These health-insurance funds were often of limited local orientation and had little 
interest in joining a national umbrella organisation. The second category of mutual funds 
was characterised by a total vision of how health care should be organised; they defended 
this vision to the medical establishment and, if necessary, amongst themselves.
When the Landelijke Federatie was founded just before the First World War, a modest and 
loose national collaboration of twenty mutual funds was established. The most interesting 
thing about this umbrella organisation was that it defended the positions of the mutual 
health-insurance funds to the NMG and mainly to the government. Not only did the Landelijke 
Federatie contain only a small minority of mutual funds during the twenties, but there was 
little evidence of co-ordination. Some funds had their own paid staff (e.g. De Volharding in 
The Hague), other funds (e.g. Ziekenzorg in Amsterdam) experimented with payment per 
treatment; most made use of a subscription system.90
 The trade unions were constant in their criticism of the ineffi cient organisation, the faulty 
co-ordination and the poor fi nancial management among the mutual funds in general and 
the Landelijke Federatie in particular. Ultimately this resulted in a few proposals for greater co-
operation and a modest form of centralisation. In 1929 the NVV and the CNV, along with the 
Landelijke Federatie, set up a Algemeene Raad ter bevordering van het Ziekenfondswezen (General 
Council for the Advancement of the Health-insurance fund System). The Catholic trade union 
RKWV was also prepared to join in but did not want to participate formally in the Algemeene 
Raad. Among the goals set by the Algemeene Raad were: to increase mutual fund membership, 
to set up new mutual funds and to promote more unity in the health-insurance fund system. 
The trade unions were clearly striving for a well organised health-insurance fund system.91
Collaboration with the trade unions produced quick and positive results: within two years the 
number of associated funds rose from 23 to 49. Consultations remained diffi cult, however, and 
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in 1934 the Algemeene Raad was dissolved. In the meantime, stimulated by De Volharding in 
The Hague, a proposal was formulated in 1932 to consolidate the umbrella structure of the 
mutual health-insurance funds. This would require more central fi nancial resources, which 
led to an increase in contributions as well as resistance from and the expulsion of three major 
health-insurance funds along with 120,000 paying members.
The successful opposition to the Slingenberg bill brought the Landelijke Federatie great 
prestige from among the health-insurance funds. The Federatie profi ted from this by per-
suading non-member mutually administered health-insurance funds to join it. This activity 
underscored the need for a tighter central organisation and greater fi nancial resources so 
the Federatie could take a stronger position in negotiations with employees (and workers’ 
organisations). Such a step came about in 1937 with the approval of an amendment to the 
articles of association in which the name Landelijke Federatie was replaced by Centrale Bond van 
Ziekenfondsen (the Central Alliance of Health-insurance funds (CBZ)). The CBZ administrative 
board had greater powers than the Landelijke Federatie. The central board of the CBZ had the 
authority to enter into umbrella agreements with workers’ organisations, for example. On the 
other hand, the individual funds could not negotiate with employees without consulting with 
the board of the alliance, when organising their administration they had to take into account 
any changes made by the board, and they were required to allow a representative of the board 
to attend their meetings.92 This centralisation clashed with the desire for independence felt by 
some health-insurance funds, which broke away and set up the Landelijke Contactcommissie van 
Onderling Beheerde Ziekenfondsen (National Contact Commission of Mutually Administered 
Health-insurance funds). Later, however, they returned to the CBZ.
The strengthening of the CBZ certainly did not mean that all mutually administered health-
insurance funds were united in a single organisation. In addition to dozens of mutual funds 
that continued operating locally there was a second, smaller umbrella of Roman Catholic 
mutual funds. In the Roman Catholic segment of society the subsidiarity principle had long 
played a central role. In the area of healthcare, the prevailing belief (in conformity with this 
principle) was that too much government interference in the health-insurance fund system 
was undesirable. The main emphasis in healthcare, including the health-insurance funds, should 
be placed on private initiative. In this spirit, even before the First World War a few outspoken 
Catholic health-insurance funds (such as St Liduina in Utrecht in 1894) had been started. 
In around the mid-twenties this subsidiarity principle was intensifi ed, and this included the 
health-insurance funds. The RKWV saw the founding of Roman Catholic health-insurance 
funds as one of its tasks. In 1922 a special commission for an RKWV-based health-insurance 
fund system was set up.93 The RKWV chose to follow its own path outside the collaborative 
efforts with other health-insurance fund organisations, and in 1926 separate Catholic funds 
were launched. This position of the RKWV should be seen as a consolidation of the pillarisa-
tion that developed during the interbellum period. The high hopes that the Roman Catholic 
health-insurance funds would expand were never realised, despite the support of the second 
largest national trade union. In 1939 there were only about 150,000 members, or less than 
5% of the national total.94
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c/ Commercial funds and factory funds 
The market share of the commercial funds before the First World War was estimated at 15 to 
20%. Despite the ferocious attacks by the doctors’ organisation and constant complaints of 
alleged abuses, this fi gure remained quite constant: in 1936 the CBS counted 50 commercial 
funds with 588,000 insured members, of 16.5% of the total. They were also substantially 
larger on average than a standard health-insurance fund. These commercial funds, sometimes 
a branch of large life-insurance companies, could easily respond to the demand and offered 
an extensive spectrum of insurance packages from minimal coverage at a low premium to 
all-in insurance that included hospital and district nursing care. They were very successful, 
especially in the urban conurbations: in Amsterdam and Rotterdam the commercial funds 
were even the largest funds on the insurance market.95
As previously mentioned, there were hundreds of industrial health-insurance funds before 
the First World War that were primarily set up to issue sick pay, often supplemented by pay-
ments for medical care and medicines. After 1920 the factory and sector health-insurance 
funds gradually shifted their attention to supplementing workers’ old-age benefi ts. When the 
Ziektewet was introduced in 1930, their task was taken over by industrial insurance boards 
or Raden van Arbeid, and a large number of industrial health-insurance funds lost their raison 
d’être. According to the CBS count, there were still 62 industrial health-care funds in 1937 with 
a total of 357,000 insured persons or about 10% of the total. It was not unusual for them to 
offer their member-employees better insurance terms − including hospital insurance − than 
most of the mutuals and especially the Maatschappijfondsen.96
3/ The Unifi cation Commission and other attempts at co-operation
Because of the failure to come up with a legal arrangement for health-insurance funds and 
healthcare insurance, a few proposals for reform and more effi ciency were formulated by 
the interested parties themselves. A fi rst initiative came from the NMG. They wanted to talk 
with the NVV about ‘district funds’. Both parties were concerned about the fragmentation 
of the health-insurance fund system.97 Both the NMG and the NVV supported the idea of 
concentrating a large number of health-insurance funds, and they cherished the hope that 
concentration would also promote the development of national arrangements. The Landelij-
ke Federatie, which was not involved in the discussions at fi rst, decided for several reasons 
to become involved anyway on the condition that they would not be obliged to pledge 
themselves to any conclusions.
The relations between the Landelijke Federatie and the NMG had always been extremely 
cool. Things did not go smoothly with the trade unions either, as can be expected from 
two workers’ organisations. Initially the Landelijke Federatie did not want any trade union 
representatives sitting on the boards of its health-insurance funds. The Catholic trade unions 
refused to commit themselves and at fi rst decided not to participate, but later they sent ob-
servers anyway. The most important reason for this passive attitude was that they had plans to 
set up their own Catholic health-insurance fund. The fi rst result of the discussions between 
the NMG and the NVV was the Unifi cation Commission, created in 1922. To a large extent 
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the parties present represented those involved as producers or consumers in the provision 
of medical care.98
Conspicuous by their absence, for lack of a national umbrella organisation, were the 
representatives of the commercial funds and the industrial funds, which together comprised 
more than one-quarter of all the health-insurance fund members. The operating principle 
of the Unifi cation Commission was that the fragmentation of health-insurance funds was 
obstructing the creation of a proper healthcare scheme.99 So the Commission’s primary goal 
was to produce proposals for a concentration of health-insurance funds.
The results of the investigation and the discussions carried out by the Unifi cation Commis-
sion were laid out in the Unifi catierapport (Unifi cation Report), which was published in 1925. 
The important conclusions were: one health-insurance fund per sector and the establishment 
of a Central Council as supervisory body, to be made up of representatives of the organisa-
tion of the health-insurance funds, the employees, the trade unions and the government. No 
agreement on crucial points of contention was reached, however, such as the composition 
of the boards or the practical interpretation of the principle of free choice of doctors and 
pharmacists.100 The Landelijke Federatie remained dead set against the unlimited choice of 
doctors because in its view the only way to guarantee the total dedication of doctors to their 
health-insurance fund patients was to make sure their fund practice provided them with a 
full livelihood so they would not have to concern themselves with building up a lucrative 
private practice. The NMG and the Landelijke Federatie were in solid agreement on this point. 
When it appeared that the NVV was no longer willing to continue consultations without the 
Landelijke Federatie, the Unifi cation Commission was regarded as dissolved by the other parties. 
The Unifi catierapport ended up in the closets of the commission members, but after years of 
abandonment it would resurface once more at the beginning of the Second World War.
Their joint activity in the Unifi cation Commission had brought the NVV and the Landelijke 
Federatie closer together, so that the NVV and the CNV decided not to set up their own health-
insurance funds and to work towards closer collaboration with the Landelijke Federatie. The 
NVV and the CNV did request that, when mutual health-insurance funds were set up, they be 
required to pursue a good working relationship with the NMG. The trade unions, like the NMG,
were still convinced that an increase in concentration and scale must take place. In March 
1930 consultations began between the Landelijke Federatie and the General Practitioners’ 
Commission of the NMG. These negotiations went well and a draft agreement resulted. The 
NMG’s main board disagreed, however, and called back its General Practitioners’ Commission. 
The NMG continued to refuse to participate in the establishment of health-insurance funds 
that would not meet with the approval of the majority of local doctors. The dispute over 
historical points of contention (free choice of doctors, income limit and composition of the 
board) also occasionally fl ared up between the NMG with its health-insurance funds and the 
mutual funds in several cities. At the local level this led to distant and even hostile relations 
between the two parties. In the meantime, the collaboration also soured between the NVV and 
the CNV on the one hand and the Landelijke Federatie on the other. The trade unions thought 
the Landelijke Federatie showed a lack of effi ciency and organisational force. For its part, the 
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY178
Landelijke Federatie suspected the trade unions of wanting to capture an overly prominent role 
within the health-insurance fund system. There were also confl icts between the two trade 
unions. The distrust resulted in the termination of mutual co-operation and the dissolution 
of the Algemeene Raad in July 1934.101
The last attempt before the Second World War to bring about collaboration between or-
ganisations involved in the health-insurance fund system consisted of the establishment of the 
Centrale Commissie voor het Ziekenfondswezen (Central Commission for the Health-insurance 
fund System). This time, the mid-thirties, the initiative was made by the government in the 
person of Minister Slotemaker de Bruïne. Initially the organisations that shared the same 
position on the composition of the boards joined in the deliberations. In their view the 
board could consist of both the employees and the insured persons: the NVV, the RKWV and 
the NMG. Later the Landelijke Federatie also joined in. The traditional differences of opinion 
within the Centrale Commissie voor het Ziekenfondswezen still appeared to be irreconcilable, 
however. The mutual funds, with the full support of the SDAP and this time also of the NVV,
demanded health-insurance fund boards in which the insured persons held majority repre-
sentation. Here the trade unions abandoned their moderate position from the interbellum 
period when they strove for joint management of the health-insurance funds. Fierce local 
confl icts also broke out at several places (among them Groningen, Nijmegen and Texel) 
between the mutual funds and NMG doctors who refused to make themselves available any 
longer to members of those funds.102 The consultations were broken off, and in 1938 the 
commission also discontinued its activities without any tangible results. The old confl icts 
regarding the free choice of doctors and composition of the boards continued to stand in 
the way of fruitful and effi cient co-operation.
d. The Second World War: an unexpected breakthrough103
1/ German initiatives
In early May 1940 the fl ames of the Second World War spread to the Netherlands. The ca-
pitulation and the German occupation brought about an extremely audacious alteration in 
the Dutch political landscape. This sudden and unexpected change would have drastic and 
enduring consequences for the health-insurance funds and especially for the long, drawn-out 
discussions over healthcare insurance. These consequences soon manifested themselves. While 
there was a certain amount of continuity in the Ministerie van Sociale Zaken (Department of 
Social Affairs) in the person of Director-General van den Berg, it quickly became clear that 
the occupying power wanted to created an insurance system for sick pay and medical costs 
based on the German model. According to Jacob, the German leader of the Geschäftsgruppe 
Soziale Verwaltung (GSV), the Dutch system was lagging behind, especially in the area of medical 
assistance, as a result of the government’s failure to vigorously intervene. With the introduction 
of compulsory insurance, Jakob had two goals in mind: to win the sympathy and support 
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of the working population for the German cause and to put the competitive relationship 
between German and Dutch companies on equal footing.
The Dutch health-insurance fund community was quite serious about reorganisation based 
on the German model. To stay one step ahead of radical German intervention, representatives 
of the Maatschappijfondsen, the Centrale Bond van Ziekenfondsen and the alliance of Roman 
Catholic health-insurance funds came together on 29 July 1940. In a joint declaration they 
formulated their intention to strive for a far-reaching fusion of all health-insurance funds, 
in line with the almost forgotten Unifi catierapport of 1925. The NMG in particular took the 
position that the Netherlands must have one big health-insurance fund with a package that 
would contain full medical care and hospital nursing. All Dutch people below an income level 
yet to be determined would be required to join the fund. This position was diametrically op-
posed to the proposals that Van den Berg defended to the German authorities in line with his 
pre-war ideas. He continued to insist that a great diversity of funds was possible and rejected 
concentrations created by mergers. As in the Van den Tempel proposal, which in turn was an 
adapted version of the Romme draft, he said that limited supervision would be suffi cient.
Jakob rejected the Van den Berg plan because government control did not go far enough. 
He was also opposed to an income limit for the compulsory insurance, which was to be 
available to all workers as it was in Germany. He instructed H.W. Groeneveld of the workers’ 
insurance section of the Ministerie van Sociale Zaken to design a better sickness fund decree. 
Groeneveld formulated a proposal that went quite far in approximating the German com-
pulsory insurance:
– Employers and employees would each take responsibility for 50% of the premium
– All workers insured under the Sickness Benefi t Act would also have to be compulsorily 
insured for medical costs
– Health-insurance funds would have to offer a standard package yet to be determined 
Jakob was not yet satisfi ed, however. It was mainly the fragmented implementation that ir-
ritated him. Now he himself designed a proposal in which the clear intention was to apply 
the German model to the Dutch situation. Everyone with an employment contract, as well 
as self-employed persons with an annual income of up to NLG 3,600 per year, would be com-
pulsorily insured. Collecting the premium payments, with employers and employees paying 
equal amounts, would be the task of the Raden van Arbeid (Labour Councils). 
The employers’ contribution (half), which was higher than that in Germany (one-third), 
was regarded as compensation for other social contributions made by employers in Germany. 
The state would be assigned a role because the central implementation organisation would 
come directly under the province of the secretary-general. There was almost no place in the 
Jakob plan for private organisations such as health-insurance funds. At the most a few of the 
existing health-insurance funds would still be able to play a marginal role in the implementa-
tion of supplementary healthcare insurance.104
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Van den Berg’s announcement that Jakob’s plans would face joint resistance from the health-
insurance funds and the medical professionals, and that introducing a completely new or-
ganisation would create enormous chaos, made little impression on Jakob. More infl uential 
were signals from his German bosses indicating that they were less than delighted with the 
almost total omission of private insurers. In Germany, the traditional health-insurance funds 
had always been the fi rm backbone of the insurance system. The introduction of compulsory 
insurance for the self-employed with incomes under NLG 3,600 was the object of German 
criticism as well: Dutch medical-expense insurance would thereby reach further than that 
in Germany. Jakob adapted his original version slightly: he dropped the linkage between 
the Ziektewet and the health-insurance funds. In his new plan, however, provisions for com-
pulsory insurance and dispensing with the wage limit were retained. But fi erce criticism 
from his own circle − Jakob was even summoned to Berlin − forced him to come up with 
a completely new plan.
2/ The Ziekenfondsenbesluit of 1941
On 8 May 1941 Jakob presented a new draft that fi nally met with the approval of his su-
periors. On 1 August 1941 the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) appeared on the 
statute books.
The most important articles in the  Ziekenfondsenbesluit were:
– Article 1: the Secretary-General of Social Affairs would determine which health-
insurance funds would be offi cially recognised
– Article 2: everyone with an income of up to nlg 3,750 per year was eligible for the 
insurance
– Article 3: everyone compulsorily insured under the Ziektewet was also compulsorily 
insured under the Ziekenfondsenbesluit
– Article 3.2:  dependent family members of the principal insured person were also 
insured
– Article 9: the premium would be levied by the recognised health-insurance 
funds105
– Article 10: employers and employees would each pay half the premium 
The compulsorily insured had the right to care provided by the general practitioner, medicines 
and dressings, specialist care and hospital nursing (42 days per incident) and an allowance for 
a stay in a sanatorium. A payment was also provided in the event of death. Before the war, 
all health-insurance funds were already providing GP care and medicines. Paying the GP by 
means of subscription was a common practice.
Much more drastic were the consequences of entitlement to specialist and dental care. A 
large number of health-insurance funds paid little or no attention to this before the  Zieken-
fondsenbesluit. Indeed, specialist care was regarded as a luxury that was not meant for the likes 
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Ziekenfondsenbesluit, 1941
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of health-insurance fund patients. As with GPs and pharmacies, the insured person now had 
to choose a dentist as well. The health-insurance fund registered the insured person with the 
dentist by name. Initially the maximum number of health-insurance patients per dentist was 
6,000. Hospital nursing care was a new benefi t for about half the funds, and a daily allowance 
for care in a sanatorium was a complete novelty for most of them.106 The health-insurance 
funds were obliged to reinsure for both sanatorium nursing and for death benefi ts, since 
small health-insurance funds ran a high risk relative to the other funds. Not only did the
Ziekenfondsenbesluit greatly broaden the basic package, but the existing regional differences 
between the health-insurance funds were thereby reduced.107 Not unimportant, in view of 
the discussion that had dragged on for decades, was Article 13 of the Third Implementation 
Decree, which stated that an end must come to the system in which health-insurance funds 
worked exclusively with doctors, pharmacists or dentists in their employ. Article 13 also 
provided for a transition period until 1 July 1942, to which Azivo, the great Hague health-
insurance fund, made an appeal. Azivo would succeed in guiding through the war years an 
organisation with numerous employees on its payroll, its own pharmacy and its own hospital. 
Ziekenzorg of Utrecht also succeeded in preserving its own pharmacy and dental service, 
but it did have to eliminate its employment connection with GPs and midwives. From their 
side, the Maatschappijfondsen − which in fact were the NMG − also had to allow non-NMG
doctors to work for them.
It was also decided that the government would provide general supervision of the health-
insurance funds. The state supervision was initially assigned to the Secretary-General of the 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken, who delegated the task to the commissioner charged with the 
state supervision of the health-insurance funds. In this way the German Führerprinzip was 
introduced into the Dutch health-insurance fund system. This commissioner was not only 
charged with the job of supervision, but he was also to exercise regulatory power in which 
he would be advised by a Raad van Bijstand (Council of Assistance), as in Germany, consisting 
of representatives of the parties involved.
3/ The consequences of the Ziekenfondsbesluit
a/ Thinning numbers
To the great satisfaction of the health-insurance funds, Van den Berg was appointed super-
visory commissioner. The healthcare insurance would be implemented by the recognised 
health-insurance funds, private organisations of divergent backgrounds. With the recogni-
tion procedure in view, it was very important for the existing health-insurance funds to be 
able to negotiate with a commissioner who had a thorough knowledge of the problems of 
healthcare insurance − and especially with someone who, as he had already demonstrated, 
was not averse to a pluriform health-insurance fund system. His role gained in importance 
when the Raad van Bijstand, established by the First Implementation Decree of 30 August 
1941, proved to be only short-lived. After a brief term of service, this advisory council was 
no longer convened after 1941.
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Naturally the introduction of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit had a huge impact on the health-insu-
rance funds. Funds with a small membership and a limited benefi ts package were particularly 
endangered. To be on the safe side, a few dozen of the smaller funds that felt threatened joined 
the Algemeen Nederlands Onderling Ziekenfonds (General Netherlands Mutual Health-insurance 
fund (ANOZ)), so they could continue working as a section of that national health-insurance 
fund, if necessary. Each health-insurance fund board was faced with the question of whether 
to aim for recognition and how to do it. More than 300 of the approximately 650 existing 
health-insurance funds decided they were either unable or unwilling to begin implementing 
compulsory healthcare insurance with all the attendant administrative requirements. Doctors’ 
funds in particular begged off in great numbers. Because the recognition procedure imposed 
an enormous administrative burden on the ministry, provisional recognition was granted. In 
the end, 204 health-insurance funds were provisionally recognised and admitted. Of these, 77 
were Maatschappijfondsen, 61 mutually administered funds, 37 corporate funds, 16 commercial 
funds and 13 other kinds of funds. Forty-three applications were rejected, largely because 
these funds did not offer help in kind but paid out benefi ts monetarily, either entirely or 
partially. Interestingly, a relatively large number of corporate funds survived the shrinkage. It 
is also rather peculiar that a number of commercial funds could continue their operations. 
On the other hand, quite a few small doctors’ and mutual funds disappeared, either by shut-
ting down or by merging. With only a few exceptions, all the Maatschappijfondsen survived 
the restructuring and thinning.
Table V.3 Comparison of numbers of recognised health-insurance funds, the Netherlands, 1937-1942
 1937 1942
Association funds 84 77
Mutually administered funds 216 61
Corporate funds 62 37
Commercial funds 50 16
Doctors’ funds 214 ---
Other funds 22 13
Source: 1937: H.C. van der Hoeven, Om de macht bij het fonds, 168; 1942 : H.C. van der Hoeven, 
Ziekenfondsen en de Duitse bezetting, 52.
b/ Compulsory and voluntary insurance
The recognised and admitted funds had an enormous job ahead of them. First and foremost, 
they had to adapt their internal organisation to the new insurance structure. This meant 
thro wing together two separate administrations at record speed: one for the old existing 
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insurance − now called voluntary insurance − and one for the new compulsory insurance. 
With great care, separate books had to be kept of receipts and expenditures for both types of 
insurance. In addition, the administrations of the health-insurance funds mobilised as much 
of their resources and manpower as they could to entice as many compulsorily insured per-
sons as possible to join their fund. On top of that, these new members as well as the existing 
members had to be thoroughly informed of their rights and duties. The competitive battle 
was tempered slightly by the Ziekenfondsenbesluit, which forbade health-insurance funds from 
operating outside the municipality in which they were already active. This implied that the 
founding of new health-insurance funds was virtually impossible. This rule hit the alliance 
of Roman Catholic health-insurance funds particularly hard; in previous years the alliance 
had set up several new sections, especially in Brabant, Limburg and Utrecht, and not without 
success.108
Between 1 October and 31 December 1941, with the introduction of the Ziekenfondsen-
besluit, the number of persons insured by the health-insurance funds increased in one fell 
swoop by 1,236,800 members, or over 30%. Very large regional differences were recorded, 
however. Because many workers were already voluntarily insured and the income limit of NLG
3,750 kept the better-paid workers off the health-insurance fund rolls, membership growth in 
the Randstad (the urban agglomeration of Western Holland) was modest rather than drastic. 
In the province of Zuid-Holland, growth went no higher than 15%. On the other hand, 
in the northern provinces, where the number of fund members had traditionally been low, 
the growth fi gures for health-insurance funds were very strong, with Friesland going right 
through the roof. In this province the number of insured persons practically trebled. Now a 
total of almost 60% of the Dutch population was insured with a health-insurance fund. In 
the coming years, the number of compulsorily insured would increase even further when 
compulsory insurance expanded to include domestic help in 1942, and the unemployed 
starting 1 October 1944. Most of the premium for the unemployed was paid by the national 
government and the municipality.
Also striking was the large number of voluntarily insured. Apparently eager use was made of 
the option to sign up for a health-insurance fund on a voluntary basis if one was not eligible 
and one’s income was lower than NLG 3,000. The number of voluntarily insured − mostly 
civil servants, small-scale self-employed persons and retired persons − was about two million, 
or more than 20% or the total Dutch population. Diffi culties would soon arise with regard to 
voluntary insurance, however. By transferring the good risks (employees between 16 and 65 
years of age) to compulsory insurance, the fi nancial capacity for voluntary insurance quickly 
shrank. In addition, voluntary insurance exhibited a number of disadvantages in comparison 
with compulsory insurance: members had to pay a relatively high premium for a smaller 
standard package. Psychologically, a split occurred between employees on the one hand, with 
their compulsory insurance, and small-scale self-employed persons and farmers.
While most health-insurance funds were struggling with increasing fi nancial problems in 
the voluntary insurance branch, there were far fewer worries with compulsory insurance. 
First of all, a few important bad risks such as unemployed workers (until October 1944) and 
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retired workers were excluded and relegated to voluntary insurance. In addition, the govern-
ment, with the help of the CBS, had carefully calculated the costs per insured person when 
compulsory insurance was introduced. Expenses were estimated at sixteen guilders per insured 
person per year, with due allowance for a safety margin. It was also estimated that, for every 
directly insured person, there was an average of 1.5 indirectly insured persons. In addition, 
the average wage was estimated by the CBS at NLG 1,000. This provided an annual premium 
of NLG 40, or 4% per directly insured person. In accordance with the Second Implementation 
Decree, this premium was deposited in a central pot, the payment fund.
When the accounts for 1942, the fi rst full work year, were closed, it appeared that the 
expenditures per insured person had been rather overestimated: on average there were only 
1.1 indirectly insured persons for each directly insured person, and the expenditures per 
person were limited to NLG 13.90. The annual income was almost perfectly estimated, so 
that a premium of about 3% would have been suffi cient. This meant that, on balance, most 
health-insurance funds could begin building up a strong reserve.
Even during the war years that followed, the fi nancing of compulsory insurance did not 
suffer. The rising unemployment over the course of 1943, and especially 1944, did have a 
harmful effect on incomes. Over and against this, the pre-war fees set in the context of the 
policy of price control were not adjusted for the high wartime infl ation. In mid-1943  Van der 
Table V.4 Number of persons insured by health-insurance funds per province in the Netherlands, 
1941
Province 1 Oct. 1941 31 Dec. 1941 Increase
number in %
Groningen 88,677 214,511 125,834 142
Friesland 56,841 167,727 110,886 195
Drenthe 60,732 103,394 42,662 70
Overijssel 349,329 425,631 76,302 22
Gelderland 277,138 403,859 126,721 46
Utrecht 233,933 277,995 44,062 19
Noord-Holland 1,055,627 1,254,638 199,011 19
Zuid-Holland 1,269,708 1,457,427 187,719 15
Zeeland 68,257 126,081 57,824 85
Noord-Brabant 429,396 617,429 188,033 44
Limburg 130,856 208,602 77,746 59
National 4,020,494 5,257,294 1,236,800 31
Source : H.C. van der Hoeven, Ziekenfondsen en de Duitse bezetting, 54.
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Does even announced that the health-insurance funds could enrol up to 3,000 patients for 
every GP, so even in this respect an increase in doctors’ incomes was not possible. Although 
from a national standpoint the compulsory insurance sector appeared fi nancially sound, some 
health-insurance funds had disappointing results because the distribution mechanism for 
the overall premium was defective. The payment fund paid out the deposited premiums to 
each health-insurance fund on the basis of the number of insured members. However, this 
quite manageable criterion led to considerable distortion among the funds themselves. The 
government had overlooked the fact that, because of the heterogeneous composition of the 
various memberships, the costs could differ quite sharply from fund to fund. This continued 
to result in bickering and diffi culties. 
Table V.5 Costs of compulsory healthcare insurance per person in the Netherlands, 1942 
(in NLG)
Expenses:  
 1.  General practitioner care NLG 3.19 
 2.  Medicines and dressings  2.60
 3.  Specialist care  1.36
 4.  Dental care  0.96
 5.  Obstetric care  0.34
 6.  Hospital nursing care  3.21
 7.  External therapies  0.14
 8.  Prosthetic devices  0.24
 9.  Collection, administration and auditing costs  1.53
 10.  Reinsurance payment in the event of death  0.16
 11.  Sanatorium nursing  0.17
 12.  Other  0.05
  -----
Total expenses: NLG 13.95
Receipts:  
13. Article 49 Ziektewet NLG 0.03
14. Other receipts  0.02
  -----
Total receipts: NLG 0.05
Total (expenses – receipts) NLG 13.90 
Source: H.C. van der Hoeven, Ziekenfondsen en de Duitse bezetting, 98.
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4/ Doctors on the defence
While the health-insurance funds had their hands full getting their activities into shape in 
terms of quality and quantity, a fi erce legal battle arose concerning the monitoring of the 
Maatschappijfondsen. On 19 December 1941, Seyss-Inquart, Nazi Reichskommissar for the 
occupied Netherlands, issued a Doctors’ Ordinance by which the Dutch Medical Association 
was abolished and replaced by a new organisation along German lines − the Artsenkamer
(Physicians’ Chamber)  − which every Dutch doctor was required to join. Every doctor con-
nected to a health-insurance fund would automatically be part of the Nederlandse Vereniging 
van Ziekenfondsartsen (Netherlands Association of Health-insurance fund Doctors (NVVZA)), 
which would also take over NMG property. Both organisations were under the leadership of 
Croin of the Dutch national socialist movement, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, NSB.
These decisions could have important consequences for the Maatschappijfondsen. Croin, 
president of both the Artsenkamer and the NVVZA, tried to take control of the Maatschappijfond-
sen. Resistance against this action was organised by Medisch Contact (Medical Contact (MC)), 
a resistance organisation set up by a small group of doctors in August 1941. From within the 
resistance a struggle arose to combat the interference of the occupying power and National-
Socialist organisations like the Medical Front. For its resistance work Medisch Contact quickly 
gained the co-operation of the vast majority of the approximately 6,500 Dutch doctors. In 
reaction to a possible takeover of the Maatschappijfondsen, Medisch Contact threatened to al-
low the funds to empty out, even if this meant transferring members to the mutual funds. 
To counter this unexpected manoeuvre, the government issued the Stopcirculaire (Cessation 
Circular), which offered insured persons the opportunity to change health-insurance funds 
unless they were moving outside their working area. This measure eliminated all mutual 
competition among the health-insurance funds for the rest of the war.
On 25 March 1942, Van den Berg was dismissed as commissioner. He was accused of not 
having been loyal to the Ziekenfondsenbesluit, of impeding the work of the NVVZA and of 
having shown disloyalty to the ANOZ health-insurance fund.109 Actually, neither this association 
nor the Artsenkamer had been very successful. Of the 6,500 doctors, no more than 1,600 had 
fi lled in the registration form for the Artsenkamer in 1942. Included were 700 Jewish doc-
tors who had decided to register out of fear of additional risks and on the advice of Medisch 
Contact. Van den Berg was succeeded by L.P. van der Does, chairman of the Hengelo Labour 
Board, who had been promised by the occupying power that the NVVZA would not be al-
lowed to take over the Maatschappijfondsen. So the struggle over the Maatschappijfondsen was 
fi nally decided to the advantage of Medisch Contact. The former Maatschappijfondsen would 
become independent and would be given corporate rights. The goods, rights and duties of 
the former Maatschappijfondsen would be transferred to the new funds. In the end, however, 
all this came to naught.
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5/ New restructuring plans
The uncertainty surrounding the property of the Maatschappijfondsen and the inadequate 
preparations made for the introduction of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit resulted in a lack of clear 
leadership and administrative chaos, especially among the smaller funds. This was despite the 
fact that almost seventy health-insurance funds (mostly Maatschappijfonds) had entrusted their 
administration to CAVINED,Centrale Administratie Verzekeringsinstellingen in Nederland (the Central 
Administration of Insurance Agencies in the Netherlands) . Moreover, the implementation of 
the Ziekenfondsenbesluit occurred in an extremely fragmented fashion across both large and 
numerous small health-insurance funds, despite the liquidation of hundreds of funds in late 
1942. No less than 51 (or one-quarter of the funds) had less than 10,000 members, and nine 
funds even had less than 2,000. As a result of government pressure, both mild and harsh, a few 
limited mergers took place over the following months, so the number of health-insurance 
funds dropped from 204 in early 1942 to 190 by the end of 1943. 
Soon after his appointment, Van der Does proposed a thorough restructuring of the health-
insurance fund system. According to this plan, a concentration of health-insurance funds 
would greatly improve both administrative effi ciency and the funds’ cost structure. Indeed, 
the costs for administration, collection and auditing in 1942 accounted for more than 11% 
of all expenditures − higher than the expenditures for specialist help or dental care, obstetric 
care and prosthetic devices combined. In the plans proposed by Van der Does there was still 
room for 33 regional health-insurance funds, a maximum of ten larger corporate funds, a State 
health-insurance fund and a fund for bargemen. One striking feature was that the regional 
health-insurance funds would be under the leadership of directors who were public offi cials 
and were advised by a Council of Assistance. Van der Does’s proposals collided head-on 
with the interests of the existing health-insurance funds and the medical men, who feared 
paternalistic treatment by the government. So passive and active resistance on the part of the 
health-insurance funds, Medisch Contact and even Croin with his Artsenkamer was not long in 
coming. Van der Does’s regionalisation and centralisation plans soon faded away, as so many 
other proposals had since the beginning of the century. 
In 1943, the Nederlands Arbeidsfront (Netherlands Labour Front (NAF)) also felt called to 
launch concentration plans for the health-insurance fund system. The NAF proposed entrus-
ting the implementation of the Ziektewet and the Ziekenfondsenbesluit to a Labour Council, 
over which it gradually had taken control in several places. The NAF proposals included the 
elimination of the industrial insurance boards, which had been in control of implementing the 
Ziektewet for the most part since 1930. As in Germany, the role of the Nederlandse Vereeniging 
van Ziekenfondsartsen would be limited to that of offi cial contact partner of the health-insurance 
funds and to the organisation charged with paying doctors’ fees. Although these ideas were 
supported by the occupying power, whose aim was to create one implementation organ per 
region, nothing came of them, either. In 1943 Van der Does appointed a commission that 
included representatives of the health-insurance funds and was charged with perfecting the 
Ziekenfondsenbesluit, but it, too, produced no results. The commission members among the 
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leadership of the Maatschappijfondsen did make it clear, however, that they were completely 
opposed to the plan of linking of the Ziektewet to the Ziekenfondsenbesluit.
The commission had no further meetings and the discussions of reforming the health-
insurance fund system fell silent. As the fortunes of war turned against Germany, the prio-
rities of the occupying power came to be focused more on the military organisation and on 
keeping the war economy going than on social reforms − which, moreover, kept arousing 
resistance within the powerful physicians’ lobby. It is striking to note that during the entire 
war, when clashes occurred with NSB member Croin and his organisations, the occupying 
power usually took the wishes of Medisch Contact, the doctors’ resistance organisation, seriously 
into account. Direct confrontations between the occupying power and Medisch Contact were 
rare and usually ended in a compromises acceptable to both parties. The German occupying 
power was apparently aware that the doctors formed a well-organised and easily mobilised 
group which the offi cial Medical Front could hardly touch.
4. The end of the war: forward or back?
During the course of 1944, the approaching defeat of Germany became increasingly appa-
rent. Both health-insurance funds and doctors had already started making preparations for 
the post-war period. Now the crucial question was whether the German Ziekenfondsenbesluit
would remain in place or be suspended or even abolished as a German intervention. For the 
time being the answer was unclear: the employers wanted to retain the Ziekenfondsenbesluit
while the doctors and health-insurance funds appealed for a return to the pre-war voluntary 
insurance.110
The partial liberation of the country in the autumn of 1944 created a confusing situation. 
In the liberated area, some employers refused to continue contributing their share to pay 
for insurance premiums. After the liberation of the south, the Dutch government quickly 
called in former commissioner Van den Berg to rebuild and monitor the health-insurance 
fund system. Despite the diffi cult circumstances, he was able to bring a degree of structure 
and co-ordination to the system. This included the compulsory fi nancing of the premiums 
through the issuing of health-insurance fund coupons.  While the south of the Netherlands 
was free to rack its brains over these luxury problems, the rest of the Netherlands was plunged 
into a hard Hunger Winter and months of hopeless deprivation, which fi nally came to an 
end with the German capitulation in May 1945.
Summary
Despite the disruption of the economy and the rising unemployment throughout the war, 
Minister Treub submitted a bill in 1915 − to no avail − that attempted to link the disburse-
ment of sick pay with medical treatment. In line with Treub, Aalberse introduced a bill 
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− also in vain − for compulsory insurance for sick pay and medical costs. In 1929 Minister 
Slotemaker de Bruïne fi nally gained approval for a compulsory Ziektewet. The compulsory 
insurance for medical costs would have to wait until 1941, despite several bills during the 
interbellum period. One thread running through all the proposals was that the government 
continued to assume a reluctant attitude towards direct fi nancial support, in contrast to the 
situation in Belgium.
Due to the absence of health-insurance fund legislation there was no strict regulation 
prescribing the minimum contents of the insurance package. Each health-insurance fund 
put together a package of its own. Consultative bodies were formed in the cities, however, 
between the health-insurance funds and the organised medical establishment. These bodies 
laid down the premiums, benefi ts and other conditions for the city, thereby restricting the 
competition between the funds. The main benefi ts were general practitioner care by sub-
scription and the dispensing of medicines. Dental and nursing care were supplementary, and 
cover for specialist care continued to expand.
The number of members of the health-insurance funds continued to rise during the 
interbellum period. In 1941, 45.6% of the population were members of a fund, while only 
27.9% had been members in 1926. This increase was caused by the rise in the standard of 
living and by sectoral shifts, together with increasing urbanisation. The number of health-
insurance funds stabilised during the interbellum period. Despite the stabilisation of the total 
number, new funds were established. In 1936, the membership of the Maatschappijfondsen 
represented one-third of all health-insurance fund members. Unlike Belgium − and especially 
Germany − it was impossible for the Dutch funds to take a strong negotiating position with 
regard to the doctors. Because of the position of the Maatschappijfondsen, the Dutch health-
insurance funds were not able to negotiate with the government or the medical association 
as a single bloc. In contrast with Belgium and Germany, the mutually administered funds in 
the Netherlands comprised only about one-quarter of the total number of members. This 
group, moreover, was very heterogeneous, which led to increasing criticism and to propos-
als of co-operation from the trade unions. Commercial and factory funds represented 15 to 
20% of the insured.
The outbreak of the Second World War led to the sudden realisation of the Ziekenfond-
senbesluit. Each employee with an income of up to NLG 3,000 − and his family − had to be 
compulsorily insured with an offi cially recognised health-insurance fund. This caused an 
increase in the number of insured persons to approximately 60% of the population. The 
premium was to be paid in equal parts by employee and employer. Besides the compulsorily 
insured, another 20% of the Dutch population joined voluntary health-insurance funds. 
The introduction of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit led to a considerable increase in scale: while the 
number of members skyrocketed, the recognition procedure reduced the number of funds 
to almost one-third the pre-war amount.
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Chapter VI
GROWTH AND ITS LIMITS, 1945-2000
1. Germany
a. Peace and reconstruction
In many respects, May 1945 was Stunde Null for Germany. The whole country was occupied 
and was politically, economically and morally in ruins. The occupying powers divided Germany 
into four zones (Soviet Union, Great Britain, United States and France). Agreements relating 
to the occupation had already been made before the end of the war, and were elaborated 
during the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam in February and July-August 1945. Each zone 
was governed by a commander-in-chief who held absolute and independent authority.1
Despite the partition into zones, the express objective was that Germany would one day be 
governed as a single country again. 
In practice, the principle of joint government was not achieved. Each zone had its own 
approach to economic reconstruction and political structure. Under military governor Clay, 
economic revival in the American zone began as early as the winter of 1945-1946. Clay 
appointed Germans to all levels of the administration.2 During this period, relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated very rapidly. 
The Americans were working towards the full economic recovery of Germany. Real reco-
very would not be possible unless the economic frontiers between the zones were removed. 
The Americans repeatedly proposed the integration of zones to the other Allies. Only the 
British agreed to the proposal. On 1 January 1947, the American and British zones were 
merged into a single economic entity: Bizonia.3 In addition to the unfavourable economic 
circumstances, Soviet activity in Eastern Europe and the fear of communism (Truman 
Doctrine) were further reasons for America’s foreign policy towards Germany. The German 
economy had to be rapidly reconstructed so that Germany could play its part in defending 
the West. The Americans incorporated German economic reconstruction in their large-scale 
recovery programme for Europe: the Marshall Plan. The East European countries were also 
asked to participate in the plan, but the Soviet Union rejected this form of aid and the Soviet 
zone was consequently excluded from the programme. This heralded the beginning of an 
economic – and later political – division in Europe that was to last for decades.
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On 12 May 1949, the Allies approved the Constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany 
(BRD). On 7 September 1949, the Bundestag sat for the fi rst time.4 Theodor Heuss was elected 
fi rst president and Konrad Adenauer became the fi rst chancellor of the new German nation. 
Under his strict, long leadership, Germany underwent a complete transformation. Harmo-
nious labour relations led in 1949 to the soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy), a 
combination of economic liberalism and welfare state. The Wirschaftswunder that followed, 
a sensational economic miracle, was a period of unprecedented growth that lasted from 
approximately 1950 until well into the 1960s. This economic prosperity provided a solid 
foundation for the development of the nascent West-German democracy.5
b. Health-insurance funds – back in their old form, 1945-1955
The Second World War and subsequent occupation by the Allies dealt a heavy blow to the 
health-insurance funds in Germany. The collapse of the Third Reich brought an end to the 
social insurance system that the Nazis had centralised. It also brought an end to a number 
of Nazi institutions such as the Reichs insurance apparatus and fund, and the Reichs labour 
Competition between the Ersatzkassen and the Ortskrankenkassen, 1930-2000
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ministry. The collapse had serious fi nancial consequences for the health-insurance funds. 
The insurers lost all the reserves that they had been forced to hand over to the government. 
Moreover, the government bonds in which the law obliged them to invest a large share of 
their reserves were now totally worthless. The combined losses of the health-insurance funds 
amounted to more than 14.5 billion Reichs marks.6 For the health-insurance funds too, 1945 
was literally Stunde Null.
There were few changes to the social insurance system in the post-war years. This was cer-
tainly due in part to socio-economic conditions in 1945. The high demand for the provision 
of medical care to war victims and the weakened population forced the rapid re-establishment 
of health-insurance funds at a local level.7 In the period 1945-1949, the socialists appealed to 
the Allies to set up a strong, centrally organised insurance system. Above all, they sought the 
elimination of the Sonderkassen (occupation-related funds), in casu the Ersatzkassen (substitution 
funds) and the Betriebskassen (company funds). The social status and income of the members 
of these funds were, on average, higher than those of the Ortskrankenkassen (local health-
insurance funds) and the Innungskassen (guild health funds), the traditional health-insurance 
funds that were closer to the labour movement. The higher premiums of the Sonderkassen
meant that they were able to offer more facilities of a higher standard than the other funds, 
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particularly the Ortskrankenkassen. The socialists also wanted the health-insurance funds to 
be run exclusively by employees,8 a demand that was directly opposed to the traditional 
management structure of the health-insurance funds, particularly the company funds. 
Eventually, in 1949, a coalition of CDU, CSU and FDP decided that compulsory health insu-
rance would be restored in virtually the same branched structure as in the pre-war years, i.e. 
before the reforms of the Hitler regime. The socialist ideas about a social solidarity insurance 
were rejected out of hand and the Sonderkassen survived. A small but not unimportant change 
was introduced with regard to premiums. Employer and employee were now required to pay 
an equal share of the insurance premium, whereas the ratio had previously been two-thirds 
to one-third. This review of premiums had far-reaching consequences for the management 
of German health-insurance funds. Seats on the elected management boards were divided 
equally between employees and employers. The only exception to this paritary representation 
was the Knappschaften, the centuries-old mineworkers’ funds in which employees formed 
two-thirds of the board. Premiums were based on salary and deducted before tax for direct 
payment to the insurance funds. The premium for each employee was set as a percentage. In 
1949 this was 6% of the gross salary. Wage deductions applied to all members, whatever their 
age, sex or individual health risks.
The defi nitive restoration of the basic structure of the pre-1933 constitutional state took 
place after the introduction in the BRD of the Gesetz über die Selbstverwaltung und über Änderungen 
von Vorschriften auf dem Gebiete der Sozialversicherung of 22 February 1951. Equally important 
for the organisation of health insurance was the Gesetz über die Verbände der gesetzlichen Krank-
enkassen und Ersatzkassen of 17 August 1955 and the Gesetz über Kassenarztrecht (GKAR) of 17 
August 1955. In many respects, these pieces of legislation built on the pre-1933 structure.9
In post-war Germany, the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (statutory health-insurance system 
(GKV)) grew slowly but surely. Over the next 25 years, continual changes were made to en-
sure that the GKV system, which dated from 1883, kept pace with the rapid changes in social 
relationships.10 However, no radical changes were introduced until after 1980. The German 
health-insurance system continued to be based on the fundamental principles of solidarity 
and subsidiarity. It was the responsibility of every person to guarantee a reasonable standard 
of living for their fellow citizens in need. In terms of healthcare, this principle could be trans-
lated into a shared insurance risk. Solidarity also meant that insurance premiums increased 
in absolute terms in proportion to income.11
c. A two-tier insurance system
1/ The good old GKV
a/ More and more members …
After the Second World War, the health-insurance funds continued to be the unchallenged 
providers of health insurance in Germany. The vast majority (approx. 90%) of the popula-
tion of West Germany (Germany after 1990) were insured for sickness benefi t and medical 
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costs via the compulsory health-insurance system. The GKV funds were service providers, and 
were independent organisations, fi nancially and otherwise. The elected board of management 
determined the premiums for the fund. The members of the GKV funds could be placed in 
three categories, namely those for whom membership of a particular fund was compulsory 
(e.g. Knappschaftkasse), those who were free to choose between various health-insurance funds, 
and members who voluntarily chose to join a GKV fund rather than a private fund. 
All employees and retired persons with an income below a statutory income threshold, 
which was determined every year, were required to take out compulsory health insurance. 
In 1949, the income threshold was DM 4,500 per year. In 2001, the threshold was set at DM
78,300 (EUR 40,034).12 However, persons whose income exceeded the threshold for com-
pulsory health insurance were not automatically excluded from GKV funds. All employees 
with an income above the threshold, as well as the self-employed, had a choice: they could 
join a compulsory health-insurance fund, take out private insurance, or choose not to take 
out any insurance. In 1995, 100,000 residents in Germany were uninsured.13 Persons op-
ting for voluntary insurance through a compulsory health-insurance fund had to register 
within three months of exceeding the income threshold or commencing a new job.14 Later, 
in the context of reinforcing the solidarity principle, the law of 1989 imposed restrictions 
on voluntary membership of the GKV. Insured persons who had opted for private insurance 
Table VI.1 Membership (x 1,000) of the GKV system, 1950-2000 (excluding the former East Ger-
many)
Year Total membership Compulsory  Retirees Voluntary
  members  members 
    
1950 20,443 13,245 4,734 2,464
1955 24,535 15,448 6,205 2,882
1960 27,060 17,655 5,504 3,901
1965 28,740 17,201 5,884 3,655
1970 30,646 17,839 8,009 4,799
1975 33,493 19,137 9,632 4,725
1980 35,340 20,638 10,248 4,454
1985 36,209 21,106 10,623 4,480
1990 37,705 22,269 10,982 4,454
1995 40,475 23,743 11,708 5,023
1997 40,652 23,382 11,806 5,464
2000 41,187 *) *) *)
*): not known
Source: D. Leopold, Die Geschichte der sozialen Versicherung. For 2000: information from G. Merkens, 
Regional Director, AOK-Aachen.
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were not allowed to return to voluntary GKV membership unless their income fell below 
the threshold.15 In 1990, approximately 4.4 million insured persons were voluntarily insured 
with the GKV.16
(Source: DAK infodienst)
Reunifi cation brought new opportunities for the Krankenkasse in East Berlin
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The membership base of the compulsory health-insurance funds continued to increase: 
between 1950 and 1975 (GKV) it rose from 20.4 million to 33.5 million. By 1990 it had in-
creased further to 37.7 million.17 By the end of the century it had reached 38.2 million for 
West Germany and 9.9 million for former East Germany. The GKV system provided family 
insurance. This meant that the insured person’s spouse and children under the age of 18 were 
automatically insured too, provided their earnings were below the minimum (DM 610 per 
month in 1997 for West Germany and DM 529 per month for the former East Germany). The 
membership base of GKV funds represented a large proportion of the total number of insured 
persons. In 1975, more than 55.5 million Germans were insured for medical costs via the 
GKV system. Thereafter, a period of stabilisation followed for the fi rst time since the system 
was introduced in 1883. In 1980 and 1990, 55.9 and 55.8 million members respectively were 
insured via the GKV. Ten years later, this fi gure had increased to 71.3 million. Of this number, 
58.9 million lived in West Germany and 12.4 million in the former East Germany.18
The increase in GKV fund membership up to 1975 was largely due to the classic factors 
of demographic growth and an increasing working population, in particular the number of 
employed persons. After 1975, the birth rate began to decline. Legislative changes also played 
a role. The Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung der Landwirte (Legislation relating to health 
insurance for those employed in the agriculture sector) of 10 August 1972 resulted in a sig-
nifi cant expansion in the proportion of the population covered by insurance. Following the 
introduction of health insurance for independent farmers, 1,230,000 agricultural workers and 
1,200,000 family members joined the GKV system.19 This led to the establishment of nineteen 
landwirtschaftliche Krankenkassen (agricultural health-insurance funds)  which co-operated at a 
national level with the existing Landkrankenkassen. A further increase in GKV members resulted 
from the introduction of the Gesetz über die Sozialversicherung Behinderte (Social Security act 
for handicapped persons) of 7 May 1975, the Gesetz über die Krankenversicherung der Studenten
(Health-insurance act for students)  of 24 June 1975, and the inclusion in 1977 of handicapped 
persons employed in sheltered workshops, and in 1981 of artists, writers and journalists.
The reunifi cation of Germany was also a caesura in the 100-year history of the GKV
system, and was also refl ected in the number of members. On 1 January 1991, the tiered 
health-insurance system of West Germany was extended to the fi ve new Bundesländern. As a 
result, the East German state insurance system was abolished. This was compensated partly 
by the establishment of new funds, as with Ortskrankenkassen and Innungskassen, and partly 
by the existing West German health-insurance funds extending their activities to the former 
East Germany.20 The following new funds were set up: Wirtschaftlichen Krankenkassen Berlin 
und Sachsen, 54 Betriebskassen, 36 Innungskrankenkassen and 12 Ortskrankenkassen, while the 
Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Berlin extended its activities over the former East Berlin.21 As in 
the old Bundesländer, it was not long before more than 90% of the East German population 
were insured via the GKV system.22
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b/ …in fewer and fewer funds...
The current GKV system consists of a large number of independent health-insurance funds, 
which fall into two categories: standard funds and Ersatzkassen (substitution funds). The fi rst 
group insures approximately 60% of the population and consists of the local and district funds, 
factory and company funds, and funds for specifi c groups of employees (e.g. mineworkers, 
farmers, seamen). Substitution funds have evolved out of the former mutual relief funds and 
are usually organised at national level. They insure approximately 35% of the population, 
mainly civil servants.23
In 1950, the membership was distributed among 1,996 health-insurance funds, which from 
1955 were grouped into Landesverbände in each Land. The Landesverbände in turn formed 
a Bundesverband. The Verbände, which were public bodies, were answerable to the highest 
decision-making bodies of the Länder, while the Bundesverbände came under the Bundesmi-
nister for Labour and Social Planning. In the period 1950-1990, the distribution of members 
among the different funds changed radically. In 1950, the Ortskrankenkassen (oKK) had almost 
fourteen million members, or nearly 70% of the total number of persons insured via the GKV
system. The Betriebskassen (BKK) had 2,300,000 members (11%), the Innungskrankenkassen (IKK)
Table VI.2 Persons insured via the GKV system (x 1,000), by main type of health-insurance fund, and 
the number of funds, 1950-2000 (excl. former East Germany)
Year OKK BKK IKK Angestellten
Ersatzkassen
No. of health- 
insurance funds
1950 13,838 2,300 398 1,764 1,996
1955 16,143 2,960 660 3,071 2,070
1960 15,433 3,600 936 4,909 2,028
1965 15,442 3,874 1,244 6,082 1,972
1970 15,990 4,172 1,403 7,068 1,827
1975 16,138 4,256 1,587 9,064 1,465
1980 16,495 4,287 1,824 10,395 1,319
1985 18,207 4,187 1,913 11,547 1,215
1990 16,349 4,393 1,958 12,635 1,149
1995 16,686 4,548 2,232 14,585 876
2000 15,579 6,291 2,478 14,535 499*)
*): in 1997
Source: D. Leopold, Die Geschichte der sozialen Versicherung. For 2000: information from G. Merkens, 
Regional Director, AOK-Aachen.
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had only 398,000 members (2%), and approximately 1,760,000 persons (almost 19%) were 
insured via the Angestellten Ersatzkassen (funds for employees). The remainder were distributed 
among specifi c occupation-related funds.24
More than a quarter of a century later, the market shares of the various groups had changed 
drastically. In 1978, the 34,500,000 members of the GKV system were distributed among 1,359 
funds. In the world of health insurance, the scaling-up of activities had clearly not been a hollow 
concept: only two-thirds of the funds from 1950 were still active in 1978: 281 Ortskrankenkassen
(47.3% of members), 885 Betriebskassen (12%), 157 Innungskassen (5.1%), 19 Landwirtschaft-
liche Krankenkassen (2.3%), 8 Arbeiter Ersatzkassen (1.15%), 7 Angestellten Ersatzkassen (28.5%), 
the Seekrankenkasse (0.2%) and the Knappschaftliche Kasse (3%). The combined membership 
comprised 58% employee-members and almost 29% retirees. In addition 13% (4,460,000 
members) were insured voluntarily. The majority of this number (2,800,000) were insured 
via an Angestellten Ersatzkasse. In 1978, the number of co-insured family members was still 
above 25 million. The Angestellten Ersatzkassen alone insured 9,800,000 employees plus more 
than six million family members.25 In recent decades, the shifts have been less marked than 
during the period 1950-1975. The Ersatzkassen were able to increase their share to 35% by 
the year 2000, largely at the expense of the Ortskrankenkassen (37.8%) and to a lesser extent 
the Betriebskassen (15.3%). Between 1950 and 2000, membership of the Ortskrankenkassen
increased in absolute terms by only 13%, while that of the Betriebskassen almost trebled, that 
of the Innungskrankenkassen (6%) increased six-fold, and that of the Angestellten Ersatzkassen
increased more than eight-fold.26
Table VI.3 GKV members in the new states (the former East Germany) by type of health-insurance 
fund, and the number of funds, 1991-2000




1991 7,032 861 260 2,762 187
1992 6,702 860 425 2,914 201
1993 6,333 815 542 2,997 217
1994 6,035 775 628 3,077 214
1995 5,540 672 678 2,874 208
1996 5,330 631 733 3,019 197
1997 5,034 635 768 3,184 180
2000 4,502 907 805 3,206 164*)
*): in 1998. 
Source: D. Leopold, Die Geschichte der sozialen Versicherung. For 2000: information from G. Merkens, 
Regional Director, AOK-Aachen.
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In the former East Germany, the market shares of the various types of health insurance-
fund were comparable to that in West Germany. The Ortskrankenkassen insured 45.4% of the 
population, and were therefore ahead of the fi eld. However, after a promising start in 1991, 
membership of this type of fund fell by more than one-third in the following decade. This was 
largely due to the rapid growth of the Innungskrankenkassen, which insured 9% of members 
in the year 2000. In the period 1991-2001 membership of this type of fund has increased 
threefold. The Betriebskassen (9%) and Angestellten Ersatzkassen (32%) also grew rapidly.
Table VI.4 GKV membership in the new states (the former East Germany), 1991-2000
Year Membership Compulsory  Retirees Voluntary
  members  members 
   
1991 11,385 7,844 3,045 495
1992 11,360 7,790 3,066 511
1993 11,119 7,393 3,097 629
1994 10,940 7,025 3,213 702
1995 10,179 6,360 3,175 643
1996 10,130 6,192 3,286 661
1997 10,096 6,098 3,348 649
2000 9,913 *) *) *)
*): not known
Source: D. Leopold, Die Geschichte der sozialen Versicherung, 1999. For 2000: information of G. Merkens, 
Regional Director, AOK-Aachen.
More than a century after the introduction of compulsory health insurance, the German 
health-insurance funds form a very stable but still heterogeneous landscape. They remain 
in the traditional categories that existed in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In 
addition to very large Angestellten-, Ersatz- and Ortskrankenkassen, there are still hundreds of 
relatively small Betriebskassen.
c/ …..through continual scaling-up of activities
During the 1980s, there were repeated calls for reforms to the health-insurance system. In 
addition to economic reasons – namely increased scale, cost reduction and increased effi ciency 
– the restructuring proposals were based on purely internal problems. The Ortskrankenkassen
in particular pressurised the government to put an end to the vast differences in premiums for 
the different types of health insurance. The Ortskrankenkassen felt very disadvantaged by the 
allocation system, because the general Ortskrankenkassen in particular served as ‘catch-alls’ for 
high-risk groups.27 The vast majority of retirees, with their low premiums and high costs, were 
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Handbook for persons insured with the Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse, ±1950
(Source: DAK infodienst)
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allocated to the Ortskrankenkassen. In order to balance their budget, the funds had to restrict 
their service offering to the standard insurance package. On the other hand, the Angestellten 
Ersatzkassen and Betriebskassen – which were open only to the employees of the company 
in question – could count on premiums from employees with an above-average salary and 
a good risk profi le. Moreover, many Betriebskrankenkassen received direct or indirect support 
(e.g. administration costs) from the company. This enabled them to keep their premiums to 
a minimum while offering a full range of services. 
The complaints from the Ortskrankenkassen increased as a result of a wave of new Betriebs-
krankenkassen that were created in the 1980s. In the space of just a few years, the Ortskrank-
enkassen lost an estimated eighty thousand members due to the new Betriebskrankenkassen.
The wide variations in premiums were a threat to the principle of solidarity, such that the 
Bundesminister für soziale Sicherheit (Labour and Social Planning) even considered a temporary 
prohibition on the creation of new Betriebskrankenkassen.28
The series of reforms introduced in the German healthcare system from 1988 onwards 
led to signifi cant increases in scale. This was partly the result of merging the numerous Orts-
krankenkassen to form, in principle, a single Ortskrankenkasse for each state, thereby reducing 
the number of Ortskrankenkassen from 268 in 1989 to only 12 in 1998. The creation of 
Betriebskrankenkassen was more strictly regulated. Existing Betriebskrankenkassen were allowed 
to continue operating only in companies with at least 1,000 (instead of 450) compulsorily 
insured employees. As a result of this measure, these funds decreased in number from 693 
to 362 in 1998. The number of company funds, which had insured more than 30% of all 
insured persons before the First World War, was reduced to one-third by the end of the 
century. The number of Innungskassen also fell spectacularly from 159 to 29 as a result of the 
same compulsory scale changes. This was largely the result of mergers, which meant that the 
combined membership remained more or less the same. Although the reformers had them 
fi rmly in their sights, the number of active Ersatzkassen remained stable – they were already 
large-scale before the reforms. They had profi ted signifi cantly from the continuing growth 
in the tertiary sector and the service economy on the one hand, and the reunifi cation of 
East and West Germany on the other hand. In addition to the four main groups, the specifi c 
funds for seamen, mineworkers and agricultural workers continued to exist. This group was 
partly the result of merging the numerous Ortskrankenkassen to form, in principle, a single 
OKK for each state.29
2/ The private insurers
Approximately one-tenth of persons in Germany with health insurance were insured with the 
Privater Krankenversicherung (private insurance (PKV)) . In the mid-1970s, the private insurance 
companies had 6,200,000 insured persons (10.2% of the total number of insured persons) 
distributed among 37 companies (1977).30 Their membership base included those in the pro-
fessions (e.g. doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, notaries, architects, accountants and tax consultants), 
the self-employed, employees above the income threshold, civil servants and people not in the 
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workforce. In addition, those with an income between the new and old threshold (retirees, 
students and farmers) had the opportunity to opt out of compulsory insurance.31
Much of the revenue of private insurers was generated through Zusatzversicherungen (sup-
plementary insurance). There were two types of supplementary insurance: continuous and 
single-premium. Examples of the fi rst type are supplementary life insurance, or insurance to 
cover additional hospital costs (e.g. for a private room or special medical treatment). Single-
premium insurance policies are usually purchased to cover medical costs while travelling 
abroad.32 In this way, the insurers reached 13% of the population through insurance that is 
either wholly or partly private.33 In the spring of 1995, 8.1% of persons insured via the GKV
system had private supplementary insurance.34
In the second half of the 1990s, more and more people took out private health insurance. 
This growth took place primarily in full health insurance, but the supplementary sector also 
recorded positive results. This growth was due to the following factors: increasing premiums, 
the reduction in benefi ts paid out by the insurers, imposed by the Gesundheits-Reformgesetz 
(Healthcare Reform Act) of 1989 and the Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz (Healthcare Structure 
Act) of 1993, and fi nally the extension of the customer base into the new Länder.35 The 
health reforms introduced in 1989 restricted the possibilities for professionals and the self-
employed to join the GKV system. Only those who were already insured in this way (e.g. 
an employee who set up his own company) were allowed to remain members. As a result, 
the aforementioned occupational groups are now mainly insured with private insurers. The 
competition between GKV and PKV with regard to acquiring new members is restricted, and 
geared mainly to people whose income is above the threshold.
The legal relationship between the insurers and insured persons was almost fully laid down
in the Allgemeinen Versicherungsbedingungen (General Conditions of Insurance (AVB)) . The AVB
comprised three sections: fi rst, the main conditions for private insurance according to the type 
of insurance (these determined the minimum conditions and applied to all private insurance 
companies), second the tariff conditions and, third, the tariffs.36
In contrast to the income-related premiums for compulsory insurance, the premiums for 
private insurance were calculated on a Wagnisgerecht (risk-justifi ed)  basis for every insured 
person according to the principle of equality. This meant that, over the total term of the 
insurance, the sum of all contributions and all care provided (including the set-up and ad-
ministration costs of the insurance), had to be the same for every group with similar risks. 
The contribution of the PKV was therefore, in principle, based on individual health risks. 
Premiums depended on pricing, the insured person’s age when the insurance commenced, 
and the sex of the insured person. In addition to the premium, a savings element was also 
deducted to allow for the fact that health risks increase with age.37
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d. Doctors and health-insurance funds: sometimes united, sometimes divided
The Gesetz über Kassenarztrecht (GKAR) of 17 August 1955 also retained the foundations of the 
pre-1933 system and introduced only a small number of changes. However, the seven national 
heath-insurance organisations were confronted with a new, decentralised organisation of 
doctors. In 1945, the Kassenärtzliche Vereinigung Deutschlands (German association of insurance-
fund physicians (KVD)) ceased to exist. Since 1932, it had been the only negotiating partner 
for contracts in the ambulatory sector with the health-insurance funds. Instead, the regional 
branches of the Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung became the doctors’ offi cial representatives. 
The eighteen associations of insurance-fund doctors together formed the Kassenärztliche 
Bundesvereinigung (Federal Association of Social Health Insurance Physicians (KBV)).38
1/ Modernisation of the fee system
The Kopfpauschale (capitation-fee) system, introduced in 1931, was raised for discussion in the 
Federal Republic. Doctors were not paid according to the treatment they provided. Instead, 
the insurance funds in each district paid a fi xed annual sum per member to the recognised 
doctors’ association, which then allocated the sum to its doctors according to its own criteria. 
The fi xed sum, which was based on the basic income of employees in the region, was ne-
gotiated every year by the health-insurance fund and doctors’ association of the district, and 
set down in a contract. This remuneration method worked very well in the pre-war period. 
After 1945, the number and technical nature of various types of medical procedure increased 
sharply. However, this development was not refl ected in doctors’ salaries. On the contrary, 
war infl ation and post-war monetary depreciation drastically reduced the purchasing power 
of the doctors’ income.39
As a result of these developments, there was a considerable gap between the annual remu-
neration, which had been fi xed since 1931, and wages and prices in post-war Germany. This 
could have been avoided if, in 1931, the fi xed annual remuneration had been expressed as a 
percentage of the Grundlohnsumme (basic income), in which case the doctors’ salaries would 
have refl ected the nominal wage increase. The discrepancy between the total remuneration 
paid to doctors and the services they provided became so large that a radical adjustment 
became inevitable. The doctors attempted in all sorts of ways to put pressure on the GKV
health-insurance funds. They sought the support of public opinion to publicise the fact that 
they were underpaid and their poor fi nancial status. An important point that lent strength 
to their argument was the comparison between the Gesetzliche Kassen (compulsory funds) 
and the Ersatzkassen (substitution funds). The special statutes of the Ersatzkassen provided for 
the payment of doctors according to the treatment they provided. Persons insured with the 
Gesetzliche Krankenkassen (GKK) were worried that they received a lower standard of medical 
care than the members of the Ersatzkassen. Some doctors exploited this by setting up separate 
waiting rooms for patients who were members of the Ersatzkassen.40
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2/ Gesetz über Kassenarztrecht (The Contracted Physicians’ Rights Act), 1955
In order to ease the tense situation, the legislation of 17 August 1955 reformulated the rela-
tionship between doctors and the health-insurance funds, although the legislation formally 
retained the basic principles of 1931, i.e. a contractual relationship and payment by the 
health-insurance funds of a total fee to the doctors’ associations. In 1931, the health-insurance 
funds and doctors’ organisations also worked on the basis of the budget available for medical 
treatment in a defi ned period, and calculated the level of remuneration on that basis. This 
method did not take account of the changes in the number or nature of services provided. 
The system of 1955, on the other hand, incorporated a double dynamisation whereby the 
annual remuneration to doctors increased not only in proportion to the number of services 
provided, but also in proportion to Grundlohnsumme. In addition, the legislation granted 
insurance-fund doctors the exclusive right to treat national-health patients. Under the new 
remuneration system, there was no effective brake to prevent abuse of this monopoly posi-
tion and keep the number of procedures/consultations within reasonable fi nancial limits. 
Furthermore, a ruling of 23 March 1960 (Kassenarzturteil) by the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(Federal Constitutional Court), declared that a compulsory limit on the number of consul-
tations was in contravention of the law. As a result, the number of doctors and procedures 
increased alarmingly.41
3/ The transition from capitation fees to per-procedure fees 
At the end of the 1950s, despite the government’s unsuccessful attempts at reform, the Be-
triebskrankenkassen (company health-insurance funds) in particular attempted to shift from 
the Kopfpauschale (capitation-fee) system to a remuneration system based on per-procedure 
fees. This resulted in a more direct link between the care provided by the doctors and the 
fees they received. At the beginning of the 1960s, the fi rst Ortskrankenkassen made the tran-
sition, which led to impassioned and principled discussions at the annual national meeting 
of these funds in 1964. However, the new remuneration method became fi rmly established 
within two decades. By 1967, as many as 36.1% of the Ortskrankenkassen and 52.8% of the 
Betriebskassen had introduced the individual remuneration system. Slowly but surely, all the 
health-insurance funds decided to follow suit.42
4/ A question of numbers
The Gesundheits-Reformgesetz of 1993 formulated proposals for changes in the fee scales. 
This was prompted by the sharp increase in the number of consultations. In parallel with 
the increase in healthcare expenditure in the 1960s and 1970s, the number of staff employed 
in the medical sector also increased very rapidly. At the end of 1959, 36,864 insurance fund 
doctors were employed in the Federal Republic. Following the Kassenarzturteil of 1960, 
the health-insurance funds could no longer exert any infl uence on the number of doctors 
employed. The number increased to 48,308 in 1975. During the same period, the number 
of dentists increased from 23,821 to 27,240 and the number of hospital doctors virtually 
doubled from 30,767 to 60,635. The number of nursing staff increased from 110,570 
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to 245,278. The surplus of doctors led to government intervention in 1993. Nevertheless, 
in 1997, 108,900 fund doctors were registered in the GKV system; 60% were GPs and 40% 
were specialists.43
While the number of consultations increased, the value of each consultation decreased as 
a result of advances in medical techniques and the shift in the relationship between hospitals 
and doctors. As a result, the Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung was forced to base remuneration 
on budgets. On 1 July 1997, budgets for health-insurance fund doctors were introduced. 
They were ‘practice budgets’ specifi c to groups of doctors and based on the number of cases: 
arztgruppenspezifi sche, fallzahlabhänginge Praxisbudgets. This resulted in a large number of budgets 
based on the types of care provided. The fees of the fund doctors depended on which fund 
they belonged to, the number of patients they treated, and their additional qualifi cations (spe-
cial diagnostic and therapeutic services). Doctors were very sceptical about this new system, 
which placed a strict limit on the number of ambulatory services they provided.
e. The government steps in
1/ Economic growth: the sky’s the limit
Floating on the euphoria of the wirtschaftswunder, the coffers of the health-insurance funds 
continued to swell. This enabled them carefully to extend their insurance package. The 
changes to sickness benefi t illustrate this. Sickness benefi t was increased in phases from 60% 
of the basis wage after three ‘waiting days’ (Karenzdagen) to almost 80% and even to 90% of 
the net wage, without Karenzdagen. From 1973, benefi t was also paid out if a parent had to 
care for a sick child (fi rst for fi ve days, later for ten days). New services were introduced and 
the scope of existing services extended. 
At the end of 1969, the large coalition government consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD
that had been in power since 1966 was replaced by an SPD/FDP coalition led by the socialist 
Willy Brandt. On the one hand, the SPD, leading the government for the fi rst time since 
the war, wanted to reform health insurance. On the other hand, still under the infl uence of 
the ‘Golden Sixties’ euphoria, it wanted to extend the insurance package. This was refl ected 
with the establishment in April 1970 of the Sachverständigenkommission zur Weiterentwicklung 
der sozialen Krankenversicherung (Advisory Committee on the Development of Social Health 
Insurance).. This committee’s tasks included the improvement of medical care and the 
strengthening of the insurance funds’ position in relation to providers of medical services. 
The Krankenversicherung-änderungsgesetz (Health Insurance Amendment Act (KVAG)) was in-
troduced on 21 December 1970, and one of its consequences was the inclusion of preventive 
examinations in the basic insurance package.44 In the context of extending the GKV system, 
considerable improvements were made in health insurance up to 1975. 
By around 1975, the German healthcare system had without doubt developed into a sys-
tem that was admired worldwide: since the war, partly as a result of the wirtschaftswunder, the 
system had regained the ground lost during the war and was striding ahead. But the great 
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leap forward came at a price: between 1950 and 1975, expenditure per member increased 
twelve-fold. This increase in expenditure did not have a single explanation but was the result 
of many factors including economic processes, demographic change, changes in illness pat-
terns, lack of co-ordination, the medicalisation of services, and long hospital admissions. The 
fi rst half of the 1970s in particular saw spectacular increases in GKV expenditure. Expenditure 
per member between 1970 and 1975 increased on average by 17.4% every other year. Even 
taking the high infl ation rate into account, this was a drastic increase in the insurance funds’ 
costs in real terms.
For a long time, no-one was really concerned. The continuing economic boom brought 
full employment and therefore increasing revenues from premiums. Those who were insured, 
blinded by rising nominal wages, accepted an ever-higher premium percentage, which was 
increased from 6% in 1950 to 8.4% in 1960, reaching 9.9% in 1965 and 10.47% in 1975. By 
the end of the century, premiums had increased further to 13.3%.45
2/ The fi rst attempts at reform
So long as the rapid economic growth of the golden sixties continued to fuel full employment, 
the weaknesses in the health-insurance system were not apparent, and the government could 
postpone radical changes. By the end of the 1950s, Adenauer had already experienced how 
diffi cult it was to introduce reforms in health insurance. In its policy statement of 29 October 
1957, the CDU/CSU government announced that, once the pension reforms were complete, 
it would focus on reorganising the health-insurance system with the aim of encouraging 
responsible attitudes to health, promoting the principle of self-help, and stimulating private 
initiatives in order to prevent a decline into a total welfare state. In 1959, entirely in line with 
these aims, a Referentenentwurf (draft bill) was submitted containing the proposal to introduce 
per-procedure remuneration and co-payments by patients. The government hoped that this 
measure would discourage insured persons from visiting the doctor when it was not really 
necessary. The idea was also introduced that health insurance was not for trifl ing ailments, 
but primarily for serious illnesses.46
As was to be expected, these proposals for radical change met with very strong opposition. 
The SPD, trade unions and doctors’ associations were unanimously against co-payments and 
formed a united front. Despite the heavy criticism, in January 1960 the government submit-
ted a draft bill to the Bundestag. The draft was rejected after a year of fruitless debate. Until 
the end of 1963, the Adenauer cabinets made repeated attempts to reform the GKV system. 
When Chancellor Erhard, Adenauer’s successor, distanced himself from the idea of reform in 
October 1963, the end of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition government also brought an end, 
for the time being, to attempts to reform the GKV system. 
3/ Problems for compulsory health insurance
In 1966, there was a brief but serious economic recession, the unrecognised sign of the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s. As government revenue continued to fall ominously from 1973 
onwards, the government continued to follow a defi cit-spending policy in order to combat 
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the recession and increasing unemployment. Around 1975, it gradually became clear that the 
years of exuberant economic growth had not merely been interrupted by an unexpected re-
cession, but by a serious structural depression. In the healthcare sector, the realisation gradually 
dawned that the years of plenty were over, and continued increases in expenditure could no 
longer be justifi ed. Further expansion was regarded as unfeasible, from a political as well as a 
budgetary point of view. This promoted the legislator to create opportunities for intervention 
and administrative instruments to control the expenditure of the GKV.47
Previous calls for increased expenditure on medical care were replaced by a frustrating 
quest for ways to tighten belts and save money. The Krankenversicherungs-Kostendämpfungsgesetz
(Health Insurance Cost-Containment Act (KVKG)) of 27 June 1977 heralded the beginning of 
a series of cost-cutting measures that would last for many years. The main aim was to bring 
increasing costs under control and stabilise premiums. The series of laws and regulations were 
designed to achieve not only short-term results, but also more radical structural changes in 
the social insurance system. 
During the fi rst phase, there was a clear emphasis on cost control. Fees paid to doctors 
were linked more closely to the average basic wage. This meant that it was easier to balance 
premium revenues and expenditure on care provided by doctors. The number of reimbur-
sable items was also reduced; medicines and dressings, etc., used to treat minor ailments were 
no longer reimbursed, and the new legislation introduced ceiling amounts for medicines. 
Opportunities for co-insuring family members were limited and, depending on the fund, 
the co-payment level for dental care was set at around 20%. 
In the fi rst years after the introduction of the KVKG, the fi nancial situation of the GKV system 
improved, and there was less upward pressure on premiums. After two years, the legislation 
had clearly ceased to have an effect: the percentage growth in expenditure on medicines, 
medical aids (10.8%) and dental care (11.8%) had doubled by 1980, while the basic wage 
had increased by 5.38%. Premiums had to be adjusted again (from 11.26% to 12%) in 1982 
in order to put the health-insurance system back in the black.48
The cost savings achieved through these measures were DM 3.4 billion short of the target. 
The government responded in 1981 with a new series of cost-saving measures, namely the 
Kostendämpfungs-Erganzungsgesetz (Health Insurance Cost-Containment Amendment Act 
(KEG)) of 22 December 1981. The aim of this new legislation was to stabilise the fi nancial 
position of the GKV. Progress was made through accompanying legislation for the budget of 
1983 and 1984. This resulted in the following, among other things: an increase in the level 
of co-payments, an increase in the prescription fee from DM 0.50 to DM 2, and the abolition 
of reimbursement for medicines for minor ailments (e.g. colds, headache). Insured persons 
who were admitted to hospital had to pay DM 5 per day for up to fourteen days per calendar 
year. From the 1980s, the level of co-payment also increased for retirees.49
Neither of the two pieces of cost-containment legislation contained far-reaching mea-
sures. The government was pursuing a cautious ‘salami policy’: small cost-reduction measures 
to reduce expenditure slice-by-slice. However, it was something of a psychological shock 
for Germans to have to accept that the system that allowed them to make unlimited use of 
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medical services, with virtually no co-payment for medicines and hospital care, was a thing 
of the past. The central aim of the cost-cutting policy, namely to align the growth in GKV
expenditure with increases in the basic wage, was achieved only in part. During the period 
1978-1982, expenditure increased by an average of 5.8% per year, while the basic wage 
increased by 5.2%. In 1984, the expenditure defi cit in 1984 remained at 2.8%, but in 1985 
and 1986 it fell to 1.3%.
f. Structural intervention: the legislation of 1989, 1992 and 1997
Economic conditions did not improve, but healthcare costs continued to rise. This forced 
the government – a CDU/CSU and FDP coalition that had been in power under Chancellor 
Kohl since 1982 – to introduce radical measures in order to save the hundred-year-old GKV
system. After the mid-1980s, the government decided on structural intervention in order 
to slow the increase in insurance premiums, which had now risen to more than 13%, and if 
possible to reduce them. In 1988, 1992, 1997 and 1998, the successive Kohl cabinets intro-
duced a series of reforms.
1/ The Health Reform Act of 1989
In the 1980s, a broad political discussion began about the reorientation of the healthcare system 
in Germany. The debate centred on two opposing views. On the one hand, there were calls 
for stricter government regulation of the healthcare sector and, on the other hand, there were 
calls for a more market-oriented approach. This discussion led to a fl ood of proposals designed 
to develop one or other of the standpoints. The basic principle of some of the proposals can 
be summarised as Globalsteuerung und Budgetierung (Overall Control and Budgeting).50
It was inevitable that, at some point, there would be a response to the years of public discus-
sion about the reforms and to the call for the structural reform of the GKV by all the political 
parties in parliament. Immediately after the 1987 Bundestag elections, the government put the 
reform of the GKV high on its political agenda. A committee consisting of social experts from 
the governing parties formulated a series of measures. These were submitted to parliament on 
7 December 1987 by the Federal Minister for Labour and Social Planning as a preliminary 
draft under the title Solidarität und Eigenverantwortung (solidarity and self-responsibility). The 
opposition parties, the SPD and the Grünen, were extremely critical, and called the proposed 
reforms ‘ein Bundel Maßnahmen zu Lasten der Versicherten’ (‘a bundle of measures paid for by 
insured persons’).51 Despite the strong reactions, the government kept to its reform plan 
and presented its draft bill in April 1988. The aim of the Gesundheitsreformgesetz (Healthcare 
Reform Act), which came into effect on 1 January 1989, was to achieve annual savings of DM
14.1 billion. The way in which the government sought to achieve this ambitious goal was in 
line with earlier reforms. The introduction of reference-priced medicines on 1 September 
1989 was the foundation for the reforms. Since that date, the health-insurance funds have 
paid Festbeträge (reference prices) for most medicines. Reference prices are the maximum 
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prices reimbursable to pharmacies by the health-insurance funds.52 The services covered by 
health insurance had to be reduced to strictly necessary medical treatment. A typical example 
of the drive to economise was the fact that GKV funds stopped the reimbursement of funeral 
expenses, despite the fact that this was the reason for setting up many of the funds in the fi rst 
place. The emphasis shifted to illness prevention and, above all, to increased co-payment levels. 
Thanks to these interventions, the legislation of 1989 can be regarded as the most important 
health-insurance legislation since 1911.
On the basis of the Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code), the Federal Committee of 
doctors and health-insurance funds decided which groups of pharmaceuticals could be 
reference-priced.53 Obviously, the pharmaceutical industry was very critical of the reference-
price system. The Federal Committee forced pharmacies to lower their prices, particular for 
brand articles. The aim of the reference-price system was to bring 80% of the expenditures 
in the pharmaceuticals market under control within a three-year period.54 At the beginning 
of 1990, it was assumed that reference prices would be set for a total of 4,300 medicines by 
1 July 1990.55 This target was not achieved, however. By 1997, reference prices had been set 
for 60% of the products in the pharmaceuticals market. Nevertheless, within one year of the 
introduction of the legislation, expenditure had decreased by 3.7%. This saving, combined with 
favourable developments in the basic wage which led to increased revenues from premiums, 
resulted in a surplus of no less than DM 9.3 billion for the health-insurance funds. Opinions 
differed widely as to the reasons for this success. Many claimed that it was mainly due to the 
increased level of co-payments.56
2/ Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (The Healthcare Structure Act) of 1992
Only two years after the reform act of 1989, healthcare expenditure in some sectors had in-
creased by more than 10%. The government was forced to introduce new cost-saving measures. 
The statutory structures in Germany were such that the government (Liberals and Christian 
Democrats) had to reach consensus with the Social-Democrat dominated Bundesrat (Federal 
Council comprising representatives of the Länder). The resulting ‘Lahnstein compromise’ 
was in fact a coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. As a result, the reform 
legislation became a bizarre mixture of regulations that related to conservative healthcare 
policy on the one hand and to democratic healthcare policy on the other.57
The reform act of 1992 was the second step in the restructuring of the healthcare sys-
tem and had important consequences for the health-insurance funds in particular. The key 
measures were as follows: 
– The introduction of a general budget provision for the various healthcare sectors
restrictions on the opening of new health-insurance practices by doctors
– A new pricing system for hospitals
– A loosening of the separation between ambulatory care and hospital care
– Freedom of choice between health-insurance funds for all insured persons
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– The introduction of a risk-adjustment scheme to compensate the insurance funds for 
disparities in the overall health risk of their members
The budget for the 108,900 health-insurance fund doctors was fi xed for three years and intro-
duced on 1 January 1993. It was based on total expenditure on ambulatory care in 1991. 
However, it was another measure in the act that sent a shock wave through the world of 
health insurance in Germany because it reduced the autonomy of the doctors’ associations 
and health-insurance funds. Since the Berliner Abkommen of 1913, they had been concluding 
contracts with each other independently, without any form of government intervention. 
The government’s role did not extend beyond that of intermediary in a number of major 
confl icts such as those of 1913 and 1924. However, the reforms of 1992 gave the government 
the opportunity to intervene directly in the contract process for matters such as doctors’ fees 
and the size of hospital budgets. This brought an end to the policy – which was more than a 
century old – of government non-intervention and to the self-governance of social insurance 
by the insurance funds and doctors. 
The health reform legislation also forced the ambulatory and hospital care sectors to work 
together more effectively. The fairly strict separation of ambulatory and hospital care often 
led to problems when it came to follow-up care (continuity and feedback) and overlap in 
medical care, and therefore to unnecessary cost increases. The legislation of 1992 gave hospitals 
the right to provide medical pre-care and aftercare for ambulatory patients. The government 
also encouraged outpatient operations in order to reduce the level of expenditure on surgi-
cal procedures.
The government aimed to stimulate market forces by granting all insured persons the 
freedom to choose between the health-insurance funds. This was known as the Wahlfrei-
heitmodell. However, not everyone had freedom of choice. Employees of companies that 
had their own insurance funds were required to insure themselves through those funds. The 
members of certain professions or craft trades were also required to join their corporative 
Innungskrankenkassen, from which ‘outsiders’ were excluded. Membership of certain Ersatz-
kassen was also restricted. 
By announcing freedom of choice for all those with compulsory insurance, to take effect 
on 1 January 1996, the government aimed to make the insurance market more transpa rent in 
the hope that strong competition would drive down premiums. It was not only the premium 
that was important for the compulsory insurance consumer in search of the ‘best buys’, but 
also the actual package of insurance benefi ts. Here, too, the government aimed for increased 
competition and greater transparency, thereby making it easier for insured persons to compare 
the packages on offer and the extra services and costs.58
However, even under this new system, not everyone had freedom of choice. Members 
of the See-Krankenkasse (seamen’s health-insurance fund), the Bundesknappschaft (miners’ 
health-insurance fund) and the Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkasse (farmers’ health-insurance 
fund) were still subject to the allocation system, due to organisational aspects of these funds. 
The freedom-of-choice model resulted in two types of company funds, i.e. open and closed. 
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Membership in a Betriebskrankenkasse or Innungskrankenkasse was restricted to employees of 
the company concerned, but employees of companies with a Betriebskrankenkasse and In-
nungskrankenkasse were allowed to insure themselves with an Ortskrankenkasse (local fund) or 
Ersatzkasse (substitution fund). Complete freedom of choice applied only to the latter two 
funds, which insured approximately 80% of the insured population.59
3/ The Reform Act of 1997
The third phase of reforms planned by the government was unsuccessful due to the lack of 
political consensus between the Bundestag, with a majority of the governing parties (CDU/
CSU and FDP), and the Landestag, where the opposition held the majority. However, on 1 
January 1997, the Beitragsentlassungsgesetz (Contribution Relief Act) came into effect as part 
of a general programme for economic growth and employment. The aim of this act was to 
reduce expenditure by the health-insurance funds by more than DM 7.5 billion. The cost 
savings would be achieved through increased levels of co-payment, among other things. The 
co-payment sums for medicines were DM 9, 11 and 13, depending on the size of the packaging. 
The act also provided for various other co-payment increases (e.g. for ambulance transport, 
psychotherapy and massage). The Krankenhaus-Notopfer, a new form of co-payment, was also 
introduced to fi nance the maintenance of hospitals. Each insured person was required to make 
a payment of DM 20 per year towards the maintenance of hospitals. This payment was subject 
to a maximum: 2% of the gross annual income. The unemployed, those with a minimum 
income, students and children under 18 years of age were exempt from this payment. 
In addition to the Beitragsentlassungsgesetz, two further cost-reduction measures were 
introduced that did not need the approval of the Landestag, namely the fi rst and second 
GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz (Restructuring Act (GKV)). The second act in particular led to the 
redefi nition of the basic health-insurance package. The act provided for a reduced basic pac-
kage, which every health-insurance fund was required to offer its members, and an optional 
package consisting of the services that the insurance funds could offer their members in the 
context of free choice.60
The act also introduced a separate system for meeting the cost of healthcare for retirees. 
Expenditure for retirees was redistributed and spread among the various health-insurance 
funds. Retirees paid a nationally set premium from their pension and other income. However, 
this co-payment covered only 41% of costs.61 The state pension fund acted in the place of 
employers and paid the 50% as a normal employer’s contribution. Every active employee 
paid a special contribution to compensate expenditure for retirees that was not covered.62
This implied that demographic ageing exerted – and is still exerting – pressure on the real 
incomes of the active population. 
The Gesetz zur Stärkung der Finanzgrundlagen der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung in den neuen 
Ländern of 24 March 1998 was designed to restore the imbalance in Risikostrukturausgleich 
(risk adjustment scheme) between West Germany and the former East Germany. In order to 
strengthen the fi nancial base of the health-insurance funds in the new states, and to reduce 
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the differences in premiums, from 1999 onwards the West German health-insurance funds 
contributed DM 1.2 billion per year to the East German funds.63
In 1998, a further two new acts relating to health insurance were introduced. The fi rst of 
these, das neunte Gesetz zur Änderung des fünften Buches des Sozialgesetzbuch, provided for changes 
to the fi fth book of the Social Security Code with regard to dental treatment and introduced 
co-payment for psychotherapeutic consultations. The co-payment was set at DM 10 per visit 
after the fi rst two consultations. Under the second act (Gesetz über die Berufe des Psychologischen 
Psychotherapeutischen und des Kinder- und Jugendlichenpsychotherapeuten, zur Änderung des fünften 
Buches des Sozialgesetzbuch und anderer Gesetze) of 16 June 1998,  following twenty years of 
discussion, psychological psychotherapists and child/youth psychotherapists were once again 
admitted to the GKV system starting 1 January 1999. The result of this legislation was that, 
from 1999, insured persons could consult non-medical psychotherapists. These practitioners 
could now work independently, like doctors, and their profession was no longer regarded as 
a remedial profession. They were granted equal status with contract doctors and integrated 
into the physicians’ organisations.64
4/ Expenditure: stop – go
The health-sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s can be described largely as a series of 
cost-reduction measures. An expenditure limit was placed on healthcare providers by means 
of sectoral budgets and pressure to lower the price of branded medicines. The main effects 
of the series of reforms have been increased scale, a more effective  market mechanism, the 
‘thinning out’ of insurance packages, stricter budgeting and the possibility for the government 
to intervene in contracts between insurance funds and doctors.
Each reform was a success in terms of reducing costs in the short term. The announce-
ment of healthcare reform legislation led to savings and, as a consequence, lower increases in 
expenditure in the year following the actual introduction of the reform.65
However, the cost-saving measures did not succeed in stabilising expenditure in the longer 
term. Neither did they prevent the steady increase in premiums, despite the fact that it was in 
the interest of three powerful institutions to do so, namely the employers’ organisations, the 
trade unions and the Federal Ministry of Health. At best, the measures brought a brief pause 
in the upward trend. The reforms of 1988 and 1992 had a moderating effect that lasted for 
only a couple of years. In 1996, the average premium had increased further by 13.5%. It is 
not yet clear whether the latest intervention will have a more permanent effect. One of the 
express aims of the reform legislation of 1997 was to reduce premiums by 0.4%. 
Summary
Interventions in the healthcare sector and health insurance might give the impression that 
the German health-insurance system has been ‘stripped bare’ during the past two decades 
but, in fact, little has changed in the system during the past fi fty years. The cost of medical 
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care and of most medicines is still reimbursed more or less in full. Patients are required to 
make a modest co-payment for hospital admission and certain medicines. The government 
has the right to intervene in remuneration agreements, but the health-insurance funds and 
doctors’ associations still negotiate their contracts without further intervention. Notably, the 
pre-war system of predefi ned budgets remains in place. The budgets are still allocated to doc-
tors by the insurance fund on the basis of points. Today, the German health-insurance system 
is known as a system that allows the population access to a high standard of care at a socially 
acceptable price. The principle of administrative autonomy and self-governance is still an 
inherent feature of statutory health insurance in Germany. The government has a mediating 
role in the health-insurance system: it legislates, provides an organisational framework for 
healthcare and takes on the role of co-ordinator for independent and semi-statutory health 
organisations. However, the administration of the system is the responsibility of the non-
governmental health-insurance funds.
In the world of health insurance too, there have been few changes. The recent govern-
ment interventions in the sector have not altered the fact that the insurance funds are still 
undoubtedly the pivot of the German health-insurance system. The various types of fund 
operating today differ little from those that were operating around the time of the First World 
War, although there were movements in their market share after the Second World War. A 
remarkable development was the growth of the Ersatzkassen (substitution funds) largely at 
the expense of the Ortskrankenkassen (local health-insurance funds) and, to a lesser extent, 
the Betriebskassen (company funds). Likewise, the composition of the management boards 
and the method of election have undergone few changes since 1950. For fi fty years now, 
with the exception of the Knappschaften, seats on the management boards have been divided 
equally between employees and employers. Due to the high income threshold, compulsory 
insurance funds are easily accessible for the vast majority of the population. It is therefore 
not surprising that approximately 90% of the population are insured with a compulsory 
health-insurance fund.
2. Belgium
a. Rapid economic recovery
The liberation of Belgium took several months. The bitter fi ghting between the advancing 
Allies and the retreating German troops, culminating unexpectedly in the dramatic Ardennes 
offensive, caused considerable human and material damage. Moreover, V1 and V2 bombs 
continued to bring death and destruction long after the last German troops had left Belgian 
territory. Compared with its neighbours, Belgium also had a number of excellent trump 
cards to help it on the way to full and rapid recovery. The port of Antwerp was virtually un-
damaged when it fell into the hands of the Allied forces, and could be used immediately for 
mass import, fi rst of military goods, then later of food for the population and raw materials 
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for industry. The revenues from Congolese uranium supplied to the United States during 
and after the war, plus revenues from the use of the port of Antwerp by the military forces, 
brought in much-needed dollars for Belgium. The Belgian economy also benefi ted from 
the high level of expenditure by Allied troops in Belgium. In contrast to the other European 
countries, Belgium’s foreign-currency reserves continued to grow, and Belgium had more 
then enough valuable dollars to buy new capital goods and raw materials for its industrial 
sector. The strong recovery of coal production, which powered the whole economy, was 
vitally important. Thanks to these advantages, Belgian industry was able to reach its pre-war 
production levels remarkably quickly. Belgium’s economic recovery was so spectacular that 
the country received very little aid from the Marshall Plan, which was implemented on 1 
July 1947 and began to take effect in 1948. 
b.  A modern social security system
After the war, far-reaching social reforms were introduced. In October 1941, a handful of 
infl uential leaders (leading employers and fi gures from the socialist and Christian work-
ers’ movement) began holding secret discussions as to how social-economic life should be 
organised after the war. Social security was an important part of that discussion. They set 
up the Committee of Employers & Employees, with Henri Fuss, a socialist, as chairman. 
Occasionally, leaders of the health-insurance funds also took part in the committee’s activi-
ties. Even before the liberation, in April 1944, this resulted in the Social Pact, which was 
offi cially known as the Draft Accord for Social Unity and was primarily intended for waged 
and salaried employees in the private sector.
On 26 September 1944 – long before Belgium was fully liberated – a government of 
national unity was formed with representatives of the Catholic, Socialist, Liberal and Com-
munist parties. The socialist Van Acker, who had helped prepare the Social Pact, became the 
Minister for Labour and Social Services. Van Acker used the draft accord as the basis for his 
Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders (Social Security Act for Employed 
Workers), promulgated on 28 December 1944 and entered in the Belgisch Staatsblad (Belgian 
statute book) of 30 December 1944. This was followed at the beginning of 1945 by additional 
provisions relating to pensions for elderly and widowed persons and to family benefi ts, health 
and disability insurance, and the special statute for mineworkers. Consequently, the separate 
legislation for health and disability insurance, unemployment, pensions, child benefi t and an-
nual holiday for workers was brought together under a single heading: ‘social security’. The 
former voluntary insurances for unemployment, illness and disability were now compulsory, 
so that the obligation on the part of employees to take out insurance now extended to all 
sectors of the Belgian social-security system.
A new structure was introduced to fi nance the social security system. Employers and em-
ployees were required to pay contributions. The employee contribution, equal to 8% of the 
wage, was deducted by employers. The employer contribution was equal to 15.5% of the 
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wage. These amounts were paid to a new institution called the Rijksdienst voor Maatschappelijke 
Zekerheid (National Social Security Offi ce (RMZ)). The RMZ then allocated the monies to the 
national insurance funds for each sector. Four funds already existed before the war, namely the 
Rijkskas voor ouderdoms- en weduwerente (National Fund for Old-Age and Widowed Persons’ 
Pensions), Steunfonds voor werklozen (the Support Fund for the Unemployed), Nationale Kas 
voor Kinderbijslagen (the National Fund for Child Benefi t) and the Rijkskas voor Jaarlijks Verlof
(National Fund for Annual Leave). A new organ was created for the health insurance and 
disability insurance sector: the legislature created the Rijksfonds voor Verzekering tegen Ziekte en 
Invaliditeit (National Fund for Sickness and Disability (RVZI)) to serve as a link between the 
RMZ and the mutualities. The responsibility of this fund was to provide insurance for medical 
care and pay out incapacity benefi ts. The fi ve state funds would be responsible for allocating 
the fi nancial resources among the various benefi t and insurance institutions. The RVZI, in turn, 
had to distribute the money among the insurance bodies (the fi ve existing national alliances 
and the newly formed regional RVZI services) that were responsible for compulsory insurance. 
The legislature therefore did not opt for a single mutualistic entity, but made a clear choice 
in favour of further extending the existing mutuality structure.
A fi nal fundamental change was the joint governance of social-security institutions. The seats 
on the management boards were divided equally between representatives of employers’ and 
employees’ professional organisations. The Minister for Social Services was represented only 
by a civil servant, who attended sittings in an advisory capacity and had no right of veto. 
c.  At last – compulsory insurance for sickness and disability
1/ Compulsory – but not for everyone
The Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders (Social Security Act), and there-
fore the provisions relating to health insurance, applied to all employees and civil servants 
who had an employment contract. There were a number of exceptions, such as agricultural 
workers, domestic staff and people who worked at home. The legislation would not apply to 
these groups until the specifi c decrees of the Regent were adopted. Moreover, the Besluitwet 
op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders did not apply to mineworkers and workers of a 
similar status, or to merchant seamen. Provision would be made for these groups in special 
draft legislation. Special legislation was also drawn up for employees of the Belgian National 
Railway Company (NMBS). In addition to compulsory insurance, the voluntary-insurance 
sector remained for groups that were not covered by social security. These were mainly civil 
servants and the self-employed.66
The employee contribution received by the RVZI was 6% of the salary: 3.5% was deducted 
from employees’ pay and 2.5% was paid directly by the employers. For civil servants, the total 
received was 5% of the wage, of which 2.75% was paid by the insured person and 2.25% by 
the employer. The difference was due to the fact that civil servants who became unfi t for 
work still received their pay directly from the employer during the fi rst month of absence. The 
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percentages were not calculated over the full wage, however, but over a maximised amount. 
In 1944, the wage ceiling was set at BEF 3,000 per month. In fact, this system was socially 
unjust: the contributions of the lowest paid were calculated according to their full income, 
while the highest-paid were required to show solidarity only up to a certain wage level, and 
therefore paid relatively less. Clearly, this distinction was made in order to avoid incurring 
the displeasure of better-paid civil servants.67 On 1 July 1945, the wage threshold was raised 
to BEF 4,000. Employers, who had never had to contribute to voluntary insurance, resigned 
themselves to paying a share of the premium. On the one hand, they hoped that this would 
enhance social stability, productivity and purchasing power. On the other hand, they were 
satisfi ed with the joint system of governance for the social security bodies.68 In addition, state 
subsidies were granted amounting to 16% of the statutory contributions.69
The Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders included several provisions on 
sickness benefi ts. In the event of illness, workers received 60% sickness benefi ts after eight 
days. Civil servants would receive benefi ts after thirty days. After one year, benefi ts would be 
reduced to 50% of the salary. A female employee who did not work for six weeks before and 
after having a baby could also count on sickness benefi t equal to 60% of her wage.
2/ A leading role for the mutual societies
Under the implementation of Article 6 of the Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der 
Arbeiders of 28 December 1944, the Regent’s Decree of 21 March 1945 (Belgisch Staatsblad,
28 March 1945) established the organisation of compulsory health insurance and disability 
insurance. Every employee was required to join a mutual society of his/her choice, or a re-
gional service of the RVZI. The mutualities were grouped in fi ve national alliances or unions: 
Christian, Socialist, Liberal, Neutral and Professional. They not only reimbursed medical costs 
and paid out sickness benefi ts, but they were also involved in collecting the contributions. 
Employers gave employees a receipt for the contributions that had been deducted from their 
pay. The receipt was then handed to the relevant mutuality, which was reimbursed by the 
RVZI, minus 10% to cover administration costs and as a fi xed contribution for the insurance 
institutions for insured persons who did not receive a premium receipt (e.g. the disabled, 
retirees). The Decree of 21 March 1945 also provided for a control system. Monitoring and 
supervision was the responsibility of the RVZI and was limited to the administrative supervision 
of the health-insurance funds and insured persons. The national alliances were responsible for 
medical verifi cation and were henceforth required to appoint medical advisors. In relation 
to the pre-war situation, the RVZI replaced the mutualities, which concluded agreements 
with doctors at local level. After the war, the negotiating role of the mutualities was taken 
over by the RVZI.
For a long time after its introduction in 1945, medical insurance was an insurance with 
pre-defi ned benefi ts for insured persons. Nevertheless, the mutualities had plans for cost-based 
insurance whereby reimbursements were based on the actual fees paid by insured persons. 
Since no agreement had been concluded with healthcare providers, health insurance funds 
had to set their own fees for medical services. Reimbursements were in accordance with 
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these fees, regardless of what the insured person had actually paid for the service. The insu-
rance funds aimed to align their benefi ts as closely as possible with the actual cost of medical 
care. When the discrepancy between actual fees and the fees set by the funds became too 
large, the insurance funds increased their benefi ts, sometimes in quite large steps. This often 
prompted healthcare providers to increase their fees, leading to an upward spiral that pushed 
up the expenditure of the health-insurance funds.70
Compulsory insurance covered only those medical services that were stipulated in the legis-
lation. The legislation relating to voluntary insurance, however, allowed mutualities to offer 
services of their own choosing that were also available to persons with compulsory insurance. 
For this ‘voluntary supplementary insurance’, insured members paid an additional premium 
direct to the mutuality. The most notable initiatives included children’s holidays in the con-
text of preventive healthcare. Since as early as 1921, the socialist mutualities offered attractive 
services in this fi eld. In 1947, the Christian mutualities also introduced this service.71
In addition to compulsory insurance and voluntary supplementary insurance, there was also 
insurance for those who were not included in the compulsory-insurance system. The govern-
ment continued to subsidise these activities, as it had in the past. Although full responsibility 
for fi nances rested with the mutualities, this sector was also subject to not inconsiderable 
constraints. Benefi ts were linked to equivalent services in the compulsory insurance sector, 
which meant that, here too, the RVZI was involved, albeit indirectly.72
3/ Mixed reactions
With his swift action, Minister Van Acker had made the most of the consensus between the 
social partners during the euphoric post-war months. However, criticisms began to emerge. 
Although the legislation had been pushed through by Van Acker, a socialist, it was the Chris-
tian movement that had the greatest cause for celebration. Compulsory health insurance 
was based on the principles of institutional pluralism and joint governance, which had been 
staunchly defended before the war. This was essential for the Christian movement, since it 
meant that the Christian ‘pillar’ of society would not be marginalised by the government. 
But the Christian organisations were not entirely happy. Initially, a number of leaders of the 
LCM made frenetic attempts to resist the changes.73 They believed that, despite the joint go-
vernance structure, the state still had too much infl uence on day-to-day affairs. According to 
these critics, the responsibility and scope for action of the mutualities were greatly restricted, 
since premiums and payouts were set by law. 
The strongest socialist elements in the legislation were the central collection of contribu-
tions and the compulsory nature of the insurance. But this did not satisfy the socialists. The 
number of entitled benefi ciaries remained limited to certain categories of waged and salaried 
employees. The free practice of the medical profession also remained intact. The socialist idea 
of a single (mutualist) entity organisation was not adopted. Neither was there mention of a 
National Disability Fund.
The trade unions were not completely happy either. The Christian trade union ACV be-
lieved that the system should also cover work-related accidents and illness. It also believed 
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that the state had too much infl uence on the social-security system. Management of the 
system should be entirely in the hands of employers’ and employees’ organisations. This last 
standpoint caused a confl ict within the Christian labour movement, namely between the 
ACV and the Christian mutualities. Only after intensive discussions did the ACV and the LCM
agree that the Christian trade union would adopt and support the views of the LCM with 
regard to compulsory insu rance.74 Among the socialists, the confl icts between the mutual-
ists and the syndicalists increased in number and intensity. Unlike the ACV, the socialist trade 
union would never adopt the preservation of the voluntary mutualist organisations as a point 
of doctrine.
The doctors were not at all happy with the new system. They feared for their fees. Accor-
ding to the doctors’ organisations, if the RVZI wished to set reimbursement rates, this should 
under no circumstances mean that doctors should be forced to respect set fees in all cases. 
Furthermore, this government intervention would have pernicious consequences for the 
quality of medical care. What doctors feared most was a state medical system in which they 
would have to work as civil servants or waged employees.75
d. Defi cits and shortfalls
1/ Confrontation with old principles
Compulsory health and disability insurance had hardly been introduced before there were 
calls to reform the brand-new system. Obviously, this had something to do with the fi nancial 
defi cits that were quickly mounting. The defi cits were not borne equally by the mutualities. 
In 1949, the socialist mutualities recorded a defi cit of BEF 197 million, while the Christian 
mutualities recorded a remarkable profi t of BEF 89 million. The three other national alliances 
also recorded losses, albeit modest ones. How can the differences be explained? The socialist 
mutualities categorically rejected the accusation that the debts were due to bad manage-
ment. They attributed their fi nancial diffi culties to purely objective factors: certain entitled 
benefi ciaries cost more than others. Elderly, disabled and widowed persons required more 
medical care than the active population; health risks for workers were greater than those for 
civil servants, who earned more and therefore generated more revenue, etc. For historical and 
structural reasons, the level of risk for members of the socialist mutualities was much greater 
than for the other health-insurance funds.
The socialists were also of the opinion that the state should be more generous. Insured 
persons should not be penalised fi nancially because they happened to be insured with an 
organisation that had a large proportion of high-risk members. In the fi rst place, their pre-
ference was still a compulsory insurance system with a single mutualistic organisation. If the 
structure of mutualist pluralism were to remain in place, fi nancial correction mechanisms 
should be built in whereby the burden would be borne equally by all insurance organisa-
tions. The socialists also wanted to see closer fi nancial ties between the mutualities. Their 
view was that fi nancial surpluses belonged to the compulsory-insurance system, not to the 
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profi t-making insurance organisation. The surpluses could then be used to cover the defi cits 
of other mutualities.76
The LCM did not deny that the burden of risk was not shared equally. However, it was 
dangerous to take it for granted that the state would subsidise a loss-making mutuality. This 
would undermine the mutuality’s sense of responsibility and, in exchange for its fi nancial 
contribution, the government would want to increase its hold over the compulsory insurance 
system. The fi nancial resources of the insurance organisations should in no way be brought 
together in a single, shared fund, but should (at least in part) belong to the individual mu-
tualities.77 The Catholic health-insurance funds sought greater independence and fi nancial 
responsibility for insurance funds. These views had very defi nite consequences for the way in 
which the mutualities managed their fi nances. Insurance was a matter of balancing revenues 
and expenditure.78 According to the LCM, there were two things that an insurance organisa-
tion could do if its expenditure was too high. It could raise its premiums, reduce the level of 
benefi t – or do both. A well-managed insurance organisation would generate a surplus and 
accumulate reserves, enabling it to reduce its premiums and increase its benefi ts as necessary. 
The reserves therefore belonged to the relevant mutuality, not to the compulsory-insurance 
system as a whole.79
2/ Failed compromise 
From 1947 to 1949, Belgium was governed by a Catholic-Socialist coalition. This helped 
the negotiations between the two large mutualities, and a solution was eventually found. The 
compromise was based on an old Belgian negotiation formula: exchange. The Catholics agreed 
to the changes in the fi nancing mechanisms of the mutualities. This meant that it was possible 
to compensate the differences in specifi c risks resulting from the varying social composition 
of the mutualities’ members. The socialists also made a concession: if, despite the changes, a 
mutuality still had a defi cit, it had to increase its premiums and/or reduce its benefi ts. Obvi-
ously, a health-insurance fund with a surplus could do the opposite.80 This decree of 1949 
allowed the insurance institutions greater scope to manage their fi nances more effectively. 
By contrast, the mutualities still had very few powers with regard to regulatory management. 
Most of those powers rested with the RVZI.81
No-one was happy with the compromise, and the tensions between the mutualities 
increased, not only because the defi cit of the socialist alliance continued to grow, but also 
because the other national alliances of insurance funds were making losses. It was clear that, 
hardly fi ve years after the introduction of compulsory health insurance, the demons of the 
past had raised their heads and the old rivals had taken up their pre-war positions again. The 
confrontation between the mutualities became part of an intense political power struggle be-
tween the Catholics and the anti-clericals. Between 1950 and 1954, the country was governed 
by a homogeneous Catholic government, which was succeeded in 1954 by an anti-clerical 
Socialist-Liberal cabinet. In 1958, a homogeneous CVP minority government came to power 
and was extended to a CVP-Liberal cabinet after a few months (1959-1961). In addition, the 
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turbulence of the ‘Schoolstrijd’ (Schools Debate) between 1955 and 1958 was not conducive 
to the calm reform of the health and disability insurance system. 
e. Political battles, 1950-1963
1/ Still in the grip of politics
Christian and socialist proposals for reform followed each other in rapid succession. Under the 
Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders of 28 December 1944, the regulation 
of compulsory sickness and disability insurance was the responsibility of the executive body. 
Successive Ministers for Labour and Social Security took full advantage of these powers. After 
every change of government, the new minister would ‘undo’ his predecessor’s legislation by 
Royal Decree. When seeking a satisfactory fi nancing structure for compulsory sickness and 
disability insurance, for example, a socialist minister would favour the relevant socialist mutua-
lity, while a Christian-Democrat would favour the allied Christian health insurance funds. 
The criterion for the allocation of state funding had already been amended under the 
socialist Troclet, through door the Regent’s decree of 12 March 1948: the subsidies paid 
to the mutualities would no longer be based on the total contribution received from their 
members, but on the total expenditure of the respective mutualities. This meant that sub-
sidies paid to the socialist health insurance funds, which were making losses, increased by 
one-quarter,82 while most of the other national alliances had to make do with less. Troclet 
devised the compromise of 13 January 1949 primarily to help the socialist funds out of their 
precarious fi nancial situation. 
The election victory of the CVP and the formation of a homogeneous Catholic government 
in 1950 altered the balance of power between the socialist and Christian mutualities. Van 
den Daele (CVP) became the Minister for Labour and Social Security. In the Royal Decree 
of 31 December 1952, he divided medical care into two categories: ‘priority’ care, for which 
reimbursement of workers’ allowances was not adjusted, and ‘facultative’ care, in which al-
lowances were reimbursed only if the health-insurance fund had the necessary resources. 
The mutualities had complete freedom when it came to facultative services. In that sector, 
they were only allowed to spend what remained once the primary risks had been covered. 
The mutualities themselves were responsible for balancing their income and expenditure. A 
mutuality with a fi nancial surplus could take the initiative to provide more benefi ts for its 
members. In the case of fi nancial defi cit, there were two options: it could reduce – or even 
abolish – the reimbursements for facultative care, or increase the premium paid by members. 
Finally, the decree also included a provision relating to the settlement of past debts. 
The LCM had got its way: the mutualities would again become insurers in the true sense of 
the word. There were strong reactions from the socialist camp, however. Regulation would 
be the death knell for the socialist mutualities. The socialist association of health-insurance 
funds refused to apply the legislation. In order to avoid discord, the other national alliances 
of insurance funds did not apply the legislation either. The discussions dragged on until the 
elections of 1954.
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The CVP suffered a heavy defeat in the elections of April 1954. An unusual coalition of socia-
lists and liberals forced the Catholics into the opposition and would govern until 1958. As 
was to be expected, Troclet, once again Minister for Labour and Social Security, resolutely 
broke with his predecessor’s policy. The Royal Decree of 14 December 1954 dispensed with 
the distinction between priority and facultative care. Troclet went much further. Numerous 
measures, incorporated in the act of 14 July 1955 and the Organic Decree of 22 September 
1955, were a move towards state control. Disability and rehabilitation, two sectors for which 
the costs were clearly not borne equally by the national alliances of insurance funds, were 
transferred from the mutualities to state organisations. They would be fi nanced through an 
advance levy on the overall revenues of the compulsory-insurance system and no longer from 
the resources of each national alliance. This substantially eased the burden on the association 
of socialist insurance funds, which had the highest proportion of disabled members. The 
centralising tendency of this decree was also evident with regard to control. For this purpose 
Troclet set up a new government body that was separate from the mutualities: Hoge Raad 
voor Geneeskundig Toezicht (the High Council for Medical Supervision). He also amended 
the fi nancial regulations. Mutualities with a surplus (i.e. the Christian mutualities) were no 
longer free to dispose of their reserves as they pleased. A large proportion of their fi nancial 
surplus would be used to cover the defi cits of the other health-insurance funds. In its turn, the 
Catholic pillar, supported by the other national alliances of insurers (apart from the socialist 
organisations), also began to resist this frontal attack on the autonomy of the mutualities. 
2/ The third power: the doctors between the government and the mutualities
Troclet’s reforms met with strong resistance from the mutualities and even stronger resis-
tance from the medical organisations. The old Algemeen Belgische Geneesherenverbond (General 
Association of Physicians (ABGV)), set up in 1863, was the largest organisation and brought 
together several doctors’ associations, which often had opposing interests. Flemish and Wal-
loon doctors also had their differences. The Algemeen Vlaamse Geneesherenverbond (Flemish 
Physicians’ Union (AVGV)) was set up in 1922 to counter the dominance of French-speaking 
Belgians in de ABGV. In the 1930s, approximately three-quarters of Belgian doctors were 
members of the ABGV, and approximately one-quarter were members of the AVGV.83 Du ring 
the Second World War, the leaders of the AVGV engaged with the collaborating Orde der Ge-
neesheren (Order of Doctors)), which had been set up by the Germans in November 1941. 
The ABGV was formally dissolved by the occupier at the beginning of 1943. After liberation, 
pro-Flemish sentiments still prevented a number of doctors from joining ABGV. This led to the 
creation in 1946 of the Vereniging der Vlaamse Geneesheren van België (Association of Flemish 
Doctors in Belgium (VVGB)).84
Neither the old ABGV nor the young VVGB, which changed its name in 1954 to the Algemeen 
Syndicaat der Geneesheren van België (General Medical Union of Belgium), had shown much 
collective power. The ABGV was a cumbersome organisation, torn by internal differences and 
disputes. There was serious discord between the GPs and the specialists. The approach of the 
VVGB towards the government was moderate and co-operative. The government had appa-
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rently not expected resistance from the medical sector. As with the review of the legislation 
of 1944 and the implementation of compulsory health insurance, minister Troclet – like his 
predecessors – had hardly considered the medical organisations. 
Troclet’s intervention was a wake-up call for the doctors’ organisations, which regarded it 
as etatist. In order to curb expenditure, Troclet was attempting to regulate the medical profes-
sion. The problem was to achieve a balance between the actual cost of medical care (within 
the context of liberal medicine, in which doctors are free to set their fees) and the amounts 
reimbursed through the compulsory-insurance system. The question, as always, was how 
much the insurers should reimburse, given the freely-set doctors’ fees. Since 1945, insurers 
had operated a fi xed-sum reimbursement system, but the amounts had to be continually 
adjusted in accordance with the fees that doctors actually charged their patients. Minister 
Troclet wanted to change this situation in order to create certainty for insured persons as 
to the fees they had to pay by requiring agreements to be drawn up between the health-
insurance funds and the medical profession. In addition, the compulsory ‘third-party payer’ 
system was introduced, whereby the insurance funds had to pay medical fees directly to the 
doctors, without the involvement of insured persons. 
Doctors interpreted this as an attack on their professional freedom and an attempt to intro-
duce a state medical system. The ABGV joined the chorus of protest from the national alliances 
of mutualities, the unions, and employer organisations. They united against the government, 
which consequently became completely isolated. On 15 December 1955, the co-ordination 
committee representing the doctors concluded an agreement with four national alliances of 
insurers. Henceforth, these mutualities and the doctors’ organisations would conclude conven-
tions that specifi ed preferential fees for insured persons who were less well-off. Furthermore, 
the principles of direct payment by the patient after each medical consultation and the free 
choice of doctor were affi rmed. This was a major victory for the doctors.85 The government 
was forced to backtrack and the disputed legislation was abolished, to the fury of the socialist 
trade unions and mutualities. 
3/ Haunted by the communal spectre
Elections were held in June 1958. The CVP/PSC, eager for revenge, won a majority in the 
Senate but narrowly missed an absolute majority in the House of Representatives by only a 
few seats. After a short-lived CVP/PSC minority cabinet, a Catholic-Liberal government was 
formed on 6 November 1958, with Servais (PSC) as the new Minister for Labour and Social 
Security. In November 1959, Servais also submitted a draft bill to the House. Servais partially 
resorted to Van den Daele’s proposals by distinguishing between levels of risk. Minor risks 
would be covered by the federations of mutualities (the regional organisations that formed 
the national alliances of mutualities). The draft legislation imposed minimum reimbursement 
tariffs, but federations with a surplus would be able to pay out additional benefi ts. Federations 
with a defi cit, on the other hand, would have to increase their premiums or reduce their 
payouts, while still observing the statutory minimums. Major risks would be covered by the 
landsbonden (national alliances), which would also pay out sickness benefi ts. Any defi cits would 
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be eliminated via a compensation fund fed by insurance organisations with a surplus and by 
state subsidies. The state would be responsible for paying out disability benefi ts. 
The Servais Plan was not implemented either. According to the socialists, who were now 
in the opposition, the solidarity of insured persons was being undermined by inequality. 
Persons insured with a federation that had a relatively greater proportion of high-risk mem-
bers would be treated differently than those insured with a federation in a more favourable 
fi nancial position. The draft legislation was also criticised in parliament, particularly by the 
PSC (the French-speaking Christian Democrats). Implementation would also cause problems 
among the regional associations of Wallonia’s Christian mutualities. Serious tensions arose 
within LCM and the Walloon regions even threatened to break away. This dealt the collective 
death blow to the Servais Plan.
4/ Impasse
As a result of the political battles relating to the health-insurance funds, the indecision, post-
poned implementation and the constant reversal of decisions, the fi nancial situation of the 
compulsory health-insurance system worsened by the year. A temporary reprieve was won 
through ad-hoc measures, advances, loans and extra subsidies. 
A straightforward summary of the changes in the funding mechanisms between 1945 and 
1963 shows all too clearly the lack of direction in the health-insurance sector:
– The wage threshold was adjusted from BEF 3,000 (1945) to BEF 8,400 (1964)
– The employer’s contribution for employees and civil servants increased from 2.5% and 
2.25% (1945) to 3.5% and 3.25%, respectively
– The government subsidy for unemployed patients was raised
– A special government contribution was introduced for mineworkers and the disabled.
– A series of extra-legal concessions were granted. After 1959, they even became more 
important than the normal government subsidies.
– Despite these advantages, excluding the special provisions for mineworkers, the defi cit 
increased to BEF 3.7 billion between 1945 and 1963. It was covered by a loan and a special 
advance from the government.86
In an effort to overcome this political and fi nancial impasse, Leburton, the chairman of the 
national alliance of Socialist mutualities, asked the minister to investigate the problems of 
compulsory-insurance system in more detail, and to assign this task to a parliamentary wor-
king group. MPs from the three main parties joined forces to help the sickness and disability 
insurance system out of its impasse. It was not the task of this working group to produce 
made-to-measure draft legislation, but to map out a general framework for reforming the 
system, based on the fundamental principles of all social-security systems, and on the specifi c 
character of Belgian politics, long experience of health insurance and more than fi fteen years 
of practical experience of compulsory insurance.87 The working group was set up at the 
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beginning of 1960 and completed its work at the end of 1961. Its report was the foundation 
for the legislation of 9 August 1963, better known as the Wet-Leburton (Leburton Act). 
f. The Wet-Leburton (9 August 1963): a milestone
1/ A new start for health insurance
After years of painful discussions, which were reminiscent of the principled but fruitless discus-
sions of the 1920s, the three traditional political parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists and 
Liberals) fi nally reached an agreement that was approved by parliament as the Wet-Leburton.
This act laid down a secure legal foundation for the future and was undoubtedly a mile-
stone in the history of health insurance in Belgium. The legislation divided the compulsory 
health-insurance sector into two branches: insurance for medical care (medical expenses) 
and disability insurance (sickness benefi ts). Each branch had its own area of activity, its own 
income from contributions and government subsidies, and its own management committee. 
This separation created additional capacity in healthcare insurance, which meant that this 
branch could be made compulsory for other groups in addition to employees, namely the 
self-employed (1964), public-sector employees (1965), students (1969), members of the clergy 
and monastic orders (1969), and the disabled (1970).
The Wet-Leburton retained the tripartite structure comprising the state, Rijksinstituut voor 
ziekte- en invaliditeitsverzekering (the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance, 
(RIZIV, which replaced the RVZI)) and the pluralist structure of the mutualities. Regulatory 
tasks still rested with the government, albeit with a considerable delegation of powers to a 
committee for healthcare and a second committee for sickness benefi ts. Few changes were 
made to the executive role. The responsibilities and scope for action of the health-insurance 
funds remained unchanged. Little else could be expected of a study group in which the three 
largest national alliances were permanently represented and defended via ‘allied’ political 
parties. The principle of pluralism was retained in the benefi ts agencies: the health-insurance 
funds remained responsible for the administration of health insurance, i.e. medical costs as well 
as sickness benefi ts. The basic principle of ‘subsidised freedom’ in the compulsory insurance 
sector was also retained. The choices open to insured persons were hardly affected. They were 
still free to insure themselves with a mutuality of their choice. However, an offi cial Hulpkas
(Auxiliary Fund) was created for those who did not wish to insure themselves with an exist-
ing free mutuality. From the beginning, this fund enjoyed little success. 
The most radical reforms were those relating to monitoring and supervision. An administra-
tive control department was set up, which, together with the existing Instituut voor Geneeskundige 
Controle (Institute for Medical Control), was brought under the RIZIV.
2/ Doctors on strike
One of the main objectives of the new legislation was to bring the fi nances back into ba lance. 
Leburton was very clear about this: When estimated expenditure exceeds estimated income, the 
premiums must be raised in order to cover the difference (...) the percentage deducted from wages for this 
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purpose will vary from year to year. In order to balance the books, it was necessary to conclude 
agreements with healthcare providers. By concluding agreements on fees, it would fi nally be 
possible to create certainty for patients with regard to the fees they had to pay. According to the 
Wet-Leburton, fees would be set in agreements (‘conventions’) concluded by special commit-
tees made up of representatives of insurance organisations and the professional organisation(s) 
of a specifi c group of healthcare providers. Once approved by the Minister for Social Affairs, 
the agreement would have to be submitted to the interested parties for approval. If it proved 
impossible to reach an agreement, the government could impose maximum amounts for 
fees and charges. The health-insurance funds would reimburse only those medical services 
that were provided by ‘conventioned’ doctors.
The statutory provisions relating to fees met with fi erce resistance from the doctors, 
in particular from the strong and militant doctors’ organisation the Syndicale Kamers van 
Geneesheren (National Chambers of Doctors). While the ASGB, led by the Flemish doctor 
De Brabanter, supported the accord, this new organisation (formed in March 1963 under 
the leadership of Doctor Wijnen) judged the convention system to be contrary to medical 
ethics. The Syndicale Kamers van Geneesheren maintained that doctors could not be forced to 
accept a convention. Neither should the government impose constraints on therapeutic and 
diagnostic freedom for budgetary reasons, or breach medical confi dentiality (e.g. by making 
patient records compulsory). While the old ABGV faded away, Wijnen’s modern and dynamic 
mobilisation strategy won the support of the vast majority of doctors.88
In order to break the impasse, offi cial negotiations were held between the doctors’ or-
ganisations, the representatives of the health-insurance funds, social-security offi cials and 
government representatives. These negotiations were fruitless. For the fi rst time in the social 
history of Belgium, there was a national strike in the health sector. The strike lasted for weeks 
and paralysed the health service, especially when the doctors refused to guarantee longer 
stand-by hours. The government had no choice but to enter into new negotiations, which 
resulted in the accord of 25 June 1964 (Sint-Jansakkoord), in which the government made 
important concessions. This agreement between the government, health-insurance funds and 
public sector provided for the immediate abolition of discrimination in reimbursement rates, 
proposed a new tariff system, and removed from the legislation the restrictions on professional 
freedom to which the doctors’ associations objected. Agreements regarding fees would only 
come into effect if at least 60% of doctors in each arrondissement approved them. This provi-
sion was subsequently amended (14 January 1970) to the affect that an agreement would be 
binding unless it was rejected by 40% of doctors within thirty days. Incentives in the form of 
special pension arrangements – for ‘conventioned’ doctors only – were to encourage doctors 
to accept conventions and as partial compensation for any loss of income. The state would 
pay part of the premium for a special pension insurance.89 From 1966 onwards, negotiations 
between the doctors and the mutualities made good progress, and new agreements were 
concluded in subsequent years, almost without problems.90
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3/ Everyone compulsorily insured – well, almost
In the years that followed, the Wet-Leburton was developed and refi ned through a series of 
laws and decrees. As mentioned above, the compulsory insurance system was extended to 
cover new groups of insured persons. The jewel in the crown was the act of 27 June 1969, 
whereby compulsory insurance (the branch relating to medical costs) was extended to all 
population groups that were not yet insured. By 1970, as a result of the addition of various 
new groups, virtually the whole population was compulsorily insured for sickness and dis-
ability. However, not everyone was insured to the same extent: the self-employed were insured 
only for major risks.91 The various national alliances reorganised their voluntary insurance 
for the self-employed, which was offered even before 1964, and converted it into voluntary 
insurance for minor risks. Persons outside the scope of the compulsory insurance system 
could insure themselves voluntarily. 
Doctors protest against the statutory regulation of fees, 1962
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g. Laws and practical diffi culties interfere between word and deed, 1975-1990
1/ The Petit Report
The legislation of 7 July 1966 was designed to make the insurance organisations more effi cient 
and restore fi nancial equilibrium. In order to prevent defi cits in the future, the legislation 
empowered the King (or the government as necessary) to make direct changes to the system 
of services and the conditions for reimbursement. The legislation also provided for personal 
mediation in the case of certain services. After several years it had become clear that the 
Leburton Act, despite a favourable economic climate and substantial increases in premiums 
through the continual increases in the wage threshold (from BEF 8,600 in 1964 to almost BEF
38,000 in 1975), had not brought about a lasting equilibrium in the health-insurance system. 
Year after years, ever-larger defi cits were recorded.92 In addition, between 1966 and 1975, 
government funding had increased from less than 35% to 40% of health-insurance revenues. 
At the end of 1974, the healthcare defi cit had to be cleared again with a loan of BEF 5.55 
billion. The budget of 1975 showed a defi cit of BEF 10.4 billion.
Given the continually increasing expenditure, and the realisation that defi cits were the rule 
rather than the exception, the government was forced to take action to solve the health-
insurance funding problem. In 1975, the government appointed a Royal Commissioner, Mr 
Petit, whose task was to propose the most appropriate measures to reorganise and improve the 
functioning of healthcare insurance at lower costs within the general context of healthcare 
policy.93 In his lengthy report of 1976, Petit formulated a number of proposals to prevent the 
bankruptcy of the compulsory health-insurance system. With regard to fi nance, he proposed 
retaining the existing system, but with a completely different structure. The general system 
and the system for the self-employed would be divided into a sector for the ‘active’ population 
and sector for ‘non-active’ persons, the ‘WIGW’ category (widowed persons, orphans, disabled 
and retired persons). The fi rst sector would have to be fi nancially self-suffi cient, while insu-
rance for non-active persons would be fi nanced from three sources: a solidarity contribution 
from active persons, a personal contribution payable by those in the WIGW category with 
a higher income, and a government subsidy. This was supposed to result in a more rational 
and manageable system. 
Petit presented an impressive series of proposals to eliminate the accumulated defi cits and 
above all prevent future defi cits. Only the most important proposals will be discussed here. 
Petit regarded an increase in the basic premium and the abolition of the wage threshold, 
including in the system for the self-employed, as necessary as well as feasible, because the basic 
contribution in Belgium was one of the lowest in Europe. In order to eliminate fi nancial 
defi cits, co-payments by patients/healthcare consumers would also have to be increased. At 
the same time, Petit proposed a review of the list of registered and reimbursable medicines. 
The unbridled expansion of hospital costs had to be brought under control through binding 
plans relating to the number of hospital beds, a reduction in the length of hospital stays, and 
more effective management of the per-day rate for hospitalisation.94 Improved co-operation 
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between fi rst-line healthcare providers (i.e. GPs) and (hospital) specialists would prevent 
overlap and double costs. 
The structure and functioning of the health-insurance funds did not escape Petit’s attention 
either. He pointed out that new legislation was urgently needed to replace the Mutualiteitwet
1893. The new legislation should emphasise the role of the health-insurance funds as the 
defenders and representatives of their entitled benefi ciaries. He also regarded the provision 
of advice and information, social guidance, and the organisation of supplementary services as 
essential tasks for a modern health-insurance fund.95 Simplifi ed administration (e.g. by abolis-
hing premium receipts) could also help to cut costs. Finally, Petit advocated the restructuring 
of the RIZIV. Stakeholder groups that were interested only in securing their share of the budget, 
and not in the actual responsibilities of management, would no longer be eligible for a seat 
on the management committee.96 Petit was clearly referring to the doctors’ associations. 
2/ The government procrastinates
The Petit Report, published in 1976, attracted a great deal of attention and initiated a discus-
sion between the social partners that lasted for many years but was slow to produce concrete 
results. The government appointed a working group under Delpérée (Secretary-General of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs), which was responsible for translating Petit’s suggestions into 
feasible proposals. Clearly, the government’s priority was to restore fi nancial equilibrium. 
The working group was not allowed to formulate proposals that resulted in new costs or 
lower revenues. 
Some of Petit’s suggestions were adopted almost in full by the working group, for example 
the introduction/increase of the co-payment for hospitalisation, a reduction in the number of 
hospital beds, price reductions for medicines, and a franchise of 25% of the agreed price for 
minor risks. With regard to the administrative costs of the insurance organisations, the wor-
king group recommended that these should no longer be based on total revenue, but would 
be replaced by a fi xed sum for each entitled benefi ciary. Monitoring and supervision of the 
insurance organisations should be the task of the state.97 The working group also proposed 
that parliament draw up a new basic legislation for the health-insurance funds. 
According to the working group, there were two ways to increase revenues: either increase 
basic contributions or amend the formula for calculating them. The idea of separate budgets 
for active and non-active persons was adopted, but with increased scope in the context of 
providing social security. The private sector and the state would fi nance the insurance sectors 
for unemployment and disability, while active employees would fi nance only health insurance. 
The budget for non-active persons would be funded through the personal contributions paid 
by the non-active persons and through government subsidies.98
3/ A bankrupt health-insurance system?
Despite all the studies, proposals, small-scale cutbacks, and the abolition of the wage threshold 
in 1982, the situation worsened. At the end of 1980, the RIZIV once again had to resort to a 
loan of more than BEF 28 billion to eliminate a defi cit that had accumulated in the period 
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1976-1980. In 1981, the government fi nanced 43.8% of the healthcare sector, and premiums 
paid by insured persons and employers contributed 21.9% and 32.7% respectively. For the 
period 1981-1984, the accumulated defi cit was as much as BEF 60 billion. 
This enormous defi cit could only be attributed to the healthcare branch, since the sickness-
benefi t branch had recorded a surplus. In a report in 1984, Dillemans – since 1980 chair-
man of a Royal Commission charged with preparing the codifi cation, harmonisation and 
simplifi cation of the social-security system – pointed to several factors as an explanation for 
the relative failure of the Wet-Leburton of 1963:
– The fi nancial repercussions of the preferential tariffs for those in the WIGW category had 
been underestimated. Demographic ageing and increased life expectancy have led to a 
huge increase in healthcare expenditure for this category of entitled benefi ciaries. In 1966, 
the WIGW category accounted for 38.5% of healthcare expenditure. By 1983, this fi gure 
had increased to 52.5%.
– Due to the unfavourable economic climate, total revenue from premiums was lower 
than expected. High unemployment rates had a negative infl uence on the number of 
employees in the social-security system. 
– The introduction of bridge pensions for the disabled signifi cantly increased the expendi-
ture of the benefi ts branch of the social-security system.
– The lack of a healthcare policy focusing on primary healthcare caused the number of 
hospital beds, clinics, laboratories, pharmacies and healthcare workers to spiral out of 
control.99
Adding to Dillemans’ conclusions, Kesenne pointed to the sharp increases in the cost price 
of a number of medical procedures. Between 1966 and 1981, the consumer price index rose 
by 250%. In the same period, the per-day charge for hospitalisation increased six-fold and 
the price of pharmaceuticals provided in hospitals increased fi fteen-fold.100
4/ Cautious restructuring
As a result of the continuing crisis and large budget defi cits, the Belgian national debt had 
escalated between 1970 and 1985. A growing ‘interest snowball’ threatened to drag the entire 
Belgian economy with it and mortgage the future of the country. Restructuring plans were 
drawn up and – at last – implemented, albeit only in part. There were major reorganisations 
from 1984 onwards, mainly in the hospital sector. Hospitals that were too small were forced to 
merge, with a reduction in the total number of beds. Departments (mainly geriatric, maternity 
and paediatric departments) were downsized or even closed. Some of the beds released through 
these measures were used to set up specialised geriatric departments in homes for the elderly. 
In an effort to control escalating expenditure on clinical biology, a fi xed payment for services 
was introduced. In order to control the increasing cost of the more expensive services (e.g. 
laboratory tests, radiology), separate budgets were allocated to each service within the overall 
compulsory-insurance budget. If budget limits were exceeded, correction mechanisms (e.g. 
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reduced fees) were activated. From 1989, the concept of therapeutic freedom was also ‘ad-
justed’. The health-insurance funds were now required to produce statistics for each healthcare 
provider, making it possible to monitor the prescription behaviour of GPs and detect fraud 
and abuse. From 1993, following an introductory and test phase, effective sanctions could be 
imposed (e.g. suspension from compulsory-sector services for a specifi ed period).101 Until 
the end of 1987, the fi nancial performance of the Belgian health-insurance sector went from 
bad to worse. The situation fi nally improved in 1988, 1989 and 1990. However, the improved 
results could not be attributed to more effective control of expenditure in real terms. The 
respite in the fi nancial problems of the health-insurance sector was largely due to increased 
revenues resulting from the economic upturn and the large surpluses transferred from other 
social-security sectors.102
In the meantime, through the Royal Decree of 23 July 1985, a fresh attempt was made to 
align the distribution of government funding among the health-insurance funds with the 
varying levels of risk and the social circumstances (unemployment, WIGW) of insured persons. 
This change benefi ted the socialist mutualities most, and the liberal and neutral mutualities 
to a lesser extent. The socialist funds insured less than 29% of the insured population, but 
received more than 36% of government funding. By contrast, the Christian mutualities insured 
almost 45% of the insured population and received the same amount of funding. Despite 
these changes, the socialist funds continued to incur losses. The large discrepancy between 
the revenue and expenditure of the socialist mutualities was causing increasing concern and 
rancour in the world of health insurance.
Table VI.5 Average annual growth percentages for healthcare expenditure in the system of sickness and 
disability insurance (Belgium), 1969-1989











1969-1974 15.44 6.41 9.03
1974-1979 13.54 7.28 6.26
1979-1984  8.28 7.14 1.14
1984-1989  6.49 2.36 4.13
Source: J. Kesenne, J. Hermesse and R. Soete, ‘Financiële verantwoordelijkheid: een regeling voor de 
toekomst’, in: D. Sauer (ed.), De mutualiteit vandaag en morgen, 369.
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Table VI.6 Breakdown of revenues, expenditures and members (salaried persons only) among the Belgian 










Christian 36.38 48.02 42.16 41.15 44.47
Neutral 9.79 8.65 9.26 9.08 9.10
Socialist 36.03 25.34 30.40 31.99 28.66
Liberal 7.36 6.22 6.76 6.71 6.41
Occupational 9.63 11.17 10.35 10.21 10.50
Auxiliary 0.81 0.60 0.99 0.85 0.85
*) for healthcare 
services
Source: As for Table VI.5; 376.
h. From mutuality to health-insurance fund: the Act of 6 August 1990
1/ Doctors as agitators
In 1990, the Belgian Mutuatliteitwet (1894) had been in force for almost a century. Since its 
introduction, the social context of the legislation and the scope of the mutual relief funds 
had changed radically. The act of 1894 made no mention of national alliances, but it was the 
organisational structure based on national alliances that was so crucial to the effi cient opera-
tion of the health-insurance system. There were repeated calls to modernise the legislation, 
adjust the objectives of the health-insurance funds to today’s circumstances, and give the tasks 
relating to the administration of compulsory health insurance a fi tting place within the system 
as a whole. Furthermore, the question was whether the primary societies at the lowest level 
of the hierarchy should be maintained.103
Financial diffi culties quickly led to disputes. It is diffi cult for the management of any or-
ganisation to announce and justify expenditure cuts to critical constituents, and this was no 
different in the compulsory insurance sector. Health-insurance funds were quick to blame 
the high fees of ‘greedy’ healthcare providers for the unmanageable defi cit. In the 1980s, 
the funds themselves came under heavy fi re from the doctors, who accused them of being 
uncontrollable and wasteful socio-political powers. The leaders of the Syndicale Kamers der 
Geneesheren (National Chambers of Doctors) in particular, which had long battled against the 
health-insurance funds in the cause of liberal medicine, pointed to the funds as being the cause 
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of all the problems and responsible for the defi cits in the health-insurance system.104 On the 
basis of the outdated legislation of 1894, the Syndicale Kamers initiated several high-profi le 
proceedings in which the senior executives of the Christian and socialist mutualities were 
summoned to appear in court. These proceedings attracted a great deal of media attention, 
not only because those standing trial were well-known political personalities, but mainly 
because the insurance funds were such an important part of Belgian public life.105 The militant 
doctors’ organisation accused the leaders of the health-insurance funds of using money from 
statutory insurance to fund their own initiatives. Considerable tensions arose with regard to 
voluntary supplementary insurance organised by the funds at local or national alliance level. 
The representatives of the funds were cleared, but it had to be admitted that many funds had 
(too) freely interpreted the old legislation from 1894. Seen from the perspective of the le-
gislation dating from the end of the nineteenth century, many of the voluntary activities that 
the funds were involved in at the end of the twentieth century were illegal. Modernisation 
of the legislation, as advocated by Petit as early as 1976, could no longer be postponed if the 
health-insurance funds were to protect themselves from new attacks.106
2/ A legal foundation for a modern insurance system
In 1990, parliament approved legislation designed to provide a defi nitive legal basis for the 
activities of the mutualities. The act contained several important reforms. Offi cially, the old 
name ‘mutualiteiten’ (mutualities) was changed to ‘ziekenfondsen’ (health-insurance funds) and 
the existing tripartite organisational structure was replaced with a bipartite structure: health-
insurance funds (the former verbonden) and landsbonden (national alliances). The (local) primary 
societies were disbanded and their assets, rights, obligation and members were transferred to the 
health-insurance funds (i.e. the former co-ordinating regional alliance). Only in exceptional 
cases, and subject to strict conditions, was it possible for a mutual-relief society to remain a 
legal entity under that name. The health-insurance funds became responsible for managing 
compulsory insurance as well as organising a number of additional services. 
The landsbonden were now the ‘core’ of mutualist life in a legal as well as a practical sense. 
The legislation of 6 August 1990 defi ned landsbonden of health-insurance funds as associations 
of at least fi ve funds. The landsbonden have the same aims as the health-insurance funds, but 
can provide services to the members of some or all of the affi liated funds. The new legislation 
granted wide-ranging powers to the landsbonden and set out their responsibilities in accord-
ance with the provisions of the World Health Organisation.107 All health-insurance funds 
were required to join a landsbond, which was empowered to act as an insurance organisation. 
At the same time, every health-insurance fund was required to offer at least one service 
with the purpose of participating in the administration of compulsory health and disability 
insurance. These services had to be approved by a landsbond. This meant that the landsbonden
were effectively handed a de-facto monopoly. The intention was apparently to prevent the 
creation of pseudo-funds set up by insurance companies and other companies or institutions 
that wished to take advantage of the benefi ts of the mutualist statute. The health-insurance 
funds also had to provide fi nancial resources for the prevention and treatment of illness. In 
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addition, they could pay out supplementary incapacity benefi ts and provide fi nancial support 
in situations whereby the physical, psychological or social well-being of the members can be enhanced.
They were also required to provide assistance, information and advice to persons with com-
pulsory or voluntary insurance.108 This created a legal foundation for the activities of the 
health-insurance funds and landsbonden, in the compulsory and voluntary insurance sectors. 
The health-insurance funds were also granted the power to defend their members in court 
in cases where excessive fees had been charged. They were allowed to conclude co-operative 
agreements with public and private legal entities. In order to ensure that the health-insurance 
funds were democratically controlled, the 1990 legislation stipulated that management boards 
were to be elected every six years, with all members entitled to vote.109
3/ Tighter controls over an insurance monopoly anchored in law
One of the main aims of the new act was to stave off new complaints about the combining 
of funds from compulsory and voluntary supplementary insurance. In addition to refi ning a 
system of internal control, an independent supervision authority was set up to monitor the 
health-insurance funds and landsbonden: the Controledienst voor de ziekenfondsen en de landsbonden 
van ziekenfondsen (Supervising Authority for Health-Insurance Funds and National Alli-
ances of Health-Insurance Funds).110 The aim of the legislature was to make only one body 
responsible for monitoring all the activities of the health-insurance funds and landsbonden,
in contrast to the past, when supervisory tasks for different activities were designated to dif-
ferent entities. Monitoring and supervision would cover three aspects: fi nance/accounting, 
insurance practice and general activities. The fi rst form of supervision and control was carried 
out by independent auditors who were to be allowed full access to fund accounts – at all 
levels – and to all services offered. With regard to the supervision of insurance practice, the 
legislation provided for the compulsory recognition of every service providing voluntary 
supplementary insurance, unless the nature or scope of the services was such that no fi nancial 
risk was involved. In addition, separate reserve funds had to be created for certain activities. 
Besides these two aspects, the supervisory authority was responsible for ensuring that the 
activities of the mutualities remained within the defi ned framework and were in accordance 
with the principles of protection, mutual assistance and solidarity. The new authority was 
also responsible for the composition and proper functioning of the decision-making bodies 
of the health-insurance funds and landsbonden.
In exchange for the tighter control and regulation provided in the 1990 act, the health-
insurance funds have gained a solid position in the health-insurance market. This has left 
hardly any scope for private insurers, since almost everyone is compulsorily insured through 
a health-insurance fund.111 Revenues are currently generated through premiums (approx. 
60%) and various forms of state subsidy (approx. 40%). A salaried person (employee or civil 
servant) pays 3.55% (2001) and his employer 3.8% of the gross wage for compulsory insurance 
(to cover medical costs). In addition, the Belgian health-insurance funds also pay out sickness 
benefi ts, for which the parties pay 1.15% and 2.35% respectively (2001). In contrast to the 
Netherlands and Germany, where premium ceilings are incorporated in the income threshold, 
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in Belgium these contributions have been calculated on an unlimited wage base since 1982. 
Consequently, there is a not insignifi cant redistribution between employees with high and 
low wages, which means that the principle of (compulsory) solidarity is fully effective.
i. The health-insurance fund landscape 
1/ The Christian mutualities lead the market, 1944-1963
The Besluitwet op de Maatschappelijke Zekerheid der Arbeiders of 1944 was a radical reform that 
fundamentally changed the nature/essence and functioning of the pre-war mutualities. After 
decades of ideological discussions and intense political struggle, the fi rst post-war govern-
ment opted for mutualistic plurality rather than a single mutual entity, thereby preserving 
freedom of choice for insured persons. However, the mutualities lost some of their autonomy: 
premiums were now collected by the state, and the activities of the mutualities as executive 
bodies were strictly regulated.112
The signifi cant lead that the socialist funds had gained immediately after the First World 
War was gradually eroded by the Christian health-insurance funds in the inter-war years. 
This trend, which was favourable to the LCM, continued after the Second World War. At the 
end of 1945, one year after the introduction of compulsory insurance, the LCM had 585,989 
members, or 34.5% of the total number of persons with compulsory insurance. This was 
almost the same number as the socialist landsbond, which the LCM would overtake in the 
years to come. By 1963, the LCM was clearly the largest alliance with approximately 43% of 
the total number of persons with compulsory insurance.113 The LCM immediately took the 
lead in the sector for voluntary insurance. In 1945 it had 246,736 members, increasing to 
339,759 in 1963. The LCM therefore had as many self-employed members as the other four 
landsbonden combined. Not surprisingly, the professional mutualities had a stronger position 
than the socialist health-insurance funds in this category. 
Interestingly enough, members rarely moved from one fund to another. Since employees 
were required to insure themselves, and the premium was a wage percentage that was deter-
mined by law for everyone, the health-insurance funds could no longer compete on the basis 
of premiums. In addition, Belgian society was already strongly ‘pillarised’ before the Second 
World War, and polarisation sometimes took on extreme forms – as the intense debate on 
schools (Schoolstrijd, 1955-1958) showed – so there was very little ‘defection’ from one ideo-
logical camp to another. It was highly unusual for children, once they reached employment 
age, to move to a different health-insurance fund than their parents. Most changes took place 
upon marriage, if the partners were members of different insurance funds. That is why the 
health-insurance funds granted generous benefi ts on marriage through their voluntary sup-
plementary insurance (discussed below). 
Two factors benefi ted the LCM and largely explain the rapid growth of its market share in 
the compulsory insurance sector between 1945 and 1963. In Flanders, the Christian labour 
was much more widely established than the socialist movement, which in turn was dominant 
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in Wallonia. In Flanders, the Christian trade union and mutualities often had a dense network 
of parish facilities for their activities and services. The Christian trade union and mutuali-
ties had an advantage over their socialist competitors, thanks to the creation of new jobs 
through the rapid economic development of Flanders, combined with the stagnation – and 
even decline – in Wallonia’s mining and steel industry. Furthermore, the Christian landsbond’s
growing share in the compulsory insurance market was boosted by the fact that large Catholic 
families in Flanders provided a larger source of potential members.114
2/ Stable market shares, 1963-2000
The rapid increase in the number of compulsorily insured persons between 1963 and 1970 
had remarkably little infl uence on the balance of power between the landsbonden. From 1970 
onwards, the health insurance funds were strikingly stable, although between 80,000 and 
100,000 Belgians every year moved to another insurance fund between 1995 and 2000.115
For many years, the market share of the Christian mutualities varied between 44 and 45% 
of the total number of compulsorily insured persons, compared to 29% for the socialist 
mutualities. The two largest landsbonden together insured approximately three-quarters of 
the insured population. The remainder were insured via the three small landsbonden (liberal, 
neutral and independent), the Hulpkas (Auxiliary Fund), and an ‘outsider’, namely the health 
insurance fund of the Belgian National Railway Company (NMBS). The legislation of 1990 
made provision for this employee fund, which has existed for a very long time. Obviously 
the role of this fund will diminish as the number of NMBS employees is reduced. However, it 
has more members than the Hulpkas, the public body for those who do not wish to affi liate 
themselves with any of the fi ve voluntary landsbonden.
Table VI.7 Membership of Belgian landsbonden, 1936
Landsbond Members In % Entitled In %
   benefi ciaries
    
Socialist 549,307 42.4 1,196,205 38.5
Christian 393,545 30.3 1,147,214 36.9
Liberal 85,313 6.6 216,460 7.0
Neutral 160,469 12.4 271,480 8.7
Professional 93,616 7.2 215,009 6.9
Flemish National 14,491 1.1 63,009 2.0
    
Total 1,296,741 100.0 3,109,377 100.0
Source: H. de Geest, ‘Oorsprong en evolutie van de mutualiteiten in België en een situering van de 
kristelijke mutualiteiten’, in: D. Sauer (ed.), De mutualiteit vandaag en morgen, 14.
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The only really notable shift took place in the compulsory insurance sector among the 
landsbonden of the neutral and independent health-insurance funds (the old professional 
mutualities). In 1990, Landsbond van Bedrijfs- en Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen (the National 
Union of Professional and Independent Health-Insurance (LBBOZ)) increased its membership 
by almost 400,000. Its market share consequently increased in a single step from 10.4% to 
14.9%. This spectacular shift was entirely to the disadvantage of the Landsbond van Neutrale 
ziekenfondsen (Neutral Association of Health-Insurance Funds (LNZ)), which lost more than 
half its members and market share. The changes that took place in the 1990s did not usually 
exceed tenths of a percent, and the relative shares of the funds remained more or less the same. 
The share and absolute number of members of the two smallest landsbonden have continued to 
decline slowly but surely. As a result, the existence of the Landsbond van Liberale Mutualiteiten
(Alliance of Liberal Health-Insurance Funds (LLM)), and in particular the LNZ, was threatened 
by decreasing returns to scale in the ever-more complex world of healthcare. 
The self-employed sector has also been very stable for a long time, with changes occurring 
only in the past decade. In contrast to the employee sector, the absolute number of insured 
self-employed persons decreased continually, and fell by more than 100,000 between 1990 
and 1998. The membership of all the landsbonden therefore declined, with the exception of 
the LBBOZ. As in the employee insurance sector in 1990, this alliance increased its membership 
signifi cantly at the expense of the LNZ, and there were even further increases starting in 1995. 
With 23.4% (1998) of the insured self-employed persons, the LBBOZ is clearly in second place. 
Although, in 1990,  four smaller landsbonden were active in addition to the dominant LCM,
the LBBOZ has developed into a fully-fl edged competitor of the LCM, while, in this sector, too, 
the position of the LNZ has been reduced to that of minor market player.
Table VI.8 Distribution (%) of entitled benefi ciaries/employees among Belgian insurance organisations, 
1988-2000*)
Organisation 1988 1990 1995 2000
    
LCM 44.5 44.7 44.4 44.1
LNZ 9.1 4.3 4.4 3.8
NVSM 28.7 28.9 29.1 29.0
LLM 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.7
LBBOZ 10.2 14.6 13.8 15.0
HKZIV 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.8
NMBS ---- ---- 1.7 1.6
*): Following the introduction of the legislation in 1990, the name Landsbond van de Beroeps-
mutualiteiten was changed to Landsbond van de Bedrijfs- en Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen.
Source: Studiedienst LCM, report of 24 May 2000 and RIZIV Annual Report 2000, 151-2.
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Table VI.9 Distribution (%) of self-employed persons (including dependants) among the Belgian insu-
rance organisations, 1988-2000
Organisation 1988 1990 1995 2000
    
lcm 49.0 49.1 49.1 48.8
lnz 12.5 6.5 6.5 5.4
nvsm 13.2 13.6 14.0 14.0
llm 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.1
lbboz 16.3 21.7 21.3 23.5
hkziv 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3
Source: Studiedienst LCM, report of 24 May 2000 and RIZIV Annual Report 2000, 156-7.
j. Developments 1995-2000
1/ Voluntary supplementary insurance: increasing differentiation and competition116
As mentioned above, competition from private insurers was virtually excluded by the act of 
1990, which also heavily restricted competition between the health-insurance funds. Percen-
tage contributions paid by employees are the same for all the funds, for a fairly comprehensive 
package of medical services, the prices and tariffs for which are set in national conventions 
between all health-insurance funds and all healthcare providers. 
Justaert, chairman of the LCM, declared: We are 90% colleagues and 10% competitors. The 
10% competition relates to vrije aanvullende verzekering (voluntary supplementary insurance 
(VAV)) that the health-insurance funds are permitted to offer. When the compulsory insurance 
system was introduced in 1944, most of the health-insurance funds introduced voluntary 
supplementary insurance for minor risks not covered by that system. The premiums and 
benefi ts for this voluntary insurance vary from fund to fund, i.e. between the funds of the 
various landsbonden, and between funds in the same alliance. The elected management board 
of a (regional) health-insurance fund sets the level of benefi ts for members and the relevant 
premiums. The landsbond intervenes as necessary. The term ‘voluntary’ (vrij) does not mean 
that members can opt out of this supplementary insurance. When a person chooses to join 
a particular health-insurance fund, he/she is required to pay the premium for this supple-
mentary insurance. 
Health-insurance funds can use the income from VAV to implement and fi nance their own 
initiatives. Classic examples of benefi ts fi nanced from voluntary supplementary-insurance 
premiums were funeral expenses, holidays for the chronically ill and disabled, transport, and 
aerotherapeutics and holiday camps for young people. Some organisations use revenue from 
voluntary supplementary insurance to fi nance their own institutions (hospitals, sanatoria in 
Belgium and abroad, and care homes for the disabled) or initiatives such as speech-therapy 
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clinics, homecare and travel insurance. As mentioned above, ‘propagandist’ premiums were 
paid from voluntary-insurance revenue as an incentive to retain marrying members. The use 
of this revenue as a basis for competition between the health-insurance funds led the RIZIV
to recommend to the Minister for Social Affairs in mid-2001 that certain supplementary 
insurance benefi ts be abolished (e.g. benefi ts on marriage, confi rmation, birthday, golden 
wedding anniversary) on the grounds that they contravened the act of 1990, which stipulates 
that insurance funds must not offer incentives in order to attract members.117
It is clear that voluntary supplementary insurance has enabled the health-insurance funds 
to go beyond the boundaries of their limited role as insurers and operate as welfare organisa-
tions. After the legislative amendments of 1990, voluntary supplementary insurance gradu-
ally came to serve a new purpose. Given that the legislation of 30 March 1994 imposed a 
limit of 1.5% on real growth (above infl ation) in healthcare expenditure while the needs of 
medical technology continue to develop, the compulsory-insurance system can no longer 
keep pace. The chronic funding shortfall in the compulsory insurance system means that 
there are considerable delays before new medical technologies and treatments are introduced 
and included in compulsory health insurance. Health-insurance funds are increasingly using 
revenue from voluntary supplementary insurance to fund life-enhancing surgical procedures 
that the compulsory insurance system is currently unable to pay for. The system for voluntary 
supplementary insurance thus serves as a ‘holding area’ until there is greater fi nancial scope 
within the compulsory insurance sector. 
This makes it possible for a modern, effi cient health-insurance fund to gain a competitive 
advantage with its voluntary supplementary insurance. In the world of Belgian health insu-
rance, previously unknown concepts such as managed care and preferred providers are becoming 
more common. Health-insurance funds, either individually or with other funds in their lands-
bond, are beginning to conclude regional agreements with hospitals for the reimbursement 
of additional costs for certain services (e.g. endoscopy equipment). Members’ costs are only 
reimbursed (from VAV income) if they attend a hospital that has signed the contract. Increa-
singly, negotiations are being held with specialists regarding a system based on guideline rates 
for procedures not covered by a convention (e.g. orthodontics). Specialists who participate in 
this system become the preferred providers for the members of the health-insurance fund. 118
Voluntary supplementary insurance not only allows the landsbonden and their funds to 
compete, but also enables the funds within a particular landsbond to specialise in different 
types of benefi ts. At the end of the 1950s, the proposals made by Minister Servais led to 
tensions between the Flemings and the Walloons. Within some of the landsbonden, the recent 
extension of the voluntary insurance system is once again driving a wedge between the two 
language groups. This is most evident in the largest landsbond, the LCM, with regard to hospital 
insurance. While the Walloon funds extend cover to everyone in the interest of solidarity, and 
consequently introduced a sharp increase in premiums for voluntary insurance, the Flemish 
funds exclude members over the age of 60 in order to avoid having to increase these pre-
miums. On the other hand, in 2001, the Christian mutualities in Flanders, in the context of 
their voluntary supplementary insurance, introduced their own insurance to reimburse the 
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cost of non-medical care for persons who have become dependent (mainly elderly persons), 
for which the state makes no provision.119
2/ Greater fi nancial responsibility for the health-insurance funds
Since the war, the Belgian healthcare model has provided services of a high standard at a 
reasonable cost. At the beginning of the 1990s, the cost of healthcare accounted for ap-
proximately 7 to 8% of GNP, i.e. roughly the same level as in the Netherlands, for example. 
It was not so much the cost price itself that caused concern, but the rate at which it was 
increasing, particularly in the light of the need to restructure Belgium’s public fi nances and 
prevent further rises in labour costs. The legislation of 30 March 1994 was designed to con-
trol healthcare expenditure, stipulating that real growth must not exceed 1.5% per year.120
The government’s magic formula for achieving this was to propose budgets for a number of 
expenditure categories (hospitals, laboratories, rehabilitation) and make the health-insurance 
funds more responsible for expenditure.
From an early stage, the Belgian compulsory insurance system placed a high level of 
responsibility with patients themselves. For a long time, patients in Belgium were required to 
make quite substantial co-payments for a large number of medical services, and particularly 
for pharmaceuticals. In exchange for his premium, a member of a health-insurance fund 
can expect only 75% of the fee paid to a GP or specialist to be reimbursed. For rehabilita-
tion or speech therapy, the reimbursement percentage can be even lower. Patients are also 
required to make a co-payment for pharmaceuticals provided during a stay in hospital. For 
elderly, widowed and disabled persons, co-payments are lower and certain medicines are 
free of charge.121 In 1995, co-payments amounted to BEF 60 billion against BEF 401 billion 
expenditure on health insurance. In addition, patients paid BEF 60 billion out of their own 
pocket for non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals and all manner of supplements – the latter 
mainly in hospitals.122
By Royal Decree of 12 August 1994, the health-insurance funds were made more 
responsible for expenditures and meeting budgetary goals. Defi cits were now to be borne by 
the insurance funds through their individual and collective fi nancial accountability, and by 
the RIZIV General Council, made up of representatives of the health-insurance funds, trade 
unions, employers and the government. Initially, the income of every insurance organisation 
would be determined. The combined income of all insurance organisations would have to 
be equal to the national healthcare budget. Gradually, the health-insurance funds were made 
more accountable. In 1995 and 1996, 10% of the budget would be allocated to the insu-
rance organisations to cover the expenditure norm. The remaining 90% would be allocated 
to cover part of actual expenditure. The importance of normative funding increased over 
time, to reach 40% by 2001.123
An expenditure norm represents the costs that an insurance organisation can expect to incur 
on the basis of the risk profi le of its membership base. The remainder of the budget is allocated 
retrospectively on the basis of the each health-insurance fund’s share of total expenditure in 
the year in question. If an insurance organisation’s income exceeds its expenditure, 15% of 
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the difference can be deposited in a reserve fund. The interest earned on the reserve fund 
can be used to fi nance additional administrative costs, enabling the organisation to improve 
its services (e.g. by recruiting extra staff). When an insurance organisation’s expenditure ex-
ceeds its income, it is responsible for 15% of the defi cit, to be fi nanced from its reserves. In 
order to create an initial reserve, in 1995 and 1996 all health-insurance funds were required 
to collect an extra premium of BEF 90 per member. An insurance organisation with a defi cit 
must therefore use this special reserve fund, and subsequently replenish the fund to the tune 
of BEF 180 per insured person, either through an extra premium or from its own reserves. 
It is clear that, in the long term, this delegation of fi nancial responsibility will have important 
consequences for health insurance in general and the health-insurance funds in particular. 
Funds that generate a surplus have more money, can extend and enhance their service pro-
vision, attract more members, and have a more solid foundation.124 Time will tell whether 
competition and market forces will heal the chronically ailing health-insurance system. The 
coming years will certainly be very diffi cult. On the one hand, the mutualities have (too) 
little room for manoeuvre to ensure that the limited resources made available by the RIZIV
are suffi cient to cover healthcare costs. There are few possibilities for selective contracts, for 
example, too few resources and too little authority to infl uence the prescription behaviour of 
medical practitioners.125 On the other hand, it is not easy to formulate precise and gene rally 
accepted criteria for the norm element. Further, individual risk parameters were not available 
in Belgium, which meant that the distribution had to be based on aggregated data.126
Obviously there is a considerable gap between theory and practice. At the beginning of 2001, 
it appeared once again that the results were below expectations. Not only did expenditure 
remain above the growth norm of 1.5%, but the Minister for Social Affairs, Van den Broucke, 
was already predicting a sizeable defi cit in the compulsory insurance system for that year.
Summary
During the Second World War, following decades of debate surrounding a compulsory insu-
rance system, an elite group worked in secret to formulate a Social Pact. This paved the way 
for a new and extensive system of compulsory social insurance, including compulsory health 
insurance for employees. The system was fi nanced through a percentage premium, which 
was collected centrally, based on a maximised gross wage and paid jointly by employer and 
employee. A chronic shortage of funds gradually pushed ceilings and premiums upward. Since 
1982, premiums have been based on the total gross wage, so that there is currently complete 
(imposed) solidarity between employees in terms of health insurance. The administration of 
the compulsory insurance system (medical expenses and sickness benefi t) system remained 
the responsibility of the traditional mutualities. The law stipulated which medical services 
and pharmaceuticals were reimbursable. The legislation also enabled the mutualities to offer 
their own services in the form of voluntary supplementary insurance.
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It was not long before the old battle of principles fl ared up again between the Catholics 
and socialists. Successive governments were dissatisfi ed with the health-insurance system 
they inherited, and attempted without success to adapt the legislation to their own ideolo-
gies. Meanwhile, the fi nancial situation went from bad to worse. The Wet-Leburton of 1963 
was designed to pacify the political parties and the health-insurance funds. In the years that 
followed, new groups were continually being admitted to the health-insurance funds and, 
by around 1970, the compulsory health-insurance system could be regarded as a national 
insurance. However, compulsory insurance for the self-employed and the free professions 
covered only major risks.
In the 1970s it became abundantly clear that the government and the social partners, 
who managed the system, had overestimated revenues and underestimated expenditure. The 
government, fearful of the political power of the health-insurance funds, was reluctant to 
intervene and increased its already high contribution even further with additional subsidies 
and loans. By the mid-1980s, the precarious state of public fi nances left no choice. Piecemeal 
cutbacks and restructuring were introduced. In the 1990s, following the example of other 
countries – and the Netherlands in particular – a fi rst, cautious attempt was made to reform 
the system and increase the fi nancial accountability of the mutualities. 
In the meantime, the new Health-Insurance Funds Act of 1990 had put the mutualities in 
a stronger position and given them a virtual monopoly in the health-insurance sector. Private 
insurers had to content themselves (for the time being?) with the ‘crumbs’ of supplementary 
insurance (e.g. for hospitalisation). After the Second World War, the balance of power in terms 
of total membership shifted in favour of the Landsbond van Christelijke Mutualiteiten (National 
Union of Socialist Mutualities (LCM)), which, with a market share of approximately 44%, was 
clearly ahead of the socialist mutualities (29%). After about 1970, there was little change in the 
relative positions of the two market leaders. Of the three small landsbonden, the Landsbond van 
Bedrijfs- en Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen (the National Union of Professional and Independent 
Health-Insurance Funds), which included the factory funds, made remarkable progress. This 
was largely at the expense of the Liberale Landsbond (National Union of Liberal Mutualities) 
and above all the Landsbond van Neutrale Mutualiteiten (National Union of Neutral Mutualities). 
These two small alliances consistently lost ground and began to fear for the future. 
3. The Netherlands
a. New social initiatives
German capitulation in May 1945 brought a defi nite end to the misery of war. However, 
mass unemployment cast a shadow over the euphoria that followed liberation. More than 
ever before, the Dutch needed to translate the national motto Je maintiendrai from words into 
deeds. Radical government intervention was needed in order to prevent the collapse of the 
social system. The rapid reconstruction of traditional sectors and the development of new 
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activities were given absolute priority. Recovery was tackled in a spirit of national solidarity. 
The direct damage to industrial plants had to be repaired as a matter of urgency. The recovery 
process was seriously hampered by an acute shortage of foreign currency, especially dollars. 
Rapid economic reconstruction required the large-scale import of machines and raw materi-
als, while the export sector had collapsed with the loss of trade from Germany, the country’s 
largest market, and revenue from the Netherlands Indies had fallen sharply.
Fortunately, in 1948 the fi nancial oxygen needed to fuel recovery was provided in the form 
of aid under America’s extensive Marshall Plan. Dollars began fl owing into the Netherlands 
and solved industry’s foreign-currency problems. Industry also benefi ted fully from the go-
vernment’s efforts with regard to national reconstruction. In his fi rst industrialisation plan of 
September 1949, the Minister for Economic Affairs, J.R.M. van den Brink, advocated the 
strengthening of the industrial sector as an income base, not only in the light of the increasing 
working population, but also to replace the lost revenue from the former colonies with new 
sources of foreign currency from industrial exports. In the spirit of national solidarity, prices 
and wages had to remain as low and as stable as possible in order to boost exports. Business 
profi ts had to be invested to support export-oriented companies. 
The reconstruction process in the Netherlands was a great success, carried along by a wave 
of national solidarity and political unity. In 1948, industrial production exceeded pre-war 
levels and in 1950 exports had already increased by one-fi fth compared to 1938. During the 
1950s, real GNP increased on average by almost 5% per year, and full employment had almost 
been reached by around 1960. Dutch industry was clearly growing faster than the European 
average, thanks to the policy of wage and price restraint, in co-operation with the trade unions 
and employers. The gradual liberalisation of the world market was also favourable to cheap 
Dutch production. Dutch business and agriculture also profi ted from the German ‘economic 
miracle’ – the extremely rapid and strong recovery of Germany – and European economic 
integration, fi rst through the formation of Benelux and the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) and from 1958 through the European Economic Community (EEC).127
During its exile in London, the Gerbrandy government experienced at fi rst hand two 
initiatives designed to create a society based on social justice after the war. On 14 August 
1941, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, which 
included the freedom from want declaration. All nations would work together to improve 
conditions of employment, achieve economic progress and guarantee social security.128 The 
Dutch government, and above all the Minister for Social Affairs, Van den Tempel, were also 
impressed by the Beveridge Report (Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services) of 1942, 
a comprehensive plan for universal social security in the United Kingdom.129 In 1943 Van 
den Tempel appointed a committee chaired by A.A. van Rhijn, the Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. The task of the committee was to devise a general framework for 
the future development of social insurance. 
The Van Rhijn Report largely followed the English example. It proposed a comprehensive 
system of social provision for the whole population. The report advocated a system that 
provided insurance (based on premiums) and healthcare (partly funded through the tax sys-
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tem), with no distinctions between waged workers, the self-employed, and those who were 
not employed.130 Citizens would have access to the social-security system by virtue of the 
fact that they belonged to the national community. A compulsory insurance system for the entire 
population, from the cradle to the grave – in other words: a national insurance for everything and 
everyone.131 The system would no longer be administered by the bedrijfsverenigingen (indus-
try insurance associations), but by decentralised Social Councils that were as independent 
as possible and governed by public law. The councils would be made up of employer and 
employee representatives and representatives of the government, the small-fi rm sector and 
farmers. The system would be brought under an umbrella organisation, the Central Social 
Council (Centrale Sociale Raad). The various funds for fi nancing benefi ts were to be merged. 
There was no place for co-payment or risk transfer; neither was there a place for private 
insurance unless it supplemented compulsory social insurance.132
As was to be expected, these (too) drastic proposals, which gave virtually no consideration to 
existing institutions or power relationships, met with fi erce resistance. Eventually, on 18 June 
1947 a mixed  Van Rhijn committee was appointed to review the social-insurance system. 
In March 1948 the committee presented a report with proposals that were much less radical 
than those of Van Rhijn. The idea of a more-or-less comprehensive national insurance was 
abandoned for the time being. However, the report stated that, in principle, social insurance 
should be extended to cover the self-employed (e.g. sickness and disability insurance, child 
benefi ts) and it must be possible in the future to extend old-age insurance to cover groups 
other than waged workers and the self-employed. Social insurance would be administered 
by compulsory industry insurance associations made up of employers and employees, the 
social partners and government representatives. These associations would be supervised by 
the Central Social Insurance Council.133
In the years that followed, successive cabinets, beginning with the Catholic-Red coalitions 
led by Willem Drees, rapidly established a fi nely meshed social-security net. The Catholics 
and Socialists were able to reach compromises that had been impossible before the war. 
The Social Democrats accepted the industry insurance associations as the foundation of the 
social-insurance system, and the Catholics accepted de facto the idea of national insurance. The 
Algemene Ouderdomswet (General Old-Age Pensions Act (AOW)) of 1956 was the best example 
of this. It provided for a state pension that would guarantee a basic income for all elderly 
persons.134 Good statutory provisions were also introduced for widowed persons, orphans, 
the disabled and the unemployed. The Sociale Verzekeringsraad (Social Insurance Council), a 
public-law organ established in 1952, supervised the implementing bodies for employee and 
national insurance. Industry insurance associations, which employers were required by law to 
join, were granted a legal monopoly in the implementation of employee insurance, including 
the compulsory insurance for unemployment introduced in 1952.135
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b. Slow legislation, 1945-1970
1/ The Ziekenfondsenbesluit is still the foundation
Although the social-security system was modernised fairly rapidly, remarkably few changes 
were made to the German Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) of 1941. All the parties 
concerned agreed that this moffenbesluit (‘Kraut legislation’) should be replaced as quickly as 
possible with entirely Dutch legislation untainted by the Germans. But the consensus went 
no further than this. Views differed widely: some advocated a return to the pre-war system 
of voluntary insurance, others a limited amendment to the decree. Still others advocated 
compulsory national insurance as proposed in 1946 in the report by the Van Rhijn Com-
mittee. Furthermore, views differed widely on how the health-insurance system should be 
implemented. Employers and employees wanted the system to be implemented by the trusted 
and familiar industry insurance associations, analogous to other social-insurance legislation. 
However, the majority of health-insurance funds and medical-practitioners’ organisations 
wanted to keep the state and the private sector out of the health-insurance sector as far as 
possible. Although many were not against the plan for national insurance, the pragmatists 
who pointed to the sombre economic climate won the day. 
For the next two decades, the ziekenfondsenbeleid (Health-Insurance Fund policy) formed 
the legal framework for health insurance,136 but was stripped of its most obvious Nazi feature, 
namely the Führerprinzip in the form of a commissaris. The act of 24 April 1947 established 
the Ziekenfondsraad (National Health-Insurance Council) and was followed by the Besluit 
op de Ziekenfondsraad (Health-Insurance Council Decree) of 31 January 1948. The decree 
established the mixed composition of the council, which would be made up of 36 members: 
a chairman, seven civil-servant experts, nine representatives of the general health-insurance 
funds, seven representatives from the private sector and twelve representatives of health care 
providers. The act and decree came into effect on 1 January 1949.137
The Ziekenfondsenbesluit distinguished between compulsory health insurance for em-
ployees and a voluntary insurance for non-employees with an income below the threshold. 
Although they could insure themselves with a private insurer instead of a health-insurance 
fund, few people made use of this opportunity because the premiums for private insurance 
were much higher. 
Voluntary health insurance proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit and 
the sector soon encountered serious fi nancial problems.138 According to De Bruine and 
Schut, the problems with voluntary insurance were mainly due to the relatively high risk 
and relatively low income of the insured persons. The high level of risk was due to the fact 
that every compulsorily insured person who was excluded from the work community due 
to disability or old age would more or less certainly end up in the voluntary insurance sector 
because of the lack of affordable alternatives. The division into compulsory and voluntary 
insurance therefore threatened to become a division into an insurance for good risks and 
an insurance for bad risks. As a result, the voluntary insurance sector was faced with much 
higher expenditures than the compulsory sector. Consequently, the premiums set for voluntary 
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insurance soon proved inadequate to cover rapidly rising expenditures. However, the fi nancial 
capacity of the voluntarily insured persons was not strong enough for a break-even premium 
rate.139 First, a number of ad-hoc measures were introduced in an attempt to eliminate the 
defi cits: benefi ts were restricted, a limited government subsidy was granted, and reserves were 
transferred from the compulsory insurance funds. However, these were merely temporary 
‘fi xes’ that could only briefl y postpone structural intervention. 
Under the legislation of 21 December 1950 a number of groups of limited fi nancial 
means (the elderly, the disabled, students, and disabled children under 20 years of age) were 
transferred from the voluntary-insurance system to the compulsory insurance system. At the 
same time, more and more local councils took the initiative to insure the poor via a voluntary 
health-insurance fund so they could dismantle their own health services.140 Starting in 1951, 
premiums for voluntary insurance were no longer set at national level. The health-insurance 
funds could now set differentiated premiums based on the risk profi le of their membership 
base in order to eliminate their defi cits. In most cases, this resulted in substantial increases 
in premiums. 
But this was not the defi nitive answer to the problems. The health-insurance funds were 
caught in a vicious circle that was virtually impossible to break. The increasing cost of health-
care continued to push up the expenditure of the health-insurance funds, which consequently 
needed to increase their income in order to balance their budgets. But the government re-
fused to increase its subsidies for voluntary insurance, and the health-insurance funds had no 
choice but to increase their premiums. This meant that voluntary insurance might become 
unaffordable for persons of limited means. At the same time, the premium increases prompted 
the ‘good risks’ to move to the private insurance sector, which put the voluntary insurance 
sector under even greater fi nancial pressure. The transfer of reserves from the compulsory 
sector could not continue indefi nitely. The health-insurance sector appeared to be sitting on 
a time-bomb. It was certain to explode, but no-one knew when.
Following the introduction of the Algemene Ouderdomswet (General Old-Age Pensions Act 
(AOW)) in 1957, the health-insurance funds introduced a separate insurance for the elderly. From 
the beginning, the funding of this insurance was a major problem for the health-insurance 
funds. On the one hand, access to the insurance was heavily restricted by means of a low 
income threshold. On the other hand, the income-related premium covered no more than 
half the estimated expenditures for each insured person. If revenues were lower than expected, 
the difference had to be made up from the central fund for old-age insurance. In addition, the 
central government had to pay a considerable subsidy each year to eliminate the premium 
shortfall. It soon became apparent that the government subsidy and – even worse for the 
health-insurance funds – the contribution from compulsory-insurance revenue would have 
to be increased in order to ensure the continuity of old-age insurance.141
2/ From Ziekenfondsenbesluit to Ziekenfondswet
The amended Ziekenfondsenbesluit of 1941 was still in force. Prolonged consultations and 
protracted discussions had produced initiatives for a health-insurance act: from Minister Joekes 
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in 1949 and 1951, and from Minister Suurhoff in 1958. Each time, however, their bills and 
draft bills amounted to nothing. The failure was mainly due to old but still thriving pre-war 
ideological differences, i.e. the confl ict between those who advocated a compulsory national 
insurance and those who advocated a combined compulsory/voluntary insurance system 
with the involvement of the private sector. 
The former camp brought together mutual health-insurance funds, the NVV and the Social 
Democrats. The second group comprised the supporters of the confessional principle of 
subsidiarity and independent liberal initiative. The standpoint of the latter group was aptly 
expressed in a report by the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) on the statutory regulation of the 
health-insurance fund system: ‘Given that compulsory insurance has been introduced, and employees 
wish to retain this system, compulsory insurance up to a certain income limit can be considered accep-
table in the circumstances. In regulating this insurance system, however, anything that could undermine 
the sense of personal responsibility must be avoided, and everything must be done to reinforce it.142 The 
dualistic system of partly compulsory and partly voluntary insurance must be maintained, provided that 
statutory measures are taken with a view to establishing a more full voluntary insurance. It is the view 
of the anti-revolutionaries that the compulsory insurance system should not be extended to include the 
self-employed.’143
On 25 August 1962, Minister Veldkamp submitted a new bill for the regulation of health 
insurance, the Ziekenfondswet. This time it was approved – albeit with amendments – and 
came into force on 24 June 1964. The purpose of the legislation was two-fold: to legalise 
and co-ordinate the law of occupation that had existed for more than twenty years, and to 
make a number of changes to technical elements and basic principles.144 The key elements 
for legalisation and co-ordination were as follows:145
– Retain the principle of compulsory health insurance with free choice of doctor, hospital 
and health-insurance fund
– Retain old-age insurance and voluntary insurance in addition to compulsory insurance
– Retain the existing funding mechanisms for compulsory insurance and old-age insurance, 
i.e.:
– compulsory insurance fi nanced through contributions paid jointly by employers and 
insured persons
– a modest premium for old-age insurance, plus substantial (equal) contributions from 
the general fund and general resources
– Retain the principle that the health-insurance funds will be the implementing bodies 
for the three types of insurance, as institutions created from free social initiative
– Retain the Ziekenfondsraad (Health-Insurance Council) to advise the government, monitor 
the insurance system and introduce ‘technical’ measures
– Maintain the benefi ts-in-kind system to at least the existing level, without increasing 
co-payments
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– Retain the principle that services are provided by means of contractual agreements with 
freely established and independent medical and paramedical practitioners, hospitals and 
other relevant institutions
– Retain the principle of free entry into the health-insurance system for eligible organisa-
tions
Changes proposed by Veldkamp with regard to principles were as follows:
– Greater freedom for health-insurance funds: the right to determine their own area of 
operation within reasonable limits and in accordance with statutory guidelines, and greater 
fi nancial independence/autonomy
– Promote legal certainty by including many new complaints committees
– Include provisions to prevent the health-insurance funds from extending their activities 
beyond the desired limits
– Include provisions to ensure that voluntary insurance is  fully complementary to com-
pulsory insurance and old-age insurance
– Reform the voluntary-insurance system through the introduction of a premium based 
on ability to pay and a system of  mutual settlement
– Withdraw the requirement for insurance funds to call themselves ‘general insurance 
funds’
– Change the composition and responsibilities of the Ziekenfondsraad
– Abolish the provision in the legislation that stipulates that a compulsorily insured person 
who is not insured with a health-insurance fund is not entitled to sickness benefi ts
Veldkamp was a competent politician who managed to bring together water and fi re. His draft 
legislation left virtually intact the structure and administration of compulsory insurance for 
employees (i.e. not for the self-employed), and old-age and voluntary insurance. At the same 
time, he managed to appease the advocates of national insurance by announcing, when he 
submitted the draft bill, a further initiative for a national insurance covering serious medical 
risks. Veldkamp proposed several notable changes: freedom to set up a health-insurance fund 
and choose an area of operation; the prohibition for funds to set up their own healthcare 
institutions, and above all a change to the composition of the Ziekenfondsraad.146 Veldkamp 
established a tripartite structure: the council would be made up of employer and employee 
representatives and Crown-appointed members.147 Civil servants, implementing bodies and 
would no longer be represented on the Ziekenfondsraad. These proposed changes met with 
strong resistance, and Veldkamp withdrew most of them. As a result, representatives of the 
health-insurance funds and hospitals were admitted to the council. 
The amended bill was eventually passed by the Lower House on 24 June 1964, and the 
law came into effect on 1 January 1966. The main provisions were as follows: 
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– The Ziekenfondsraad to monitor compliance with the Ziekenfondswet
– Compulsory insurance for wage-earning persons below a specifi ed income threshold
– Health-insurance funds to set premiums for voluntary insurance
– Identical package of benefi ts for compulsory and voluntary insurance
– Insurance for the elderly to be based on three income categories148
In fact, these measures were largely old wine in new bottles, but the politicians had fi nally 
succeeded in introducing healthcare legislation that was purely Dutch and untainted by the 
Nazi regime. 
3/ A national insurance: the AWBZ
Minister Veldkamp kept his word. On 24 January 1966 he submitted a bill that provided 
everyone in the country with insurance to cover serious medical risks. According to the go-
vernment, anyone could fi nd themselves – or a family member – in circumstances in which 
they require medical care for long-term illness or infi rmities but are unable to afford it. 
His draft bill proposed solidarity-based compulsory insurance covering serious medical 
risks for the whole population. In contrast to the existing social insurance programmes, no 
age limit was specifi ed. The purpose of the insurance was to establish entitlement to benefi ts-
in-kind to cover treatment and care in cases of serious medical risks. The insurance was to be 
implemented by the health-insurance funds, health insurers, and the bodies that implemented 
public-law healthcare provisions for civil servants. Insured persons had to pay the premiums, 
which were levied by the tax authority, out of their own pocket.149
In 1966, Minister Veldkamp submitted a public-health memorandum that revealed the vul-
nerable position of voluntary insurance. In 1966, seeking a solution to the pressing problem of 
how to fi nance voluntary health insurance, and to a lesser extent old-age insurance, Veldkamp 
made two unsuccessful attempts to establish a national insurance programme with broader 
cover.150 First, he submitted a bill to amend the Ziekenfondswet with a view to introducing 
compulsory national insurance with an income-related premium for all insured persons whose 
income was below a specifi ed threshold. Veldkamp hoped that this would solve the problems 
with the funding of compulsory, voluntary and old-age insurance, and eliminate the distinc-
tion between them. The proposal was torpedoed by objections from the trade unions and 
medical profession. The employers’ organisations reacted particularly strongly to what they 
saw as the worrying expansion of the social-security system.151 Veldkamp withdrew his bill, 
but made another attempt to extend the scope of the insurance system, this time through an 
amendment to the bill he had already submitted relating to the insurance of serious medical 
risks. This all-too-transparent manoeuvre drew even heavier criticism and was also a failure.152
Veldkamp’s proposed extension of the insurance system was not adopted by his successor, 
Roolvink, and the Lower House eventually passed Veldkamp’s original bill on 25 October 
1967 in slightly amended form as the Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ)). The AWBZ came into effect on 1 January 1968. 
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c. The world of the health-insurance funds, 1945-1970153
1/ One health-insurance fund, two types of insurance
The number of employed people increased rapidly as a result of economic growth and in-
dustrialisation in the post-war years. This increase was immediately refl ected in the number 
of persons insured with the health-insurance funds: on 31 December 1947, the Dutch 
health-insurance funds had 6,400,000 members, compared with 5,300,000 when the 
Ziekenfondsenbesluit was introduced in 1941. The number of compulsorily insured persons 
rose continually to almost 55% of the population in 1955. This increase was also due to 
the tendency to extend the scope of the insurance system to population groups not previ-
ously covered (e.g.  seamen and elderly persons of limited means). After 1955 the number 
of compulsorily insured persons decreased, eventually reaching 49% of the population in 
Minister Veldkamp gives his inaugural speech at the fi rst meeting of the Ziekenfondsraad in 
its new composition. Left: Bartels, Minister for Public Health. Right: De Kort and Ledeboer, 
chairman and secretary of the council
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1960. After 1960 the rate of decrease slowed. The decrease was mainly due to the fact that 
lower-ranking civil servants were no longer covered by the compulsory-insurance system. 
During the 1950s, special insurance schemes were set up for this group and implemented 
by separate public-law bodies.
Non-employees with an income below the threshold could insure themselves voluntarily. 
In 1943, 22.5% of the population did so. This percentage increased slightly in the years that 
followed, but began to fall in 1947 when the health-insurance funds sharply increased their 
premiums in an attempt to reduce their chronic defi cits. In 1960, 15.9% of the population 
were voluntarily insured with the health-insurance funds.154
2/ Further scale increases
In 1942, these persons with compulsory and voluntary insurance were distributed among 
slightly more than 200 approved and recognised Algemene Ziekenfondsen (General Health-
Insurance Funds). In 1945 that number had fallen considerably to 171, and continued to 
decrease after that date. At the end of 1947, 154 funds were still active, of which 139 had 
joined a national organisation. The government wanted the number of funds to fall still 
further. For several years, the Ziekenfondsraad even had a committee that focused on con-
centration and helped to solve problems relating to mergers. In the 1950s, too, the number 
of health-insurance funds continued to fall slowly but surely, from 141 at the end of 1950 
to 127 in 1956. The decrease continued gradually until, by around 1970, approximately 100 
insurance funds remained.
Table VI.10 Overview of Dutch health-insurance organisations and their size relative to the total number 
of insured persons, 31 December 1947
Organisation Funds % members
Federatie Verenigde Maatschappijfondsen 64 48
Centrale Bond van (Onderlinge) Ziekenfondsen 32 18
Bond van R.-K. Ziekenfondsen in Nederland 5 8
Overleg van Ondernemingsfondsen 22 3
Ned. Bond van Ziekenfondsen (commercial funds) 13 14
Organisatie van Algemene Ziekenfondsen 4 8
Unknown or non-organised 15 2
Double membership - 1 - 1
Source: H.C. van der Hoeven, Om de macht bij het fonds, 233. 
Table VI.10 shows that, at the end of 1947, approximately half the total number of com-
pulsorily insured persons were insured with Maatschappijfondsen (Association funds), about 
20% more than during the pre-war years. In 1945 the Maatschappijfondsen broke away from 
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the NMG to form the Federatie Vereenigde Maatschappij Ziekenfondsen (Federation of United 
Association Health-Insurance Funds (Federatie VMZ)). When the Federatie VMZ also became 
legally separate from the NMG in 1954, it changed its name to Federatie van door Verzekerden 
en Medewerkers bestuurde Ziekenfondsen (Federation of Member- and Employer-Administered 
Health-Insurance Funds or Federatie VMZ). The autonomy of the federation did not mean 
a separation from the NMG, and both organisations maintained close ties. There were oc-
casional disputes, however. Directly after the war, confl icts arose in the NMG between the 
executive board and the newly-formed Landelijke Verenigingen van Huisartsen en Specialisten
(National Associations of General Practitioners and Specialists) with regard to the task of the 
associations. It was decided that they should protect the interests of the profession within and 
outside the health-insurance system. Thereafter the relationship between the executive board 
and the stakeholder groups was a regular source of confl ict, for example in 1949, 1954 and 
1966-1967.155 Things were not running smoothly within the federation either. In 1951, three 
health-insurance funds left the federation and set up a new organisation, the Stichting Autonome 
Ziekenfondsen (Foundation of Autonomous Health-Insurance Funds (SAZ)). These funds did 
not go along with the increasing level of co-operation between the health-insurance funds 
and the government, and demanded absolute priority for private-sector initiatives. Above 
all, they disputed the view that health-insurance funds should be merely the implementing 
bodies of a statutory social-insurance system.156
The second-largest national organisation was the Centrale Bond van Ziekenfondsen (Central 
Alliance of Health-Insurance Funds (CBZ)), which became closely allied to the Labour Party 
(PvdA) and the Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (Dutch Association of Trade Unions 
(NVV)) after the war. Together they emphasised the role and responsibilities of the government 
with regard to the organisation of healthcare services, and aimed for a national insurance 
programme. In 1946 the Landelijke Contactcommissie van Onderling Beheerde Ziekenfondsen
(National Contact Committee for Mutually Managed Insurance Funds) disbanded and the 
affi liated health-insurance funds joined the CBZ again. Yet the size of the mutual health-
insurance funds was stagnating at the pre-war level of approximately 18%. In 1951 they 
changed their name slightly to Centrale Bond van Onderling Beheerde Ziekenfondsen (Central 
Alliance for Mutually Managed Insurance Funds (CBOZ)). Expressed in terms of membership 
and market share, the Maatschappijfondsen were certainly winning the power struggle in the 
health-insurance system.157
The Ziekenfondsenbesluit continued to admit for-profi t commercial funds to the system. 
Their share of the total number of insured persons fell slightly from 16% in 1939 to ap-
proximately 14% in 1947, but their membership accounted for one in seven compulsorily 
insured persons. In the years that followed, their market share would fall sharply. By 1950 it 
was only 10%. As a result of portfolio transfer, the commercial funds had disappeared from 
the hardly profi table medical-expense insurance sector before the Ziekenfondsenwet of 1966 
prohibited for-profi t organisations from operating as health-insurance funds. 
The Roman Catholic health-insurance funds and the Organisatie van Algemene Ziekenfondsen
(Organisation of General Health-Insurance Funds (OAZ)) each accounted for less than 10% 
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of compulsorily insured persons. The factory funds had had to make considerable sacrifi ces. 
By the end of 1947, despite the relatively high number of funds, together they accounted 
for scarcely 3% of the total number of insured persons. 
3/ Increasing co-operation
As time progressed, the health-insurance funds began to co-operate more closely, both at 
local/regional level and national level. The disappearance of the pre-war – sometimes bitter – 
competition was due to a number of factors. As in Belgium, the diffi cult years of occupation 
undoubtedly strengthened the sense of personal solidarity between the managers, and blurred 
the social distinctions between insured persons and doctors. Personal contact through the 
Ziekenfondsraad enabled those involved to remove the roughest edges from potential confl icts 
within a petit comité. The intervention of the German occupier, and subsequently the Dutch 
government, had restricted the area of operation of the health-insurance funds, and severely 
restricted their ability to compete with each other for members. Demographic factors were 
largely responsible for changes in market share in the years that followed. 
But the urge to compete still smouldered, as became evident when the health-insurance 
fund in Culemborg was terminated in 1951 and that of the Dutch Railways in 1953,158 but 
these incidents did not lessen the desire to co-operate. Benefi ts packages and staff salaries 
were mainly set at national level, and were therefore virtually identical for every insured 
person. The regulations – often detailed and complicated – became more like public law, 
given the Ziekenfondsraad’s right to approve. Premiums for voluntary insurance were usually 
set at local or regional level, in proper consultation between the relevant health-insurance 
funds.159 It was in the interest of the health-insurance funds (and their insured) to present 
a united front during national negotiations with strong medical professionals’ organisations 
on the subject of fees.  
The desire to co-operate resulted in the establishment in 1947 of the Centraal Overleg van 
Ziekenfondsorganisaties (Central Consultation of Health-Insurance Fund Organisations (COZ)), 
in which all national organisations were represented. In 1953, the co-operation unexpectedly 
and temporarily came to an end. The Federatie VMZ was prompted to leave the COZ as a result 
of the aforementioned transfer of railway employees to the compulsory-insurance system (in 
which the trade unions were called upon and unfair arguments were used to the advantage 
of the CBOZ and above all the Catholic health-insurance funds).
Meanwhile, proposals came from all directions to unify the health-insurance system. As 
early as 1952, a report by the Dr Wiardi Beckman Foundation (PvdA) advocated strengthen-
ing the health-insurance system by creating a single health-insurance fund for each region.160
Interestingly, in the years that followed, the boards of organisations that used to be out-and-
out opponents and polar opposites (i.e. the association funds and the mutual funds) took a 
leading role in a widespread merger movement. The attitude of the Federatie VMZ was even 
more remarkable because the NVV as well as the CNV had been represented on the manage-
ment board of the CBOZ since January 1953. In mid-1955 the General Meeting of the CBOZ
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY260
reacted positively to the Federation’s report for 1954, which stated that the Federatie was 
willing to consult and co-operate. 
January 1956 saw the creation of another new regulated alliance between the Federatie 
and other health-insurance organisations, namely the Gemeenschappelijk Overleg van Zieken-
fondsorganisaties (Joint Consultation of Health-Insurance Fund Organisations (GOZ)), which 
succeeded the COZ. Only the Roman Catholic funds and the SAZ did not join the new 
organisation. The GOZ aimed to merge health-insurance funds and insurance-fund organisa-
tions into a single entity for each area of operation. The participants had to reach agreement 
on the following main points:
– The composition of the management board of the local health-insurance funds and the 
national alliance
– Negotiations with medical professionals’ organisations
The fi rst attempt to merge the health-insurance fund organisations was thwarted in 1957 
by the NMG
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– The position of fund-operated care institutions care institutions, owned and managed by 
the health insurance funds161
Smooth discussions between the Federatie and the CBOZ resulted in mid-1956 in a proposal 
presented by the Federatie to the other six health-insurance organisations for the creation 
of a Nationale Organisatie van Ziekenfondsen (National Organisation of Health-Insurance 
Funds).162 The three largest associations (Federatie VMZ, CBOZ and the OAZ) were prepared 
to take part in further negotiations as part of a merger committee. The association of Ro-
man Catholic health-insurance funds and the SAZ pulled out of the negotiations immediately, 
while the Nederlandse Bond van Ziekenfondsen (Netherlands Health-Insurance Fund Alliance) 
was willing to co-operate but saw no point in a merger. The merger committee worked fast. 
Before the end of the year a document was produced containing unanimously approved 
proposals for a merger. 
At the very last moment, the management board of the NMG threw a spanner in the works. 
The NMG members in the boards of the association funds were asked to oppose the merger 
because the NMG could not agree to relinquish joint day-to-day management of the health-
insurance fund organisation, and medical professionals would be put in a minority position. 
Furthermore, the NMG objected to the fact that health-insurance funds could employ doctors, 
pharmacists and dentists. Finally, the NMG feared that the infl uence of doctors within the health 
service would be threatened because medical professionals on the management board of a 
fund would not be allowed to involve themselves in negotiations about fees.163 As a result of 
this NMG ‘ukase’, the merger plans had to be shelved at the very last moment.
This unexpected interruption of the merger movement did not mean that co-operation 
was suspended too. The GOZ monitored the plans for a health-insurance act very closely and 
commented on them when necessary. On 12 November 1963, the national health-insurance 
funds responded to Minister Veldkamp’s bill in a joint address to parliament. The strength of 
the GOZ as a pressure group towards the government and the medical profession was rein-
forced in 1964 by the entry of the Bond van R.-K. Ziekenfondsen (Alliance of Roman Catholic 
Health-Insurance Funds) and the SAZ. The co-operation regulations of 3 January 1964 also 
established the permanent character of the GOZ, while preserving the autonomy of each 
participating health-insurance organisation. In addition to promoting regular consultations 
and giving advice, increasing co-operation took the form of a number of initiatives such the 
creation of two foundations, namely the SOAZ (to purchase and develop automation systems) 
and the CBC (to promote uniform national medical supervision and control).164
d. Three decades of tinkering, 1970-2000
1/ A complex system
At the beginning of the 1970s, it was generally acknowledged that the Netherlands had an 
excellent social-security system – perhaps even the best in the world. However, over the 
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years, a highly complicated and sometimes obscure system of implementing and supervisory 
bodies had evolved. The health-insurance branch was a good example of this. In contrast to 
Belgium, where, following the Wet-Leburton, the compulsory insurance system was extended 
between 1963 and 1970 to cover virtually the whole population (i.e. employees as well as 
the self-employed), and in contrast to Germany, where most people were covered by com-
pulsory insurance, the Netherlands still retained its historically rooted plurality of insurance 
organisations. In the fi rst place, there was the tripartite health-insurance system consisting of 
compulsory, voluntary and old-age insurance. Premiums varied for each type of insurance and 
there were different income thresholds for old-age insurance on the one hand, and compulsory 
and voluntary insurance on the other hand. Those who were not covered by compulsory 
insurance, and did not wish to take out voluntary insurance, had to resort to private health 
insurance. In addition, there were separate schemes for civil servants – the only employee 
category excluded from the compulsory-insurance system. At the beginning of the 1950s, 
separate public-law health-insurance schemes were created for the employees of municipal 
and provincial authorities.165 Still other schemes existed for state civil servants and teachers 
in specialised education.166 Later a modifi ed scheme was introduced for state civil servants, so 
that specifi c insurance systems were in place for this category, organised by municipality (IZA), 
province (IZR), state (ZVA) and police (GPV). The system became even more incomprehensible 
to outsiders when, in the post-war years, the health-insurance funds set up their own private 
insurance companies, known as bovenbouwverzekeraars or bovenbouwen.
It was almost inevitable that the complex and almost incomprehensible structure of the 
Dutch healthcare system, with its jumble of allied and competing organisations, would lead to 
calls for reform and rationalisation. These proposals, in turn, resulted in exhausting discussions 
between the parties and to open or discreet lobbying by policy-makers in order to expand the 
relevant area of operation – which was often not clearly defi ned – or exclude competitors. 
2/ Compulsory health insurance: a generous system without restrictions
The Dutch health-insurance system as it was in around 1970 was a very generous system. In 
the euphoria of the 1960s ‘golden age’, the standard health-insurance package was continu-
ally extended. In exchange for the premium, insurance-fund members could make virtually 
unlimited use of home as well as hospital healthcare services, and medicines were free. In 
Germany and particularly in Belgium, new co-payments were introduced or existing ones 
increased, but in the Netherlands this subject was taboo, especially for the trade unions and 
the Labour Party (PvdA). At the time, the term moral hazard was not yet part of insurance 
jargon, but healthcare expenditure continued to soar to dizzying heights, leading inevitably 
to fi nancial problems. 
Every year, healthcare expenditures increased by between 10 and 20% − and even more 
– through the increasing demand for healthcare services, which in turn was due to gro wing 
wealth, an increase in the average age, increased demand for specialist care in relation to 
cheaper GPs, and a spectacular increase in costs, particularly for intramural hospital and nur-
sing care.167 In 1968 healthcare costs amounted to fi ve billion guilders. In 1972, expenditure 
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had doubled to ten billion guilders and it doubled again over the next four years to reach 
20 billion guilders in 1976. Obviously, these unbelievably rapid increases were also due to 
the high infl ation rate of the time. But in real terms too, the increase was still impressive. 
In 1968 healthcare accounted for 5.5% of national income. This increased to 6.7% in 1972 
and no less than 8.8% in 1976.168 The global economic crisis, which continued unabated 
during the second half of the 1970s, had its impact on the Netherlands too. Yet healthcare 
expenditure continued to spiral. In 1982 it increased to 31.7 billion guilders, representing a 
six-fold increase in the space of fourteen years. 
For health-insurance funds and private insurers alike, the only way to tackle soaring costs 
was to introduce substantial premium increases. In 1966 the health-insurance premium was 
5.8% of the wage. This rose to 7.5% in 1970, reaching the record level of 9.6% by mid-1976. 
In July 1976, as part of the government’s attempts to bring galloping price infl ation under 
control by means of cost containment, insurance-fund reserves were partly drawn on to reduce 
the premium to 8.2%. In the following years, the premium was stabilised at around 8%. 
This short-term measure could not remain in place for long, and appeared more like a head-
in-the-sand policy to avoid having to confront the structural problems. On the one hand, the 
economic crisis affected the revenues of the health-insurance funds because premiums were 
a percentage of earnings. On the other hand, the desperate attempt to fund the structural 
cost increases from reserves was bound to lead to a fi nancial debacle. In 1980, joint coffers 
of the health-insurance funds were almost empty and large defi cits began to loom. A new 
series of premium increases was inevitable. Despite an increase in the compulsory-insurance 
premium from 8.1% in 1980 to 8.6% in 1981 and to 9.1% in 1982, the combined defi cit 
of the health-insurance funds was estimated at 1.44 billion guilders in 1982. The insurance 
funds were forced to raise the premium again in 1983, to 9.8% of the wage. 
3/ Voluntary insurance: a nightmare
Compulsory health insurance was only one – and not even the most serious – of the fi nan-
cial problems. Another branch of the health-insurance system, namely voluntary insurance, 
encountered even greater problems. In the 1950s and 1960s, voluntary insurance was already 
a serious worry for the health-insurance funds and the government. During the 1970s, 
voluntary insurance became a downright fi nancial nightmare for the funds, as they faced 
increasing competition from private insurers. Their situation was far from ideal. Unlike the 
private insurers, the health-insurance funds had to comply with statutory regulations. They 
were not allowed to turn away anyone applying for membership, and they had to offer a 
statutory package of benefi ts. They also charged an average premium. 
From the perspective of solidarity, the health-insurance funds also aimed to charge the same 
premium throughout the voluntary-insurance branch, despite the fact that actual fees paid 
by patients varied from region to region. This was done by clearing the voluntary-insurance 
defi cits through three regional equalisation funds. This premium was the same for the young 
(above 15 years of age) and elderly persons. In the private insurance sector, premiums could 
be based on the age of the insured person.169
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The competition between private insurers was very intense and had a direct infl uence on the 
voluntary-insurance sector. In order to make their premiums competitive, the private insurers 
went in search of the good risks, i.e. primarily young people. In order to attract these people, 
they introduced differentiated premiums and offered low premiums for low-risk groups. 
Consequently, the low premiums attracted young insured persons away from not only private 
competitors with higher premiums, but also from the voluntary insurance sector. The shift of 
young good risks from the voluntary to the private insurance sector reinforced the serious 
effects of the demographic-ageing spiral. Average expenditure per insured person increased 
further in the voluntary insurance sector as a result of the increasing health risks associated 
with old age. The logical consequence of this was escalating premiums, which, in turn, caused 
even more good risks to leave the voluntary insurance sector. 
This development among private insurers towards increasingly differentiated premiums 
based on age culminated in 1980 when twenty commercial insurers jointly launched a ‘budget 
policy’ in the market with age-related premiums and co-payment.170 For the health-insurance 
funds, for which compulsory insurance was already a serious problem, the situation became 
untenable. The government too, wrestling with towering budget defi cits, was continually 
obliged to pump money into the bottomless pit of voluntary insurance. 
4/ The sting of the economic crisis
a/ Good years followed by lean years
The decade of the 1970s was also the end of the ‘golden years’. Unemployment, which was 
still only 1.4% in 1970, rapidly increased to more than 5% of the working population. Nei-
ther the wage-price spiral nor the galloping infl ation could be brought under control. The 
private sector struggled and there was a sharp decline in competitiveness, company profi ts 
and investment. Employees were made redundant, companies closed. The government, driven 
into a tight corner by the economic crisis, looked for a solution and was forced to consider 
cutbacks in the social sector. The collective burden had increased between 1970 and 1979 
from 41% to 54% of the national budget.171 The disastrous developments in state fi nances 
and the spiral of cost/premium increases, which was untenable in the long term, required 
stronger intervention by the government with regard to healthcare costs.
The Netherlands was certainly not alone in this damaging situation. During the same period, 
the health-insurance funds in Belgium and Germany struggled with rising expenditures and 
premiums, and growing defi cits. But no other country studied and discussed the situation 
as much as the Netherlands between 1970 and 1980. Offi cial organs and committees, trade 
unions, the health-insurance funds themselves, the various political parties and the govern-
ment produced studies, reports, recommendations, follow-up recommendations and bills, 
and even commissioned studies from private research institutes. Each time, they were just as 
zealously dismissed by opponents. Despite the mass of paper, virtually none of the desired 
reforms had been implemented by the end of the 1970s.
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b/ The government hesitates
In his study Democratisering van de ziekenfondsen: een haalbare kaart? [Democratisation of the 
health-insurance funds – is it possible?], T. Waaijer rightly pointed to the stagnation in the 
decision-making domain and a dominant ad-hoc approach to tackling problems.172 A co-
ordinated approach was also lacking in the fi eld of healthcare and health insurance. Whereas 
the 1960s were characterised by unbridled expansion and a lack of planning – there was plenty 
of money for everything, after all – the 1970s created a confusing picture of ill-considered and 
unfocussed government cutbacks and stagnation. In the fi rst instance, social groups reacted with 
surprise and incredulity to the growing fi nancial tensions in the healthcare sector. Criticisms 
of the situation were stifl ed by political protests against social degradation and the attack on 
rights and privileges. Government policy was slow and unco-ordinated. The book by H. van 
der Hoeven contains several striking examples of the slow reaction of the government and 
above all its advisory bodies. The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) took 
more than fi ve years to issue confl icting advice about the structure of the health-insurance 
system. Reputable consultancies did no better, and took years to submit largely (politically) 
unusable reports about how to simplify the implementation of social security.
The only early concrete measure taken in an attempt to control expenditure was the 
Wet Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen (Hospital Provisions Act) of 1971. Under this act, it was forbid-
den − and even became an offence – to build new hospitals or nursing homes or expand 
existing ones without offi cial approval. This legislation was introduced at the insistence of 
the health-insurance funds in order to control unbridled expansion and the related costs. 
The intramural sector, with its hospitals and care homes, had been able to expand almost 
without restriction, at the cost of resources for psychiatry and extramural care such as GP 
and paramedical care.173
c/ The Hendriks policy paper
The government became increasingly concerned about the explosive increases in costs, as the 
1974 policy paper Structuurnota Gezondheidszorg (‘Structuring Healthcare’) by State Secretary 
J.P.M. Hendriks showed. This policy paper heralded a break with the past. In future, the 
government would determine the general framework and norms for the healthcare sector. 
The memorandum also announced a reduction in the number of hospital beds, which would 
have to fall from 5.6 to 4 beds per thousand inhabitants. There was even an amendment to 
the recent Wet Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen to the effect that the government could now close 
all or part of a hospital. From the point of view of governance, the position of the regions 
would be strengthened. Local and regional organs would have an advisory role and even 
a decision-making role. Healthcare would have to be divided into two echelons, the fi rst 
based on GP care and the second on specialised facilities, limited to the basic specialisms. 
The ‘super-specialisms’ would not be included in the echelons but would be organised at 
supra-regional level.174
At the same time, the government, in casu State Secretary Hendriks, was once again toying 
with the idea of a national insurance system. After the Second World War, the idea reared 
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its head once more and, like the Loch Ness monster, disappeared and did not resurface for 
many years. After Veldkamp’s failed attempt, it was now the turn of Hendriks to take his 
chance. But he got no further than a draft bill for a national medical-expenses, approved by 
the government in June 1975 and submitted to the Council of State for advice. 
The bill proposed merging the Ziekenfondswet and the AWBZ into a system whereby 
everyone would be entitled to the benefi ts provided for in the legislation. This meant, for 
example, that the entitlement to care by GPs and dentists would become universal, as would 
the entitlement to medicine. With regard to implementing the legislation, the goal was, after 
a period of transition, to aim for a single implementing body for each region. Importantly 
for the health-insurance funds, the restrictions on area of operation would be lifted. The 
Ziekenfondsraad would be changed into a Raad voor de Gezondheidsverzekering.
An essential element, namely fi nance, was missing from the bill – a fatal fl aw during a 
full-on economic crisis. The fi nancial perspectives had worsened so quickly that Minister for 
Finance Duisenberg could not approve this undoubtedly expensive national-insurance system 
without guarantees that it would incorporate measures for controlling expenditures. Hendriks 
consequently submitted two bills in the autumn of 1976: the Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg
(Healthcare Charges Act) and the Wet Voorzieningen Gezondheidszorg (Health Services Act). 
None of the bills made it to the statute books while the Den Uyl cabinet was in power.175
The attempt by State Secretary Hendriks in 1977 to create a national health-insurance system 
failed and the idea of a basic insurance was shelved
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Table VI.11 Funding of Dutch healthcare, 1979; direct payments by funding bodies to healthcare 
institutions
NLG billion In %
Total cost 25.539 100
Proportion fi nanced by:
- health-insurance funds 10.922 42.8
- private contributions and payments
(incl. private and public-law health insurance) 6.390 25.0
- AWBZ 6.325 24.8
- government subsidies (state, province, municipality) 1.684 6.6
- other 0.218 0.9
Source: W.P.M.M. van de Ven, Studies in Health Insurance and Econometrics, 16.
5/ Restructuring, but in dribs and drabs
Financial restructuring was now inevitable. At the end of the 1970s, the government’s desire 
to introduce cutbacks grew. The amended Wet Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen of 1977 effectively 
gave the minister the power to close hospitals, or parts of them, according to the four-per-
thousand norm. The Van Agt cabinet had removed from the government agenda the idea of a 
national insurance, which would be diffi cult to fi nance, when it came to power in 1978. Bit 
by bit, sections of the Structuurplan were realised. In 1979 and 1981, parliament nevertheless 
approved the Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg and the Wet Voorzieningen Gezondheidszorg, albeit 
with a number of amendments. Consequently, the government had greater control over 
healthcare expenditure which, despite the measures introduced between 1976 and 1982, had 
increased from 20 billion guilders to approximately 32 billion guilders. 
Additional measures also proved necessary because, despite the substantial rise in insu rance 
premiums, the health-insurance funds in the compulsory-insurance branch continued to 
struggle with growing defi cits. The problem was not so much government contributions 
to health insurance. In contrast to Belgium – where government subsidies in various forms 
accounted for more than 40% of the health-insurance funds’ income – the Dutch govern-
ment’s contribution remained very modest, as Table VI.11 shows.
Further increases in premiums would undoubtedly bring increasing protests from busi-
nesses and trade unions, because this would automatically lead to increasing labour costs and a 
decrease in employees’ purchasing power (during a full-on economic crisis). The government 
therefore reverted to the old idea of introducing limited co-payments, as tried and tested 
in Belgium. Attempts to do this in the 1960s had immediately provoked negative reactions 
from the health-insurance funds of the CBOZ and later from the VNZ, the trade unions and 
the PvdA.
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The reactions were now no different but, in the light of the altered economic climate, the 
Van Agt cabinet received parliamentary support for the introduction in 1980 of a (limited) 
co-payment of 50% for voluntary plastic surgery (with a maximum of 3,000 guilders) and 
intramural maternity care. In addition, entitlement to physiotherapeutic care was restricted. 
For the time being, however, the introduction of these co-payments was primarily symbolic. 
It was a clear signal to the whole population that the good years of unlimited growth were 
past and the lean years of sacrifi ce had begun. It was also a signal to stakeholder groups in 
society that the government was prepared to face protests in order to implement necessary 
cutbacks. 
Cutbacks continued to rain down in the years that followed. In 1982, the norm for hospital 
beds was reduced further to 3.7 per thousand inhabitants and limits were imposed on the 
number of young physiotherapists permitted to set up practice. Expenditures on pharmaceu-
ticals were also curbed through the introduction of a reference guide to pharmaceuticals in 
1982 and the medicijnknaak (a co-payment of NLG 2.50 per medicine) in 1983. 
6/ Structural reform
a/ Van der Reijden’s three-stage rocket
This series of cutbacks brought expenditures under control, but it could not break the trend. 
After years of well-intentioned but uncohesive ad-hoc measures, it was time for more structural 
intervention if further premium increases were to be avoided. Meanwhile, the time-bomb 
under the voluntary insurance branch continued to tick unsympathetically, while old-age 
insurance required increasing attention as the effects of demographic ageing were increasingly 
being felt. In 1983, State Secretary J.P. van der Reijden introduced new ideas for restructuring 
the health-insurance system. According to H. van der Hoeven, he was thinking of insurance 
in the form of a three-stage rocket: ‘The fi rst stage is a national insurance for uninsurable risks, with 
a percentage premium. This will be followed by a compulsory insurance with built-in co-payment and a 
nominal premium. The third stage of the rocket consists of the option for people to insure themselves for 
any remaining risks that were not covered.’176
Van der Reijden also requested advice on a solution for the acute problems in the voluntary-
insurance sector. His plans would establish a national insurance – very similar to the Belgian 
system – and almost destroyed the private insurers, who were left with only a modest area 
of operation. They launched a double counter-offensive. In 1983, the KLOZ, the national 
organisation of private insurers, concluded a surprising agreement with the VNZ relating to 
voluntary insurance. The KLOZ undertook to make available a sum of 180 million guilders 
per year to help solve the problems of the voluntary-insurance sector, thereby hoping to 
remove the main argument in favour of a national insurance. Every possible pressure tactic 
was used – successfully – to mobilise social forces against Van der Reijden’s plans. They were 
supported by the FNV, which objected above all to the nominal premium that undermined the 
principle of premiums based on the ability to pay, and to the fact that the weaker members 
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VNZ chairman De Vries (right) gives a protest speech against the discontinuation of voluntary 
health insurance, 1985 
(Source: ’t Sticht fotobureau)
of society would be the victim of the health-insurance reforms. The three-stage rocket soon 
proved to be a damp squib. 
b/ The Wet op de Toegang tot de Ziektekostenverzekering
In September 1984, the fi rst Lubbers cabinet fi nally introduced radical reforms: voluntary 
and old-age insurance would shortly be abolished. The wholesale transfer of the member-
ship base – more than one million insured persons – to the compulsory health-insurance 
system met with unanimous approval. However, the abolition of the voluntary system – with 
approximately 1.5 million members – met with fi erce resistance from the health-insurance 
funds and the VNZ, who would lose many of their voluntarily insured members to private 
insurers. 
Van der Reijden’s proposals were nevertheless approved by parliament in the spring of 
1986, and the Wet op de Toegang tot de Ziektekostenverzekering (Insurance Law on Access to 
Healthcare (WTZ)), also known as the kleine stelselwijziging (minor system reform) came into 
effect on 1 April 1986. From that date, approximately 780,000 voluntarily insured persons 
now had to rely on private insurance. The number of compulsorily insured persons increased 
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from 7.1 million to 8.9 million when compulsory insurance was extended to cover remai-
ning groups that had been voluntarily insured – still more than 700,000 – and all members 
with old-age insurance. However, total membership in the health-insurance funds fell by 
almost 800,000.
As a result of the WTZ, the total percentage of persons insured with a health-insurance fund 
fell from 66.3% in 1985 to 61.2% one year later.177 In order to ensure a smooth transition, 
special measures were introduced for those who had to switch insurance. Private insurers 
were not allowed to turn people away because they were ‘poor risks’. In addition, they had 
to offer a standard package of benefi ts that was virtually the same as that offered by the 
health-insurance funds – and for a premium that was even lower than the earlier premium for 
voluntary insurance.178 Besides this, the private insurers also had to help cover the increased 
cost of compulsory insurance resulting from the transfer of insurance for the elderly. 
c/ The Commissie-Dekker
The WTZ was also known as the ‘minor system reform’ because the government intended to 
introduce even more far-reaching reforms in the long term. In the governing manifesto of 
the second Lubbers cabinet, the coalition partners CDA and VVD included the appointment 
of a committee to consider the structure and funding of healthcare. The committee would 
advise on the possibilities for:
– Controlling the growth of healthcare in terms of volume
– A further review of the health-insurance system 
– Introducing deregulation179
The limited committee was appointed in August 1986 and was led by W. Dekker, chairman 
of the Supervisory Board of Philips. By March 1987, the Commissie-Dekker (Dekker Com-
mittee) had already presented its report.180
According to Schut and Van der Velden, the proposed system would have two founda-
tions, namely a national insurance with wide-ranging coverage and regulated competition. 
The fi rst key point was the introduction of a national insurance scheme that would remove 
the distinctions between the AWBZ, the health-insurance funds, the insurance scheme for 
civil servants, and private insurance. A clean sweep: the new system would do away with 
the nebulous structure of the health-insurance system. A system providing basic cover for 
everyone would account for approximately 85% of the existing health-insurance fund and 
AWBZ benefi ts package. People would be able to take out voluntary supplementary insurance 
for healthcare that was not covered in the basic package. The second principle was that the 
implementation of this national insurance would be entrusted to competing risk-bearing 
healthcare insurers. Insured persons would have the option to change insurers, because a pe-
riodic underwriting obligation had been introduced for insurers. The premium would consist 
of two parts, namely an income-related premium set and collected by the government (75% 
of the total premium) and a nominal premium (25% of the total premium) to be set by the 
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insurers, thereby allowing them to compete on price. This proposal by the Commissie-Dekker
was very similar to the Belgian system, i.e. a premium as a percentage of the wage, plus a 
premium for a voluntary supplementary insurance set by each mutuality. 
But there the similarities ended. In contrast to Belgium – and also Germany – where national 
contracts were concluded with doctors’ organisations, healthcare insurers in the Netherlands 
would no longer be bound by contracts and uniform national model agreements with care 
providers. Insurers would themselves be able to negotiate with healthcare providers on the 
price, quality and organisation of the services to be provided. The Commissie-Dekker hoped 
that competition would drive down prices and, at the same time, lead to greater effi ciency 
in the healthcare sector. 
The committee did not ignore the possible negative effects of its proposals for liberalising 
the healthcare sector. A reallocation mechanism between insurers was proposed in order to 
prevent competition from reducing fi nancial accessibility and to prevent the socially undesi-
rable practice of preferred risk selection by insurers. Premiums would be deposited in a central 
fund – similar to the RIZIV in Belgium – which would redistribute the revenue among insu-
rers on the basis of a ‘benefi t norm’ that refl ected the health profi le of their insured persons. 
This benefi t norm would not cover all costs. The shortfall would have to be funded from 
the nominal premium. Effi cient insurers would be able to offer an attractive low premium, 
while insurers who performed less well would have to charge higher premiums, with all the 
risks this entailed for their membership base. 
In the Netherlands, the Dekker Plan revived the idea of broad insurance coverage for the 
entire population, as had existed in Germany since 1883 and in Belgium since 1945 for an 
increasingly large section of the population. As was to be expected, the plan provoked mixed 
reactions. For some, the proposed national-insurance system did not go far enough and the 
nominal premium undermined the principle of solidarity. The strongest resistance came from 
the physicians, who saw the proposals as an attack on their medical and fi nancial freedom. 
A destructive debate began surrounding the actual content of the compulsory-insurance 
package. In a policy document of 7 March 1988 entitled Verandering Verzekerd (‘Change As-
sured’), the government guaranteed that the basic elements of the Dekker plan would be 
introduced in phases and would lead to compulsory basic insurance for everyone by 1992. 
But this was wishful thinking on the part of the government. The serious discord and embit-
tered discussions surrounding the National Environmental Policy Plan was causing growing 
resentment between the coalition partners, culminating in the fall of the second Lubbers 
cabinet on 2 May 1989. By then, only a small part of the phased plan had been implemented. 
On 1 January 1989 the scope of the AWBZ was extended and the health-insurance premium 
was split into a percentage premium (8.1%) and a fl at-rate nominal premium (156 guilders 
for adults and half that rate for children). 
d/ The Simons Plan
The third Lubbers government, a coalition of the CDA and PvdA (the Christian Democrats 
and the Labour Party), was quick to abolish co-payments in the form of the medicijnknaak
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(NLG 2.50 per medicine) and the specialistengeeltje (a co-payment of 25 guilders for refer-
ral to a specialist, introduced in 1988). On 10 May 1990, Deputy Minister for Health H.J. 
Simons presented his policy document Werken aan Zorgvernieuwing (‘Working for Change in 
Healthcare’), which came to be known as the Simons Plan. There would be a single health 
insurance for everyone in the form of a statutory compulsory national-health scheme. The 
system would rest on two pillars: a social system (solidarity and accessibility) and a market-
oriented system. Van der Hoeven’s summary shows that Simons’ plan was largely based on the 
proposals of his predecessor Dekker: ‘The new insurance system would place greater responsibilities 
with parties in the public-health sector and would cover 85% of expenditure through income-related 
premiums, to be collected by the tax authority. Premium revenues would be allocated to the insurers 
through a Central Fund, on the basis of a budget set as objectively as possible. The remaining 15% of 
expenditure would have to be fi nanced from co-payments and nominal premiums. By enabling insurers 
to make regional and local agreements with healthcare providers, nominal premiums could be differenti-
ated. Furthermore, since agreements with insured persons were defi ned in functional terms rather than 
in strict regulations, the insurers could work more effi ciently and effectively. The resulting savings could 
then lead to lower – and competitive – premiums.’181
Based on his socialist vision, Simons introduced a number of mainly small amendments. 
For example: the nominal premium as a proportion of the total premium was reduced from 
25% to 15%. The most radical amendment was his attempt to include in the basic package 
approximately 95% of the coverage offered by the health-insurance funds and AWBZ. This 
immediately met with a negative response from coalition partner CDA. The national-insurance 
system would be realised through the gradual extension of the AWBZ. The whole undertaking 
had to be completed in 1995. After a hard struggle, the government managed to extend 
co verage under the AWBZ to include pharmaceutical care (medicines), to take effect on 1 
January 1992. On the other hand, the AWBZ also provided for the introduction of co-payments. 
A number of other Dekker-Simons measures were also implemented. The important change 
for the health-insurance funds was the abolition of compulsory areas of operation and the 
obligation for the health-insurance funds to conclude agreements with healthcare providers 
Table VI.12 Healthcare funding in the Netherlands, 1994-1999 (in NLG billion)
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
      
AWBZ 25.2 26.6 20.2 26.7 28.4 30.1
ZFW 16.6 16.5 22.0 23.9 25.2 26.0
Supplementary insurance 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6
Private insurance 8.2 7.9 10.1 10.2 10.5 11.5
      
Total 50.3 51.8 53.5 62.1 65.6 69.2
Source: VEKTIS website, August 2001.
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Attempts by State Secretary Simons to reform the health-insurance system appeared to have 
been successful in 1990
(Source: Inzet 11 (1990))
and institutions within their area of operation. In the meantime, there was growing resistance 
from the VNZ as well as the KLOZ to further implementations under the Simons Plan. The 
coalition parties also increasingly asked questions about the possibly undesirable social and 
fi scal effects of liberalisation and market forces. 
e/ A change of course under the ‘purple’ fl ag: the Kok I and Kok II cabinets
In 1994, the fi rst Kok government came to power. The ‘purple’ coalition of PvdA-VVD and 
D’66 decided against introducing a basic insurance à la Dekker, and the basic funding struc-
ture was left intact. 
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Van der Reijden’s three-stage rocket made another appearance, this time in a modern and 
partly market-oriented form. Health insurance would be divided into three compartments, 
each with its own funding and implementation system. The fi rst compartment consisted of 
the AWBZ, which would assume its former role of covering uninsurable risks. The benefi ts 
in this compartment would be regulated by the government. In the second compartment, 
to comprise all essential forms of curative care, the Dekker model of regulated competition 
would be further implemented. The government no longer wished to be closely involved 
in the third compartment, which was intended for ‘luxury’ care and facilities that were af-
fordable for everyone, and market forces were given free rein. The defi nition of ‘luxury’ was 
a matter for discussion. Starting 1 January 1995, entitlement to dental care for adults was 
restricted to preventive treatment, and other forms of dental care were excluded from the 
compulsory-insurance package. With the division of the insurance system into three fun-
ding segments, it appeared that the idea of a broad national insurance had once again been 
shelved, particularly as the second Kok cabinet continued the policy of gradually amending 
and improving the existing system. 
The governing manifesto of 1998 did state that, in the light of demographic ageing and 
international developments, the cabinet would examine whether more far-reaching changes 
were required in the organisation and funding of healthcare.182 Internal disagreement led to 
wavering and protracted discussions, and it was not until 6 July 2001 that the cabinet presented 
its report Zorg aan bod (‘A Question of Care’), which proposed the implementation in 2005 
of a compulsory and equal basic medical-expenses insurance for everyone in the Netherlands. 
First, the basic insurance scheme would integrate the health-insurance funds, private health 
insurers and the various health-insurance schemes for civil servants. This would then be 
extended to cover most of the benefi ts from the insurance package still fi nanced from AWBZ
premiums.183 Many aspects remained unclear, however. The report contained no concrete 
decisions about the level of premiums or about the introduction of co-payments to curb 
over-consumption. The cabinet assumed that the premium would consist of an income-related 
element part plus a fi xed (nominal) sum. The ratio of the two amounts would be decided by 
the next cabinet. However, the cabinet’s view was that the fi xed (nominal) premium should 
be high enough to allow insurers to compete effectively with each other.184 If the plans were 
realised, it would be the most radical change to Dutch health insurance since the introduction 
of compulsory health insurance.
Everyone was aware that radical changes were needed. Between 1990 and 1999, healthcare 
expenditures increased by an average of 5.2% per year. According to the estimates of the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau), additional funding to 
the amount of 6% per year would be required between 2002 and 2006 to maintain health-
care standards and to accommodate the consequences of demographic aging. In concrete 
terms, this meant that expenditure in 2006 would have to be 27 billion guilders higher than 
in 2001.185
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e. The world of health insurance, 1970-2000
1/ Marginal shifts
When studying the health-insurance fund membership fi gures for the past three decades, we 
have to take into account the effects of the WTZ in 1986. However, it is diffi cult to compare 
fi gures over time, given the transfer to compulsory insurance of members with old-age insu-
rance, and the transfer of voluntarily insured persons to compulsory and private insurers.
Around 1970, members of the health-insurance funds were divided among three branches: 
compulsory insurance, voluntary insurance and old-age insurance. Together, these branches 
of insurance provided coverage for some nine million persons. As the population increased, 
the membership of the health-insurance funds increased too, to approximately 9,600,000 in 
1985. There were no notable changes in the compulsory-insurance sector. In the 1960s, market 
share hovered around 50%. During the 1970s it gradually increased to 51.5% (1975) then fell 
again to approximately 48.9% in 1983. These slight fl uctuations were probably due to the 
economic crisis. During bad years with high unemployment, the income of those without 
work – who previously had to insure themselves privately – fell below the income threshold 
and were covered by the compulsory-insurance system. The reverse happened as the crisis 
began to ebb. This had only a limited effect on health insurance, however. In contrast to the 
pre-war depression, the gross national product did not fall signifi cantly during the recession 
of the 1970s. The exuberant growth of the 1960s gave way to a period of (too) slow growth. 
As a consequence, although social groups did not really have to contend with a drastic fall 
in wealth, they were unexpectedly forced to adjust their optimistic expectations and future 
prospects. Those entering the labour market were hit hardest. Young people could not fi nd 
work and were forced to postpone their plans to lead an independent life.
The voluntary insurance sector had to compete directly with aggressive private insurers in 
order to keep its ‘good risks’. At the end of the 1970s in particular it was in danger of losing 
that battle, but this was not directly refl ected in the membership fi gures, which remained at 
around one and a half million in the 1980s. However, the stable membership fi gures did not 
mean that the risk profi le of insured persons remained the same over time. It is possible that 
voluntary insurers lost good risks, but gained the bad risks who had been refused by other 
insurers or put off by the high premiums for private insurance. But voluntary insurance was 
more than a marginal phenomenon in the insurance market: in 1983, 10.7% of the Dutch 
population still had voluntary insurance. As expected, old-age insurance improved in quan-
titative terms. As demographic ageing took hold, more and more elderly persons took out 
old-age insurance. At the beginning of 1982 more than 1,074,000 elderly persons (7.4% of 
the population) were insured via this third branch of the health-insurance system. 
The ‘minor system reform’ of the WTZ caused an upheaval in the world of health insurance. 
As noted earlier, 780,000 voluntarily insured persons had to move to private insurers. The 
remainder, together with persons with old-age insurance, were covered by the compulsory 
health-insurance system. As a result of these drastic changes, the number of compulsorily 
insured persons had increased from 7.1 to 8.9 million by 1 April 1986. But this quantitative 
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increase was deceptive: in reality the market share of the private health-insurance sector fell 
from 66.3% in 1985 to 61.2% in 1986.186
The gradual quantitative growth continued after 1985, as Table VI.13 shows.
Table VI.13 Number of insured persons in the Netherlands, 1985-1999 (in millions)
 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
       
Health-insurance funds 9.6 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.9
Private insurance       
 - Private-law insurers 3.9 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8
 - Public-law insurers 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Sub-total 4.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6
       
Remainder 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
       
Total population 14.5 15.0 15.5 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8
Source: VEKTIS website, August 2001
In 1990 more than 61% of insured persons were insured with the health-insurance funds. In 
1995 and 1999 the share was 62 and 63% respectively. 
2/ A double concentration process
a/ Scale increases continue
Between 1970 and 2000, a double concentration process radically transformed the health-
insurance fund landscape in the Netherlands. On the one hand, the health-insurance funds 
continued to increase in size. In 1970 there were still 99 health-insurance funds. They gradually 
decreased in number to 72 in 1976, 58 in 1981, and 53 shortly before the introduction of the 
WTZ in 1985. The WTZ seemed to accelerate the decrease. In scarcely fi ve years, the number of 
health-insurance funds shrank by one-third to 37 in 1990. Another sharp decrease followed in 
the period 1990-1995. Since then, the thinning-out process seems to have come to a halt. 
As health-insurance funds disappeared, new ones were also set up. Private insurers set up 
their own national health-insurance funds, thereby increasing their regional market share so 
that they could negotiate effectively with healthcare providers. Besides this, the co-operation 
between the health-insurance funds and private insurers had the advantage that employers 
could be offered collective contracts for their entire workforce, enabling insurers to compete 
more effectively in the growing market for collective insurance.187 In 1990 and 1992 respec-
tively, OHRA and Zilveren Kruis were approved as health-insurance funds.
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The question arose of how many health-insurance funds were still genuinely operating 
in that capacity. According to a report by the Algemene Rekenkamer (Netherlands Court of 
Audit) in 1997 no less than 18 of the 29 health-insurance funds were ‘empty boxes’, i.e. they 
consisted only of a board, directors, and a member’s council. Their activities were brought 
under a service company that also provided services to a commercial insurer belonging to 
the same concern. 
Table VI.14 Number of health-insurance funds and private insurers in the Netherlands, 1985-1999
 1985 1990 1995 1999
    
Health-insurance funds 53 37 27 28
Private insurance    
 - private-law insurers 69 68 47 48
 - public-law insurers 13 13 3 3
Sub-total 82 81 50 51
    
Total 135 118 77 79
Source: VEKTIS website, August 2001.
It was not only economies of scale that facilitated this process of concentration. The activi-
ties of the legislature also forced the health-insurance funds to co-operate. Under the AWBZ,
small health-insurance funds were forced to merge and become part of larger organisations.188
Due to their small scale they did not have the facilities and resources to give specialised trai-
ning to their staff or release them to implement the complex AWBZ legislation and deal with 
specifi c dossiers. 
b/ Towards a single national umbrella organisation: the VNZ
The increase in scale of the health-insurance funds was certainly facilitated by a second 
concentration movement, namely among the national umbrella organisations. In the 1950s 
and 1960s there were already signifi cant improvements in the co-operation at national level 
between the six umbrella organisations for hospitals. The gradual social ‘depillarisation’, re-
fl ected in the rapprochement between the large trade unions NVV and NKV, also had an effect 
on the health-insurance funds. At the beginning of 1971, the CBOZ and the Roman Catholic 
funds (34 health-insurance funds insuring 32% of all insured persons) merged to form the 
Nederlandse Unie van Ziekenfondsen (Netherlands Union of Health-Insurance Funds ). The 
main aim of the Union was to establish a consumer organisation within which the manage-
ment of funds remained in the hands of insured persons. During that year, the small um-
brella organisation Overleg van Ondernemingsziekenfondsen (Consultation of Corporate Funds) 
also joined the Union. In total, the new organisation accounted for approximately 35% of 
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The concentration of the health-insurance fund organisations complete
(Source: ’t Sticht fotobureau)
GROWTH AND ITS LIMITS, 1945-2000 279
health-insurance fund members in the Netherlands. But the largest organisation was still the 
Federatie VMZ with a market share of around 50%, brought together in 45 health-insurance 
funds. The Federation aimed to promote co-operation between insured persons and the 
medical profession, and did not want the trade unions to have too much infl uence through 
the management boards. The main difference between the two umbrella organisations was 
the composition of the funds’ management boards.
Although the Federatie VMZ and the Nederlandse Unie appeared to be each other’s ideologi-
cal opposites, a number of co-operative alliances were set up in which the two other, smaller 
umbrella organisations (OAZ and SAZ) were also involved. They co-operated, for example, in the 
Stichting Organisatie en Automatisering Ziekenfondsen (SOAZ), a Foundation for the Organisation 
and Automation of the Health-Insurance Funds, and in the National Information System 
for Health-Insurance Funds (Landelijk Informatie Systeem Ziekenfondsen (LISZ)). Ultimately, the 
historical distinctions between the mutually governed funds and the association funds became 
blurred. A meeting of the chairmen of the health-fund organisations in June 1974 resulted 
in the 1977 merger of the four remaining umbrella organisations into one large umbrella 
organisation. On 1 January 1977, all 70 existing health-insurance funds were integrated 
in a single organisation, the Vereniging van Nederlandse Ziekenfondsen (Association of Dutch 
Health-Insurance Funds (VNZ)). The VNZ management board had 24 members, including 
representatives of insured persons, medical professionals, directors of health-insurance fund 
organisations, trade unions and independent experts. Van der Hoeven points out that the 
merger of the CBOZ and the Roman Catholic funds did not automatically lead to a merger 
of the health-insurance funds of the former umbrella organisations. For a time, most of the 
funds continued to operate independently. Before 1977 the mergers were mostly between 
the company health-insurance funds and the larger Union funds, and between the health-
insurance funds of the Federatie VMZ and the OAZ.189 The effects of the unifi ed national umbrella 
organisation were felt well beyond 1977. 
c/ Zorgverzekeraars Nederland: the culmination of the concentration process
Several allusions have been made above to the increasing co-operation between health-
insurance funds and private insurers.190 This was not a surprising development. After the war, 
some of the health-insurance funds had set up their own private insurance companies: the 
bovenbouwverzekeraars or bovenbouwen. Regional funds often worked together to provide sup-
plementary insurance for hospital care. De bovenbouwen also offered full healthcare insurance 
at affordable premiums for people with incomes above the threshold. 
The main differences between these health-insurance associations and the commercial 
healthcare insurers were their no-exclusion policy, non-risk-related premiums and better 
policy terms (e.g. no exclusion of coverage for existing health problems). They did their best 
to practice the principle of solidarity between healthy and sick persons by operating as mutual 
non-profi t insurance associations. As a result of their premiums, benefi ts packages, and con-
nection to the health-insurance funds, the bovenbouwen soon became major competitors of 
the private insurers. After all, with the permission of the Health-Insurance Council and the 
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government, they could make use of the health-insurance fund structure and organisation 
(agents and administration). 
In 1961, the private insurers established the Kontaktkommissie Landelijke Organisaties van 
Ziektekostenverzekeraars (Contact Body for Private Health Insurers (KLOZ)). The bovenbouwen
could also join the KLOZ, the fi rst formal consultative body for private insurers and health-
insurance funds. A second important step towards co-operation between the healthcare 
insurers and the health-insurance funds was the joint scheme for the insurance of bad risks 
in the Nederlands Onderling Herverzekeringsinstituut voor Ziektekosten (Netherlands Mutual 
Medical-Expenses Reinsurance Institute (NOZ)) in 1967. As mentioned previously, the 
liberalisation of the healthcare market and regulated competition were the main developments 
that increased the scope for synergy benefi ts between health-insurance funds and healthcare 
insurers within a single group. This tendency towards co-operation and group forming led 
in June 1994 to the establishment of a single national organisation for the health-insurance 
sector, Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN), through the merger of the umbrella organisations of 
the health-insurance funds (VNZ) and the private insurers (KLOZ). 
(Source: ’t Sticht fotobureau)
Founding meeting of Zorgverzekeraars Nederland
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Summary
Discussions in Belgium and Germany about health insurance are largely restricted to the 
fi nancial capacity of the system. In the Netherlands, however, the discussion has focused for 
decades on a frequently recurring issue, namely the structure of the health-insurance system. 
The system has been constantly adjusted in order to make it more transparent and rational. 
Until 1986, the possibility to switch between voluntary and private insurance had continu-
ous negative side-effects. There is great frustration and unease among retired persons who, 
after many years of membership, suddenly fi nd themselves excluded from the compulsory-
insurance system because their income is above the threshold.191 E. Schut and H. van der 
Velden rightly point out that, due to the dissatisfaction with the fragmented funding system, 
the plan for a national-insurance scheme appears in a new form every ten years like a phoenix 
rising from the ashes, only to be quickly reduced to ashes yet again. Each time, it founders 
on the confl icts of interest within the corporatist decision-making structure of the Dutch 
healthcare system.192
But the discussion about the structure of Dutch health insurance and the role of the 
health-insurance funds was far from over. At the end of 1999 the media reported that, when 
the second Kok cabinet was in power, Minister Borst wanted to introduce yet another new 
insurance system for medical expenses. New? Well, no. According to an announcement to the 
Lower House, Borst was thinking of …a compulsory basic insurance for everyone, in other words: 
old wine in new bottles. Borst wanted to do away with the post-war tripartite structure. The 
basic insurance was to cover all essential forms of care. Everyone would pay an income-based 
premium in addition to a fi xed nominal component already paid by health-insurance fund 
members. A maximum would be set for the nominal sum. Insurers could introduce co-payment 
in exchange for a lower premium, as is already the case in private insurance.193
Interestingly enough, coalition partner VVD apparently let go of its traditional opposition to 
compulsory basic insurance on condition that the market mechanism would be guaranteed 
in the health-insurance sector. The health-insurance funds and some private insurers also 
renounced their principled opposition. 
Equally interesting is the fact that the Labour Party (PvdA) argued in a policy document 
entitled De Kleur van Grijs (‘The Colour Grey’, February 2000) that the services provided 
by health insurers must refl ect more closely the differences in care needs and take greater ac-
count of the individual needs of insured persons. The PvdA wanted greater variety and to offer 
insured persons a range of packages at lower or higher premiums. It should also be possible to 
opt for co-payments in exchange for a lower premium. According to the PvdA paper, ‘lighter’ 
forms of care could be excluded from the AWBZ. In the Netherlands, political thinking on the 
subject of healthcare insurance appeared to be more in fl ux than ever before. 
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Chapter VII
SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND NEOLIBERAL
REGULATED MARKET COMPETITION, 2000-2008
1. The insurance of care in Germany, 2001-2007
In the period 2001-2007, social security and health care remained linked to each other 
through four social health insurances: Pfl egeversicherung (long-term care insurance) as a limited 
contribution to the costs of nursing and disability, Unfallversicherung (accident insurance) for 
occupational health risks and Gesetzliche and Private Krankenversicherungen, compulsory and 
private insurance for income risk and costs incurred through illness.
As in the Netherlands and Belgium, the political and social debate on the reform of the 
health-insurance system was in full swing from 1997 onwards. In the Bundesrepublik, as in 
the Netherlands, the debate focused on government regulations, market forces and demand-
driven care. The reform of the Pfl egeversicherung system was regarded as a social necessity in 
terms of improving the insurance system and providing more extensive and higher-quality 
care, and reinforcing the position of consumers. Politicians were also in favour of modernising 
the structure of the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung (compulsory accident insurance) system, but 
this met with public opposition. Market theory and regulated competition largely shaped the 
development of the GKV and PKV after the reforms of the Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (Health 
Care Structure Act) of 1992 and the Neuordnungsgesetze (Reorganisation Acts) of 1997.1
a. Modernisation of the Pfl egeversicherung
The Pfl egeversicherung was introduced in 1994, after twenty years of intense discussion on how 
to provide compulsory insurance for the high fi nancial risks in long-term care. The purpose 
of the insurance was das fi nanzielle Risiko der Pfl egebedürftigkeit abzusichern und Pfl egebedürftigen 
trotz ihrer Hilfbedarfs ein möglichst selbständiges und selbbestimmtes Leben zu ermöglichen (to insure 
the fi nancial risks of care needs and to enable those in need of care to live an indepen dent 
life).2 The legislature assumed that home care would allow people to continue living inde-
pendently for longer than if they were cared for in another household or in an extramural 
setting such as a home for the elderly.3 The introduction of this insurance lessened the burden 
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on the municipal social funds and the GKV, which up until then had been the main fi nancers 
of home care, elderly care and nursing-home care.4
The Pfl egeversicherung revolutionised German social security for two reasons. It was the fi rst 
provision for the public fi nancing of long-term care, and a large number of persons were 
insured.5 GKV and PKV members were compulsorily insured. The large scope of care insu-
rance, with 99.6% of the German population insured,6 meant that the Pfl egeversicherung can 
be seen as the fi rst German social insurance covering the whole population.7 GKV insured 
persons were insured under soziale Pfl ichtversicherung (social long-term healthcare insurance).
Those insured through the PKV had to take out private Pfl egeversicherung (private long-term 
healthcare insurance). 
The insurance was administered by the Pfl egekassen (care administration offi ces), which 
were set up by the Krankenkassen. The Pfl egekassen were the German equivalent of the Dutch 
zorgkantoren (care administration offi ces). The premium was 1.7% of gross income, with a 
ceiling of € 3,562.50 per month in 2006.8 Employers and employees each paid a contribution 
of 0.85%. The insurance did not pay out benefi ts in kind as provided for by the Dutch AWBZ
(Exceptional Medical Expenses Act), but offered fi nancial compensation for the cost of care 
provided at home or in a nursing home. Pfl egeversicherung therefore furnished less cover than 
the AWBZ. Benefi ts of between € 1,023 and € 1,688 per month were paid out, depending 
on the level of care required (Pfl egebedürftigkeit), categorised in Pfl egestufen, with category III 
being the highest level of care.9
VII.1 Care categories and benefi ts for Pfl egeversicherung. Maximum amount paid out per month
Level of care I II III III (special cases of 
hardship)




Short-term care, 24 
hrs per day
1,432 1,432 1,432
Part day/night nursing 384 921 1.432
Additional care (max. 
per year)
460 460 460




to costs, up to a 
maximum of 
€ 256
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Pflegebedürftigkeit kan jederzeit jeden treffen, 34.
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In 2004, benefi ts paid out under the soziale Pfl egeversicherung were composed as follows:10
– 48%  fi nancial reimbursements
– 9%  direct payments for professional nursing at home
– 10%  combinations of fi nancial payments and nursing
– 28%  nursing-home care
– 3%   intramural care for the disabled
– 2%  professional nursing in day/night clinics
Expenditure in 2004 amounted to € 17.7 billion, of which € 16.9 billion was covered by 
premiums. By comparison, expenditure under the Dutch AWBZ, with its benefi ts in kind, was 
€ 22 billion in 2004, with some form of care or nursing provided to about 550,000 people.11
In 2003, 2,075,000 people in Germany were entitled to make use of Pfl egeversicherung. Of 
that total, 1,925,000 people were insured through the soziale Pfl egeversicherung and 181,000 
people were privately insured.12
VII.2 Expenditure on long-term care in Germany in 2000, as a % of Gross Domestic Product
Home care Institutions Total
Public expenditure 0.43 0.52 0.95
Private expenditure 0.04 0.36 0.40
Total 0.47 0.88 1.35
The Pfl egeversicherung system clearly met demand in 1995, but came under heavy criticism 
from 2002 onwards. The funding base had not been amended since 1995, despite the rising 
demand for care as a result of demographic ageing.13 From 1999 onwards, premium revenues 
did not cover costs; in 2006 the defi cit was € 350 million.14 Premiums were still set too low, 
despite the fact that the rate for adults without children increased in 2004 from 1.75% to 
1.95% of the wage.15 The distinction between private and compulsory insurance was regarded 
as contrary to the principle of solidarity by the Linke, the Grünen, the left wing of the SPD, 
the Krankenkassen and social organisations.16 Since 1995, benefi ts had hardly been adjusted 
at all to allow for infl ation and cost increases.17 The benefi ts package had not changed since 
1995 although the demand for intensive care as a form of nursing care had increased sharply 
and reimbursements were inadequate. 
The limited introduction of personal care budgets in 2004 was the beginning of demand-
driven care in the Pfl egeversicherung.18 The insurance had to be geared more closely to the 
needs of Germany’s healthcare consumers. The debate on Pfl egeversicherung focused on im-
Source: RVZ, Langdurige zorg in het buitenland, 77.
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Scheme VII.1 Financial development of the Pfl egeversicherung, in billions of euros 1995-2006
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proving the quality of care, both at home and in nursing homes. This care had to be more 
closely aligned to patients’ needs and more effectively to safeguard their rights and dignity.19
Examples included:20
– Improvement of care for persons suffering from dementia 
– Improvement of ambulatory care in order to postpone the moment of need for intramural 
nursing care
– Increased benefi ts for care in homes for the elderly and nursing homes for Pfl egestufen II 
and III
– Three-yearly adjustment of benefi ts and of costs eligible for reimbursement
– Improvement of prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration by requiring the Pfl egekassen
to send the insured person’s medical dossier to the GP, who then has a pivotal role in the 
provision of primary care
– Nursing-home patients treated by their own GP
– Improved coordination of admission to a convalescent/nursing home after discharge from 
hospital
As in the Dutch debate, the focus was on the introduction of demand-driven care through 
strengthening the position of patients as consumers of care. Nutzersouveränität (consumer 
power) had to be increased by introducing ‘chain care’, facilitated by a trägerübergreifendes 
persönliches Budget (personal budget for integrated care).21 In 2007, benefi ts were extended 
when the Pfl egekantore began to conclude contracts with nursing institutions for chain care 
or Integrierten Versorgung (integrated care).22 Nursing homes could also contract for mobile 
geriatric care, specialised ambulatory palliative care and home nursing in the case of excep-
tionally long waiting lists for medical treatment.
By 2007, the experiment with personal budgets that had begun in 2004 was regarded as 
a success. This system would enable patients to circumvent the bureaucracy of intra- and 
extramural care and verstärkt Einfl uß auf die Leistungsangebote am Pfl egemarkt nehmen (obtain 
more infl uence on the service offering in the care market). Support was to be provided by 
Pfl egestützpunkte (care support offi ces) and Fallmanagers (care managers).23 Personal budgets, 
in addition to existing and future benefi ts, should be offered as an option for risk coverage. 
Demand-driven care was to be promoted through quality assurance for medical practice 
and nursing and by improving transparency for care users and patient associations. Protocols, 
professional standards, quality criteria and rates were to be made public, and patients’ organi-
sations were to be involved in their development. 
As with the Dutch AWBZ, the Pfl egeversicherung – Germany’s insurance for major medi-
cal risks − was faced with signifi cant changes in 2008: fi nancial strengthening, adjustment 
of benefi ts to take account of demographic ageing and the modernisation of health care 
through demand-driven care and quality assurance. The aim was to achieve greater cohe-
rence with the hospital care and curative care provided by the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
(compulsory health insurance). 
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The main difference from the Dutch reforms related to the funding base. While the funding 
base and budgets of Pfl egeversicherung in Germany were to be increased, the Dutch government 
was aiming to make cutbacks under the AWBZ. In Germany, the burden on the municipal 
social funds would be reduced through improvements of the Pfl egeversicherung, while in the 
Netherlands certain areas of responsibility (e.g. home care) under the AWBZ were transferred 
to the municipalities through the introduction of the Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning
(Social Support Act (WMO)). It is useful to look at the outcomes of these developments in 
conjunction with each other.
b. Limited modernisation of the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung
The Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung (compulsory accident insurance) was introduced in 1884 
by Bismarck as part of his package of mandatory social health insurances, in order to provide 
workers with insurance for occupational health risks and accidents. 24 The aim of the 
insurance was to provide sick pay, curative care and rehabilitation to ensure that wor kers 
recovered as quickly as possible and could return to work or social reintegration. Care 
provision was not to depend on the question of whether the employee or employer was 
responsible for the accident. These principles underlying compulsory accident insurance 
did not change until 2008.
The main features of the accident insurance were:
The principle that, in the event of claims resulting from a work-related accident or illness, -
compensation rather than assistance would be provided (risque professionel)
Financing though employer premiums, as for the Dutch - Ongevallenwet (Accident Act)25
The relationship between prevention and compensation as - Prävention voor Entschädigung, 
Rehabilitation vor Rente (prevention for indemnifi cation and rehabilitation for monetary 
benefi ts)26
Corporatist, private-law administration by - Unfallversicherungsträger or by public-law ad-
ministration such as Berufsgenossenschaften (institutions for statutory accident insurance and 
prevention (BGs)) and Unfallkassen (casualty administration boards), rather than by the 
Krankenkassen.27 This would mean that employers were more closely involved, through 
sector-based administrative bodies, in implementing legislation, and would be more likely 
to introduce measures to prevent work-related illness and accidents.
From the beginning, the BGs were successful in terms of encouraging occupational preven-
tion. Employers proved willing to introduce measures to prevent occupational accidents 
and illness in order to bring down premiums. 28 For the BGs, research into improving the 
prevention, rehabilitation and treatment of work-related illness was one of the main ways 
to control claim costs and manage the reintegration of ill and disabled workers. In 1890, 
the Knappschafts-Berufsgenossenschaft opened the Krankenanstallt Bergmannschaft as the fi rst 
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rehabilitation clinic. It is the oldest accident clinic in the world.29 In 1906, the gewerbliche 
Berufsgenossenschaften founded the Kaiser-Wilhelm und Kaiserin Viktoria-Auguste-Stiftung, the 
fi rst institution for the study of accident prevention and safeguarding the lives and health of 
workers. The research conducted by the BGs was internationally pioneering in the fi eld of 
social and insurance medicine, the development of research into occupational prevention, 
accident rehabilitation and the diagnosis of and therapies for work-related illness.30 Examples 
of research into work-related illnesses, recovery and convalescence are research into miners’ 
diseases such as asbestosis and silicosis, into more common work-related health problems 
resulting from excessive noise, and into more modern illnesses and syndromes such as RSI
and eye disease caused by infra-red or ultraviolet radiation.31
In the century or more of practice and research relating to the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung,
prevention, rehabilitation, reintegration and claim assessment became specialist areas for the 
BGs, the Unfallkassen and their Spitzenverbände (umbrella organisations). They initiated the de-
velopment of legislation and regulation for prophylaxis, health protection and safety, and gave 
advice during its social and political implementation.32 The cost of claims under compulsory 
accident insurance in the business operations of the German social health-insurance system 
VII.3 Public and private expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure on health care in Germany, 
1992-2003
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003
Public expenditure 77.7 77.0 77.2 75.3 75.5 74.9 75.2 74.6
Tax 13 12.9 10.8 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.8
Statutory health insu-
rance
60.7 59.7 57.4 56.7 56.9 57 56.9 56.7
Statutory retirement 
insurance
2.3 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8
Statutory occupational 
accident insurance
1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Long-term care insu-
rance
-- -- 4.9 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.9
Private expenditure 22.3 23.0 22.8 24.7 25.4 25.1 24.7 25.4
Out-of-pocket pay-
ments and private sub-
sidies
10.7 11.1 11.3 12.6 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.3
Private health insurance 7.3 7.6 7.3 7.8 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6
Employee contributions 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Source: R. Busse, A. Riesberg, Gesundheitssysteme im Wandel, 70.
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was and remained relatively low as a result of this knowledge, experience and qualitatively 
consistent administrative practice. 
Although the BGs, the Unfallkassen and employers had been able for a century to control 
the costs of premiums and claims, from 2002 onwards the Bundestag and the government 
began to discuss the reform of the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung (statutory accident insurance) 
as part of the debate on restructuring the social-security system. 
Despite the favourable performance and the solid medical and social achievements of the 
Unfallversicherung, in May 2003 the Bundesregierung introduced a proposed amendment to 
modernise it.33 The historic transition from an industrial society to a service-based society 
caused shifts in the sectorally structured Unfallversicherung that were detrimental to certain 
industrial sectors. The building and raw-materials industries were paying disproportionately 
high premiums. This gave rise to the need for a fairer distribution of the burden through 
improved Finanzausgleichsverfahren (fi nancial equalisation) among the industrial sectors. Costs 
could be reduced by simplifying the implementation structure by merging the BGs that 
administered the Unfallversicherung for the industrial sector.34
Privatisation of the administrative system was not up for discussion, as has happened in 
the Netherlands with disability insurance.35 Since 1967, the Dutch disability insurance had 
been an income insurance that could be implemented by private insurers. German disability 
insurance provided a benefi t package that covered the full spectrum of care and social sup-
port, from medical treatment to rehabilitation, social reintegration and income provision for 
dependents.36 In the view of the Bundesregierung, accident insurance should not be privatised 
because it was too closely interwoven with the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, the Altertum-
srenteversicherung and the Pfl egeversicherung: integrated social health insurance.37 Privatising the 
implementation of part of the German social health-insurance system would undermine the 
performance of the system as a whole. Privatising Unfallversicherung would merely increase 
costs. Profi t margins and expenditure on acquisition, advertising and marketing meant that 
the management costs of private insurers were higher than those of the public BGs for the 
same level of benefi ts paid out. Discussions on reforms related to:38
The introduction of a new fi nancial equalisation fund-
Reorganisation of the implementation structure through the merger of - BGs and Unfall-
kassen
Merger of the umbrella organisations to form a - Spitzenverband (interest organisation)
Encouraging competition among the implementing bodies-
No changes to the benefi ts package. The internationally recognised high standard of -
medical care, revalidation and claim assessment should be preserved.39 Greater emphasis 
should be placed on prevention.
The reorganisation of the implementation structure and the updating of the equalisation 
structure were initiated in 2004. From 2004, the reorganisation of the implementation 
organisation resulted in a fall in the number of BGs from 31 to 23, and the number of Un-
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fallkassen fell from 54 to 27.40 The umbrella organisations of the Genossenschaften and the 
Kassen merged to form the new association Verband “Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung 
VDGU” (German Statutory Accident Insurance) that acted on behalf of both implementing 
bodies in respect of the political arena, employers and the trade unions. Equalisation was 
modifi ed by means of an Überaltlastausgleich, a fund for equalising previous disproportionate 
operating costs by sector. Other plans, such as improving the control of premium collection 
and strengthening the supervisory role of the VDGU, were realised only in part or not at all. 
There was too much public opposition to far-reaching proposals such as reducing benefi t 
payments. The standards of prevention, care and reintegration were such that intervention 
met with too much protest. The foundation of German compulsory accident insurance had 
remained intact since 1884.
c. Cost increases and solidarity, or: the need to reform the Gesetzliche and Private Krankenver-
sicherung
Until the reforms of 1997, changes in German health insurance had been geared to con-
trolling cost increases in the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung. In 1974, when Heiner Geißler, 
Minister for Social Affairs in Rheinland-Pfalz, described the future cost trends of the GKV as 
an öffentlichkeitswirksame Kostenexplosion (a public cost explosion), it heralded the beginning 
of a twenty-year period of einnahmenorientierten Ausgabenpolitiek (revenue-oriented expendi-
ture policy).41 Up until 2005, more than 200 laws and measures were introduced to control 
expenditure.42 The reforms had a limited effect. In 1997, the costs of medical care and most 
medicines were still reimbursed, but with a limited policy excess or co-payment. The govern-
ment had the scope to intervene in the relations between Krankenkassen and care providers, 
but Kassen and doctors still continued the pre-war practice of concluding mutual contracts 
with predefi ned budgets with the professional organisations (Spitzenverbände). The autonomy 
of the Kassen and professional organisations was still intact.
Premiums and the cost of claims for the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung continued to rise, 
despite the reforms of 1992 with government intervention in rate agreements, budgets and the 
introduction of free choice of Krankenkassen, and the Beitragsentlassungsgesetz of 1997 for the 
introduction of co-payments for medicines, medical transport, psychotherapy and massage. 
The infl uence of these cost increases was relative. Government policy did not aim to reduce 
the share of the GKV and healthcare costs in the Gross Domestic Product, but to control 
GKV premium levels.43 Healthcare expenditure, expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product, remained stable at between 5.17 and 5.58% in the alten Bundesländer from 1977 to 
1992. After reunifi cation, this increased for the old and new Länder, varying between 6.14% 
and 6.39% in the period 1992-2003.44
The provision of care and cover for income risk by the Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung were 
set out in section 3 of the Sozialgesetzbuches V.45 In general terms, they comprised:
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Illness prevention and health promotion in the workplace-
Prompt diagnosis-
Medical treatment by ambulatory physician care, dental care, medicines and devices/-
appliances, paramedical care, hospital care, home care, forms of rehabilitation and socio-
therapy
Trauma care and emergency services, medical transport-
Special benefi ts like information for patients-
Sick pay-
The income threshold between the Gesetzliche and the Private Krankenversicherung (GKV and 
PKV; compulsory and private health insurance) remained in place after 1997. This varied 
between the old and new Bundesländer and increased from € 37,733 and € 32,671 in 1997 
to € 47,700 and € 42,750 in 2007.46 In 2008, the insurance was implemented by 21 mutual 
insurers, 26 commercial insurers and two specialised insurers: the Krankenversicherung der 
Bundesbahnbeamten (for railway employees) and Postbeamtenkrankenkasse (for postal work-
ers).47 In addition to comprehensive policies for Private Krankenversicherung (private health 
insurance), the insurers also offered supplementary insurance for sickness benefi t and Private 
Pfl egeversicherung (private long-term care insurance). 
Source: H. Berié, G. Braeseke et al., Strukturen und Kostensteuerungsmechanismen, 98.
VII.4 Expenditure on benefi ts under the GKV in 1992 and 2003, in millions of euros, with percen-
tage increases 
1992 2003 2003/1992
BIP 1,613,200 2,128,200 31.9%
Management costs 5,397 8,206 52%
Expenditure 102,033 136,223 33.5%
Hospital care 33,815 46,780 38.3%
GP/physician care 17,068 24,301 42.4%
Medicines 16,642 24,218 45.5%
Devices/appliances 5,725 9,294 62.3%
Dental care 10,882 11,819 8.6%
Sick pay 7,211 6,973 -3.3%
Medical transport 1,300 2,857 119.8%
Maternity care 2,037 2,836 39.2%
Other benefi ts 4,292 1,840 -57.1%
Home nursing 862 1,700 97.2%
Social services / prevention 444 1,035 133.1%
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The cost increases for PKV were higher than for GKV. The share of PKV exploitation in the 
Gross Domestic Product exploded between 1977 and 2003, from € 3,041 million to € 20,612. 
The number of persons with full insurance cover age had increased from 4.2 million in 1975 
to 7.7 million in 2002 (i.e. from 6.9% to 9.3% of the population).48 Costs per insured per-
son for PKV increased by 122% between 1985 and 2001, and by 89% for GKV. The average 
premium increase per policy was 57%. 
From a political and social perspective, left-wing parties such as the Grünen and Die Linke
regarded the PKV system as an anti-solidarity anomaly in the German health-insurance 
system.49 Privately insured care could be better and more extensive, depending on the 
policy. However, insurers had freedom in terms of risk selection and premium differentia-
tion. Premiums depended on age, sex and medical history, and therefore were often risk-
based. In contrast to the GKV system, premiums were also levied for spouses and children. 
The number of policies rose by 480,000 between 1999 and 2001.50 This was the result of 
the increase in premiums for voluntary GKV insurance, which meant that good risks (e.g. 
young, healthy persons) preferred to take out private policies rather than the more expensive 
Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung.
VII.5 Increases in benefi t expenditure per insured person in compulsory and private insurance, 
1992-2003
GKV PKV Ratio of PKV to 
GKV
GP/physician care +24 +70 2:9




Devices/appliances +49 +67 1:4
Hospital care +33 +55 1:7
Total +36 +50 1:4
Source: R. Busse, A. Riesberg, Gesundheitssysteme im Wandel, 96.
d. The reform of GKV and PKV: political and social consensus
After 1997, too, European unifi cation51 and the need to control premiums, secure the Ger-
man social health-insurance system for the future and provide preventive care meant that the 
modernisation of Gesetzliche and Private Versicherung had to continue.52 By 2030, demographic 
ageing could lead to premium increases amounting to 23% of the Gross National Product. 
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Higher co-payments for care were thought to be inevitable to ensure fi nancial viability, but 
there were doubts as to their effectiveness for the German system.53
The system was caught in an upward cost spiral, while politicians sought to stabilise or 
reduce premiums. Modernisation of the GKV system was part of Agenda 2010, a political 
programme of economic, social and educational reforms designed to address the problems of 
unemployment and demographic ageing and to strengthen Germany’s position in the Euro-
pean Union.54 Functional competition on an equitable basis should ensure that, after 2010, 
the health-insurance system would be accessible to the majority of the German population.55
The solution to the problems was still thought to be a thorough reform of the fi nancial base 
for the system of statutory coverage of health risks. For employers and employees, this was 
the most important part of the GKV reforms:56
The wage threshold for compulsory insurance meant that, with increasing wages, the -
premium base for GKV was limited, and premiums had to be increased
As a result of globalisation and the shift from entrepreneurs’ to shareholders’ interests, -
employers wanted to get rid of their contribution to compulsory insurance. By separating 
healthcare funding from wage costs, Germany would become more attractive economi-
cally from an international perspective.57 Employers preferred premium nominalisation of 
Kopfpauschalemodellen (capitation-fee models) to income-related premiums. They hoped 
that fi scal premium collection would mean that the economy would no longer foot the 
bill for rising healthcare costs. It seemed that employers wanted to dispense with the 
Rhineland model and its income-related premium solidarity.
Demographic shifts such as ageing appeared to be a threat to social security systems (such -
as the GKV) funded through allocation, because health care for an expanding group of 
insured persons with higher costs and lower premiums had to be funded by a shrinking 
group of young insured persons 
Income from wage premiums fell as a result of persistent unemployment, which meant -
that premiums had to be increased even if healthcare expenditure remained at the same 
level
Funding problems resulting from advances in medical technology could be resolved by -
making adjustments to benefi t packages and by reforming the funding base. The type 
and number of benefi ts could be rationalised. The unlimited inclusion of new forms of 
curative care also meant open-ended fi nancing and non-regulated premium increases. It 
was necessary to end the direct relationship between economic burdens through wage-
based premiums and advances in medical technology.
The alternative to compulsory public-law health insurance and private-law medical expenses 
insurance – a system that was more than a century old – was to replace it with a population-
wide insurance for the coverage of health-related risks: integrierte Krankenversicherung, or 
Bürgerinnen- und Burgerversicherung (universal health insurance).58 As in the Netherlands, there 
was a debate about the introduction of a general basic insurance for medical expenses. Opin-
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ions differed as to whether the Dutch model as in the Zorgverzekeringswet of 2006 would be 
feasible for the German system.59
The German government was of the opinion that the ultimate aim of the health-insurance 
reforms was to create a Burgerversicherung, but in the system of 2008 this did not have suffi cient 
public support.60 The right-wing parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) wanted to reform the GKV
funding base by means of a Gesundheitsprämie, a nominal premium unrelated to income and 
secondary income and – as in the Netherlands – compensation paid out by the tax authority 
for people on lower incomes.61
The left-wing parties were divided. The SPD was in favour of a national insurance with 
income-related premiums based on income from work and capital, increased competition 
between the Kassen and care providers, and the co-existence of private insurers and Kranken-
kassen.62 In 2007, Die Linke wanted a Burgerversicherung with income-related premiums.63 The 
combination Bündnis 90/Die Grünen was not opposed to a national insurance for medical 
expenses, but party members had doubts about its feasibility. They wanted to extend the 
funding base for compulsory insurance, which had remained limited to wage and wage-
related income with levies for Private Krankenversicherung such as Solidärausgleich, so that higher 
incomes would also contribute to the GKV.64
It seemed unlikely that a decision would be made on a national health insurance before 
2010, although there was political and social consensus regarding the need for immediate 
and radical reforms. A regulated market mechanism and budgets would keep costs down, in 
the manner of the Dutch attempts to reorganise health care and social health insurance.65 A 
compromise between the Burgerversicherung and Gesundheitspauschale or premium nominalisa-
tion appeared impossible. 
e. Management systems, care and fi nancial restructuring
Scientifi cally, socially and politically, the consensus remained that governance of the German 
system for structuring and funding health care at a macro level should remain intact. The 
government would continue to have fi nal responsibility for controlling budgets, and competen-
cies and powers would be delegated to corporatively managed implementing bodies, which 
in turn would be responsible for concluding collective agreements to set the price, quantity 
and quality of care.66 Corporative coordination had proved successful for price and quality 
management in agreements such as those for GP/physician care whereby, since the Berliner 
Abkommen of 1913, the corporatively managed Kassen and the national doctors’ organisation 
Hartmann Bund retained full responsibility for concluding and implementing the agreements.67
This mechanism had not been used to control the price and volume of medicines, devices/
appliances and hospital care, and these costs had increased sharply. 
This confi rmed the observation that the pluralist, corporative participation model not only 
offered the possibility for democratic control of the administration of social health insu rance 
and a guarantee of solidarity, but could also reinforce cost control and self-regulation among 
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the parties.68 Institutional social economics is concerned with governance, thought of as good order and 
workable arrangements: the way in which the social midfi eld, as part of civil society under the 
supervision of and in cooperation with the government, organises the structure and funding 
of health care.69
In the German system of corporative management and capped expenditure, regulated 
competition was not an appropriate goal for structural reforms, but it was used as an instru-
ment for reallocating and improving the distribution of money and care supply and capacity.70
The GKV-Modernisierunggesetzes (Health Insurance Modernisation Act) of 2004 strengthened 
the Gemeinsame Selbstverwaltung, or corporatist governance of the care system. All existing 
national negotiating and cooperating committees, in which Kassen and healthcare providers 
negotiated and concluded agreements, were merged into a Gemeinsamen Bundesausschuss
(Federal Joint Committee (G-BA)).71 The Bundesausschüsse for Kassen, doctors, dentists and 
hospitals remained as part of the national committee. The G-BA comprised nine representatives 
of the associations of Krankenkassen, nine representatives of the care providers, two impartial 
members and an impartial chairman. The meetings of the Bundesausschuss were also attended 
by nine representatives of patient organisations. 
The Bundesausschuss was authorised to issue binding directives for all aspects of the GKV,
and it translated legislation into practical measures. The main responsibility of the G-BA was 
to issue directives on the form and content of care (e.g. directives for medical and surgical 
treatment, recognition of new research and treatment methods, pharmacy provisions, devices/
appliances, and quality standards for ambulatory care). 
The modernisation of the corporatist governance model was one element of the changes 
to the German healthcare system. Competition between members and healthcare providers 
would force the Kassen to become more effi cient and provide more personalised care, and, 
as with Dutch health insurers, place them more in the role of care managers.72
VII.6 Changes in the structure and types of expenditure of the GKV, as a percentage of total expenditure, 
1977 and 2003
Type of expenditure 1977 2003 % change, 2003:1977
Hospital care 29.39 32.39 +10.2
GP/physician care 17.94 16.83 -6.2
Pharmacy 14.14 16.77 +18.6
Devices/appliances 4.8 6.43 +34
Dental care 7.76 2.62 -66.2
Source: H. Berié, G. Braeseke et al., Strukturen und Kostensteuerungsmechanismen, 76.




































































































































































































































































































































































TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY302
The introduction in 1993 of the Wahlfreiheitmodell (freedom-of-choice model) for a Kasse 
was the fi rst step towards introducing competition between the funds. The Wahlfreiheit was 
extended in 2002, and from that date on there was no longer a deadline for switching funds. 
In the period 1996-2004, the Ortskrankenkassen (regional sickness funds) lost 16% of their 
members, and the Angestellten-Ersatzkassen (sickness funds for employees) lost 11% of their 
members. At the same time, the membership of the Betriebskrankenkassen (company health-
insurance funds) increased by 100%, that of the Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen by 5% and that of the 
Innungskassen (sectoral sickness funds) by 3%.73 The rationalisation of the Kassen continued.
Freedom of choice for insured persons did not mean that the Kassen were in a position to 
compete in a commercial sense.74 The foundation for the market mechanism and competition 
between the Krankenkassen was laid in 1998 with the introduction of the Risikostrukturausgleich 
(risk equalisation system (RSA)).75 The purpose of the RSA was to equalise the differences in 
the risk profi les of the Orts-, Ersatz, Innungs- and Betriebskassen. Risk solidarity would be rein-
forced in order to create a level playing fi eld for the different Kassen regarding risks in terms 
of old age, gender, chronic illness and income differences for setting premiums. For 2004, this 
meant that people paying GKV premiums contributed ±13.5% of their income to the RSA,
while the premium itself was 14.2%.76 Ninety percent of healthcare expenses were eligible 
for reimbursement under the RSA. The RSA was a break with the system, da ting from 1883, 
whereby the Kassen themselves were responsible for premium collection and expenditure. A 
national fund was created for allocating the majority of premium revenues, and the method 
of allocation to the Kassen was centrally determined. In 2004, the following consequences 
of Wahlfreiheit and the RSA were noted:77
GKV-  insured persons were increasingly willing to switch from one Kasse to another. In 
1998, 9.3% considered changing, but in 2003 this had risen to 23.4%.
Insured persons switched - Kasse more often, as shown by the changes in the membership 
fi gures for the Orts-, Angestellten- and Innungskassen. The Ortskassen had lost 16% of their 
members since 1996 and the Angestelltenkassen had lost 11%, while the Betriebskassen
doubled their membership to 10.4 million.
The changes in membership fi gures were due to differences in premiums - and to the 
benefi ts offered
The change in membership fi gures heightened the differences in the risk profi les of the -
various Kassen. Young and healthy insured persons tended to switch funds more often.
Differences in premiums were lessened not by competition but by the - Risikostrukturaus-
gleich78
Levelling out the differences between the old and new Bundesländer was not the only purpose 
of the RSA.79 The changes in risk profi les resulting from premium differences were weake-
ning the solidarity between those insured with the growing Betriebskassen and the shrinking 
Ortskassen, which were obliged to accept all applicants.80 In 2001, therefore, the Bundestag
accepted the Gesetz zur Reform des Risikostrukturausgleichs (Health Insurance Equalisation Fund 
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Modernisation Act) in order to eliminate the differences in the risk profi les and to give all 
Kassen – including the competing Betriebskassen – the opportunity to improve the provision of 
care for the chronically ill.81 The equalisation criteria (age, sex, capacity for work), were sup-
plemented in 2001 with the introduction of Disease Management Programmes (DMPs).82
DMPs are treatment programmes providing professional, cross-sectoral integrated, proto-
colled and evidence-based care with the aim of improving quality and reducing costs. In the 
medium and long term, personalised care for chronically ill patients by means of qualifi ed 
chain care would cut costs. These systems, which were originally developed in the United 
States in order to legitimise the marketing strategies of the pharmaceutical industry, were 
taken over by Managed Care Organisations and, from 1999 onwards, were also introduced 
in European countries including the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain and Switzerland.83 From 
2001, DMPs were implemented in Germany not only to improve curative care but were also 
linked to the RSA.84
The Kassen had to set up these chain-care programmes themselves. Integrated care as an 
effective transition between acute care, convalescence and nursing care was not possible unless 
the Kassen and care providers worked together and were forced to do so by the government.85
The concept of chain care was not unknown in the German healthcare system. Before 1989, 
Dispensairebetreuung (integrated care) had been in place in the DDR for many decades.86 The 
Kassen would have to contribute less to the RSA if they could realise demonstrable cost saving 
by means of Disease Management Programmes or qualitätsgesicherten strukturierten Behandlungs-
programme (quality-assured structured treatment programmes).87 This fi nancial stimulus would 
put the Kassen in a better position to provide integrierte or chain care. Given that 20% of the 
German population suffer from a chronic illness, this had to be feasible.88 In 2001, diabetes 
mellitus was the fi rst disease for which a DMP was introduced, rapidly followed by COPD
and coronary heart failure. Insured persons who participated in a DMP were registered by 
their Kasse in a special category for equalisation purposes through the RSA.89 Krankenkassen
concluded contracts with healthcare providers on the basis of predefi ned quality requirements, 
and informed their members about voluntary participation in the DMPs. In December 2005, 
more than 2 million GKV insured persons were registered in DMPs.90
By means of the DMP system, the state made it possible for Kassen to compete more in 
terms of the quality of care, and made it impossible for Betriebskassen to form a monopoly 
by weakening other Kassen. The insured person or care consumer should not only be free 
to choose which Kasse to join, but should also be offered a range of care options to ensure 
diversity. Under the DMP system, the system of national, collective contracts with healthcare 
providers such as doctors would be replaced with agreements between individual Kassen
and healthcare providers. The DMP system would reinforce the market mechanism initiated 
through the Wahlfreiheit and Risikostrukturausgleich.91 This did not exactly proceed smoothly. 
The doctors’ organisations in particular still attempted to conclude collective agreements with 
the Kassenbunde, much against the will of the government and political parties.92
By mid-2008, the scientifi c evaluation of the DMP was not yet complete, but the govern-
ment, politicians, Kassen and patient organisations were satisfi ed with the system. The parties 
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regarded DMPs as an innovative stimulus for the German healthcare system. Patients became 
actively involved in their treatment and received better information and supervision. Quality 
management was introduced into curative care through evidence-based treatment, the organi-
sation of documentation and closer involvement of the Kassen in prevention, convalescence 
and reintegration.93 Opposition parties such as Bundnis90/Grünen saw DMPs as enhancing 
the options for and position of patients.94 Further development of the DMP system, with its 
integrated care − or chain care – could be part of the solution for dealing with the effects of 
demographic ageing. Bureaucracy in the healthcare sector could be reduced: the Kassen could 
take over the administration of chain care from the government and care institutions.95
Optimised DMP administration was supposed to yield data about multimorbidity and 
comorbidity among Disease Management Programme patients. The DMP system had to 
become the foundation for transforming, in 2009-2010, the RSA from a system based on 
cost calculation into an equalisation system based on morbidity risk, as introduced in the 
Netherlands in 2006 for the basic insurance for curative care.96
When the Risikostrukturausgleich was reformed in 2002, the weighting factors for equalisa-
tion by means of the RSA (old-age profi le, income and gender) were considered inadequate 
for equalising the differences in the operating costs of the Kassen in a competitive way.97
Kassen were not encouraged to avoid risk selection because the weighting factors did not 
equalise the actual business, resulting from expenditure on care.98 Risk equalisation, calcu-
lated by sickness expenses or morbidity fi gures, was seen as a more appropriate instrument 
for strengthening the solidarity of the GKV in combination with the benefi ts of regulated 
competition. The main Ortskassen, which had negative business results due to unfavourable 
risk profi les and negative morbidity fi gures, would be better able to compete on quality and 
diversity of care with the smaller Betriebs- en Innungskassen if there was a krankheitsbezogenen 
Risikostrukturausgleich (morbidity-related equalisation fund) and a good DMP policy.99
In the period 2004-2006, Wahlfreiheit, a morbidity-related Risikostrukturausgleich, the mo-
dernisation of curative care by means of DMPs, and the replacement of collective healthcare 
contracts by a more individualised system were still considered insuffi cient in terms of GKV
reforms. The reorganisation of the funding base was and remained the basis for the tenability 
of the cost structure in the short and medium term. According to the left- and right-wing 
parties in the Bundestag, there was a lack of competitive incentives for improving quality and 
effi ciency.100 Because the integration of Private Krankenversicherung and Gesetzliche Kranken-
versicherung to form a single Bürgerversicherung was not considered feasible before 2015, and 
because competition between the two systems had to be avoided101, there were calls for cut-
backs in the interim, increased co-payments, measures for limiting care consumption, greater 
competition in ambulatory physician care and pharmacy and a quality policy for care and 
administration.102 The GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz of 2004 would have to generate cost savings 
of € 9.8 billion, or 7% of forecast GKV expenditure, and € 23 billion in the period to 2007. 
The reform act of 2004 was designed not only to cut costs but was also related to social and 
institutional modernisation, such as reinforcing corporatist governance by the Gemeinsamen 
Bundesausschuss. Collective and individual patient rights would be extended by introducing 
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the right of consultation for patient organisations. Competition in primary care was promoted 
because, in addition to individual practices, multidisciplinary care centres were also allowed 
to compete for GP care contracts. These centres were allowed to offer GP services, specialist 
care and integrated care. Until 2004, such centres existed only in Berlin and Brandenburg 
as relics of the out-patient clinics from the time of the DDR. The ‘gatekeeper’ role of the GP
as an intermediary for specialist physician care was reinforced when it became compulsory 
for the Kassen to register their insured persons in Hausarztmodelle or to offer permanent 
registration with a GP practice in combination with discount on co-payments and media-
tion for waiting lists.103
Kassenvereine, interest organisations for the various types of institution, were encouraged to 
merge. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Spitzenverbände der Krankenkassen (Association of Sickness 
Fund Organisations) acted as a consortium of all health-insurance fund organisations. In 
contrast to the merger of the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung umbrella organisations to form the 
VDGU, the merger of the Kassenvereine was considered undesirable. It would be too radical a 
change to the old social structures, it would have a destabilising effect and would make the 
tasks of the Kassen, in terms of structuring and coordinating care, too demanding.
The measures of 2004 had a limited effect. The planned reduction in premiums could not 
be implemented in 2005.104 Cost levels for care stayed within the estimates, but the rate of 
expenditure on physician care, pharmacy and hospital care remained the same. The social and 
political consensus on the need for the radical reform of the funding base and care structure, 
as opposed to piecemeal changes, was so strong that in 2004 the Bundestagfraktionen of coali-
tion and opposition SPD,CDU/CSU,Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and FDP, the Minister for Public 
Health and Länder representatives began to hold talks on large-scale structural changes.105
The ultimate aim was not the introduction of a basic insurance or Bürgerversicherung (uni-
versal health insurance) but a Gesundheitsreform (health system reform) to be implemented 
by 2009 whereby the entire population would have access to good health care at affordable 
premiums. The distinction between Gesetzliche and Private insurance would remain. The 
reform of the funding base – the income side – would have to align with changes on the 
expenditure side in order to ensure that available resources were allocated effi ciently and 
effectively. The new Gesundheitsreform, possibly in anticipation of a Bürgerversicherung, would 
have to provide for:106
Insurance for everyone living in Germany, with no distinction between - GKV and PKV
Universal access to medically necessary care-
Guaranteed universal access by increasing the fi scally fi nanced premium-
Enhanced quality and effi ciency by means of increased competition on care between the -
Kassen, reducing the number of collective agreements with healthcare providers
Reform of the organisational structure by enabling the merging of the different types of -
Kassen for the Gesundheitsfonds (health-insurance fund) already in the works
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Greater competition among healthcare providers through greater freedom to conclude -
individual agreements for ambulatory care, and price competition for medicines, devices 
and appliances
More options to choose and switch between - Private Krankenversicherung by adjusting the 
Alterungsrückstellungen (old-age provisions) and introducing a basic rate for which all PKV
insured persons, GKV voluntarily insured persons and persons entitled to PKV policies 
could insure themselves
In 2006, the CDU/CSU and SDP parties and the Bundesregierung reached agreement on a new 
Gesundheitsreform, which came into effect on 1 April 2007 and would be implemented in 
phases: the GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz (Competition Reinforcement Health Insurance 
Act (GKV-WSG)).107 The market mechanism was to be reinforced by means of measures to 
increase competition between patients and doctors, insured persons and Kassen, Kassen and 
care providers through tariff options, individual rather than collective contracts between 
Kassen and care providers, a new fee structure for physician care, cost/benefi t standards for 
medicines, and improvements in integrated care between the ambulatory and stationary sec-
tors. Improving quality and effi ciency was to be the objective of the corporatist governance 
model. Bureaucracy would be reduced by integrating the seven interest organisations of 
the Krankenkassen into a Spitzenverband Bund (Union of Health Insurance Organisations).108
Mergers between Kassen, including cross-category mergers, were encouraged. 
From 2009, all persons living in Germany will be required to take out insurance, but a dual 
system of Private and Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung will remain in place. Private insurers will 
have to compete with the Krankenkassen. In order to make this possible, legislation has been 
introduced that will control their business practices. From 2009, anyone who is privately 
insured must remain so.109 The transfer of individually accrued entitlements when switching 
between GKV and PKV will be regulated by law. For the PKV, basic policies or Basistarife will 
be introduced to provide for the GKV benefi ts package, as well as the obligation to accept all 
applicants without a medical assessment, affordable premiums and sick-pay accrual. Privately 
insured persons will be able to exchange their older, more expensive policies for these basic 
policies, which will also be available to persons with voluntary insurance. This patronisation 
was not accepted without complaint by the private insurers. In 2007, 25 companies instituted 
proceedings against the introduction of the basic-policy system. They regarded the transfer 
of entitlements as an infringement of statutory guaranteed property rights.110
The main change is the introduction of the Gesundheitsfonds in 2009.111 Central funding 
of the GKV system by means of a central national (Bundeseinheitliches) fund instead of de-
centralised premium-setting and collection by the Kassen should result in the more effi cient 
use of premium revenues and the increase of tax-funded contributions to health care.112 The 
funding of the GKV was made more transparent. The Gesundheitsfonds will be funded with 
premiums paid by employers, social-insurance institutions, voluntarily insured persons and 
fi scal contributions for child insurance. After 2009, the fi scal share will be increased from € 1.5 
billion to € 14 billion in order to reinforce the funding base for health insurance. 
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The Kassen will no longer determine or collect the contributions paid by employers and 
employees. From 2009, they will receive a nominal sum (or Grundpauschale) for each insured 
person, plus a supplement based on age, gender or health risk.113 The Risicostrukturausgleich will 
be based on the costs relating to 50 to 60 illnesses.114 If a Kasse funded from the Gesundheits-
fonds makes losses, the executive board can impose an additional charge or Zusatzpremie on 
insured persons, up to 1% of the income of each insured family. This is a measure to increase 
competition between the Kassen.115
Regional differences in exploitation will be evened out by the Konvergenzklausel (regional 
equalisation fund).116 The fi nancial position of the Kassen will be improved.117 They must be 
debt-free when the new funding system is implemented. From 2010 they will be required 
to form reserves. The new system will also have positive consequences for the budgets of 
local authorities and Bundesländer: they will no longer be liable for defi cits of the Ortskran-
kenkassen.
The Gesundheitsreform is designed to strengthen competition between the Kassen. The 
fl aws of the old system of decentralised premium-setting and collection in combination with 
disproportionate risk distribution can be resolved, and the reformed system will create a level 
playing fi eld for all Kassen (i.e. the Ortskassen as well as the categorised Betriebs-, Ersatz- and 
Innungskassen) in terms of competing on healthcare quality, concluding agreements and setting 
tariffs. They can cut healthcare costs to benefi t insured persons and respond more effectively 
to care requirements and demand: thanks to the general freedom of choice (Wahlfreiheit), 
surely every insured person can choose the Kasse that best suits their needs?
As in the Netherlands, the question was raised as to whether the reforms to the Ger-
man healthcare system would encounter problems with regard to European law.118 Did the 
principles of free movement of goods and people apply to national social-security systems? 
Did European law on competitions and cartels apply to the gesetzlichen Krankenkassen and 
their umbrella organisations? The GKV umbrella organisations were of the opinion that the 
German system of agreements between Kassen and care providers fi t within the statutory 
healthcare system and therefore did not need to be subject to the European tendering system.119
Politically and socially, the view was that the European directives on the free movement of 
goods and services would not necessarily lead to the dismantling of the existing governance 
mechanisms for the GKV. The Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms rulings also granted GKV insured 
persons entitlement to cross-border care, but the Kassen retained suffi cient latitude to grant 
permission for insured persons in terms of exceptional benefi ts and forms of  intramural 
care in the border region.120
European cartel legislation could also be a determining factor regarding the question of 
whether a care system in the form of a National Health System is the only possibility under 
European law, or whether the German system of corporatist self-governance as a hybrid 
form between government regulation and the private market would be possible.121 The 
GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz appeared to bridge the gap between private and gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung, which meant that concentration among Kassen and Spitzenverbände
would be subject to European legislation. In large parts of Germany, the more far-reaching 
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merger of Ortskassen would strengthen market share in relation to the categorised Kassen.122
Krankenkassen were the implementing bodies for social security and concluded contracts on 
a non-profi t basis, according to the principle of solidarity. Therefore, within the meaning of 
European and German law, they were not private enterprises. European competition regula-
tions did not apply to the collective agreements they concluded for healthcare and insurance. 
Price regulation for pharmacy was not intended to limit competition, but to encourage it 
in order to limit the cost of providing medicines.123 The Bundesauschuss, the Ministry of 
Justice and the Ministry of the Interior did not foresee any major problems for the German 
Gesundheitsreform in terms of European directives and regulations.124
In 2008 it was not yet possible to estimate the effect of the changes to the German health-
care system. The most important element, the total reform of GKV funding and the regulation 
of the PKV, had yet to be introduced. The distinction between private and national-health 
insurance remained, in contrast to the Netherlands, where it was removed in 2006 with the 
introduction of basic insurance for curative care. In Germany, the political and social prefe-
rence was for strengthening the corporatist governance model to regulate the competitive 
relationships between Kassen and care providers. The Netherlands, under the infl uence of 
neoliberal ideology, opted for competition between healthcare insurers and providers; the 
system of healthcare and insurance was to be regulated by market forces under government 
supervision rather than by corporatist governance.125 It will not be possible for another fi ve 
to ten years to say which system is favourable for price, quality and accessibility – unless 
excessively strong market forces in both countries lead to price increases, volume problems 
and a lack of solidarity, resulting in the need for price and volume controls. We have an 
interesting time ahead of us.
Summary
For the four components of the German social health-insurance system, the period from 2000 
to 2007 was one of transition and renewal in order to secure the system of care and social 
security for the future. Incremental measures, such as those implemented through legislation 
and regulations up until 2000, proved to be unsatisfactory due to their temporary nature and 
effects. Each section – the Pfl egeversicherung, the Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung and the Gesetzliche
and Private Krankenversicherungen – had its own point of departure, problems, strengths and 
weaknesses. The following were common points of departure for reform:
– Strengthening funding bases
– Modernising management mechanisms
– Meeting the demand for care more effectively
– Strengthening competition between insurers and care providers in order to optimise the 
reallocation of goods and services and raise quality standards
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Government, politicians and the civil society (made up of social-security agencies and provid-
ers of care, goods and services) agreed that this should be done by strengthening traditional 
corporatist governance: the Gemeinsame Selbstverwaltung according to commonly agreed 
guidelines and under the distant supervision of the state. Shared, equitable governance by 
stakeholders involved in insurance would promote a sense of responsibility and serve com-
mon interests better in terms of a good price/quality ratio and more effective allocation of 
goods and services than by replacing this with the market mechanism, as had happened in 
the Netherlands in the period 1990-2007. 
For the German social-security system, it seemed that making amendments to the system 
while retaining proven methods and techniques would be more likely to succeed than the 
radical replacement of GKV and PKV with a Bürgerversicherung as a national insurance for 
medical expenses. The qualities of the Unfallversicherung, with its good premium/quality 
ratio and excellent reputation for prevention, revalidation and rehabilitation, precluded the 
privatisation of this social insurance, but improvements to the outdated equalisation system 
were essential. The Pfl egeversicherung would have to undergo radical change by extending the 
funding base and through reorienting towards demand-driven care and improvement of the 
quality of care provided.
Concentration and convergence were stimulated in implementation. The various consulta-
tive committees for Krankenkassen and care providers were brought under the Gemeinsame 
Bundesauschuss. The old category structure comprising implementing bodies and Spitzenver-
bände for Unfallversicherung (accident insurance) and Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (compulsory 
health insurance) was dismantled by granting insured persons the freedom to choose Kassen
and by the mergers between the various umbrella organisations. The objectives were to reduce 
bureaucracy, improve administrative effi ciency and strengthen the competitive position of the 
social-security agencies in negotiations on the price and quality of care.
The reform of the system was not only geared towards reforming its funding, administration 
and strengthening competition between Kassen, insurers and care providers, but also towards 
improving health care and the position of insured persons as users of care. The provision of 
ambulatory and inpatient care should be more closely aligned with the demand for care:
The countervailing power of the care consumer had to be reinforced, among other things -
by legally assuring the position of patient organisations for participating in the consulta-
tions between administrative organisations and care providers and personal budgets
The integration of the components of health care in the form of chain care would be -
improved by instruments such as Disease Management Programmes and contracting for 
integrated care. The barrier between the hospital care and curative care provided by the 
GKV and Pfl egeversicherung had to be removed.
The reforms planned and realised in the period 2000-2008 have left the German health-
insurance system that has evolved since 1883 largely intact. Corporatism as a management 
model, private administrative bodies such as Krankenkassen, Berufsgenossenschaften and insurers, 
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the insured benefi ts packaged and equitable income-related premiums continue to exist. The 
most important changes relate to centralisation, the fi nancial and institutional reforms of the 
Pfl egeversicherung, GKV and PKV, and reinforcing the position of insured persons as care con-
sumers. Strengthening competition between Kassen, insurers and care providers – thus levelling 
the playing fi eld as much as possible for all parties through legislation and regulations – was 
not thought to go against European non-life-insurance directives and cartel legislation.  
2. Recent developments in the Belgian medical insurance system
a. The Belgian medical insurance system 
Unlike Germany, and particularly the Netherlands, where market forces and competition 
among the various insurance companies were given free rein, no fundamental changes have 
been introduced in Belgian medical insurance since the turn of the century. According to 
Louvain professor E. Schokkaert, this means that the Belgian medical insurance system is 
still a hybrid form: on the one hand it has a centralised organisational structure in which the 
power is in the hands of the government and the role of independent insurance companies 
remains limited (as it is in England); on the other hand the insurance companies act as third-
party payers, directly responsible for defraying the costs of the care providers and acting as 
intermediaries between the patients and the healthcare professionals.126 Thus the Belgian 
system is still based on universal, compulsory medical insurance with very broad coverage 
and fi nanced by social contributions and taxes. This means that the premiums are not linked 
to patient risks, and that people with higher incomes pay higher contributions. At the same 
time, however, Belgium has a liberal system when it comes to the healthcare provider market. 
Both insured persons and providers have a large measure of freedom, and the latter are usu-
ally remunerated on a per-treatment basis. The implementation of the system is entrusted to 
the health-insurance funds, and these historically rooted funds tend to operate like a cartel. 
They consult with other interest groups in the various consultative bodies and try to infl u-
ence government decisions.127
b. Persistent budgetary problems
The fact that there is little interference in the medical insurance structures, however, does 
not mean there are no major problems and challenges for the Belgian insurance system. War-
nings are regularly heard from different quarters (academia, politics, employers) to the effect 
that medical insurance in its present form is going to require ever-increasing contributions 
from the government and from private individuals, and that there is a danger of it becoming 
prohibitively expensive over the medium term. With the advancing ageing of the population, 
the skyrocketing prices for new medicines and the astronomical sums required to invest in 
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highly specialised technologies, future prospects are looking very bleak. Unavoidable increases 
in contributions, the expansion of co-payments and the reduction of the insurance package 
would undermine the buying power of the average family. In addition, healthcare expenses 
have been claiming an increasing portion of social security revenues for many years now.
These critics substantiate their pessimistic predictions with sober fi gures from the past. In 
scarcely fi ve years, from 1998 to 2003, government expenditure on healthcare rose from 
€ 13,686 million to € 18,236 million, or an increase of more than 33%. The amount of 
money being paid by families for medical care rose at twice that rate, from € 3,688 million 
to € 6,100 million, or an increase of 65%. Total healthcare costs rose from 8.6% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1998 to 9.7% in 2003.128 What is alarming is that this growth 
trend seems to be rising. The increase in healthcare costs in 2003, 2004 and 2005 by 7.5%, 
6.7% and 6.3% respectively (2005 estimate) in real terms vastly exceeded the average growth 
of 3.7% between 1980 and 2004, and was considerably higher than the predicted budgetary 
growth norm of 4.5%. Despite stringent economy measures taken since 2006, a € 21.4 bil-
lion budget was approved for 2008. If this amount is suffi cient, it means an increase of more 
than 17% for the period 2004 − 2008.
In the decade from 1995 to 2005, the government found it necessary to make systematic 
increases in the growth norm for healthcare expenses. The Dehaene government (1995-1999) 
allowed for growth of 1.5% per year (plus infl ation) in healthcare expenses. This was regularly 
exceeded, however. The Verhofstadt I government (1999-2003) raised that norm to 2.5%, 
and that, too, was exceeded. Verhofstadt II (2003-2007) introduced a growth norm of 4.5% 
into the coalition agreement in order to keep expenses within the budget. So far, these ef-
forts have been largely unsuccessful: in 2004 the expenses rose by almost 10% (2% of which 
was for infl ation), there was a defi cit of € 513 million and expenses surpassed revenues by 
9.8%.129 This prompted the Rekenhof (the Treasury) to sound the alarm. In its annual report, 
the Rekenhof noted that the course of growth proposed in 1994, which was intended to keep 
medical expenses at a tolerable level for public fi nancing, had already been exceeded by more 
than € 3 billion in 2004. It also mentioned that the amount had risen by one billion in a 
period of just one year (2005-2006). Moreover, the Rekenhof complained about the count-
less budgetary cost overruns. Granted, there had been fewer of them in recent years, but this 
was due not only to better control of expenses but also to raising the permitted increase 
threshold.130 Since 2006, however, the growth seems to be under control and the expenses 
have remained below the 4.5% real growth norm.
c. Dark future
The pessimistic future prospects have given rise to the greatest possible vigilance.131 Re-
searchers at the federal planning bureau anticipate a real growth rate of 3.9% for the coming 
years. Demographic factors such as the increase and ageing of the population are expected 
to be responsible for an increase of 0.9%. So demand will continue to rise. Many a patient 
has cost the health-insurance system more in his last year of life than in all his previous years 
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combined. The improved accessibility of medical care has also led to an increase in demand, 
and the opposite is true for the supply. Non-demographic factors are expected to cause an 
average annual increase of 2.9%. Because of scientifi c, technological and industrial progress, 
new products and treatments are constantly being developed that drive up medical costs. The 
trend-sensitive and more rapid price development in the labour-intensive areas of healthcare 
also promotes cost increases. The rises follow a rhythm that clearly exceeds the predicted slow 
increase in national growth. For this reason, the conclusion reached by the researchers from 
the federal planning bureau was that total medical consumption would increase from 9.7% of 
the GDP in 2004 to 12.8% in 2030.132 Coupled with a considerable increase in pension costs, 
this means that continuing moderate growth in the GDP will require either reductions in the 
outlays for healthcare or cut-backs and economies in other areas of government activity.
d. No structural reforms
Although studies show that action is needed and will be unavoidable in the not-too-distant 
future, politicians are constantly postponing a radical revision of the current medical insur-
ance system. Evidently no one dares touch a historically rooted and highly complex system 
involving numerous delicate and subtle balances between the various interest groups (national 
health insurance funds, doctors, paramedics, political parties, employers, employees, hospitals, 
patients and the government). A great many consultative bodies play a role in putting together 
the annual budget, in which it is determined who is to pay and receive what. Moreover, the 
entire system is deeply embedded in the political structure via the health-insurance funds 
because each of the leading health-insurance funds seeks support from one particular politi-
cal party. The quasi-monopoly enjoyed by the health-insurance funds in the compulsory 
medical-insurance system is fi rmly anchored in legislation, so the competition of private 
companies is forced to limit itself to supplementary insurance.
Doctors’ unions, health-insurance funds and the government seldom agree when it comes 
to taking sweeping measures, however, and never succeed in setting priorities. For this reason 
the government has become more and more involved in medical insurance in recent years, 
because consultations were going too slowly and encountering too many problems, or were 
freezing up entirely. The government decisions that were taken, however, were seldom trans-
parent and consistent. For example, the Rekenhof calculated that the government had made 
cutbacks to the tune of € 1.47 billion during the period 1999-2004 while confi rming € 1 
billion in new expenses at the same time. 
e. Timid attempts at adaptation
This does not mean that the competent ministers made no attempt to bring expenses under 
control. Frank Vandenbroucke, Minister of Social Services in the Verhofstadt I government, 
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and his successor Rudy Demotte in Verhofstadt II, made it known that they were no longer 
satisfi ed with the practice of automatically following the proposals worked out by the con-
sultative bodies. A signifi cant power shift occurred. The competent ministers stepped in and 
became involved in the workings of the medical care system at the substantive level. The time 
of mere budgetary action was over.
1/ Minister Vandenbroucke
Only by promising that rigorous agreements would be made with doctors, hospitals and 
health-insurance funds was Frank Vandenbroucke, Minister of Social Services in the Ver-
hofstadt I government, able to pry an important increase for his 2002 healthcare budget 
from his colleagues. Not only did he have to cut into the proposed budget, but he also had 
to propose structural interventions to curtail costs over the long term. To do this he set up 
the Perl working group, which submitted its fi nal report in December 2001. This report 
contained detailed proposals for eliminating the mechanisms that had once tempted hospital 
managers and hospital doctors to engage in overconsumption. Measures were proposed for 
reducing the differences in the way doctors and hospitals ran their practices. Techniques were 
also developed by which those who prescribed medicines and those who supplied them 
were made individually responsible for the costs that were generated. Doctors and hospitals 
would be required to return funds if they carried out too many diagnoses. This led to fi erce 
protests, especially from hospital directorates and hospital doctors. When the consultative 
bodies were convened, the parties failed to reach a consensus, as was to be expected. Minister 
Vandenbroucke, instead of following the traditional practice of just sitting by and watching, 
responded by taking action himself. Instead of acting as referee, the minister became the 
conductor. No longer did he confi ne himself to simply establishing budgetary limits, but 
he actively prescribed the behaviour that was expected from the medical practitioners, the 
hospitals, the health-insurance funds, the home nurses and the patients. The essence of his 
proposals was that everyone was responsible. Those who did not toe the line would pay the price 
for overconsumption. Guidelines for good medical practice, drawn up by the professional 
group itself, were also issued.
In the past, when the actual effects of certain measures were considered in retrospect, they 
often proved to fall far short of the projected results. Consequently, when the next budget 
was drawn up, additional measures would have to be taken to close the gap. And this was no 
exception. In implementing his economies, Vandenbroucke had to deal with fi erce resistance, 
not only from the care providers and hospitals but also within the government itself. Setting 
out to eliminate differences in practice, i.e. differences in medical treatments leading to dif-
ferences in price, he unavoidably found himself in the delicate and politically sensitive realm 
of fi nancial transfers from the Flemish community in the north to the Walloon community 
in the south. Medical care south of the language border was clearly more expensive than 
north of it. The annual stream of funding that ran from Flanders to Brussels and Wallonia for 
this purpose had been ignored by past ministers or challenged without success. Challenging 
differences in practice also unavoidably implied eliminating these community transfers from 
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north to south. This brought him into confl icts within the government, mainly with the 
French-speaking socialists. Yet Vandenbroucke began introducing standard prices for hospitals, 
restricting the prescribing of medical examinations, pushing down the prices of treatments and 
medications, and streamlining healthcare programmes. He also pressed for changes in patient 
behaviour. First-line care would be strengthened, making it more expensive to go directly to 
a specialist or to receive emergency care. Brand-name medications would be more expensive 
than generic remedies. To keep healthcare affordable for fi nancially disadvantaged patients, 
the minister introduced the maximum-factuur (maximum charge system (MAF)).
2/ Minister Demotte
Vandenbroucke never had the chance to get his responsibility programme off the ground, 
however, or to bring about the economies he had intended. When the Verhofstadt II govern-
ment came into power (2003-2007) he was replaced by the Walloon socialist Rudy Demotte. 
In the new government’s programme, the 2.5% growth norm was replaced by the more 
realistic and attainable norm of a 4.5% increase in healthcare expenses. But something had 
to be done to close the gulf between revenues and expenses that kept recurring year after 
year. Demotte drew up a set of policy options, a number of which corresponded with those 
of his predecessor. He insisted that he was going to continue the struggle against disparities in 
medical practice. In order to put the health back in healthcare insurance, Demotte − once again − 
organised a great dialogue at the end of 2003. Under the direction of his cabinet, the minister 
installed no less than fi fteen working groups to come up with proposals. All the various 
interest groups were represented.
For the umpteenth time the ‘great dialogue’ degenerated into a general cacophony without 
formulating any concrete proposals, so the 4.5% norm was easily exceeded in 2004. The real 
expenses for healthcare rose by almost 8%, and the defi cit ran up to € 513 million. The cost 
overrun had been that high since 1997. The Belgian medical-insurance system seemed to be 
teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. Doctors and commercial insurance companies were 
becoming increasingly vocal in their demand for privatised medical insurance.
To avoid the painful repetition of a new defi cit, Demotte asked for and was given parlia-
mentary authorisation to ‘do all it takes’ to balance the budget in 2005. Demotte’s aim was 
to avoid the ponderous and obligatory consultations with various and sundry councils and 
interest groups in order to come up with economy measures. Demotte used his authorisa-
tion to propose severe economy measures, and most of them were implemented. The refe-
rence standards for hospital expenses, which had been introduced by Vandenbroucke, were 
tightened up. In 2006, the fi xed-sum fi nancing for medical interventions was scheduled to 
begin. The minister also wanted to take action against hospitals and private practices that had 
departed from the programme and had brought in, or planned to bring in, heavy medical 
equipment. There were twenty of the exorbitantly priced PET scanners in Belgium, while 
the programme only allowed for thirteen. Six of the seven ‘illegal’ machines were in Brussels 
and Wallonia. Demotte thought the government should be able to confi scate such illegal 
heavy equipment. In 2006 the pharmaceutical companies were supposed to put through a 
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price reduction of 1.75%. Until they produced proof that they had carried out the reduc-
tion, they had to pay an extra tax of € 50 million in addition to the € 150 million extra tax 
already imposed on them to straighten out the healthcare insurance budget. Patients who 
would not take the cheapest medicine or obtain a prescription would have to pay more 
themselves and would be reimbursed less from the national health-insurance fund. Anyone 
who made unnecessary use of a hospital’s emergency services would be required to make 
an immediate co-payment. Many coercive measures were also taken to force doctors to be 
more rational in issuing prescriptions. Doctors who prescribed too many medicines or too 
few cheap medicines would be fi ned.
As was expected, his proposals met with strong resistance, especially from doctors’ trade 
unions. Marc Moens of the Verbond der Belgische Beroepsverenigingen van Geneesheren-Specialisten
(Union of Belgian Physicians and Specialists) and other medical spokespersons insisted that 
the minister could not make unilateral decisions about how much the healthcare insurance 
would reimburse, and certainly could not decide what non-reimbursed doctors could do. Even 
in Eastern Europe they came to realise that the government was not the best authority for making fi nal 
decisions about what was good for the patient, argued Moens. Combined with the growth norm 
of 4.5%, however, Demotte’s stiff economy measures produced positive results. In 2006 the 
minister could proudly report that the public-health budget would be balanced.133 In 2007 
a surplus was even booked, which immediately gave rise to new proposals from the doctors 
and health-insurance funds. It also provoked the employees’ trade unions to demand that 
the growth norm be brought back to 2.5% so that more social security resources could be 
released for other needs such as pensions. After long discussions, the provisional Verhofstadt 
III government decided to budget € 21.4 billion in expenses for 2008, thus maintaining the 
4.5% growth norm, but to hold back € 380 million for the time being as a buffer. 
f.  The patient left holding the baby
1/ Saving money at the patient’s expense
In 2006 the human resources department of the Christelijke Mutualiteiten (Christian Mu-
tualities) studied the evolution of the money being spent on healthcare in Belgium.134 The 
study mainly focused on the fi nancial consequences of these measures for the patient. An 
inventory showed that between 2000 and 2005, more than 80 different measures had been 
taken.135 To a certain extent this high number has to do with economy measures taken to 
keep the budget under control, which in turn triggered counter-measures that were meant 
to deal with dangers to healthcare accessibility or related problems. It is striking that about 
one-quarter of the inventoried measures concerned introducing or raising co-payments, with 
the patients, of course, feeling the primary impact of such measures. Some reimbursements 
were even scrapped, such as the surgical extraction of teeth.
The principal economy measures were raising co-payments for house calls by general prac-
titioners; reducing reimbursements for many original medicines to the level of their cheaper 
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alternatives, mainly generic medicines; and decreasing the reimbursement standard for many 
original medicines by 16% starting 1 June 2001. Later this percentage was syste matically 
increased to 30% by mid-2005. This often meant a larger outlay for the patient, since many 
doctors continued to prescribe original medicines even though there was a generic alterna-
tive. For some medicines such as statins or antacids, the minister extracted a price reduction 
from the industry. For medicines in large packages, the co-payments were raised by 50% 
in 2002 in order to discourage waste. This meant additional costs for patients who needed 
medicines in large packages, however. The reimbursements for physiotherapy were radically 
changed in 2002. The number of supplies for which the health-insurance fund could give 
a fi nancial contribution at the highest rate was considerably reduced, and the number of 
supplies that the doctor could prescribe per prescription was greatly reduced as well. Merely 
passive treatments such as massage were no longer reimbursed at all.
2/ Continuing rise in the number of patients
This long (and incomplete) list of economy measures was responsible for increasing family 
healthcare expenses by 65% in a period of eight years (1995-2003), twice as rapid as the in-
crease in the family budget. In 2003 the patient paid an average of about 22% of the healthcare 
costs out of his own pocket, almost the highest individual contribution in Europe. The sum 
he paid through private insurance companies is not even included in that amount. For 2007 
the Vlaams Patiëntenplatform (Flemish Patient Platform) estimated the patient contribution − 
without private insurance − at 26 to 27%.
The hospital room and doctor fee supplements, which more and more hospitals and their 
doctors are charging, played an especially signifi cant role. The introduction of a maximum 
amount for supplements for two-person hospital rooms at the end of 2002 did almost no -
thing to inhibit the increase. Then there were the non-reimbursed medicines. Some groups 
of patients were heavily hit by the measures. About half of the patient costs had to be paid 
by a mere 5% of the patients.136 There were constant warnings that a rising number of 
citizens were being faced with prohibitive medical bills and were in danger of becoming 
marginalised. In 2007, 200,000 invalids were reportedly living from social benefi ts below 
the subsistence level.137 New legal immigrants had diffi culty fi nding their way in the medi-
cal services provided by Belgian society, and in the cities large groups of illegals missed the 
medical insurance safety net entirely.
3/ Protecting healthcare accessibility
To assure the fi nancial accessibility of healthcare for people with high medical costs, a few 
measures were taken. The principal measures were the introduction of the maximum charge 
system (MAF) in 2002 and the OMNIO statute in 2007. By introducing the maximum charge 
system, Minister Vandenbroucke hoped to limit annual family healthcare expenses to a level 
commensurate with the family’s ability to pay. A personal contribution ceiling of € 450 was 
set for families with low incomes (€ 14,878 in 2006) and € 650 for families with modest 
incomes (between € 14,878 and € 22,873 in 2006). The most important kinds of co-payments, 
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such as those for ordinary medical care, a number of medicines and the personal share of the 
hospital bed-day price, qualifi ed for inclusion. The introduction of the MAF undoubtedly 
meant fi nancial relief and protection for a great many families and was a good example of 
what solidarity ought to look like in a modern welfare state. An MAF budget of more than 
€ 314 million was drawn up for 2006.
A second measure taken to lighten the fi nancial burden for the lower income group was the 
introduction of the OMNIO statute on 1 April 2007. With this system, people with a taxable 
income of less than € 13,312 (in 2006) were given the right to less expensive medical care 
in the form of increased reimbursements. Up until then, only widows, invalids, pensioners 
and long-term unemployed (known as the WIGWs) with low incomes qualifi ed under this 
regulation. As a result, many working people with incomes that were just as low fell by the 
wayside. This problem was remedied with the introduction of the OMNIO statute, by which 
an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 people would end up paying less for the doctor, the phar-
macist, the physiotherapist and the hospital. Oddly enough, one year after the regulation 
was introduced only 112,419 people had made use of the system. This was because the right 
was not automatically granted and had to be applied for. Apparently there is a large group 
of people who are not aware of the existence of the OMNIO statute, do not understand it or 
have not found the time to apply for it.
In addition, the Flemish government introduced Flemish healthcare insurance on 1 October 
2001. This provides a partial reimbursement of the non-medical costs spent on care, such as 
voluntary aid, home care and medical products, and contributes to the costs for convalescent 
homes and nursing homes. The insurance is compulsory for residents of Flanders beginning 
in the year they turn 26. Unlike the compulsory medical insurance, the implementation of 
this healthcare insurance is not exclusively reserved for the health-insurance funds. In addi-
tion to the funds managed by national associations of Christian, socialist, liberal, neutral and 
independent healthcare funds, the private sector is also involved. Private insurance companies 
such as DKV (Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG) and Ethias have set up their own healthcare 
funds. The healthcare fund of the Flemish government − Vlaamse Zorgkas (the Flemish 
Healthcare Fund)  − is managed by the Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn (Public 
Centres for Social Welfare (OCMW)).
The decision to include independent small risks such as doctors’ house calls and medicines 
in the compulsory insurance package starting in 2008, and to reimburse them, was not in-
signifi cant either. This had long been the practice for other citizens such as employees, civil 
servants, retired people and people receiving government benefi ts. In the past, the compulsory 
insurance for the self-employed only covered major risks such as hospitalisation and surgical 
treatment. This decision put an end to discrimination against the self-employed, and these 
small risks were also integrated into the compulsory insurance package.
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g. Room for supplementary insurance
1/ The non-compulsory (‘free’) supplementary insurance of the health-insurance funds
The mounting medical bills that were only partially reimbursed by compulsory healthcare 
insurance, if at all, and therefore had to be paid by the insured person himself, created more 
room for an additional insurance programme to cover these unpaid medical expenses. This 
space was partially fi lled by the health-insurance funds themselves, which offer a generalised 
non-compulsory supplementary insurance or veralgemeende aanvullende vrije verzekering; VAV
that reimburses some of the costs or develops initiatives and grants benefi ts to promote pre-
vention. Each health-insurance fund is free to set its own fees and to determine the content 
of this supplementary insurance. The government stimulates this generalised supplementary 
insurance, moreover, by granting tax deductibility for the amounts paid. Joining the VAV and 
paying the premium is not ‘free’ for health-insurance fund members, however; it is required 
by law and is regarded by the health-insurance fund as a form of compulsory solidarity with 
the other members. This broad solidarity may not be seen as a means of implementing risk 
selection. No one may be excluded on the basis of age or state of health. The board of the 
health-insurance fund makes all decisions in this regard.
To make sure the decision-making process is conducted democratically in these boards, 
the legislation requires that the health-insurance funds hold a board election every four years. 
This measure has met with very limited success. The health-insurance funds have hardly ever 
organised elections for reconstituting their policy organs. Usually there are fewer candidates 
than open positions. The Christian health-insurance fund did organise elections for two-
thirds of its groups in 2004. Of the 1,164,000 members in those groups, 338,000 or 30% 
of them voted. The Socialist health-insurance fund could only hold elections in Limburg, 
the only place where there were more candidates than mandates. Only 5% of the members 
there voted. No elections were held among the Independent, the Liberal and the Neutral 
health-insurance funds. In every case there were fewer candidates than open mandates, and 
seats on the boards remained unfi lled.
Besides the VAV, members can also sign up for an optional supplementary insurance or 
facultatieve aanvullende verzekering; FAV, on a voluntary basis. The FAV does involve a certain 
risk selection. The health-insurance fund can impose membership conditions for hospitalisa-
tion insurance (an age limitation, for example), and it can make use of a differentiated rate 
structure based on age categories. The health-insurance fund also offers membership in the 
Flemish public health insurance.
2/ Room for private insurance companies
Through the Health Insurance Act of 1990, compulsory medical insurance was reserved for 
the national organisations of health-insurance funds and was hermetically closed to private 
insurance companies. They were allowed to insure risks that were not covered by compulsory 
health insurance, however, such as travel insurance, insurance for ambulatory care, insurance 
against income loss and healthcare insurance. The non-reimbursement of some medical ex-
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penses and medicines, the growing proportion of costs paid by the insured persons themselves 
in the form of co-payments, and especially growing hospitalisation costs have fl ung the door 
wide open for commercial insurers. 
According to a survey taken in late 2007, wide segments of the population are beginning 
to take precautions to make sure they can pay for future medical expenses. No less than 89% 
of those questioned had already taken out supplementary hospitalisation insurance: 33.1% 
through their employer, 31.3% through a private insurance company and 24.9% through the 
national health-insurance fund. A large majority even felt that compulsory hospitalisation 
insurance should be introduced for all employees.138 The steadily rising amount earned in 
premiums by the DKV, the Belgian branch of market leader Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG
− from €  173 million in 2002 to almost € 281 million in 2006 − and especially the profi t of 
€  7,488,000 realised in 2006, shows the opportunities that are available to private insurers to 
operate lucrative supplementary insurance programmes. The market is not a hundred percent 
risk-free, however. According to the professional organisation Assuralia, the hospitalisation 
insurance sector has been losing money since 2002. In 2005, in fact, 12% more was paid out 
than collected in premiums. An ageing clientele, shrinking intervention by the mutualities, 
increasing supplements for medicines and one-person hospital rooms, and especially the drastic 
rise in doctors’ fee supplements forced many companies to impose signifi cant price increases 
in 2007 and 2008, doubling and even tripling them for certain categories of insured persons. 
For this reason, the government is considering regulatory intervention in the setting of fees 
and coupling the annual increase to the evolution of the health index. Achmea and Ethias, 
two major insurance companies, have even decided to step out of the market altogether.
Incomplete coverage of medical expenses is not the only factor that has been benefi cial 
to private insurers. European legislation has also become a threat to the quasi-monopolistic 
position of national health-insurance funds in the systems of compulsory medical-care insu-
rance, supplementary insurance and especially hospitalisation insurance. The non-compulsory 
supplementary insurance offered by the mutualities was always being attacked by the com-
mercial insurance companies. After the commercial insurers submitted a complaint, the 
European Commission announced that Belgian legislation for supplementary insurance 
was not in keeping with the European guidelines for indemnity insurance. For one thing, 
the supplementary services offered by hospitalisation insurance should be competitive with 
commercial insurers, who are subject to these guidelines. The actual censure had to do with 
a 9.25% tax that the commercial insurers were required to pay on their products, while the 
health-insurance funds enjoyed exemption for the same product.
The Belgian government was ordered to adjust the health-insurance fund legislation and 
was given until 15 April 2007 to present its arguments. The Belgian government told the 
European Commission that the activities of the health-insurance funds had traditionally 
been based on social welfare, mutual help and solidarity and not on making profi ts. Unlike 
the commercial insurance companies, they excluded no-one. According to the government, 
the social security structures and their goods and services do not come under the insurance 
guidelines, an exception that also applies to the supplementary services of the national health-
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY320
insurance funds. As a matter of fact, these supplementary services should not be regarded 
as economic activities at all but as services for the common good, which are not subject to 
European guidelines. The health-insurance funds are waiting in fear and trembling to see how 
the European Commission will evaluate this argument.139 If Belgium is required to adapt 
to the European insurance guidelines, the health-insurance funds will no longer be able to 
offer supplementary hospitalisation services at the present low rates, and they will be obliged 
to transfer this activity to a separate company.
Any encroachment by the private insurance companies is a nightmare for the health-
insurance funds, something they resist with all possible means. Although the supplementary 
coverage offered by the insurance companies is quite marginal compared with the coverage 
offered by compulsory health insurance, their strong growth rhythm points to increasing 
privatisation and commercialisation of healthcare, which is seen as a social risk. The health-
insurance funds also keep a very close eye on what is happening in other countries, where 
commercial companies have been active in the insurance sector for quite some time and are 
also involved in establis hing and managing hospitals and care institutions. The Belgian health-
insurance funds point to the commercial character of private insurers, who must constantly 
deploy every means at their disposal to remain cost-effective in a free and competitive market. 
They emphasise their broad solidarity in a spirit of mutual assistance and support among 
members, while the insurance companies segment their rates as much as possible when car-
rying out their activities. The companies try to attract the best risks, such as active young 
people in good health, and to identify and exclude bad risks whenever possible by creating 
structural thresholds to membership and even by terminating policies.140 According to the 
health-insurance funds, this means that patients with the greatest need for a certain type of 
insurance coverage are often the ones who fi nd it least accessible. 
Belgian care institutions are increasingly coming in contact with foreign commercial 
insurance agencies. Between 1999 and 2003, the number of foreign patients in Flemish 
hospitals doubled, from 12,000 to 25,000. Since the British National Health Service (NHS)
started reimbursing British patients for hospitalisation in Belgian hospitals in 2001, hospitals 
(especially those in West-Vlaanderen) began a systematic campaign to attract British patients 
by advertising in British publications. They were motivated by the attractive prospect of fi l-
ling empty beds, while a great many British patients were having to spend one to two years 
on waiting lists in their own country for surgical procedures in public hospitals. The Verbond 
van Belgische Ondernemingen (Belgian Business Association) even saw this as an opportunity 
to turn Belgian healthcare into an export product. The surplus of hospital beds, equipment 
and medical specialists − which artifi cially pushed up the expenditures for Belgian medical 
insurance − would be transformed into a high-tech export commodity, creating jobs and 
increasing prosperity. The university hospitals and other specialised institutions would be able 
to function as ‘centres of excellence’, attracting foreigners on the basis of their reputation. 
The health-insurance funds were not averse to this idea, but they did insist that any infl ux of 
foreign patients should not jeopardise accessibility for Belgian patients or create long waiting 
lists. It was also pointed out that the bills for foreign patients did not cover all the actual costs, 
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since government subsidies meant that the costs of the hospital infrastructure and equipment 
were only partly refl ected in the bed-day price.
In 2004 the number of patients with foreign medical insurance being treated in Belgium 
decreased to about 21,500, however, only to drop further in 2006 to just over 17,000, ac-
cording to the statistics of the Rijks Instituut voor Ziekte- en Invaliditeitsverzekering (the National 
Institute for Medical and Disability Insurance (RIZIV)). Dutch patients were the most nu-
merous, with 10,379 treatments, followed by Luxemburg (3,371) and Italy (1,659). Thus the 
stream of ‘medical tourists’ from Great Britain and other countries appears to be drying up, 
based on these RIZIV fi gures. However, the RIZIV statistics do not include the private patients 
whose medical costs in Belgium were charged to their private insurance. Consequently, it is 
unclear just how many foreign patients there are in Belgian clinics. Gaining this information 
would require a hospital-by-hospital investigation, and clearly the number differs greatly per 
hospital. The hospitals in regions bordering on the Netherlands profi t the most from the 
long waiting lists in Dutch hospitals. The Oost-Limburg Hospital, for example, which has 
branches in Genk and Lanaken, treated almost 1,500 Dutch patients, or more than 5% of 
this hospital’s total patient population.
h. Competition between the health-insurance funds
The Belgian health-insurance funds are not only involved in a struggle with the private 
insurers, but they are also fi ghting among themselves in a fi erce competitive battle to retain 
or enlarge their market share.
There have been no spectacular shifts in market share since the turn of the century, yet there 
are a few striking trends. On the one hand, the market share of the Christelijke Mutualiteit 
(CM) is shrinking. A loss of almost 2% in the general insurance market is not dramatic, but is 
does confi rm a tendency that has been apparent since 1995. In the general scheme, the CM
is not losing any members in absolute terms − their number, with approximately 70,000, is 
still rising − but its increase in the number of claimants, from about 5,807,000 in 2000 to 
6,208,000 in 2006, is less than average. This contrasts with the Socialist health-insurance fund, 
which booked a profi t of approximately 1%, and especially the smaller Mutualités Libres – 
Onafhankelijke Ziekenfondsen (Independent Health Insurance Funds (MLOZ)) which is clearly 
on its way up with an increase in market share of more than 1%. There are only minimal 
changes in the market shares of the other health-insurance funds. The CM is undoubtedly the 
market leader in the general scheme, but the difference between it and the Socialist health-
insurance fund is decreasing. Almost three-quarters of the employee claimants are members 
of these two health-insurance funds. The MLOZ, however, is turning into more than a minor 
annoyance for the two big national alliances. The duopoly of the past is gone for good. The 
rise of the MLOZ (+ 3.3%) has been even more outspoken within the independent scheme, 
a progression that is almost totally to the detriment of the CM (-3.1%). It should be noted 
that, within this scheme, the Liberale Mutualiteit also lost a relatively large percentage of its 
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already small market share in 2007. Here, too, the CM is still defi nitely the largest mutuality, 
but the MLOZ has gained even more ground than in the general scheme and has emerged 
once again as a fully fl edged competitor of the two large mutualities.
In the battle for market shares, the large health-insurance funds have the size advantage. 
They have offi ces in almost every major municipality where members can come for dis-
bursements and advice. In Flanders, the Christian health-insurance fund also has outposts 
in small towns and even in local parishes, where they organise weekly open hours for their 
members. Having a service organisation with such a fi nely knit offi ce network is a winning 
card, of course, in the ongoing competitive war among the health-insurance funds. The 
small health-insurance funds have only permanent offi ces in the larger provincial cities, so 
they look for other ways to recruit members. The best instrument by far for achieving this 
goal has been supplementary insurance. The regulations governing what health-insurance 
funds can do and can give to their members are monitored by a Supervisory Authority. But 
although the offi cial compulsory insurance package is the same for all the health-insurance 
funds, and although the funds function as a conduit, each fund board − even at the regional 
level − enjoys a great deal of latitude when it comes to deciding on the contents of the sup-
plementary non-compulsory insurance (the VAV), for which their members pay extra. There 
are limits, of course: everything the funds do with the VAV must be related to the health and 
welfare of their members. In the past, some of the benefi ts were defi nitely borderline: the 
health-insurance funds paid for eyeglasses, for instance, as well as homeopathic treatments 
and other alternative therapies.
Chart VII.3 Evolution of claimants per insurance agency, 2000-2003-2006 (30 June) in %
General scheme
Independent scheme with one activity
LCM LNM NVSM LLM MLOZ HZ IV NM BS
A.
2000 44.05  3.84 28.96 5.73 14.98  0.81 1.64 
2003 43.29 3.97 29.36 5.63 15.49 0.79 1.49
2006  42.37  3.98 30.00 5.43 16.14 0.78 1.31
B. 
2000  48.76 5.35 13.97 8.13  23.47 0.33 ---
2003 47.93  5.30 14.28 7.89 24.29 0.31 ---
2006 45.66 5.22 14.35 7.48 26.76 0.30 ---
Source: RIZIV, 2006 Annual Report, 93.
SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE 2000-2008 323
During the last decade, the once low-key struggle taking place through the VAV has become 
an all-out war. The independent health-insurance funds in particular suddenly adopted a 
very inventive and even aggressive attitude towards the public at large: they carried out an 
unexpectedly fi erce marketing campaign in various magazines and bought advertising spots 
on radio and television in which they trumpeted the benefi ts of their VAV. According to other 
health-insurance funds, those benefi ts did not always have a great deal to do with medical 
insurance. The Partena health-insurance fund, for example, which is affi liated with the MLOZ,
reimbursed the purchase of Becel Pro-activ margarine, a cholesterol-lowering product.141
The other health-insurance funds accused the MLOZ of recruiting members via specialised 
fi rms and private individuals, who were given a 300-euro commission for each new member 
they brought in.142 They called this a fraudulent practice.143 In addition, the MLOZ was clearly 
aiming its advertising at young and healthy people who make fewer claims, which the large 
health-insurance funds regarded as a breach of solidarity with the group of insured persons 
as a whole. By hook or by crook, the independent health-insurance funds were very suc-
cessful and gained tens of thousands of members. As a result all the health-insurance funds 
adopted their methods.
The competitive pressure caused a clear shift to occur in the contents of the VAV. The ele-
ments on which they had previously concentrated were mostly concerned with ‘later on’: 
good care for the aged, the disabled... These were now pushed to the background to some 
extent. Some VAVs were limited to the reimbursement of beginner athletic activities, mem-
bership in a sports club or young people’s organisation, support to schools and organisations 
for healthy meal initiatives and sponsoring television programmes having to do with healthy 
heating. Some health-insurance funds have gone even further, however. They pander to 
potential members with individual benefi ts for ‘now’: visits to the sauna, meals in vegetarian 
restaurants, discounts to beauty farms or organic health food stores. The most spectacular was 
a € 250 discount on the purchase of a car, which was offered by the Socialist health-insurance 
fund in Antwerp via its VAV. The Christian and Liberal health-insurance funds called this 
undermining the credibility of health insurance in general. The national leadership of the 
Socialist health-insurance funds stepped in and put a stop to this practice. In addition to such 
new initiatives, which sound more commercial than anything else, the health-insurance funds 
have also started many other relevant programmes in recent years, such as free counselling 
for those who want to stop smoking, partial reimbursement of vaccinations against cervical 
cancer, and treatment by psychologists.144
i. Medical insurance in the north-south discussions
It goes without saying that any medical insurance responsible for a signifi cant portion of the 
government’s budget is going to be closely tied to politics. In addition, the largest health-
insurance funds are closely aligned with certain political parties. So medical insurance has 
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automatically become involved in the north-south community discussions about splitting 
social security in general and medical insurance in particular.
The constitutional revision of 1980 transferred healthcare to the regions. At the last mo-
ment, however, an important exception was made: anything relating to social security re-
mained national. This proved to be practically everything, so almost nothing was transferred 
to the regions except preventive care. Belgian healthcare policy has Latin-French roots and 
is tied to southern European traditions: liberal medicine, payment per treatment and high 
value placed on technical and specialised medicine. This vision is mainly dominant in the 
French-speaking part of Belgium, and it has practical consequences: there are more diagnostic 
examinations in the south, and people there use stronger medicines and antibiotics. In the 
Flemish part of the country, more emphasis is placed on the general practitioner, curative 
medicine and preventive care. These choices have also had fi nancial consequences: medicine 
is more expensive in the south. This has necessitated a considerable transfer of funds from 
north to south to fi nance healthcare.
As discussions on how to eliminate the mounting shortages in medical insurance increased, 
so did irritation on the Flemish side of the border with regard to the growing cost-price 
difference between northern and southern medicine. Flemish politicians became more and 
more adamant in insisting on a split in the medical insurance system. French-speaking politi-
cians rejected this demand because it would threaten national solidarity. The discussion gained 
momentum around the turn of the century when Minister Vandenbroucke introduced the 
concept of individual responsibility: care providers and hospitals would be dealt with indi-
vidually if they incurred excessively high costs. Eliminating the differences met with fi erce 
resistance in the French-speaking part of the country because giving everyone the same 
odds according to objective criteria was especially detrimental to cost-intensive hospitals in 
Wallonia and Brussels. In 2004 Vandenbroucke was forced to hand over his Social Services 
portfolio to the Walloon socialist Demotte.
At the end of 2004, Demotte proposed strict cutbacks in an effort to eliminate the threate-
ning defi cit of 600 million euros in medical insurance. The savings would be realised primarily 
by means of linear economies in the hospital sector. The response from Flemish public and 
private hospitals was fi erce and unanimous. They refused to make sacrifi ces for exorbitant 
outlays that were mostly being made on the other side of the language border. They pointed 
out that if the average amount spent per treatment in Flanders were imposed on all the hospi-
tals in Belgium, the requisite savings would immediately be realised. They substantiated their 
statements with statistics. The minister wanted to save € 23 million in the medical landscape. 
If the Flemish model were imposed on all hospitals, there would be an immediate saving of 
no less than € 49 million. The same was true for clinical biology: € 59 million less would be 
spent. In the eyes of the States General of the Flemish Hospitals, if the government did not 
imposed these lower Flemish norms on the hospitals of Brussels and Wallonia, the north-
south splitting of the medical insurance budget would be the only acceptable solution. The 
Flemish government, with the backing of all the Flemish parties, adopted this position and 
demanded the splitting of the national healthcare system.145
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Minister Demotte had understood the message and revised his economic plans accordingly. 
With the proper authorisation he succeeded in carrying out piecemeal reforms in the years 
that followed: payments per treatment in hospitals were reduced in favour of lump sums, and 
treatment by general practitioners was given greater scope. The results were apparent. Ac-
cording to the RIZIV statistics, in 2005 a resident of Wallonia still cost € 46 − or 3% − more 
for sickness and medical insurance than a Fleming; a resident of Brussels cost € 8 more (less 
than 1%). This meant that transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels had dropped to €
150 million a year. The tentative RIZIV fi gures for 2007 − the latest available − confi rm this 
trend: a Walloon was still € 38 (2%) more expensive than a Fleming, but the Fleming in turn 
cost the federal social-security fund an average of € 100 more than a resident of Brussels. 
A scholarly analysis of the fi gures and a clear explanation for the reduction of the regional 
differences has yet to be undertaken, however.
Opponents of a split in the medical-insurance system believe that levelling the expenses 
would pull the rug out from under the expense argument, which favours switching to a 
regional division of the budget. Conversely, supporters cleverly point out that French spea-
kers no longer have reason to oppose more autonomy in the healthcare policy, since French 
speakers claim that no appreciable transfers are taking place any more, so no one is being put 
at a fi nancial disadvantage. What they mean, however, is that largely eliminating the distor-
tions in expenditures has by no means put an end to transfers from north to south. Indeed, 
besides the outlays there are also the revenues, the social contributions originating from the 
three regions of the country. In 2005, the residents of Flanders paid € 173 more per person 
in contributions than the amount spent per Fleming. In Wallonia it was the other way round: 
€ 171 less in contributions than expenditures. For Brussels, with € 493 less in revenues, the 
difference was almost three times greater. So the total transfers would not become smaller 
but larger. In 1999, € 1.086 billion fl owed from Flanders to the other regions through the 
medical insurance system. In 2005 the transfers had risen to € 1.414 billion, € 755 million 
of which had gone to Wallonia and € 659 million to Brussels. 
Recently a new argument was developed by seven Flemish and French-speaking professors 
who are social security specialists. They called for the regions to take individual responsibility 
for certain parts of the social security programme. The fi nancing of the medical insurance 
system would remain centralised but would allow for regional fi nancial responsibility. If one 
region was found to be spending beyond a responsible level, that region would have to pay 
back the difference from its own resources, or its residents would be required to make a con-
tribution. This model of regional responsibility resembles the fi nancial responsibility scheme 
for the health-insurance funds that was drawn up during the 1990s and has been standard 
practice for several years now. Data and fi gures for this regional responsibility programme are 
available, moreover: when the responsibilities for the health-insurance funds were calculated, 
the population profi le and health risks (more active and aged people in Flanders, more in-
valids and unemployed in Wallonia) were identifi ed in order to arrive at the most objective 
distribution formula possible. With this idea, interregional solidarity would remain intact, each 
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region would be free to emphasise whatever areas of healthcare it chose, and greater fi nancial 
responsibility would stimulate the more effi cient use of available funds.
3. Changes in the Dutch system of healthcare insurance, 2001-2007
The Dutch system of healthcare and its insurance has changed signifi cantly since 1 January 
2006. Until 1985, the size and funding of the healthcare system were regulated by government 
legislation. From then on, the political and social parties became engaged in restructuring the 
system into a market-oriented system in which care providers and insurers, have to compete 
with each other to attract consumers, under the supervision of the government. This change 
was largely realized in the period 2001-2007, but a number of contributing milestone events 
began in 1985. It is the aim of this chapter to describe these events. Following the introduc-
tion of a partial nominal premium on 1 January 1992, healthcare insurers had already become 
more market-oriented and were in favour of greater deregulation by the government. There 
was dissatisfaction as a result of the continuing budget system and reduced budgets. The rising 
productivity problems resulted in dissatisfi ed patients who tried to fi nd a solution in other 
European countries, which was made possible by European legislation. The government for 
its part was and remained dissatisfi ed concerning the realised cutbacks in care and, as a result, 
the realised cutback on collective charges. For this reason the system changed on 1 January 
2006 when the privatisation of care and its insurance brought something new and highly 
visible for all participants, with hope for the  realisation of their wishes. The future will show 
to what extent these wishes will be realized.
a. The political and social context
The period 2001-2007 was an extremely lively and exciting one in Dutch politics. Five 
administrations of different political beliefs succeeded each other in this period. The Dutch 
had the opportunity to experience fi ve different Ministers for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport. 
The Department of Finance was the more or less stable factor during this period. This de-
partment had a large and unmistakable infl uence on the development of the healthcare insu-
rance system. In his capacity as Minister for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport, J.F. Hoogervorst 
(a former Minister for Finance) succeeded in implementing a revised system of healthcare 
insurance as of 1 January 2006. The Minister for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport in the Kok 
I and II cabinets (the “purple” cabinets of 1994-2002), was the D66 minister E. Borst-
Eilers. This cabinet was called ‘purple‘ because it was a coalition between the socialist and 
the liberal party. Ms Borst-Eilers was the fi rst medical doctor to be minister of Healthcare, 
Welfare and Sport since 1972. As minister, Borst-Eilers had to deal with a large number of 
medical-ethical questions. She introduced the system of donor codicils and was responsible 
for the new legislation on tobacco. Her decision, in March 2000, to order the development 
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of a system of Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (DBC’s), was an extremely important one 
and was the beginning of a different fi nancing system for hospital care. In healthcare, she was 
faced with continuing fi nancial problems, especially as a result of demographic ageing and 
advances in medical technology. 
During this period, Ms Borst could not count on much fi nancial support from her col-
league G. Zalm, the Minister for Finance. Since the costs of the healthcare system were largely 
counted as collective charges, from a fi nancial point of view they were costs which had to 
be reduced. The introduction of the euro played an important role in this discussion. Zalm 
criticised France and Germany for exceeding the maximum defi cit of 3% on their national 
budgets permitted the by the Treaty of Maastricht. For this reason the Netherlands was morally 
and politically obliged to keep its budget defi cit below 3%, thereby forcing the government 
to make even harsher cutbacks. It is understandable that there was no extra money for the 
healthcare system in a situation like this.
The increasing tensions, the rise of the policial phenomenon Pim Fortuyn and the report 
concerning the fall of Srebrenica reinforced the negative picture. As a result of the elections 
on 15 May 2002 the ‘purple’ administration came to an end. At these elections the Pim 
Fortuyn List gained 26 seats and as a result became the second-largest political party in the 
Netherlands. The VVD,CDA and the LPF signed a strategic policy agreement. J.P. Balkenende, 
leader of the CDA, became prime minister. His government came to power on 22 July 2002. 
E.J. Bomhoff became Minister for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport and J.F. Hoogervorst became 
Minister for Finance. 
Before he became a minister, Bomhoff had regularly called for billions to be invested in 
healthcare. As minister, he had the responsibility but with a budget that was hardly any higher 
than the budget in the preceding “purple” administration. As a result of this, his ministerial 
period of offi ce began with bad feeling. A confl ict with his colleague at Economic Affairs, 
H. Ph.J.B. Heinsbroek, escalated so badly that on 16 October 2002 fi rst Bomhoff and after 
him Heinsbroek stepped down. The Balkenende cabinet fell the same afternoon. Bomhoff 
was replaced by A.J. de Geus, who acted as caretaker Minister for Healthcare, Welfare and 
Sport. 
On 27 May 2003, the Balkenende II cabinet came to power. Hoogervorst became Minister 
for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport. One of Hoogervorst’s main aims was to end the decades of 
discussions about the problems of Dutch healthcare insurance (public and private) by replacing 
it with private insurance with a compulsory benefi t package and acceptance of insured persons 
on a non-selective basis. The legal basis was the new legislation on healthcare insurance. In 
contrast to earlier attempts to set up a basic insurance, insured persons, healthcare providers 
and insurers were positive about this legislation from the outset. People with insurance were 
positive about it because, previously, they were increasingly faced with shortages and wai-
ting lists in the healthcare sector. Dissatisfaction about this was strongly expressed by patient 
associations, the national consumer and patient platform and the socialist party. It resulted in 
a growing number of lawsuits from patients against their insurance companies.
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Hospitals and medical specialists were happy with the new legislation because the function-
specifi c budgets of the hospitals and the lump sums available for medical specialists had been 
under increasing pressure. These parties cherished the hope that these problems could be 
solved through greater competition and agreements with insurers. The insurers themselves had 
experienced a serious culture change in the years before the new legislation was introduced, 
and as a result they seemed ready for a new insurance system. This culture change had been 
caused by continuing mergers in the preceding years. The all-fi nance idea had arisen: insu-
rance packages as healthcare insurance combined with other insurances, for example insu-
rances based on the working conditions law. Moreover, insurers had already had to compete 
with each other since 1 January 1992,  as a result of the abolition of the work areas of the 
healthcare insurance funds and the setting-up of a partial fl at-rate (nominal) premium which 
could be set by the healthcare insurers. As a result, healthcare insurance funds became more 
competitive and businesslike. 
As mentioned above, one of the main reasons for the culture change was the trend towards 
continuing mergers of healthcare insurers. The fi rst wave of mergers was prompted by the 
threat of new legislation on healthcare providers (WVG), which has never come into force. 
The ‘father’ of this law was Secretary of State J. Hendriks who introduced thinking in terms 
of structures and supply control in healthcare. On the basis of the WVG, signifi cant po wers 
would be designated to the provinces, based on the regional subdivision of healthcare. The 
second wave of mergers was caused because on 1 January 1992 the Secretary of State, Simons, 
extended the formal geographical areas of the health insurance funds. The continuing discus-
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sion concerning more market forces in healthcare prompted, from 2000-2001, the third wave 
of mergers. The new ideas were slow to be accepted but there was little resistance from the 
insurers because of the liberal ideas concerning the market and competition they expressed. 
In spite of the subsidiarity principle, the European Union and its legislation became and 
remain increasingly important for the healthcare systems at a national level in terms of the 
infl uence of the Non-Life Directives, regulations on economic competition, cross-border 
care and the rulings of the European Court. The following section therefore examines the 
infl uence of the European Union on our healthcare insurance system.
b. The infl uence of the European Union
The European Treaty expressly provides for powers for a European policy on social security. 
This is, however, undermined to a large extent by the need for unanimity in the decision-
making process. The Member States retain sovereign competency concerning the organisation 
of social security and healthcare, based on the subsidiarity principle according to Article 5 
of the European Treaty. This means that, 50 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome 
(1957), the organisation of the healthcare system is still the almost absolute responsibility of 
each Member State. 
Nevertheless, Europe is slowly but surely exerting infl uence when it comes to healthcare 
systems. This is especially due to the realisation of the internal market by the application of 
the principle of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The European policy 
that has evolved since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), together with the direct infl uence of 
European jurisdiction, obliges each Member State to take account of this European policy 
and to coordinate it within its own legislation.
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) provided the legal foundation for a European public-health 
policy. However Article 152, paragraph 5 expressly states:  Community action in the fi eld of 
public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation 
and delivery of health services and medical care.
In spite of the content of the aforementioned article, the infl uence of the European Union 
on healthcare systems has steadily increased, for example with regard to the mobility of insured 
people between Member States. Examples are the rulings by the Court of Justice and resolu-
tions of the European Parliament. The following rulings of the Court of Justice are relevant 
with regard to medical care given by a Member State to residents of other Member States:
– 28 April 1998:  Judgments C-120/95 (Decker) and C-158/96 (Kohl)
– 12 July 2001:  Judgment C-157/99 (Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms)
– 12 July 2001:  Judgment C-368/98 (Van Braekel)
– 25 February 2003:  Judgment C-326/00 (Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon)
– 13 May 2003:  Judgment C-385/99 (Müller-Fauré and Van Riet) 
– 23 October 2003:  Judgment C-56/01 (Inizan)
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– 18 March 2004:  Judgment C-8/02 (Leichtle)
– 16 May 2006:  Judgment C-372/04 (Watt)
Judgments of the Court of Justice are based on the following main principles: on the basis of 
the principle of free movement of persons, goods and services for outpatient care, a person can 
go to any healthcare provider or institution in any Member State. With regard to admission 
to a hospital in another Member State, the healthcare insurer can require that permission be 
requested in advance. This authorization cannot be refused if the waiting time in the country 
where the patient is insured is too long (judgment Watt).
In this context, it is interesting to refer to European Parliament resolution of 23 May 2007 
on the impact and consequences of the exclusion of healthcare services from the Directive 
on services in the internal market (2006/2275 (INI)). The background to this resolution is 
that the European Parliament has the impression that Member States do not adequately pro-
mote healthcare, and create obstacles to the mobility of patients and care providers between 
Member States. The European Parliament therefore requested the European Commission 
to introduce measures to ensure that Member States act in accordance with the judgments 
of the Court of Justice whereby the rights granted by the European Treaty are guaranteed 
for all European patients. The Commission is also invited to present a directive in order to 
reinforce these rights.
Apart from the issue of patient mobility, there are, of course, many other areas in which the 
infl uence of Europe is felt, for example: the free movement of goods and services etc., economic 
competition, and the European insurance card. The European Commission needs to create 
a pharmaceutical industry in Europe that can compete with the American pharmaceutical 
industry and prevent a brain-drain to the US. Higher profi ts for the pharmaceutical industry 
obviously lead to higher costs for the healthcare sector. Higher costs for the healthcare sector 
lead to higher public expenditure, which should be reduced according to current thinking. 
An alternative approach is to regard healthcare as a branch of business that contributes to 
Gross National Product (GNP). According to the former EU Commissioner David Byrne: If 
the average costs for healthcare in Europe are 10% of the Gross National Product, and if 10% of the 
working population is working in the healthcare industry, then what is the problem?
The European tender procedure (Newsletter 051129, University of Leiden) states that for 
organisations and institutions that obtain more than half their funding from the government, 
and of course for the government itself, since the beginning of  the seventies there has been 
an obligation to have a European tendering procedure for such things as construction, services 
and supplies (goods). Since 1997, accountants auditing annual accounts have had to check 
whether European tendering requirements have been observed. If these European rules are 
not complied with, the accountants can refuse to approve the accounts. 
European tenders by the government are compulsory above a certain threshold amount, 
which varies and depends on the type of order. For services to the central government, for 
example, the threshold is 137,000 euros (August 2007) The threshold for major construction 
projects is  5 million euros. Under the threshold amounts, there is no specifi c legislation for 
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tendering at national level. Obviously, the general provisions of the EC Treaty apply (e.g. equal 
treatment of proposers, no discrimination, and transparency in decision-making). Clearly, the 
rules for inviting tenders also apply to sickness funds and care institutions.
Under the new legislation on healthcare insurance introduced on 1 January 2006, the 
Zorgverzekeringswet, insurers are allowed to make a profi t. This profi t may be allocated for 
the benefi t of shareholders or the members of a mutual guarantee society. The healthcare 
insurance funds that decided to carry on their business under the legislation had to have the 
opportunity to keep the reserves they had accumulated during the public system, otherwise 
they would have a serious problem with solvability and the regulations of the Dutch National 
Bank (DNB). It was the government’s intention  that the European Commission would 
not see this as state support if the healthcare insurance funds decided to be not-for-profi t 
organisations. If they should decide within ten years to become for-profi t organisations or 
to cease operating, they should still be required to pay back the reserves accumulated under 
the public system. 
In summary, it can be said that European developments have had an important infl uence 
on the Dutch healthcare insurance system, and will continue to do so in the future. The most 




c. Infl uence of developments in healthcare
The demands that are made on the healthcare system will increase in the coming years. The 
Dutch population is an ageing population and, as a result, the demand for healthcare is ri-
sing all the time. This trend will continue, given the composition of the population, in the 
coming 30 years.
The profi le of patients is also changing. Citizens have more pronounced wishes with respect 
to the type and quality of healthcare offered. Moreover, medical technology is advancing all 
the time, bringing more and more possibilities. 
1/Developments in medicine
Developments in medicine are always more rapid, among other things because:
– In absolute numbers, there are more scientists working in research and development than 
ever before, also with related research fi elds, resulting in synergy benefi ts
– This interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary synergy is a stimulus for entirely new fi elds 
of research and development (for examples, see Converging Technologies: Innovation Patterns 
and Impact on society)
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Given these developments, the question of how medicine will look tomorrow and the day 
after is a very urgent one. Advances in medical technology and (medical) biotechnology are 
especially promising and far-reaching. It is nevertheless uncertain whether all that is effectively 
possible will actually happen. The question is what do we need, what will be insured in the 
future and what has to be paid by the patients themselves?
2/ Advances in medical technology
In De Telegraaf of 27 June 2006, Intel boss Paul Otellini wrote that we will soon have a 
technology that will change the world. Chips the size of a virus will enables us to produce, 
among other things, a digital angel, a device the size of a pacemaker (in 10 years’ time it will 
probably be 10 times smaller) that can be implanted under the skin. The chip can register 
all the person’s medical values and transmit them by satellite to a medical centre or health 
professional. Through communication technologies such as the Global Positioning System, 
it is possible to know where the patient is at any time. If the patient falls ill, a helicopter can 
be dispatched within 10 minutes, anywhere in the world. 
This type of technological development is important from a medical point of view as well 
as a budgetary point of view. The degree of predictability of this development in the long 
term is much smaller than, for example, demographic ageing. With regard to demographic 
ageing, it is possible, with a considerable degree of accuracy, to predict how many elderly 
people there will be at a certain point in time. 
ICT makes it possible to provide more care, and more effi cient care, for individual patients, 
for example through individualized homecare technology. New medicines can be developed 
for ever-smaller groups of patients. The costs of research and development, however, will be 
enormous. Today in 2007, for example, there are still very few medicines available specifi -
Source: CBS, Statline 1 September 2004.
Chart VII.4 Long-term prediction for demographic ageing in the Dutch population 
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2003 16.20 2.22 14% 1.00      6% 0.23 1%
2010 16.67 2.49 15% 1.11      7% 0.29 2%
2020 17.21 3.19 19% 1.30      8% 0.32 2%
2030 17.61 3.82 22% 1.75     10% 0.40 2%
2040 17.71 4.13 23% 2.06     12% 0.55 3%
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cally for children. Often, the advice is just halve the dose. Of course, this has everything to 
do with the size of the market and the possibilities for returns on investment. But this will 
change, with all the favourable and unfavourable consequences. A consequence of these two 
developments combined: better healthcare and higher costs. 
Apart from cost-raising technologies there are labour-saving and therefore money-saving 
technologies, for example the cataract operation. In the past, this required two weeks in 
hospital and a operation lasting an hour and a half. Today, the operation takes twelve minutes 
and is performed in an eye-surgery centre. With the new technical possibilities, however, we 
are also seeing a change in medical diagnosis. More patients than before require treatment 
at a younger age. In addition, advances in medical technology have other important effects. 
They enable the treatment of disorders that were previously untreatable, and the indications 
for medicines are broadening as a result. This enhances the quality of life, or lengthens the 
life of the patient. In the long run, lengthening the life of patients paradoxically leads to an 
increase in chronic, non-life threatening illnesses for which there is currently no treatment, 
but which require long-term care on a large scale. 
Looking at the development in the cost of healthcare, it can be said that two-thirds of 
the autonomous cost increase is due to advances in medical technology and one-third to 
demographic ageing. For medical technology, the autonomous rise in costs is the balance 
of the money-saving and cost-raising technologies. It is remarkable that, given the specifi c 
character of healthcare as an industry, technological advances lead to an increase in cost per 
unit of product, whereas in other industries it leads to a reduction in cost per unit. 
It should be clear that an autonomous increase of 3% per year in healthcare costs and an 
increase in the Gross National Product of 1.5 to 2.0% per year leads to a higher care ratio 
(cost of healthcare as a percentage of Gross National Product). In the period 1998-2002, the 
share of care costs increased, and at the end of 2003 it was 9.7%. Long-term studies by the 
Social Economic Council (SER) and the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(CPB) predict that the Netherlands must prepare itself for a care ratio of 13 - 15% in 2040.
It is clear that the government policy implemented in 1974 to control the supply side 
of healthcare is not the solution to the problems. It is too simple to argue that supply cre-
ates demand. Factors such as the infl uence of the European Union, the ageing population, 
medical advances and their impact on the cost of healthcare are autonomous developments 
which can hardly be controlled by central or regional government. Will a demand-oriented 
healthcare be better? In any case, in order to have better possibilities to solve the problems, 
from 1985 the government and involved parties involved believed that it was necessary to 
renew the system.
d. The discussion on the revision of the healthcare system and healthcare insurance
The discussion on the organisation, targeting and fi nancing of healthcare began in 1974, 
with the policy paper on the structure of healthcare by Secretary of State Hendriks. Hen-
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driks argued in favour of a social insurance for the whole Dutch population, regulated by 
the government. In 1987, the Dekker Committee also argued for a broad social insurance, 
but with a steering role for insurers and a higher fl at-rate contribution for all insured people. 
The fi rst radical change to the healthcare insurance system was the suppression of voluntary 
healthcare insurance and healthcare insurance for the elderly, through the introduction of the 
Wet op de Toegang tot Ziektekostenverzekering (Insurance Law on Access to Healthcare (WTZ)) 
in 1986. In 1991 and 1992, as Secretary of State for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport, Simons 
introduced far-reaching modifi cations in healthcare insurance. As of 1991 the healthcare insu-
rance funds were budgeted on the basis of their expenditure on benefi ts and reimbursement 
within the framework of the Zorgverzekeringswet of 2006. In 1992 this was also introduced 
for the Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ)) for 
benefi ts that had been transferred in that year from the Zorgverzekeringswet to the AWBZ. These 
budgets were made available to the healthcare insurance funds on the basis of a number of 
criteria, which were refi ned over the years. By 1 January 1992, the formal working areas of 
the healthcare insurance funds were extended to the national level.
From that date, healthcare insurance funds had to compete with each other for the cus-
tomer. The amount that was not covered produced by budget allocation based on the budget 
formula had to come from fl at-rate contributions. The fl at-rate contribution depended on 
healthcare insurers themselves, and varied from insurer to insurer. Healthcare insurance funds 
had become enterprises with risks involved. From the introduction of budget allocation based 
on a budget formula, healthcare insurers felt that they could take some risks, but only with 
respect to the healthcare costs that they could infl uence themselves. This is why the budget 
formula was continually refi ned. 
The introduction of competition between healthcare insurance funds has led to another 
phenomenon within healthcare insurance: collective contracts. By extending the working 
areas, insurers could now conclude contracts with large employers for their employees, with 
the option of including other insurances in addition to healthcare insurance. Healthcare 
insurance funds became insurance companies. Mergers between healthcare insurance funds 
became a more or less daily phenomenon. 
The coalition agreement of the Kok I cabinet from 1994 continued the radical restructu-
ring of the healthcare system initiated by previous cabinets. This fi rst ‘purple’ cabinet had a 
policy of gradual, step-by-step improvement of the existing system (the ‘no-regrets policy’). 
The second ‘purple’ administration announced in the coalition agreement of 1998 that it 
wanted to continue this policy, but also wanted to refl ect on the future. On 16 April 2002, 
this administration came to an end. After a short interim period, J.F. Hoogervorst became 
Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport (VVD, CDA, D66 coalition) on 27 May 2003. He was 
the Minister who introduced the new healthcare insurance system by law on 1 January 2006, 
the Zorgverzekeringswet.
It is clear that, from about 1974, the healthcare insurance system was the focus of the 
political parties and became a political issue. The government has tried for many years to 
control healthcare costs by such measures as restrictive construction policy, function-based 
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budgeting for healthcare institutions, and income-related measures for healthcare providers. 
All of this was because the collectively fi nanced cost of the healthcare system were seen as 
collective charges which had to be reduced in order to make or keep the economy healthy: 
supply control under the motto supply creates demand.
The ideas for making government fi nances more healthy moved gradually towards the 
opinion that shortages and debt had be reduced. In addition, limiting the (increase in) the 
tax burden and collective expenses became an important objective. Since 1980, these have 
even become the most important budget principles for the government. 
It became a generally-held opinion that the government should privatise and deregulate. 
Market and competition became the credo. There was even a suggestion to build more hos-
pitals to enable them to be more competitive. More suppliers, more competition.
In this context, the text from the Explanatory Memorandum of the new Zorgverzekeringswet
is very telling: the differences and market imperfections in the fi eld of acceptance, choice possibilities, 
responsibility and fi nancing obstruct freedom of choice and the mobility of insured people. As a consequence, 
they cannot exhort their healthcare insurers to develop their potential role as a contract party for healthcare 
providers suffi ciently. This contributes to the undesirable situation that cost control in healthcare remains 
largely a matter of central supply control and price setting by the government. As a result, deregulation, 
which is desirable from the point of view of effi ciency and effectiveness of the healthcare system, is hard to 
achieve. In the vision of the government, a healthcare insurance system that is universal and transparent 
for insured people and insurers, and  in which all persons can participate under equal conditions, is a 
condition for a sustainable and affordable healthcare system in the future.
The basic assumptions underlying these ideas concerning market competition are:
– Greater freedom of choice and responsibility for insured persons
– Greater competition and infl uence for healthcare insurers
– More tailor-made provisions and performance orientation from healthcare providers
– Less bureaucracy and fewer administrative burdens
– The government is responsible for social conditions
As mentioned above under political and social context, everyone thought they would benefi t 
from the new healthcare insurance law, and consequently its introduction was not met with 
a great deal of antagonism. There is, however, something rotten in the State of Denmark.  In the 
last chapter this will be discussed by evaluating the present and looking more closely at the 
future. 
e. The reform of healthcare insurance by legal measures and the consequences in practice
The legislative framework for Dutch healthcare insurance changed radically in the period 
2001-2007. The former healthcare insurance funds and private healthcare insurances have 
been replaced by the basic insurance, in accordance with the new legislation. The system for 
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insuring heavy medical risks was changed following the reorganisation of the AWBZ and the 
introduction of the Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Social Support Act (WMO)).
If an insured person chooses a policy with reimbursement of costs, the healthcare insurer 
reimburses the claim. The healthcare insurer is not permitted to set a maximum, but is not 
obliged to pay more than is reasonably appropriate, given the market circumstances in the 
Netherlands.
If an insured person chooses a policy with healthcare contracted in advance, it relates to 
healthcare delivered by providers who have been contracted by the healthcare insurer. If an 
insured person wants to go to another healthcare provider, then the healthcare insurer himself 
stipulates the amount of reimbursement. 
If necessary, the government can stipulate healthcare services that the healthcare insurer is 
obliged to offer to insured persons by means of healthcare contracted in advance.
Healthcare providers compete on the basis of price and quality. A transitional period to more 
regulated market forces must be taken into account. The existence and number of obligations 
for contracting in that transitional period, varies according to the sub-market.
Insured persons must pay a fl at-rate contribution to the healthcare insurer. This premium 
varies from insurer to insurer. Premiums based on the risk profi le of insured persons are not 
permitted. Insured persons who have the same policy all pay the same premium. Differentia-
tion is prohibited.
Healthcare insurance law also provides for an income-related premium. Employers con-
tribute by means of obligatory reimbursement to their employees of the income-related 
contribution paid by them. The income-related contribution is paid to a healthcare insu-
rance fund.
In order to fi nance the premium for children younger than 18 years of age, the government 
pays a contribution to the healthcare insurance fund.
Healthcare insurers fund their activities from the fl at-rate contributions of insured per-
sons, and budgets are allocated on the basis of risk equalisation which the healthcare insurer 
receives from the healthcare insurance fund, taking into account the characteristics of its 
insured persons.
Insured people were entitled to a no-claim refund. This no-claim rule expired. The govern-
ment introduced an excess for all persons as of 1 January 2008.
The healthcare insurer can offer premium discounts for collective contracts. This discount 
may vary only according to the number of participants.
As of 1 January 2007, it has become easier for people to change their healthcare insurer. 
The new regulation makes an announcement in December effective as of 1 January 2007. 
In addition to the new healthcare insurance law, a number of other new laws have been 
introduced that are important for the healthcare system. The most important of these are:
The- Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (The Social Support Act (WMO)). The WMO came 
into force on 1 January 2007. The government wants to ensure that citizens can remain 
active in society for as long as possible. The WMO must therefore help to promote and 
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preserve the possibility for citizens to remain independent and participate in society as 
long as possible. The WMO is implemented by the municipal authorities.
The- Wet Toelating Zorginstellingen (The Healthcare Institutions Licensing Act WTZi)) came 
into effect on 1 January 2006. The aim of the WTZi is gradually to create more freedom 
of responsibility for healthcare institutions. Healthcare institutions must be licensed in 
order to be allowed to provide healthcare to be reimbursed under the Zorgverzekeringswet
or the AWBZ. If a healthcare institution intends to construct a new building or renovate 
an old building, permission is necessary in some cases. The WTZi regulates this.
The- Wet Financiële Dienstverlening (The Financial Services Act (WFD)). This law also became 
effective on 1 January 2006. It sets out the responsibilities of fi nancial service providers 
(and therefore also healthcare insurers) to their customers. The quality aspects such as 
expertise, reliability, adequate information provision and careful advice for the consumer 
are provided for in law. 
Wet Marktordening Gezondheidszorg - (The Healthcare Market Regulation Act).This law 
became effective on 1 October 2006. The law is one of the last building blocks in the 
restructuring of the healthcare system. The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) will imple-
ment and monitor market competition in healthcare, regulate tariffs, and ensure proper 
implementation of the healthcare insurance law and the AWBZ.
The NZa will cooperate with the other supervisory bodies such as:
The Healthcare Inspectorate, which ensures the quality of the care-
The Netherlands Competition Authority (- NMa), which reviews mergers and maintains 
the trust prohibition and the prohibition on abuse of economic dominant positions
The Dutch National Bank that looks after insurers to ensure that they have suffi cient -
reserves to meet their obligations
The- NMa has the power over all healthcare markets required to force parties with a 
considerable market share to fulfi l certain obligations in order to promote competition 
in that specifi c market
f.  The effects of the new legislation in practice
What was the overall intention of the legislation? Market forces in healthcare must lead to 
affordable, high-quality healthcare for consumers, with greater cost-awareness among consu-
mers and healthcare institutions, and effi cient and innovative healthcare insurers. With regard 
to all market imperfections, it is necessary to control the market and we therefore speak of a 
regulated market. This is a task for the Netherlands Competition Authority and the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority. Of course, is it still too early to tell whether the goals of government 
policy have been achieved, if it is ever possible to tell. What, for example, is high-quality 
healthcare and who decides what it is?
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A number of matters can be observed regarding the impact of the new healthcare insu rance 
law (and its impact in the preceding years):
It was already known that there was a tendency towards concentration among healthcare 
insurers. This began much earlier. As a result of the new healthcare insurance law, that trend 
may have accelerated. The number of healthcare insurers has fallen drastically in the past few 
years. The four largest concerns currently insure approximately 80% of the potential number 
of insured people.
Expenditure on marketing and public relations have increased rapidly. The total cost for 
2005 is estimated at € 50 million.
More and more healthcare insurances are considered as a total relation between insurer and 
(large/medium) employer; combined insurances in the fi eld of healthcare, staff absence etc
By 1 January 2006, approximately 25% of insured people had changed their healthcare 
insurer. This led to euphoric reactions such as It is obvious that the market works and there is 
considerable mobility among the insured. By 1 January 2007, the number of changes had returned 
to the original level of approximately 4%. The explanation is that the new healthcare insu-
rance law made it possible for those insured with the former healthcare insurance funds, and 
those with private insurance at their company level to join a collective healthcare insurance 
contract with the same provisions for every employee. The Netherlands has been “shot” 
massively in the collective contracts. This has nothing to do with choices made by individual 
insured persons, of course, but with their employers’ relations with the healthcare insurance 
companies. The role of the intermediary has increased signifi cantly as a result. However, 
this can mean that, every couple of years, insurers will ‘shop around’ for large collective 
contracts. It is good for an insurer to win a large collective contract, and frustrating to lose 
one. Meanwhile (August 2007), it appears that 58% of the Dutch population are insured by 
means of a collective contract. The effects of collective contracts on fl at-rate premiums will 
be discussed below.
It seems that the individual price (fl at-rate premium) charged by insurers is not the only 
important factor infl uencing the number of insured people. Quality and service are equally 
important. However, it must be said that the differences between premiums (at least for basic 
insurance) are not very large.
In the coalition agreement it was agreed that the no-claim rule would expire on 1 January 
2008. In 2008, all Dutch people who pay less than € 255 for healthcare would receive a no-
claim refund from their healthcare insurer. The Minister for Healthcare, Welfare and Sport 
has submitted to the Lower House an amendment to the law to replace the no-claim rule 
with an excess of € 150 per person.
The impression exists that the productivity of medical specialists has increased, thereby 
reducing the length of waiting lists.
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g. Possible impact of collective contracts on the fl at-rate contribution
The new Zorgverzekeringswet stipulates that a premium discount can only be given to people 
in a collective contract on the basis of the number of insured people, and not on the basis of 
the health risk. A healthcare insurer, however, may refuse to conclude a collective contract. 
To my knowledge, this has happened at least once because healthcare insurers have refused 
to conclude a collective contract for a certain category of patients. If the health risks of the 
insured persons have no infl uence on the fl at-rate premium, and if the budget formula is 
appropriate, then the amount collected from nominal (fl at-rate) premiums from collective 
contracts plus the amount collected from individual insured people must be equal to the total 
amount of fl at-rate premiums that the healthcare insurer needs. In other words, the individual 
insured person pays for the premium discount of the collective insured persons. The money has 
to come from somewhere as the Chief Executive Offi cer of a big healthcare insurance company 
said. It can be very problematic (at least temporarily) if the scope of the collective contracts is 
underestimated. This means that not enough premiums will be collected. It is almost certain 
that these effects were visible in 2006.
An example can clarify this: the intention is that healthcare insurers receive approximately 
50% of the required premiums from a general fund to which money is allocated by means of a 
budget formula. The remaining 50% must be collected by means of fl at-rate contributions. 
Suppose a healthcare insurer has 2 million insured persons. The expected average health-
care costs are estimated at € 2,200 per insured person for the coming year. On average, the 
healthcare insurer has to collect € 1,100 (€ 91.67 per month) per person. The insurer expects 
that approximately 25% of all insured persons will be insured via a collective contract in the 
coming year. He also expects an average premium discount for the collective contracts of 8%, 
compared to the fl at-rate premium of an individually insured person. An average discount 
of 8% reduces premium revenue by 44 million euros (1100 x 0.08 x 0.25 x 2,000,000). The 
sum of 44 million euros is added to the costs, and the fl at-rate contribution that the insured 
persons have to pay is calculated again. In this way, both the individually insured people and 
the collectively insured people help to pay for the premium discount for the collectively 
insured people. A problem will arise, however, if the number of collectively insured people is 
underestimated. This is what happened. In 2007, the number of collectively insured people 
in the Netherlands was accounted for 58% of all insured people. 
In spite of the above, the new Zorgverzekeringswet is not having a signifi cant impact at the 
moment. This is not true for the AWBZ sector.  This is the sector where it is all happening.
The most important developments are in the fi eld of care and the fi nancing of care. An 
example is the numerous mergers between institutions providing care under the AWBZ. In 
2005, 25% of all merger notifi cations to the Dutch Competition Authority were form care 
institutions within the AWBZ. Minister Van der Hoeven (Ministry of Economic Affairs) sub-
mitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers to the effect that AWBZ institutions and other 
healthcare providers must notify the Dutch Competition Authority much earlier of their 
plans for merger or concentration. Care providers are frequently active in a small relevant 
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market and have a relatively low turnover. For this reason, a merger or concentration does 
not need to be communicated to the Dutch Competition Authority, but can lead to a domi-
nant position in the relevant market, thereby limiting the freedom of choice for customers. 
A lower turnover threshold (the amount above which a merger has to be communicated) 
must reduce this risk.
Within the AWBZ, (health)care providers are preparing themselves to battle to be the pre-
ferred provider for the elderly people in the ‘gold’, ‘silver’ and ‘bronze’ categories (qualifi cation 
by income). Care providers try to develop products that they think elderly people will want 
in the future, and for which they are willing to spend money. These products are not funded 
from the basic insurance (AWBZ). It has little to do with solidarity. But why wouldn’t you spend 
your money on a peaceful old age instead of letting your children pay inheritance tax?
The idea exists that, in the near future, the elderly will have a need for to following:
An environment that is in open contact with the outside world. The feeling of ‘home’ -
rather than an institution.
Services tailored to individual needs-
Care for the elderly is not care unless they experience it as such and it has added value -
for them
The starting point is the capabilities of the elderly, not their limitations-
As a result of the aforementioned policy regarding new products for the elderly in the AWBZ
sector, there have been many mergers and concentrations to create a care chain. By creating 
a care chain many mergers and concentrations take place between care institutions which offer a different 
form of care within the chains. For example, the merger of a home-care organisation, a home for the elderly, 
and a nursing home. This requires staff, the cost of which is more easily borne in a larger setting 
than by a small institution that has in effect been stripped to the bone by years of budget 
cutbacks. Here we must mention the Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning (Social Support Act 
(WMO)). There is an impression that fi nancing the provisions of this act will cause problems 
for both partners; the home-care organisations and the municipal authorities.
h. A glimpse of the future
Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past (Orwell).
Although it is always risky to predict the future, predictions are frequently based on ceteris 
paribus assumptions, whereas changes are bigger and more numerous than can be presumed. 
Nevertheless, it is nice to consult the crystal ball and try to predict the future. In any case, the 
following recent developments (in random order) enable us to make careful forecasts:
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The merger trend among healthcare insurers has peaked. There are a number of (very) -
large and a number of relatively small healthcare insurers. It is not easy for foreign insurers 
to enter the Dutch market due to the lack of transparency.
Demographic ageing will continue-
Advances in medical technology will continue-
Market forces will lead to greater effi ciency-
Healthcare providers and healthcare insurers will be more customer-friendly and cus--
tomer-orientated in the eyes of consumers
Advertising expressions will increase. After all, you don’t need to be good, you must be -
better – or at least your potential customers should think that you are better.
Whether the market forces will also lead to increased cost-awareness among insured -
people is still questionable, since large groups of people will be insured through their 
employer in a collective contract. Employers are therefore an important customer category 
for healthcare insurers.
Within the - AWBZ sector, large-scale product development will continue in order to meet 
the demands of elderly fellow citizens. Many of these products will be fi nanced by means 
of the ‘third money fl ow’, which has little to do with solidarity.
The merger trend among healthcare institutions will continue for some time-
The labour market for nursing staff is becoming tight. In order to be able to compete -
with other sectors of business, improvements in labour agreements - and therefore higher 
costs - are unavoidable.
Given the fact that, for almost 25 years, the Netherlands has attempted to control the supply -
side of healthcare, it can be expected that the change to a demand-oriented healthcare 
system will result in an increased supply and therefore increased costs. The government 
will respond to increasing costs with further cutbacks on fees (e.g. for medical specialists) 
and the budgets of institutions, by increasing excess payments to be paid by the patients, by 
increasing the excess payment to be paid by insured people, and by reducing the benefi ts 
package of healthcare insurance.
Healthcare insurance schemes in Europe will be more alike in the future. They will in--
creasingly be fi nanced through a combination of private insurance, collective insurance, 
social insurance, and excess payments.
Product development by healthcare insurers will also deliver products that are a combina--
tion of basic insurance (social insurance) and additional insurance (private insurance). For 
example: a hospital stay in Karlsruhe, persuading the patient to receive care in Germany, 
and a week’s holiday paid by the additional insurance. The patient has freedom of choice 
between the hospitals, provided they are contracted by the insurer. Overall, this is cheaper 
for the insurer than a hospital stay in the Netherlands.
Even without the above, cross-border patient movement will increase-
The new basic insurance will lead to a decrease in solidarity. The explanatory memo--
randum on the new healthcare insurance law explicitly states that, as costs within the 
framework of collective charges becomes too high, the minister can decide to reduce 
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the benefi ts package. If this happens, insured people may be forced to decide between 
private additional insurance (with risk selection) or paying an excess. This is illustrated by 
the report of the Council for Public Health and Health Care, Sensible and durable care. The 
Council states: treatment can only be reimbursed by means of the standard package if costs are less 
than € 80,000 for each additional year of life in full health. The Council’s recommendation 
also invokes the principle of equality, but in the sense that equal access to care must be 
guaranteed if the care is fi nanced from the collective resources. However, in the future, 
the extent of collectively fi nanced care will no doubt be less than at present.
The conclusion is that, through basic insurance, not everyone will benefi t from everything -
that medical technology has to offer. For this reason, there will be less solidarity, while 
out-of-pocket fi nancing will increase, as a result of which the collective element from 
solidarity will become weaker.
Finally, the long term. In the opening article of The New York Review of Books of 23 -
March 2006, the Americans Krugman and Wells make a plea for healthcare insurance 
for medical expenses without competition between insurance companies. Their two 
most important reasons are risk selection by employers regarding the high insurance 
premiums which they must pay for their employees and the extreme high cost of the 
American healthcare system. It seems that market competition does not always lead to 
lower costs.
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Chapter VIII
THE ART OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: 
ONE CONCEPT IN THREE COUNTRIES
1. Similar countries − different solutions 
This research was planned as a comparative study of the structure and operation of the Belgian, 
German and Dutch national health-insurance systems. As J. van Langendonck emphasised 
in his talk at the 22nd Flemish Academic Economic Congress in 1995, it is very diffi cult to 
make an international comparison of social-security systems. If the researcher relies mainly on 
statistical information, such a comparative study is downright dangerous. Apparent similarities 
or differences in the fi gures are so strongly infl uenced by the differences in the national systems 
(range of application, risks covered, form of services, terms and conditions, administration) 
and by how the statistics are drawn up (defi nitions and categories used, source of the fi gures, 
counting periodicity, etc.) that in many cases no serious conclusions can be drawn.1
These observations may hold true to an even greater extent in a comparison of the national 
healthcare insurance systems. Contribution percentages can be placed side by side, for example, 
but the calculations on which these percentages are based are highly dissimilar, not only due to 
the uneven application of maximum wage levels but mainly due to the different defi nitions of 
gross income, because of which the contribution requirement is not consistently applied in the 
case of a great many costs and remunerations.2 It is even more diffi cult to make comparisons 
over a period of almost two centuries. Criteria for calculating contributions (such as basic 
wage, gross wage, average wage) or the criteria for membership (such as individual or family 
insurance) were constantly being changed over the years, so that even the statistics from the 
same country cannot always be interpreted with precision and without ambiguity. For this 
reason, Van Langendonck advises that when making international comparisons of national 
social-security systems, it is important to consider aspects other than the purely quantitative. 
Since there has already been a reference in the introduction to the absence of reliable pre-
war statistics, this fi nal chapter will concentrate on qualitative institutional characteristics and 
determinants, without ignoring the quantitative aspects.
As the fi rst chapters of this study show, during the second half of the eighteenth century 
there was little difference in economic structure and level of prosperity between the western 
and southern regions of what was later Germany, the Austrian Netherlands (including the 
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Prince-Bishopric of Liège) and the Republic of the United Provinces. From the economic, 
social and medical point of view, the regions being examined here (which occupied the 
same geographic space) were all quite similar. Agriculture was the dominating sector, while 
important craft-based industries developed in the cities over the centuries. Most of this urban 
activity took place within a strongly developed traditional guild system. In the countryside 
there was hardly any health care to speak of. In the cities, the government and the monastic 
orders focused some attention on providing hospital nursing services to mainly indigent 
paupers, while the more well-to-do citizens depended on ambulatory home care. To meet 
the costs of this health care and to offer fi nancial support in the event of long-term illness or 
death, most of the guilds organised some form of solidarity − often compulsory − for their 
member masters, apprentices and journeymen.
Two centuries later, little has changed economically speaking. Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Germany all have very prosperous economies and are undoubtedly among the world’s 
leading nations in this regard. There is almost no difference in their annual per-capita gross 
national product. The economic structure is practically identical in all three countries: a 
rapidly growing service sector, a well-established, high-quality industrial sector and a trimmed 
down but productive agricultural sector. This close similarity between Belgium, Germany 
and the Netherlands also extends to the political system (parliamentary democracy) and to 
the countries’ social features. In the area of health care, too, they barely differ from each other. 
According to data from the World Health Organisation for 2006, the healthcare output for 
the three countries is very close.
VIII.1 Comparison of healthy life expectancy in years for men and women, expenditures for health 







Belgium 69/73 3,097 9.6
the Netherlands 70/73 3,187 9.2
Germany 70/74 3,250 10.7
Bearing in mind Van Langendonck’s warning about comparing national statistics, no value 
whatsoever should be attached to statistics from the World Health Organisation. On the other 
hand, in view of the critical accountability involved in the statistical techniques, there is no 
getting around the conclusion that health care in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
must be placed at approximately the same quality level.
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2. Striking differences 
In this light, it is interesting that while the national healthcare insurance systems in general 
and the health-insurance funds as traditional administrative organs have a few things in 
common, they are mainly quite different from each other. In this chapter, a number of these 
striking differences will be discussed in terms of their historic background. First, the nature 
of healthcare insurance will be examined: the scope of healthcare insurance, the risk cover, 
the collection of insurance contributions, the governmental contribution and the income 
limit. This will be followed by a number of striking differences in the structure and operation 
of the health-insurance funds in the three countries: the health-insurance fund landscape, 
mutual cooperation and competition, the composition of the management board and, fi nally, 
the individual organizations.
a. Compulsory healthcare insurance
With the introduction of healthcare insurance by Bismarck in 1883, Germany preceded the 
Netherlands and Belgium by more than fi fty years. Bismarck’s law was not entirely original, 
however, since he was most probably inspired by existing equivalent laws in Bavaria (com-
pulsory hospital insurance in 1832) and especially Prussia with its Unterstützungskassengesetz 
(Relief Fund Act) of 1854 and was even able to build on them to a certain degree. The law 
of 1883 was by no means a ‘national insurance’ plan.
The fi rst phase of compulsory insurance was very selective and was limited to the category 
of employees working in the industries, the mines and the traditional trades. The large group 
of employees in the agricultural sector − a dominant activity in Eastern Germany − was 
excluded, as were others. As time passed, new groups, including those from the service 
sector, were admitted to the compulsory insurance system, so that by 1929, on the eve of 
the Great Depression, approximately 60% of the German population were required to be 
insured. The Hitler regime tried to increase Hitler’s popularity by including new groups in 
the GKV. After the Second World War, the high income limit caused compulsory healthcare 
insurance to evolve into an insurance that provided broad sections of the population with 
sick pay and health care.
In Belgium, compulsory healthcare insurance also assumed the form of a national health 
plan after the Second World War. Back in 1914, a bill to introduce compulsory insurance for 
sickness and medical expenses went further than the Bismarck law, since all employees − in 
industry, trade and agriculture − would be included. Because of the outbreak of the First 
World War, the Belgian senate was unable to pass the bill at the last moment. Major ideologi-
cal differences and long, drawn-out partisan discussions concerning implementing bodies 
meant that it would take until just after the Second World War for a compulsory insurance for 
sickness and medical expenses to be introduced. The self-employed had to rely on voluntary 
insurance for the time being. After the Wet-Leburton (Leburton Act) of 1963, compulsory 
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healthcare insurance was extended to almost every population group. For the self-employed 
and the professions, the requirement was limited to insurance against major risks. After 1970 
almost 100% of the total population was covered.
Compulsory healthcare insurance in the Netherlands reached a considerably smaller propor-
tion of the total population. As in Belgium, all attempts to introduce compulsory healthcare 
insurance foundered with the coming of the Second World War. Voluntary health-insurance 
funds remained the only way to avoid the pernicious repercussions of towering medical 
bills. In 1926 and 1936, 28% and 39% of the Dutch respectively were insured by a health-
insurance fund. The German occupying authorities fi nally broke new ground in 1941 with 
the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) by which compulsory health care insurance 
was imposed. Surprisingly, the German government employed a much lower income limit 
in the Netherlands than in Germany. This decree limited the number of people who were 
required to have insurance to about 60% of the population. Another 20% opted for voluntary 
insurance with a health-insurance fund, which meant that about four-fi fths of the Dutch 
sought security in a health-insurance fund. The rest had to resort to private insurers. After the 
war, the relative portion of the population covered by health-insurance funds would fl uctuate 
at around 70%, including voluntary and senior citizen’s insurance.3 Over the last two decades, 
a slight decline in the relative portion of the population covered by health-insurance funds 
was observed: 66% in 1985 and only 63% of the total number of insured persons in 1998.4
It should also be noted that with the implementation of the Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziek-
tekosten (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act) in 1968 in the Netherlands, national insurance 
was introduced for a limited number of large-scale risks.
The Dutch basic insurance for curative care radically changed this picture. With the passing 
of the Zorgverzekeringswet (Health Care Insurance Act), for which the Algemene Wet Bijzondere 
Ziektekosten was the legal basis, the entire Dutch population was required to be insured for 
the care included in the basic package as set down by the government, starting in 2006. The 
difference between private and health-insurance funds disappeared, but the possibility of 
obtaining supplementary private health care insurance was increased.
The degree of coverage in the compulsory Belgian insurance plan for sickness and medi-
cal expenses affected the greater part of the population, but not all of it. The German GKV
reached almost 90% of the population. The entire population was granted insurance protection 
with the Gesundheitsreform (Health Care Reform) of 2005. Legal and private insurance, GKV
and PKV, continued to exist, but the introduction of a legally regulated private basic policy 
enabled competition between the two kinds of insurance.
b. Risk coverage 
Besides the advantage of being compulsory, Bismarck’s sickness-benefi t act of 1883 had a 
second important positive effect. With the introduction of the Mindestleistung (minimum 
contribution), the government set out a minimum package that every health-insurance fund 
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was required to offer to its members. In addition to this, there was plenty of room for free 
competition and all health-insurance funds could further extend their fi nancial contributions. 
Factory and industrial funds and Ersatzkassen (substitution funds) in particular could often 
offer their members interesting additional advantages.
In order to avoid further premium increases on the one hand and the threat of bankruptcy 
for many health-insurance funds on the other, the German government passed an emergency 
law on 26 July 1930 to limit benefi ts to a basic package, which was extended to include the 
whole family. Co-payments were also introduced for visits to the doctor and the purchase 
of medicines. After 1933, Hitler would increase the basic coverage considerably (to include 
dental care, ambulatory care, extended term, etc.). He also cut co-payments in half shortly 
after assuming the position of chancellor in 1933. In 1939 co-payments were eliminated for 
visits to the doctor, but those for medicines were doubled.
The German Wirtschaftswunder − the period of miraculous economic growth − and the 
‘golden sixties’ ensured that the insurance package would continue to expand after the war as 
well, with a phenomenal rise in German expenditures for health care and healthcare insurance. 
Between 1950 and 1975, the amount spent per health-insurance fund member increased by a 
factor of twelve. The prolonged economic slump that began in 1973 led to growing defi cits 
and rapidly rising premiums, i.e. the insured ended up forfeiting their purchasing power. Ad-
justments in the insurance package were unavoidable. In 1977 the government began to cut 
back on benefi t payments and to prune the insurance package selectively. When these salami 
tactics by the government did not produce the desired budgetary results, the basic national 
health-insurance package was redefi ned by means of the Zweites GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz 
(Second GKV Restructuring Act) of 1997. A division occurred between a trimmed basic 
package like the one that every health-insurance fund was required to offer its members in 
1883, and an optional economy package in which the members were free to determine and 
pay for the contents themselves. At the same time, co-payments, which had already been raised 
in 1981, were increased considerably and expanded in 1997. After 2000 the reforms were 
intended less as short-term cost-saving measures but were set up to augment the sustainability 
of the German health-insurance system over time by means of structural intervention. The 
Gesundheitsreform (Health Care Reform) of 2004-2009 did not include any radical package 
intervention, as a result of which the structure of Mindest- and Mehrleistungen (minimum and 
additional benefi ts) for the GKV remained intact. In addition, basic policies were introduced 
for Private Krankenversicherung (private health insurance) which were to provide the GKV with 
Mindestleistungen (minimum benefi ts), compulsory acceptance without medical examinations, 
affordable premiums and the right to accumulated sick pay.
When it came to introducing compulsory healthcare insurance, neither the Netherlands 
nor Belgium had a precise description of the insurance package, of course. In the Net-
herlands, since neither the government (as in Belgium) nor the employers (as in Germany) 
contributed fi nancially to the pre-war voluntary insurance programme, most Dutch health-
insurance funds were forced to limit themselves to insurance for the most essential care. In 
fact, contributions to hospital costs required a separate insurance policy altogether, unlike in 
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Belgium and Germany. The factory funds, which sometimes could count on the fi nancial 
support of the company, could offer their members larger benefi ts than the average health-
insurance fund. Commercial funds in particular made skilful use of the lack of regulations 
and offered potential clients a whole range of insurance packages, so they could tailor their 
coverage to the most limited fi nancial possibilities. One negative consequence of this com-
mercial policy was that the poor ended up with inadequate coverage or none at all. During 
the period between the wars, consultative bodies were created in most cities, by which the 
health-insurance funds worked together to make their coverage as broad as possible and to 
coordinate the ceiling of refund rates.
The introduction of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) in 1941 also implied 
the imposition of a standard package, based on the German model. One major improve-
ment was undoubtedly the inclusion of hospital and dental costs in the package. Until the 
economic crisis of the seventies, benefi ts like full hospital nursing and new forms of specialist 
care were constantly being added to the packages provided by the voluntary and compulsory 
health-insurance funds. When the economic crisis of the seventies and eighties struck, a 
debate began on the number of benefi ts and the form they should take. There was constant 
discussion of introducing co-payments into the health-insurance funds, but the package 
expansion continued.
The benefi ts included in the Netherlands’ basic insurance for curative care, as provided 
in the new Zorgverzekeringswet (Health Care Insurance Act) of 2006, is in keeping with the 
package offered in the former compulsory health-insurance funds. When the dual system 
of health-insurance funds and insurance for sickness and medical expenses was done away 
with, insured persons were no longer faced with a division in choices or inequalities for 
the most important forms of health care. The system of supplementary insurance − with its 
myriad policy and premium variants − on top of the basic policy injected new differences 
into healthcare coverage. Whether the division between basic and supplementary insurance 
and the introduction of the free market in the health-insurance system will cause differences 
in choices and use of care is a diffi cult question to answer. In the future, the basic insurance 
will not cover every form of medical technology, and this may have an impact on the degree 
of solidarity.
The healthcare package provided by the Belgian health-insurance funds before 1945 was 
clearly more generous than the Dutch, and for the most part could be compared to its German 
GKV counterpart. The law of 1894 allowed for a systematic subsidising of new mutuality 
initiatives. Since some provincial and even city councils also granted subsidies, the insurance 
packages and mutuality services being offered differed from region to region and even from 
city to city. In exchange for government subsidies, the mutualities kept on extending their 
range of services in the preventive and curative sector. Just before the Second World War, 
government subsidies constituted almost a quarter of all the health-insurance fund revenues. 
Obviously, this means that the Belgian health-insurance funds had more options than their 
Dutch colleagues did. Between the health-insurance funds themselves there was very little 
difference in the coverage being offered due to the sharp competition, especially between 
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the dominant Christian and socialist health-insurance funds operating in the same region. 
They kept a close eye on each other and enjoyed enough autonomy to enable them to re-
spond quickly to any change in the services being offered by the local competitor. To prevent 
overconsumption, or − to use a modern term, ‘moral hazard’ − co-payments for medical 
consultations and medicines began to be used in Belgium as early as 1923. 
The introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance had little impact on the insurance 
and service package of the average health-insurance fund in Belgium. Former benefi ts that 
were eliminated from the legal standard package were quickly added to the (compulsory) 
voluntary supplementary insurance, which almost every health-insurance fund introduced 
after 1945. The scope and the setting of the premiums for this supplementary insurance 
could differ from one health-insurance fund to another. The local or regional boards enjoyed 
a great deal of freedom when it came to taking supplementary initiatives. As the insurance 
package for the compulsory insurance expanded, the contents of the supplementary package 
were adjusted accordingly. The area of operation was expanded even more with the passing 
of the new health-insurance fund act of 1990. Unlike Germany and the Netherlands, where 
the government pushed back the scope of healthcare insurance, the Belgian government 
was much more hesitant to intervene with drastic measures. Expenses were reduced mainly 
by curbing reimbursements for new medical techniques and medicines and by drastically 
increasing the co-payments for medical care, medicines and hospital stays.
Since 2000 there have been no structural reforms for saving money, either. In fact, the 
Flemish healthcare insurance that was introduced in 2001 provided for the reimbursement 
of non-medical expenses such as nursing, volunteer assistance and home care. Higher co-
payments and the lowering of payments for medicines did not limit the range of insured 
care but constituted additional expenses for the patient. Co-payments for care and the need 
to cover risks not being covered by the compulsory insurance gave private insurers an op-
portunity to provide insurance on the free market for things like hospital care.
Naturally, the standard packages provided by the national compulsory insurance systems 
have a great deal in common to a certain extent. Yet striking differences developed, and still 
exist. Before the introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance, neither Belgium nor the 
Netherlands, unlike Germany, had what could be called a ‘national’ standard package. There 
were sometimes major differences between the health-insurance funds, depending on their 
fi nancial possibilities. This changed after the Second World War. In Germany and Belgium, 
and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, new benefi ts were constantly being added to the 
legal insurance package. After the standard German package was trimmed down in 1997 and 
dental expenses were eliminated from the Dutch healthcare insurance, the Belgian health-
insurance funds offered the broadest coverage. However, the high co-payments in Belgium 
(25% for small medical risks and as much as 40% for physiotherapy) are the other side of the 
coin. In 1995 these direct or indirect co-payments amounted to approximately 120 billion 
Belgian francs, as opposed to the more than 400 billion Belgian francs in expenses in the 
healthcare insurance. These high co-payments threaten to make it diffi cult or even impos-
sible for the poor to have fi nancial access. It should be noted that for vulnerable widows, 
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invalids, pensioners and orphans, these co-payments do not exist or are considerably lower, 
and the possibilities offered by the ‘OMNIO statute’ (giving low-income earners the right 
to reductions in healthcare costs) offer some compensation.
c. Premiums and contributions
Expenses must be covered by revenues, and the same is true for healthcare insurance. Reference 
has already been made to the lavish subsidies from the Belgian government. In Germany and 
the Netherlands the governments were less generous, and the health-insurance funds’ budget 
was primarily balanced by payment of premiums. Considerable differences have emerged 
over time, but after the Second World War the three countries gradually developed the same 
principle: a levy on wages in terms of percentage. In 2006 the Netherlands departed from 
this principle by supplementing the income-based premium for basic compulsory insurance 
with a nominal premium per adult and government contributions.
In the guild system and under voluntary insurance, a fi xed lump sum was generally col-
lected per insured person. Usually the size of one’s wage had little or no impact on insurance 
for healthcare expenses, although different rates were used and the rate fl uctuated if children, 
wives or other family members were to be added to the policy. In order to fi nance the com-
pulsory healthcare insurance, Bismarck introduced the levying of premiums (2 to 3%) on the 
normal daily wage. This premium was paid by both employees (2/3) and employers (1/3). 
The principle of a shared premium is still followed in Germany to the present day, although 
German employers insisted on premium nominalisation instead of income-based premiums 
when plans were made for reforming the system after 1997. They argued that separating the 
fi nancing of health care from labour costs would make Germany more economically attractive 
in the international political arena. Starting in 1949, however, each of the two parties came 
up with half the health-insurance fund premiums. After the Second World War, the percent-
age premium, now based on gross income, would constantly increase. In 1996 the average 
health-insurance fund premium amounted to no less than 13.5%. This average disguises the 
fact that some health-insurance funds charged even higher premiums. This premium inequality 
may be eliminated in 2009 by the introduction of the Gesundheitsfonds (Health Care Fund), 
with central premium collection, higher governmental contributions and risk equalisation 
on the basis of medical expenses.
Unlike Germany, there was absolutely no legal obligation for employers in Belgium and 
the Netherlands before the Second World War to be involved in the healthcare insurance 
of their employees. There were some visionary businessmen who supported a company 
health-insurance fund or who contributed to the health-insurance fund premiums of their 
employees, but this was not the general rule. In fact, just the opposite was usually true: 
employers’ organisations in Belgium and the Netherlands had long and fi ercely opposed a 
shared premium. In comparison with Germany − where the premium ran up to 6% during 
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the twenties and was later reduced by Hitler to 3.5% of the basic wage − they were able to 
push down their labour costs by 1 to 2% in this way.
Eliminating this competitive advantage was actually one of the motives behind the Germans’ 
decision to implement the Ziekenfondsenbesluit in the Netherlands. Dutch businessmen were 
even required to pay half the premium, which initially was set at 4%. After the war and in 
the context of austerity policies, the government kept health-insurance fund premiums as 
low as possible to speed up reconstruction and industrialisation. The pressure was so strong 
that the health-insurance funds went into the red during the sixties and had to dip into their 
reserves.5 After the mid-sixties, the levying of premiums went nowhere but up. Between 
1963 and 1970 the premium increased from 4.6% to 7.5%.6 In 2000 the health-insurance 
fund premium was 8.1% of the wage, up to a maximum of 215 guilders. Starting in 2006, in 
addition to the nominal premium for basic insurance, an income-related contribution, paid 
by the employer, was deposited in the Zorgverzekeringsfonds (Health Care Insurance Fund).
In Belgium, too, the health-insurance funds made use of nominal premiums until the in-
troduction of statutory healthcare insurance. Because of the government subsidies they were 
able to keep these low, which meant that access to healthcare insurance (sick pay and medical 
expenses) was also ensured for lower-paid workers. In addition, the socialist health-insurance 
funds, in their struggle with their Catholic competitors, could rely on fi nancial support from 
the socialist movement, with whom they felt strong solidarity. The transfer of the profi ts (or 
part of them) from the consumers’ cooperatives in particular constituted no small source of 
support. And in turn, the Christian funds could rely on donations from wealthy honorary 
members and the use of parish accommodations.
In 1945 the levying of premiums underwent a drastic change. The national RVZI
(Rijks fonds voor Verzekering tegen Ziekte en Invaliditeit, or the National Sickness and Invalidity 
Fund) centralised the premium, which was levied by withholding a percentage of the gross 
income up to a maximum amount. The labourer-employee was asked to contribute 3.5% for 
healthcare insurance and his employer was expected to pay 2.5%, or a ratio of about 60/40. 
Proportionally, a Belgian labourer in 1945 was required to contribute even more than his 
Dutch counterpart (50%), but less than his German counterpart (66%). For white-collar 
workers the total premium amounted to only 5%, 2.75% of which was paid by the employee. 
As the fi nancial situation of the healthcare insurance worsened, both the premiums and the 
ceilings for contributions were raised. The ceilings were fi nally eliminated in 1982, which 
means that since that year the health-insurance fund premium has been calculated on the 
full gross wage.
So even for the apparently simple premium levy, there are still striking differences between 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, in terms of both the size of the premium and the 
collection method. In Belgium and Germany, the premium is levied on a percentage basis. 
The Netherlands combines nominal premiums (which are set by healthcare insurers) with 
income-based contributions.
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d. Generous and frugal governments
Levying premiums, however, is only one source of income for a health-insurance fund, 
albeit the main one in principle. Government contributions also helped keep the health-
insurance funds’ budget in balance. Here, too, considerable differences can be noted. The 
Belgian government was always markedly more generous in this regard than the German 
and Dutch governments. The law of 1883 provided no state fi nancial contributions at all for 
the German health-insurance funds. Even in the twentieth century, the German government 
consistently stuck to this policy of non-intervention and respect for the fi nancial autonomy 
of the health-insurance funds. The budget of a health-insurance fund was clearly regarded as 
an internal question for a self-governing institution with responsibility for its own actions. 
At the very most, the government intervened whenever it felt that the general interest was 
at stake. During the diffi cult years between the wars, for example, restrictions were imposed 
on the granting of supplementary payments and the raising of premiums. One important 
post-war exception to the government’s neutral attitude can be mentioned, when the national 
pension fund took over from the employer to pay insurance premiums for retired people, 
providing the normal employer contribution of 50%.
The restraint practised by the German government in the fi nancing of healthcare insurance 
was abandoned with the adoption of the Gesundheitsreform (Health Care Reform) of 2006. 
In order to guarantee the fi nancial basis of the system for the medium term and to avoid an 
excessive increase in employees’ and employers’ premiums, the fi scal share will be raised from 
€ 1.5 to € 14 billion, starting in 2009.
The Dutch government almost always adopted the same position: that government sub-
sidies for the health-insurance funds were either non-existent (before the Second World 
War) or exceedingly minimal under the system of compulsory healthcare insurance. As in 
Germany, insurance for the elderly also formed an important exception in this policy of 
non-interventionism.
In the Netherlands, the government also intervened in the case of healthcare insurance 
for the elderly, but at the same time it tried to shift some of this heavy burden to the health-
insurance funds and the private insurers. The structural diffi culties inherent in voluntary 
insurance compelled the Dutch government to make a substantial governmental allowance. 
After its initial promise, however, the government refused any additional support, despite the 
growing fi nancial diffi culties in this branch of the insurance sector. Here, too, the health-
insurance funds and the private insurers were called in to lighten the fi nancial burdens. With 
the introduction of the AWBZ (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act), the government even 
succeeded in transferring the burden of heavy medical risks, which up until then had been 
taken care of via the Bijstandswet (Social Assistance Act), from the state treasury to the social 
insurance domain. As in Germany, the Netherlands regarded fi nancial contributions to the 
insurance system as an essential part of the change in the healthcare insurance structure after 
2000. Here, too, government contributions for costs like insurance coverage for children 
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up to 18 years of age are necessary in order to create a suffi ciently broad basis to realise the 
desired solidity for healthcare insurance in a regulated market regime.
Belgian generosity contrasts with this initial Germany and Dutch frugality. Even the fi rst 
Mutualiteitwet (National Health Service Act) of 1851 introduced stimulus premiums for re-
cognised mutualities. The second Mutualiteitwet of 1894 turned the subsidy tap on full blast. 
Before 1945 the Belgian government literally applied the principle of ‘subsidised’ freedom 
to the health-insurance funds. Health-insurance funds could count on liberal state subsidies 
for their initiatives, under certain conditions. One by one, almost all the areas of the Belgian 
mutuality services would be subsidised before the Second World War. In 1938, the last normal 
fi scal year before the Second World War, government subsidies were equal to almost 32% of 
the total premium revenues, not including provincial or municipal contributions.
The introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance in 1945 did not put an end to this 
stream of subsidies. On the contrary, because of the fi erce bidding that took place between 
the political parties, and because of their lobby work, the health-insurance funds were able 
to shift their shortfalls to the government on the one hand and to obtain additional subsidies 
for the insurance of risk groups such as miners, invalids and the unemployed on the other. In 
1966 government contributions accounted for almost 35% of healthcare insurance revenues; 
in 1981 the government fi nanced 43.8% of the ‘medical care’ branch. Afterwards, pressured by 
the continuing economic crisis and the precarious state of government fi nances, the subsidies 
were scaled down slightly; by the nineties the state allowances in various forms still provided 
for about 40% of the revenues.
e. The income limit
As cited earlier, in Belgium almost the entire population is required to be insured for health 
care expenses with a health-insurance fund; in Germany that is 90%. In the Netherlands 65% 
of the population were covered by a health-insurance fund before the introduction of basic 
curative care insurance; afterwards the group of people thus insured comprised the entire 
population. The only explanation for these striking differences is the use of an income limit 
to cordon off access to the health-insurance funds for the well-to-do. The Dutch income limit 
was historically rooted and was the clear result of the power of Dutch doctors and especially 
the Dutch Medical Association (NMG). This criterion was used early on in the Netherlands. 
On the one hand, even before the mid-nineteenth century, doctors in Amsterdam and other 
places were willing to charge more charitable rates to their needy health-insurance fund 
patients. On the other hand, they wanted to be able to go on charging lucrative fees to their 
well-to-do patients. During the second half of the nineteenth century, size of income was 
used as the criterion for eligibility to the lower health-insurance fund fees. The Bindend Besluit 
(Binding Decision) of 1912 made this income limit into an iron-clad principle that success-
fully resisted all attacks and attempts until the introduction of the Zorgverzekeringswet (Health 
Care Insurance Act) and the basic insurance. Neither the German occupying power nor the 
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post-war progressive Catholic-socialist or moderate left-wing cabinets were able or dared to 
abolish this social distinction, until the centre-right cabinet of Balkenende II succeeded in 
pushing the Zorgverzekeringswet through parliament in 2005, by which a basic compulsory 
insurance for curative care was imposed on the entire population.
As already noted, the income limit in Germany was set so high that only a small portion 
of the population was excluded from the health-insurance funds. This principle was also 
affi rmed by the Gesundheitsreform of 2006. Doctors in the Netherlands wanted, by means 
of the low income limit, to secure the higher income from their private practice, while in 
Germany the very high income limit was introduced by the government itself. In Belgium, 
access to the health-insurance fund was never barricaded by an income limit. Whoever 
could pay the premiums was admitted to the economical insurance being offered by the 
health-insurance funds, although the doctors did stubbornly defend the freedom to their 
own fees ‘à la tête du client’. It was generally accepted that the well-to-do paid higher fees, 
thereby indirectly compensating for the lower fees − or even the free health care − offered 
to the poor and needy.
The introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance in 1945 threatened to exclude the 
self-employed and professionals from the health-insurance funds, which is why the mutu-
alities continued to offer voluntary insurance without any income limit in addition to the 
compulsory insurance. This formed the basis for compulsory insurance against major risks for 
the self-employed, which arose as a consequence of the Wet-Leburton. The health-insurance 
funds also offered a supplementary insurance against minor risks for the self-employed of 
Belgium. These measures were wound up with the decision to include the self-employed 
in the compulsory insurance plan for minor risks like doctor’s visits and medicines starting 
in 2008.
f. The world of the health-insurance funds
The current structure of the health-insurance funds is the result of a long evolution. A few 
common characteristics can be found, but despite parallel economic and social developments 
there were still many sizeable differences at the end of the twentieth century.
One striking difference between Belgium and Germany on the one hand and the Nether-
lands on the other is that the Belgium and German health-insurance funds were called on 
by the government to serve as implementing bodies, not only for healthcare insurance but 
also for the disbursement of sick pay. In the Netherlands, by contrast, under pressure from 
the NMG, a distinction has gradually developed between healthcare insurance and insur-
ance against income loss due to illness. This principle, the Talma model − named after the 
anti-revolutionary Minister of Labour Talma (1908-1912) − continues to shape the Dutch 
social-security system to the present day.7
All three countries share the tendency towards national concentration of and scale increases 
in their health-insurance funds. Scale increases were particularly striking in the hands of the 
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German government. Apart from the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree), health-
insurance funds in Belgium and the Netherlands merged as a result of changes in the social 
and economic environment. The hundreds − and in Germany the thousands − of small, local 
health-insurance funds have gradually joined together over time to become a small number 
of mostly large-scale health-insurance funds. This historic process involving the integration 
of the health-insurance funds and the health-insurance companies went furthest in the 
Netherlands, so that by 2008 there were only 34 health insurers, independent or as part of a 
group, to provide the entire population with basic and supplementary insurance.
The commercial funds disappeared from the motley Dutch health-insurance fund land-
scape for good with the passing of the Ziekenfondswet (Sickness Fund Act) in 1966. Neither 
Germany nor Belgium had made room for similar commercial health-insurance funds at 
any time during the twentieth century. One striking and unique feature in the Netherlands 
were the doctors’ funds, and another were the Maatschappijfondsen (the NMG’s own health-
insurance funds). No similar health-insurance funds − in which physicians and pharmacists 
organized and controlled their own health care insurance − are known to have existed in 
Europe. These doctors’ funds and Maatschappijfondsen originally came about as a result of 
the desire of physicians to provide social care for their poorer patients, combined with a 
commercial concern for their own material position and well-being. Their early start in an 
agrarian and primarily trade-based urban environment around the mid-nineteenth century 
gave these health-insurance funds a decisive advantage over the mutual workers’ funds that 
developed mainly in an industrial-urban environment. When Dutch industrialisation really 
took hold during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the big cities already had strong 
health-insurance funds that were being managed by physicians. The early, strong organisation 
of the Dutch physicians in the NMG strengthened and channelled these widespread initiatives 
and provided effi cient coordination and guidance at the national level. The Binding Deci-
sion paved the way for the establishment of new Maatschappijfondsen, so that practically all of 
the Netherlands was enclosed within a tight net of Maatschappijfondsen. With a market share 
of around 50% and centrally controlled by the board of the NMG, the Maatschappijfondsen
exercised an infl uence on legislation and the administration of health care insurance that 
cannot be underestimated.
Unlike Germany (with its Ortskrankenkassen, or municipal or regional sickness funds, and 
Innungkrankenkassen, or sectoral sicknessfunds) and especially unlike Belgium, the socialist and 
Christian workers’ health-care funds in the Netherlands were much less able to dominate 
health-insurance fund activity and to infl uence legislative work. While the most powerful 
employees’ funds in Belgium hauled in at least three-quarters of the market, those in the 
Netherlands were stuck with 30 to 35%.
In Belgium, a few hundred independent health-insurance funds are still legally opera-
tive as a result of the law of 1990. They are regional groupings of the local sections, which 
are a continuation of the earlier autonomous local health-insurance funds. In reality, the 
boards of these regional health-insurance funds are only free to determine the content of 
the voluntary supplementary insurance. Their work is coordinated at the national level and 
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streamlined by directives, most of them binding, that are issued by the national alliance of 
which they are a part. The power of the fi ve national alliances, which were already in place 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, increased considerably over the course 
of the twentieth century, and especially after the Second World War, as healthcare insurance 
became more complex. The two largest national alliances constituted an important part of 
the all-encompassing socialist and Christian workers’ movements and were closely tied to 
like-minded political parties. Together they consistently accounted for about three-quarters 
of the total number of health-insurance funds. In fact, the two alliances together − without 
ignoring the smaller national alliances − can be called market leaders; for all intents and 
purposes they constituted a duopoly in the Belgian healthcare insurance market. Since 1970 
only marginal changes can be noted in the relative proportion of health-insurance funds 
among employees. In addition, with the law of 1990, access to compulsory healthcare in-
surance is essentially sealed off to private insurers, even for the future. European legislation, 
incomplete insurance provide private insurers with alternatives in the form of reinsurance of 
co-payments and supplementary hospital insurance. Privatisation and commercialisation are 
the great fears of the health-insurance funds, who defend themselves by emphasising broad 
solidarity with mutual assistance among the insured as opposed to striving for high yields in 
a free and competitive market.
The German structure resembles that in Belgium: advancing concentration with all-
encompassing national alliances that serve to unify the activity of health-insurance funds, 
which are organised regionally or by state. It is also striking that, as in Belgium, the national 
organisations, formed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, still exist a century 
later. But unlike Belgium, a few important shifts have taken place in the mutual power rela-
tions, expressed in membership numbers. The ratios between Orts-, Angestellten-, Innungs-, 
Betriebs- and Ersatzkassen shifted to the detriment of the Ortskassen and Angestelltenkassen
and to the benefi t of the Betriebskassen. The centralisation of the Spitzenverbande (umbrella 
organisations), seemed to have been completed for the time being by the formation of the 
Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen (National Confederation of Sickness Fund Organisa-
tions) in 2008 under pressure from the government.
g. Cooperation and competition
A high measure of cooperation has developed among the Dutch health-insurance funds dur-
ing the past few decades. Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (Branche Organisation of Dutch Health 
Insurers), a collaborative effort set up in 1995, is the end result of attempts at cooperation 
among the Dutch health-insurance funds that began very early on. With the establishment 
of the Unifi catiecommissie (Unifi cation Commission) in 1922 and the Centrale Commissie voor 
het Ziekenfondswezen (Central Commission for the Health-Insurance Fund System) before 
the Second World War, attempts had been made (admittedly fruitless at the time) at joint 
consultation and even cooperation. During and after the war, the thread was picked up once 
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again, and cooperation grew by fi ts and starts, fi rst in the COZ, later the GOZ, then the VNZ
and now with Zorgverzekeraars Nederland. A freeze on transactions imposed by the German 
occupying authorities and the regional delineation of operational areas deprived the health-
insurance boards of the stimuli needed to engage in an all-out competitive battle, and the 
rapidly advancing removal of traditional religious and socio-political barriers did the rest. In 
addition, the insurance package and the salaries of paid staff were nationally set for the most 
part, so there was little reason to engage in competition.
The change in the curative care system, with the 2006 Zorgverzekeringswet (Health Care 
Insurance Act) as the high point, strengthened the competition between the remaining health 
care insurers. This competition was fed by the size of the nominal premium, the quality of the 
care being purchased, the acquisition of collective groups and supplementary packages. Large 
concerns such as ACHMEA, UVIT, CZ and MENZIS presented themselves as national insurers 
with roots in the region with labels such as GROENE LAND,OZ and PWZ. Small, indepen dent 
institutions such as DE FRIESLAND,DSW and ZORG EN ZEKERHEID limited themselves as much 
as possible to their original sphere of activity.
The national collaboration taking place in Zorgverzekeraars Nederland and between Dutch 
healthcare insurers themselves across ideological and social borders has no counterpart in 
Belgium or Germany at the moment. Naturally, consultative organs at the national level were 
created in both countries by the health-insurance funds in order to carry out joint consulta-
tions, with a view to seeking common viewpoints at national discussions or negotiations. 
After all, forming a united bloc is essential when it comes to engaging in rate negotiations 
with the national medical and paramedical organisations. Prior agreements must also be 
made among the various health-insurance funds for the appointment of representatives in 
joint committees.
In Germany there was no close cooperation between the national alliances. The complaints 
lodged by the Ortskrankenkassen of unfair competitive practices on the part of the Betriebs-
krankenkassen in the eighties clearly showed that competitive jealousy was still smouldering, at 
least below the surface. By introducing Wahlfreiheit (freedom of choice) in 1996, the German 
government hoped to put pressure on insurance premiums by increasing the competition. 
This policy was changed after 2004. When the Gesundheitsreform was introduced, with its 
centralisation of the fi nance structure, improvement of risk equalisation and strengthening 
of corporate control, the disadvantages of premium competition were to be replaced by 
competition based on quality and control of health care and insurance.
In Belgium, too, the competitive fi re had not yet been extinguished. It is true that the 
fi erce blazes of past ideological differences are gradually becoming history for the younger 
generation of administrators. The time of mass meetings and demonstrations is clearly over. 
Now the competitive battles are mainly being fought out in the corridors of parliament and 
in the ministerial cabinets. During the course of 2001, the competitive struggle broke out 
once again after the Landsbond van Neutrale Ziekenfondsen (Neutral Association of Health-
Insurance Funds) gained publicity for its VAV by means of radio spots. The LCM, the lar gest 
health-insurance fund, immediately accepted the challenge and retaliated with its own radio 
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spots. The funds continued to compete after 2001, especially with regard to optional sup-
plementary insurance and members’ benefi ts. This free market process was reinforced by 
the growing portion of private insurers involved in the reinsuring of co-payments and sup-
plementary insurance plans like hospital insurance. Unlike in the Netherlands and Germany, 
the European Commission did seem to infl uence the way in which the health-insurance 
funds functioned in the Belgian system with supplementary insurance at economical rates. 
The European Commission decided in favour of the insurers in August 2008 when they 
protested against the protective rules and preferential treatment of the health-insurance funds 
with regard to supplementary insurance.
The political encapsulation of the Belgian health-insurance funds has a long tradition. Even 
in the nineteenth century they were used by the political parties as political instruments in 
the struggle between Catholics and liberals, later between Catholics and socialists. The fi rst 
mutuality law of 1851 was clearly intended by the conservative citizenry to quell and channel 
workers’ unrest. The law of 1894 was used by the Catholic government to benefi t the Catholic 
health-insurance funds by means of an ample subsidy pot, as opposed to the party-affi liated 
socialist health-insurance funds. In a countermove, the socialist provincial councils and city 
councils granted subsidies in turn.
The parliamentary discussions and political polarisation regarding compulsory health care 
insurance, which went on for decades, resulted in the paralysing deadlock between the socialist 
‘neutral state’ as administrator and the health-insurance fund pluralism of the Catholic party. 
The national solidarity following the Second World War broke the impasse momentarily, and 
compulsory health care insurance was rapidly and expediently pushed through by a socially-
minded elite. During the fi fties the ideological discussions cropped up again and the political 
sparring match resumed in full intensity. The temporary and partial pacifi cation of the past 
decades was facilitated by the common struggle against the medical establishment on the one 
hand and the pressure by the government to save money on the other.
Recent debates on the responsibility of the health-insurance funds and the introduction 
of health care insurance for help for the aged have clearly shown that the historic contrasts 
in Belgium have certainly not disappeared entirely. The tactical use of voluntary supplemen-
tary insurance also illustrates that each health-insurance fund is having to keep on its toes to 
prevent competitors from snatching their members away. The removal of traditional religious 
and socio-political barriers has clearly not permeated Belgian society as deeply as it has in 
the Netherlands. The electoral erosion and the loss of power of the socialist parties PS and 
SP and the Christian CVP and PSC, the traditional political patrons of the two most powerful 
health-insurance funds, does not yet seem to have really affected the competitive impulse of 
the ‘friendly’ health-insurance funds. They are still encapsulated within strong all-encompassing 
labour movements and can depend mainly on the conditional support of ideologically like-
minded labour unions: the socialist ABVV and the Christian ACV. The small liberal national 
alliance is in turn assisted by the ACLVB, the modest liberal labour union. Like the mutualities, 
these labour unions are involved in the same love-hate relationship with each other.
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h. Managing the health-insurance funds
In Germany and Belgium, the composition of health-insurance fund management boards 
went practically uncontested, while in the Netherlands a virtual war broke out on this 
topic between the NMG and the mutual relief funds in particular. With German effi ciency, 
the Bismarck act of 1883 regulated the appointment of management board members for 
the health-insurance funds on a proportional basis according to payment. Two-thirds of the 
healthcare insurance contributions were paid by the employees and one-third by the emplo-
yers. The same proportion was applied to votes for board members.
The socialist movement was particularly skilful at using this rule in order to secure the 
majority in quite a number of Ortskrankenkassen (municipal or regional sickness funds) by 
means of tactical agreements. The Betriebskrankenkassen (company health-insurance funds) 
and the Innungskassen (sectoral sicknessfunds), whose statutes were different, did not use this 
proportional distribution. In most factory funds the directorate continued to run the show for 
the time being, while in the corporate Innungskassen the management board was composed 
exclusively of workers. Proportional representation is still in effect in Germany up to the 
present day. In 1949 the consistent application of this rule resulted in half the management 
mandates being in the hands of employers because they had begun paying half the insu-
rance premiums that year. This general rule was twice departed from over the course of the 
twentieth century. Shortly before the First World War, a switch was made to equal represen-
tation on the management boards of most German health-insurance funds, under pressure 
from the entrepreneurs. Just after the war, proportional representation was reinstated − this 
time under pressure from the powerful labour movement and to temper the revolutionary 
mood among employees. The second exception took place during the Hitler regime. The 
traditional self-rule that had been followed in German health-insurance funds was quickly 
replaced by the Führer principle. One Leiter alone, although assisted by an advisory council 
containing one or more of the paid staff, was responsible for the proper working of each 
health-insurance fund.
In Belgium there were even fewer discussions about the composition of the health-insurance 
fund management boards than there were in Germany. Neither the weakly organised doctors 
nor the entrepreneurs seemed to be really interested in assuming managerial responsibility 
for voluntary healthcare insurance. And the Mutualiteitwet (Mutuality Act) of 1894, which 
until 1990 formed the legal framework for the operation of the health-insurance funds, did 
not provide for any statutory representation of employers or doctors.
The management boards at the various levels were usually formed gradually by the health-
insurance fund members. With the Christian mutualities, which made up the largest national 
alliance, the general assembly of the local mutuality elected a local board every four years. 
Usually only a very few members took part in these board elections, and often the boards 
were confi rmed again for another term without many changes. In turn, the local boards 
delegated several members to attend the meeting of the district general assembly or the re-
gional alliance. In addition to these elected members, the alliance board could co-opt a few 
TWO CENTURIES OF SOLIDARITY366
more members. These co-opted members came mostly from Christian sector organisations. 
Their contributions raised the involvement of these strong organisations in the operation 
of the mutualities. Politicians were not co-opted directly but often took seats on the board 
as elected members or as co-opted sector representatives. The general board of the alliance 
then elected an alliance chairman and a board of directors for a period of four years, which 
answered for the executive committee. Delegates were then appointed from the board of 
directors for the national council.
It is not clear whether the same election procedure was followed in the smaller national 
alliances. The new health-insurance fund act of 1990 specifi cally states that all members must 
elect the management boards of the regional health-insurance funds every six years. They are 
given the opportunity to submit their vote in writing. The fi rst two elections that took place 
reveal that only a minority of the members showed any interest in this democratic procedure 
and participated in the elections. While putting together a new board for the health-insurance 
funds was usually a problem-free procedure in Germany and Belgium, in the Netherlands it 
was a source of fi erce discussions for decades. The doctors stubbornly defended their position 
that staff members should hold at least half, and preferably the majority, of the council posts, 
not only in ‘their’ Maatschappijfondsen (Association Funds) but also on every health-insurance 
fund management board. In the Bindend Besluit (Binding Decision), the NMG even declared 
equal representation as one of the basic preconditions for cooperation in a health-insurance 
fund. During the entire period between the wars, the NMG continued to make this demand. 
After the Second World War, the ties between the NMG and the Maatschappijfondsen became 
looser and they were able to work more autonomously within the framework of the VMZ
Federation. Even so, in 1956 the non-equal composition of the boards still formed a stum-
bling block for the NMG, resulting in their refusal to agree to the establishment of a National 
Organisation of Health-Insurance Funds.
The NMG’s demand for equal representation was in principle a taboo subject for the mutual 
relief funds. Autonomy and self-government by the members was a basic right and was not 
open for discussion. They seemed prepared to fi ght for this principle, risking a boycott by 
the doctors that would endanger the normal functioning and even the future of the health-
insurance funds. The successive bills that were passed during the period between the wars 
could not solve the management problem, which was less pressing among the other funds.
Most of the management boards of the factory funds were made up of members. The 
composition of the board of the General Mineworkers’ Fund suggests that insured people 
certainly did have a voice. In addition, the general assembly was made up of employees and 
the management board needed the approval of this organ under certain circumstances. The 
management boards of the nutsfondsen (local funds) were usually made up of local notables, 
many of whom were fund staff members.
Neither the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) nor the Ziekenfondswet (Sickness 
Fund Act) contains explicit rules about the composition of health-insurance fund management 
boards. The Ziekenfondswet for the fi rst time provided a vague guideline: ‘suffi cient guarantees 
that insured persons would have a reasonable degree of infl uence on the management board’. 
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With further scale increases in the health-insurance funds and developments in the area of 
healthcare insurance, changes were also implemented in the form of health-insurance fund 
management. During the eighties a supervisory board model was chosen. Although this model 
also theoretically granted insured persons a certain amount of infl uence, in most health-
insurance funds such infl uence consists mainly of advising and overseeing the management 
of the health-insurance fund.8 The fi erce discussions on the principles of management-board 
structures were consigned to history for good by the mergers, scale increases and regulated 
market system of the Dutch healthcare system of 2008.
i. Separate facilities and staff
The ferocity with which the NMG and the mutual relief funds battled it out on the issue of 
management-board structures also had to do with the thorny problem of separate facilities 
and contractual staff members. Here, too, the governments of the three countries differed 
signifi cantly. In Belgium, the neutral and mainly socialist mutualities organised their own 
out-patient clinics during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and also set up their 
own pharmacies in various cities. Just as the socialist cooperatives were forced to suppress the 
prices of consumable goods and ensure their quality by setting up their own bakeries and 
shops, so their cooperative pharmacies had to offer urgently needed medicines to mutuality 
members at reasonable prices. Consultations in their out-patient clinics were provided by 
doctors who worked either on a freelance basis or as paid staff. The Mutualiteitwet of 1894, 
with its strong anti-socialist basis, prohibited mutualities from running their own pharmacies. 
This led to fi erce reactions from the mutualities involved, and as a result the government 
amended the act in 1898, thereby permitting the exploitation of pharmacies that operated 
within the framework of the mutuality system. Ample use was made of this loophole.
As part of their competitive warfare, both the socialist and the Christian mutualities built up 
a close network of pharmacies. Up to the present day, the professional association of pharma-
cists never succeeded in gaining the necessary political support to eliminate the competition 
of these mutuality pharmacies, despite constant protest. The establishment, management and 
operation of healthcare facilities (hospitals, out-patient clinics, sanatoriums, nursing homes, 
day centres and homes for the disabled) was often stimulated by the government before the 
Second World War by means of investment subsidies and work allowances.
The introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance forced the mutualities to remove 
these facilities from the compulsory insurance for sickness and medical expenses. Often 
they were legally categorised as VZWs (non-profi ts) and, if necessary, were fi nanced via the 
voluntary supplementary insurance system. Little changed in this situation as a result of the 
health-insurance fund act of 1990. Under the infl uence of the legal actions brought by the 
Wijnen doctors’ organisation, provisions were included that were meant to make it impossible 
to siphon off money from the compulsory to the supplementary insurance system − and 
therefore to the individual health-insurance fund facilities.
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While the health-insurance funds in Belgium have the leeway to set up their own facilities, this 
has never been the case in Germany. The law of 1883 prevented health-insurance funds from 
owning their own facilities. They were required to provide help free of charge via a doctor 
with a hospital contract and a pharmacist. This principle continued to be followed unchanged 
into the twentieth century, but in 2001 it was adjusted by means of the Gesetz zur Reform 
des Risikostrukturausgleichs (Risk Adjustment Scheme Reform Act), which made it possible 
for the Kassen (Funds) to apply a Disease Management Programm (DMP). The government 
assigned them a role as mediators and directors in the provision of custom-made care by 
qualifi ed providers of integrated multidisciplinary care for the chronically ill. The objectives 
of the DMPs were quality improvement and cost savings. In 2008, government and social 
parties were enthusiastic about the results of the DMPs and the involvement of the insured, 
although the effects had not yet been scientifi cally substantiated. This active role played by 
the German facilities was strengthened by the Gesundheitsreform (Health Care Reform) of 
2006. They must compete in terms of quality of insured care, the way they respond to the 
demand for care and in negotiating individual contracts with care providers.
The development among Dutch healthcare insurers, especially the health-insurance funds, 
was comparable. For a long time the Netherlands occupied a position between Belgium 
and Germany. Until the Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Sickness fund Decree) was passed there were 
no regulations, and each health-insurance fund was free to develop its own initiatives. Not 
unexpectedly, the mutual relief funds made use of this opportunity to provide inexpensive 
medical assistance to their members in their own facilities. Well-known examples − and 
notorious among the employees’ organisations − are AZIVO in The Hague and Ziekenzorg 
in Utrecht.
The establishment of these facilities was based not only on idealistic motives but also 
occasionally on problematic relations with the organisations of healthcare providers. In the 
struggle with the NMG and its own health-insurance fund, Ziekenzorg of Utrecht felt itself 
compelled to set up its own facilities in 1933. This was the only way that Ziekenzorg could 
avoid a boycott of the NMG and provide its members with medical help. The fund decided 
to establish its own pharmacy and to appoint its own general practitioners as well as two 
dentists. As the years passed, a specialised out-patient clinic and a laboratory were added to 
the fund’s own facilities. Surprisingly it were not only the mutual relief funds that developed 
their own facilities. The Nutsziekenfonds in The Hague had opened its own pharmacy much 
earlier, in 1868. In the early twentieth century it opened two more pharmacies, as well as its 
own out-patient clinic for specialist help. 
Except for a few out-patient dental clinics in the thirties, the Maatschappijfondsen themselves 
did not set up their own facilities. According to the NMG, health-insurance funds − and that 
included their own − were not supposed to take on the role of ‘healthcare provider’. The 
funds were not qualifi ed for this role. The health-insurance funds that did run their own 
facilities were a thorn in the side of the NMG for several reasons. First, these funds acted as 
direct providers of medical assistance to the insured; second, most of the funds refused to 
follow the principle of ‘voluntary choice of healthcare professional’ for their funds; third, 
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the funds often had health care professionals on their payrolls. The NMG’s position was also 
taken up in the 1912 Binding Decree. In the mid-fi fties, when the NMG’s Maatschappijfondsen
had organised themselves into the VMZ Federation, the NMG still opposed the ownership 
of separate facilities, since this was not the task of a health-insurance fund. The running of 
fund-owned facilities was only permitted by the VMZ Federation if consultations with health 
care professionals (or providers) failed. Health-insurance funds would then have the right to 
take measures in the interest of the insured.
The continued existence of fund-owned facilities was seriously threatened by the introduc-
tion of the Ziekenfondsenbesluit of 1941. The Commissioner of the Health-Insurance Fund 
System Inspectorate found that it was unacceptable to own facilities and to refuse to follow 
the principle of voluntary choice of healthcare professionals. A transitional measure was 
passed that was in effect until 1 July 1942, which AZIVO and others invoked. In fact, AZIVO
would succeed in skilfully running its organisation, with many healthcare professionals on 
the payroll, its own pharmacy and its own hospital, through the war years. Ziekenzorg also 
succeeded in keeping its pharmacy and dental service, but it did have to eliminate salaried 
general practitioners and midwives. Most health-insurance funds, however, were not as clever 
and were compelled by the German occupying authorities to close their own facilities.
After the war the Ziekenfondsenbesluit did remain in force, but some of the earlier fund-
owned facilities were reopened. As the years passed, most fund-owned out-patient clinics 
would close their doors. This was partly because the supply had increased to an adequate 
level and partly because a number of clinics were no longer proving cost-effective due to the 
increasing competition. The fi ght for fund-owned facilities would be concentrated more and 
more on the remaining pharmacies. During the sixties, a head-on collision almost occurred 
between AZIVO and Ziekenzorg on the one hand and the KNMP pharmacists’ federation 
on the other. A partial solution came in the form of Veldkamp’s bill, which prohibited the 
establishment of new fund-owned facilities. The controversy continued to affect the existing 
facilities until 1971, when a compromise was reached. Both parties backed down a bit: the 
KNMP was forced to accept the continued existence of pharmacies owned by health-insurance 
funds, and both health-insurance funds were forced to accept free choice of pharmacies for 
their own insured customers. They also had to accept that people insured by other health-
insurance funds could not patronise AZIVO and Ziekenzorg pharmacies. This was something 
of an exhaustive privilege for both health-insurance funds. In reality, the organisations of 
paid healthcare professionals had won the decade-long war of attrition. The active role of 
the health-insurance funds as organisers and care providers had been eliminated long before, 
and now their role was confi ned to that of private implementing bodies for the health-
insurance fund system.
This changed after 1986 under the infl uence of neo-liberal free-market ideology. The struc-
tural thinking of the seventies was replaced by the ideology of privatisation, the free market 
system, competition and the government withdrawal. Politics, government and parliament 
believed that uniform insurance of basic care for the entire population, with a larger nominal 
portion of the premium for the insured and guided competition between insurers and care 
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providers − or a regulated free market for health care and its insured customers − was the 
recipe for keeping a tighter grip on healthcare costs and coordinating the connection between 
supply and demand in the healthcare sector.
In this picture, health-insurance funds and insurance companies that cover sickness and 
medical expenses − combining as healthcare insurers − were not just indemnity insurers or 
implementers of social insurance legislation. In the legislation related to the Zorgverzekeringswet 
(Health Care Insurance Act) they were assigned to serve as care directors, which included 
acting as purchasing agents and mediators of health care. This involved contracting on an 
individual rather than a collective basis, developing licensing policy, stimulating new forms 
of health care and supporting existing care according to need, and pursuing a quality policy 
for the care being purchased. If necessary, insurers themselves provided primary health care in 
the form of GP stations and pharmacies. In fact, the government put healthcare insurers in the 
same position that the mutual relief funds and many NMG health-insurance funds as private 
institutions had occupied before 1941: that of healthcare insurers and health care mediators 
and providers, with or without their own facilities in modern form.
The role of Dutch healthcare insurers and the German Krankenkassen as administrators of 
the health care they insured was different from that of the Belgian mutualities. For them it 
was a new role imposed by policy, whereas for the Belgian funds it was a matter of main-
taining the old facilities that they themselves had established, which they continued to do 
even after 2000.
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to determine what striking differences had developed histori-
cally between contemporary Belgian, German and Dutch systems of healthcare insurance. 
The list of differences discussed here is not exhaustive. There are also major discrepancies 
in other areas such as systems of repayment, voluntary supplementary insurance, imposing 
responsibility and equalisation. The study clearly shows that in order to understand and ex-
plain these contemporary differences, knowledge of the history of health-insurance funds is 
essential. The task of the historian concludes with describing, analysing and explaining the 
historic evolution of the subject. Historians are also sometimes expected to draw lessons from 
the past for the future: indeed, ‘Historia magister vitae’. What lessons can be drawn from the 
history of health-insurance funds? At the same time, however, history compels the historian 
to act modestly and to beware of futurology. Events almost never repeat themselves, after all, 
since the historical framework is never exactly the same. What is called for here, even more 
than drawing lessons, is historical refl ection.
1/ The long lives of institutions
Institutions lead long, tenacious lives. In order to understand the functioning of health-
insurance funds in the twenty-fi rst century, we should try to gain insight into the political, 
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economic and social context of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The structures of 
modern health-insurance funds can hardly be understood without learning something about 
their nineteenth-century roots. Early German industrialisation, with its socialist proletariat, 
explains Bismarck’s opportunistic but brilliant introduction of compulsory healthcare insu rance 
on a corporatist basis. It still forms the basis of healthcare insurance in Germany today. The early 
start made by heavy industry in Wallonia and the textile industry in Ghent on the one hand, 
and the rapid expansion of socialist and Christian ‘pillars’ (social divisions along sectarian and 
ideological lines) on the other, cast light on today’s political encapsulation and the dominant 
market position of the Christian and socialist health-insurance funds in Belgium. 
We hope that we have succeeded in showing that health-insurance funds today are by 
no means artifi cial, bureaucratic creations. Health-insurance funds are the result of a social 
reaction to problems within a particular environment. They are historically rooted institu-
tions in which idealistic commitment, humane concern, political opportunism, religious 
inspiration, economic effi ciency and professional management were mixed together in a 
constantly changing arrangement. So each health-insurance fund in the nineteenth century 
contained its own individual features. The partial abandonment of local individuality and 
autonomy, fi rst in regional associations and later in nationally organised alliances, did not 
happen without a struggle.
2/ National differences and European legislation
Gradually the most signifi cant differences between the various health-insurance funds were 
smoothed away within the national context of compulsory healthcare insurance. As we have 
shown, however, there are still very substantial differences between the national systems of 
healthcare insurance and health-insurance funds in Belgium, Germany and the Nether-
lands.
For the European Community, these contemporary ‘cultural differences’ justify an indi-
vidual national approach to healthcare insurance. The EC convention expressly states that the 
responsibility of the member states for the organisation and provision of health services and 
medical care should be fully respected by the European Union.9 There is still no discussion 
of direct European infl uence on the fi nancing of health care or healthcare insurance. This 
does not alter the fact that more and more pressure is being exerted on the organising of 
these national structures. On 1 May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam made some changes and 
additions to the EC convention. The new article 152 of the EC convention expanded the 
authority of the European Union to take stimulation measures aimed at improving public 
health. The Treaty states that this must be regarded as a supplement to national policy. Aspects 
of the Treaty concerning the European Union were anchored in the principle of subsidiarity, 
which leaves responsibility for shaping social security to the member states. The same prin-
ciple also allows for respecting the major cultural and moral differences that exist among the 
various members states with regard to health care.
As this study has shown, there are striking ‘cultural’ differences between the insurance systems 
that can still justify the national approaches being taken at the moment. So ostensibly there 
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is nothing to be concerned about. In the changes made to the German and Dutch systems 
after 2000, it was assumed that European supranational laws and regulations would not pose 
any diffi culties for the renewal of the German national security system, or would not be 
applicable to the private character of the Dutch basic insurance for curative care. However, 
in its response to the request of the private insurers of Belgium to give a signal concerning 
the protectionist behaviour of the health-insurance funds regarding supplementary insurance 
coverage for co-payments and hospital costs, among others, the European Commission said 
that it will stand by the principles of open competition and the free market in the case of 
these special indemnity insurance programmes.
3/ Refl ecting on the future
So there is tension between legally regulated social security and the private market. Opposed 
to the principle of subsidiarity is the principle of free market forces as the point of departure 
for economic integration. This principle was written into the Treaty of Rome of 1957, and 
its objective is competition that is as strong and complete as possible. Tension is growing 
between the principle of subsidiarity and free market forces. Within the European Com-
mission, the policy of competition has become one of the most important rights. Govern-
ment monopolies in the service sector (postal services, telecommunications, transport) were 
rapidly demolished.
As the economy gains ground over health care and as more market elements become 
visible in the health care insurance sector, the infl uence of European regulations is increas-
ing.10 Guidelines for free movement of goods and services, for European procurement pro-
cedures and the introduction of a European insurance card are examples of this infl uence. 
Monopolisation and the cordoning off of the market by health-insurance funds in Belgium, 
or legally organised cartel formation in other countries, clashes directly with this liberalisation 
trend. In an economically integrated Europe, can the disturbance of competitive conditions 
by national differences in insurance premiums be tolerated? Suggestions made by German 
employers to improve their competitive position by replacing the income-related premiums 
combined with employers’ contributions, introduced in 1883, with having the insured persons 
themselves pay the full nominal premiums were thrown in the rubbish bin. Should hefty 
governmental contributions, which force down insurance premiums, be regarded as indirect 
government support to business? When basic insurance for curative care was introduced in 
the Netherlands in 2006, the state contribution to the Health Care Insurance Fund was not 
construed by the European Commission as support to business, but this is no guarantee that 
this will not happen when reforms take place in other member states.
There are indications that national borders are also a thing of the past for healthcare insurance 
and the health-insurance funds. Anti-cartel legislation could be declared applicable to insurers 
who implement different kinds of social insurance. The rulings by the European Court of 
Justice concerning medical help, which began to be issued in 1997, made it easier for insured 
persons to obtain extra- and intra-mural care in the other member states as well as artifi cial 
devices and appliances. The request made in May 2007 by the European Parliament to the 
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European Commission for a new legal framework for cross-border health care was intended 
to make care more accessible and to offer more options to citizens of the member states. 
The next step will probably be to streamline health care insurance and health-insurance 
funds within the greater socio-economic Europe. Predicting that this will be a long and 
tedious process is to state the obvious. For the time being, the unifi cation of the national 
systems into one European structure seems impossible. The European mix of subsidiarity, 
supranational legislation and regulation and pronouncements from the European court do 
not seem to have had any structural impact on the way changes in the healthcare and secu-
rity systems have been implemented in the short and medium term in the Netherlands and 
Germany since 2004.
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany each follows its own way when it comes to 
modernising health care and social health insurance. In Belgium, the old mutual system is 
being kept in place by means of incremental alterations. In the Netherlands, the political 
establishment and the parties involved in insuring health care have decided to replace the 
Rhineland model with the Anglo-Saxon model, with an outspoken preference for directing 
the healthcare system by means of regulated market forces and competition among health-
care insurers, care providers and the legally regulated power of the consumer. The hand of 
the market, under fully regulated government oversight, is responsible for regulating the 
price, quality and accessibility of health care. In Germany, on the other hand, the Rhineland 
model’s corporatist direction by the government is being strengthened by means of state-
enforced solidarity and by shifting the borders of power and competence between insurers, 
care providers, government and consumers.
In the past, the national experience of creating compulsory healthcare insurance in the 
Netherlands and Belgium has exposed some sensitive spots: sharp ideological contrasts, 
enormous fi nancial interests, historically rooted differences and intransigent institutions. The 
problems involved in accepting a European constitution in 2007 and 2008 in France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Poland clearly shows that a united Europe is not something that 
can be taken for granted, not even socially. If attempts are going to be made to unify social 
systems in twenty-fi rst-century Europe, any historically known problems will be magnifi ed 
many times over. Indeed, this comparison of just three countries that share the same cultural, 
economic and political backgrounds has already revealed deeply-rooted differences. The 
political struggle involved in arriving at a single social health insurance for all the member 
states will become a political and social debate that could drag on for years, perhaps forever, 
in view of the differences in national systems.
Let us conclude with a personal refl ection regarding the prospects of this diffi cult European 
decision. In the introduction, the question was asked whether Europe would end up creating 
havoc like a bull in a china shop. This study shows that this has already happened repeatedly 
in the national context. In Germany, and even more so in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
compulsory healthcare insurance was pushed through at a critical moment without any real 
democratic participation. Bismarck tackled the fi ght against socialism by forcing his solution 
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on the civil parties in an atmosphere of crisis. While Bismarck still respected parliament (in 
his way), this was not at all the case in the Netherlands in 1941. The German occupying au-
thority offered no choice and compulsory insurance was simply a fait accompli. In Belgium 
a new system of social security was designed by a few socially prominent fi gures without 
any parliamentary involvement, and after the war it was pushed through with very little 
involvement. The reforms in the Dutch system after 2005 were realised after interminable 
social and political debate, in which consensus was reached by means of political manoeuvres 
and by repeating the same arguments for more than sixty years.11 Which path will Europe 
choose in the future: the way of gradual change by means of democratic consultation, or 
the brutal Big Bang?
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